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PRELIMINARY NOTE 
In 1959 the Economic Commission for Latin America 
published a volume under the title of The Latin American 
Common Market1 which brought together various 
reports and studies on this subject, to which the secre-
tariat has devoted considerable effort and much research. 
It therefore seemed appropriate to keep the Latin 
American Governments and people informed of the pro-
gress made by the common market project which in 
the last few months has led to the signature of important 
agreements in Central America as well as in other parts 
of the region. The present volume is designed to meet 
this need; it is the first of two volumes which together 
will make up the complete publication. 
In the present volume, the General Treaty on Central 
American Economic Integration and the Montevideo 
Treaty — the latter preceded for purposes of informa-
tion by the reports of the Working Group on the Latin 
American Regional Market — form the nucleus of a 
number of texts in which the movement towards multi-
lateral economic collaboration in Latin America has 
gradually taken definite shape. The first two parts of 
the volume are devoted to Central American economic 
integration and to the Latin American Free Trade 
Association. The third part consists of various docu-
1 United Nations publication, Sales No.: 59.II.G.4, July 1959. 
ments and studies on payments and credit, on customs 
policy, nomenclature and procedures, and lastly, on 
trade policy in the Greater-Colombia countries. 
In presenting this first volume, the aim of the secre-
tariat is simply to provide — conveniently arranged 
according to their subject-matter — a collection of 
official instruments, reports by the various organizations 
concerned and texts, which have either not been circu-
lated as widely as they should have been — this is true 
of many of them — or were scattered among a number 
of publications. Hence, the document does not pretend 
to be more than a compilation, but it should be extremely 
useful as a source of information and a reference work 
for study and research. 
In the second volume, which will be issued in 1962, 
the secretariat will present what is admittedly lacking 
in the first — that is, an analysis and interpretation of 
the facts contained in the texts assembled here. Many 
of these are indicative in themselves of the progress 
already made towards a Latin American common market, 
but it is essential to evaluate and assess the results 
obtained and determine the best paths to follow in 
future. The secretariat has already embarked upon this 




A. CENTRAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 

I. GENERAL TREATY ON CENTRAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
(Managua, 13 December 1960) 
The Governments of the Republics of Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, 
For the purpose of reaffirming their intention to unify 
the economies of the four countries and jointly to 
promote the development of Central America in order 
to improve the living conditions of their peoples, 
Mindful of the need to expedite the integration of their 
economies, consolidate the results so far achieved and 
lay down the principles on which it should be based 
in the future, 
Having regard to the commitments entered into in the 
following instruments of economic integration: 
Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and Central American 
Economic Integration; 
Central American Agreement on the Equalization of 
Import Duties and Charges and its Protocol on the 
Central American Preferential Tariff; 
Bilateral treaties on free trade and economic integration 
signed between Central American Governments; 
Treaty on Economic Association signed between Guatemala, 
El Salvador and Honduras, 
Have agreed to conclude the present Treaty and for 
that purpose have appointed as their respective pleni-
potentiaries: 
H.E. The President of the Republic of Guatemala: 
Mr. Julio Prado Garcia Salas, Minister for Co-ordinat-
ing Central American Integration, and Mr. Alberto 
Fuentes Möhr, Head of the Economic Integration 
Bureau 
The H. Junta de Gobierno of the Republic of El Salva-
dor: Mr. Gabriel Pilona Araujo, Minister for Economic 
Affairs, and Mr. Abelardo Torres, Under-Secretary 
for Economic Affairs 
H.E. The President of the Republic of Honduras: Mr. 
Jorge Bueso Arias, Minister for Economic and Finan-
cial Affairs 
H.E. The President of the Republic of Nicaragua: Mr. 
Juan José Lugo Marenco, Minister for Economic 
Affairs 
who, having exchanged their respective full powers, 
found to be in good and due form, have agreed as 
follows: 
CHAPTER I 
CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 
Article I 
The Contracting States agree to establish among 
themselves a common market which shall be brought 
into full operation within a period of not more than 
five years from the date on which the present Treaty 
enters into force. They further agree to create a customs 
union in respect of their territories. 
Article II 
For the purposes of the previous article the Con-
tracting Parties undertake to bring a Central American 
free-trade area into full operation within a period of 
five years and to adopt a standard Central American 
tariff as provided for in the Central American Agree-
ment on the Equalization of Import Duties and Charges. 
CHAPTER I I 
TRADE REGIME 
Article III 
The Signatory States shall grant each other free-trade 
treatment in respect of all products originating in their 
respective territories, save only for the limitations 
contained in the special régimes referred to in Annex A 
of the present Treaty. 
Consequently, the natural products of the Contract-
ing States and the products manufactured therein shall 
be exempt from import and export duties including 
consular fees, and all other taxes, dues and charges 
levied on imports and exports or charged in respect 
thereof, whether they be of a national, municipal or 
any other nature. 
The exemptions provided for in this article shall not 
include charges or fees for lighterage, wharfage, ware-
housing or handling of goods, or any other charges 
which may legally be incurred for port, storage or trans-
port services; nor shall they include exchange differentials 
resulting from the existence of two or more rates of 
exchange or from other exchange arrangements in any 
of the Contracting States. 
Goods originating in the territory of any of the 
Signatory States shall be accorded national treatment 
in all of them and shall be exempt from all quantitative 
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or other restrictions or measures, except for such mea-
sures as may be legally applicable in the territories of 
the Contracting States for reasons of health, security or 
police control. 
Article IV 
The Contracting Parties establish special interim 
régimes in respect of specific products exempting them 
from the immediate free-trade treatment referred to 
in article III hereof. These products shall be automati-
cally incorporated into the free-trade régime not later 
than the end of the fifth year in which the present Treaty 
is in force, except as specifically provided in Annex A. 
The products to which special régimes apply are listed 
in Annex A and trade in them shall be carried on in 
conformity with the measures and conditions therein 
specified. These measures and conditions shall not be 
amended except by multilateral negotiation in the Execu-
tive Council. Annex A is an integral part of this Treaty. 
The Signatory States agree that the Protocol on the 
Central American Preferential Tariff, appended to the 
Central American Agreement on the Equalization of 
Import Duties and Charges, shall not apply to trade in 
the products referred to in the present article for which 
special régimes are provided. 
Article V 
Goods enjoying the advantages stipulated in this 
Treaty shall be designated as such on a customs form, 
signed by the exporter and containing a declaration of 
origin. This form shall be produced for checking by the 
customs officers of the countries of origin and destina-
tion, in conformity with Annex B of this Treaty. 
If there is doubt as to the origin of an article and the 
matter has not been settled by bilateral negotiation, 
any of the Parties affected may request the intervention 
of the Executive Council to verify the origin of the article 
concerned. The Council shall not consider goods as 
originating in one of the Contracting States if they 
originate or are manufactured in a third country and are 
only simply assembled, wrapped, packed, cut or diluted 
in the exporting country. 
In the cases mentioned in the previous paragraph, 
importation of the goods concerned shall not be pro-
hibited provided that a guaranty is given to the importing 
country in respect of payment of the import duties and 
other charges to which the goods may be liable. The 
guaranty shall be either forfeited or refunded, as the 
case may be, when the matter is finally settled. 
The Executive Council shall lay down regulations 
governing the procedure to be followed in determining 
the origin of goods. 
Article VI 
If the goods traded are liable to internal taxes, charges 
or duties of any kind levied on production, sale, distri-
bution or consumption in any of the signatory countries, 
the country concerned may levy an equivalent amount 
on similar goods imported from the other Contracting 
State, in which case it must also levy at least an equiva-
lent amount for the same respective purposes on similar 
imports from third countries. 
The Contracting Parties agree that the following 
conditions shall apply to the establishment of internal 
taxes on consumption: 
(a) Such taxes may be established in the amount 
deemed necessary when there is domestic production of 
the article in question, or when the article is not produced 
in any of the Signatory States; 
(b) When the article is not produced in one Signatory 
State but is produced in any of the others, the former 
State may not establish taxes on consumption of the 
article concerned unless the Executive Council so autho-
rizes; 
(c) If a Contracting Party has established a domestic 
tax on consumption, and production of the article so 
taxed is subsequently begun in any of the other Signatory 
States, but the article is not produced in the State that 
established the tax, the Executive Council shall, if the 
State concerned so requests, deal with the case and decide 
whether the tax is compatible with free trade. The 
States undertake to abolish these taxes on consumption, 
in accordance with their legal procedures, on receipt of 
notification to this effect from the Executive Council. 
Article VII 
No Signatory State shall establish or maintain regula-
tions on the distribution or retailing of goods originating 
in another Signatory State when such regulations place, 
or tend to place, the said goods in an unfavourable 
position in relation to similar goods of domestic origin 
or imported from any other country. 
Article VIII 
Items which, by virtue of the domestic legislation of 
the Contracting Parties, constitute State monopolies on 
the date of entry into force of the present Treaty, shall 
remain subject to the relevant legislation of each country 
and, if applicable, to the provisions of Annex A of the 
present Treaty. 
Should new monopolies be created or the régime of 
existing monopolies be changed, the Parties shall enter 
into consultations for the purpose of placing Central 
American trade in the items concerned under a special 
régime. 
CHAPTER I I I 
EXPORT SUBSIDIES AND UNFAIR TRADE 
PRACTICES 
Article IX 
The Governments of the Signatory States shall not 
grant customs exemptions or reductions in respect of 
imports from outside Central America of articles ade-
quately produced in the Contracting States. 
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If a Signatory State deems itself to be affected by the 
granting of customs import franchises or by govern-
mental imports not intended for the use of the Govern-
ment itself or of its agencies, it may submit the matter 
to the Executive Council for its consideration and ruling. 
Article X 
The Central Banks of the Signatory States shall 
co-operate closely in order to prevent any currency 
speculation that might affect the rates of exchange and 
to maintain the convertibility of the currencies of the 
respective countries on a basis which, in normal condi-
tions, shall guarantee the freedom, uniformity and stabi-
lity of exchange. 
Any Signatory State which establishes quantitative 
restrictions on international monetary transfers shall 
adopt whatever measures are necessary to ensure that 
such restrictions do not discriminate against the other 
States. 
Should serious balance-of-payments difficulties arise 
which affect, or are apt to affect, monetary relations in 
respect of payments between the Signatory States, the 
Executive Council, acting of its own accord or at the 
request of one of the Parties, shall immediately study the 
problem in co-operation with the Central Banks for 
the purpose of recommending to the Signatory States 
a satisfactory solution compatible with the maintenance 
of the multilateral free-trade régime. 
Article XI 
No Signatory State shall grant any direct or indirect 
subsidy favouring the export of goods intended for the 
territory of the other States, or establish or maintain 
any system resulting in the sale of such goods for export 
to any other Contracting State at a price lower than 
that established for the sale of similar goods on the 
domestic market, due allowance being made for differ-
ences in the conditions and terms of sale and taxation 
and for any other factors affecting price comparability. 
Any measure involving the fixing of, or discrimina-
tion in, prices in a Signatory State which is reflected in 
the establishment of sales prices for specific goods in 
the other Contracting States at levels lower than those 
that would result from the normal operation of the 
market in the exporting country shall be deemed to 
constitute an indirect export subsidy. 
If the importation of goods processed in a Contracting 
State with raw materials purchased under conditions of 
monopoly at artificially low prices should threaten 
existing production in another Signatory State, the Party 
which considers itself affected shall submit the matter 
to the consideration of the Executive Council for a 
ruling as to whether an unfair business practice is in 
fact involved. The Executive Council shall, within five 
days of the receipt of the request, either give its ruling 
or authorize a temporary suspension of free trade, while 
permitting trade to be carried on subject to the award 
of a guaranty in the amount of the customs duties. This 
suspension shall be effective for thirty days, within 
which period the Executive Council shall announce its 
final decision. If no ruling is forthcoming within the 
five days stipulated, the Party concerned may demand a 
guaranty pending the Executive Council's final decision. 
However, tax exemptions of a general nature granted 
by a Signatory State with a view to encouraging produc-
tion shall not be deemed to constitute export subsidies. 
Similarly, any exemption from internal taxes levied 
in the exporting State on the production, sale or con-
sumption of goods exported to the territory of another 
State shall not be deemed to constitute an export subsidy. 
The differentials resulting from the sale of foreign 
currency on the free market at a rate of exchange higher 
than the official rate shall not normally be deemed to be 
an export subsidy; if one, of the Contracting States is 
in doubt, however, the matter shall be submitted to 
the Executive Council for its consideration and opinion. 
Article XII 
As a means of precluding a practice which would be 
inconsistent with the purposes of this Treaty, each 
Signatory State shall employ all the legal means at its 
disposal to prevent the export of goods from its terri-
tory to the territories of the other States at a price lower 
than their normal value, if such export would prejudice 
or be liable to prejudice the production of the other 
States or retard the establishment of a national or 
Central American industry. 
Goods shall be deemed to be exported at a price lower 
than their normal value if their export price is less 
than: 
(a) The comparable price in normal trade conditions 
of similar goods destined for domestic consumption in 
the exporting country; or 
(b) The highest comparable price of similar goods 
for export to a third country in normal trade conditions; 
or 
(c) The cost of production of the goods in the country 
of origin, plus a reasonable amount for sales expenses 
and profit. 
Due allowance shall be made in every case for existing 
differences in conditions and terms of sale and taxation 
and for any other factors affecting price comparability. 
Article XIII 
If a Contracting Party deems that unfair trade prac-
tices not covered in article XI exist, it cannot impede 
trade by a unilateral decision but must bring the matter 
before the Executive Council so that the latter can 
decide whether in fact such practices are being resorted 
to. The Council shall announce its decision within not 
more than 60 days from the date on which it received 
the relevant communication. 
If any Party deems that there is evidence of unfair 
trade, it shall request the Executive Council to authorize 
it to demand a guaranty in the amount of the import 
duties. 
Should the Executive Council fail to give a ruling 
within eight days, the Party concerned may demand 
such guaranty pending the Executive Council's final 
decision. 
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Article XIV 
Once the Executive Council has given its ruling on 
unfair trade practices, it shall inform the Contracting 
Parties whether, in conformity with this Treaty, protec-
tive measures against such practices should be taken. 
CHAPTER I V 
T R A N S I T A N D T R A N S P O R T 
Article XV 
Each of the Contracting States shall ensure full free-
dom of transit through its territory for goods proceeding 
to or from the other Signatory States as well as for the 
vehicles transporting these goods. 
Such transit shall not be subject to any deduction, 
discrimination or quantitative restriction. In the event 
of traffic congestion or other instances of force majeure, 
each Signatory State shall treat the mobilization of 
consignments intended for its own population and those 
in transit to the other States on an equitable basis. 
Transit operations shall be carried out by the routes 
prescribed by law for that purpose and shall be subject 
to the customs and transit laws and regulations appli-
cable in the territory of transit. 
Goods in transit shall be exempt from all duties, 
taxes and other charges of a fiscal, municipal or any 
other character levied on transit, irrespective of their 
destination, but may be liable to the charges usually 
applied for services rendered which shall in no case 
exceed the cost thereof and thus constitute de facto 
import duties or taxes. 
CHAPTER V 
C O N S T R U C T I O N E N T E R P R I S E S 
Article XVI 
The Contracting States shall grant national treatment 
to enterprises of other Signatory States engaged in the 
construction of roads, bridges, dams, irrigation systems, 
electrification, housing and other works intended to 
further the development of the Central American eco-
nomic infrastructure. 
CHAPTER V I 
I N D U S T R I A L I N T E G R A T I O N 
Article XVII 
The Contracting Parties hereby endorse all the pro-
visions of the Agreement on the Régime for Central 
American Integration Industries, and, in order to ensure 
implementation among themselves as soon as possible, 
undertake to sign, within a period of not more than six 
months from the date of entry into force of the present 
Treaty, additional protocols specifying the industrial 
plants initially to be covered by the Agreement, the free-
trade régime applicable to their products and the other 
conditions provided for in article III of the Agreement. 
CHAPTER V I I 
CENTRAL AMERICAN BANK FOR ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION 
Article XVIII 
The Signatory States agree to establish the Central 
American Bank for Economic Integration which shall 
be a juridical person. The Bank shall act as an instru-
ment for the financing and promotion of a regionally 
balanced, integrated economic growth. To that end they 
shall sign the agreement constituting the Bank, which 
shall remain open for the signature or accession of any 
other Central American State which may wish to become 
a member of the Bank. 
It is, however, established that members of the Bank 
may not obtain guaranties or loans from the Bank unless 
they have previously deposited their instruments of 
ratification of the following international agreements: 
The present Treaty; 
Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and Central Ame-
rican Economic Integration, signed on 10 June 1958; 
Agreement on the Régime for Central American Inte-
gration Industries, signed on 10 June 1958; and 
Central American Agreement on the Equalization of 
Import Duties and Charges, signed on 1 September 1959, 




TO INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
Article XIX 
The Contracting States, with a view to establishing 
uniform tax incentives to industrial development, agree 
to ensure as soon as possible a reasonable equalization 
of the relevant laws and regulations in force. To that 
end they shall, within a period of six months from the 
date of entry into force of the present Treaty, sign a 
special protocol specifying the amount and type of 
exemptions, the time limits thereof, the conditions under 
which they shall be granted, the systems of industrial 
classification and the principles and procedures govern-
ing their application. The Executive Council shall be 
responsible for co-ordinating the application of the 
tax incentives to industrial development. 
CHAPTER I X 
ORGANS 
Article XX 
The Central American Economic Council, composed 
of the Ministers of Economic Affairs of the several 
Contracting Parties, is hereby established for the purpose 
of integrating the Central American economies and 
co-ordinating the economic policy of the Contracting 
States. 
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The Central American Economic Council shall meet 
as often as required or at the request of any of the 
Contracting Parties. It shall examine the work of the 
Executive Council and adopt such resolutions as it 
may deem appropriate. The Central American Econo-
mic Council shall be the organ responsible for facilitating 
implementation of the resolutions on economic integra-
tion adopted by the Central American Economic Co-
operation Committee. It may seek the advice of Central 
American and international technical organs. 
Article XXI 
For the purpose of applying and administering the 
present Treaty and of undertaking all the negotiations 
and work designed to give practical effect to the Central 
American economic union, an Executive Council, con-
sisting of one titular official and one alternate appointed 
by each Contracting Party, is hereby established. 
The Executive Council shall meet as often as required, 
at the request of one of the Contracting Parties or 
when convened by the Permanent Secretariat, and its 
resolutions shall be adopted by majority vote. In the 
event of disagreement, recourse will be had to the 
Central American Economic Council in order that the 
latter may give a final ruling. 
Before ruling on a matter, the Executive Council 
shall determine unanimously whether the matter is to 
be decided by a concurrent vote of all its members or 
by a simple majority. 
Article XXII 
The Executive Council shall take such measures as 
it may deem necessary to ensure fulfilment of the com-
mitments entered into under this Treaty and to settle 
problems arising from the implementation of its pro-
visions. It may likewise propose to the Governments the 
signing of such additional multilateral agreements as 
may be required in order to achieve the purpose of 
Central American economic integration, including a 
customs union in respect of their territories. 
The Executive Council shall assume, on behalf of the 
Contracting Parties, the functions assigned to the Central 
American Trade Commission in the Multilateral Treaty 
on Free Trade and Central American Economic Integra-
tion and the Central American Agreement on the Equali-
zation of Import Duties and Charges, as well as those 
assigned to the Central American Industrial Integration 
Commission in the Agreement on the Régime for Cen-
tral American Integration Industries, as well as the 
powers and duties of the joint commissions set up 
under bilateral treaties in force between the Contracting 
Parties. 
Article XXIII 
A Permanent Secretariat is hereby instituted, as a 
juridical person, and shall act as such both for the 
Central American Economic Council and the Executive 
Council established under this Treaty. 
The Secretariat shall have its seat and headquarters 
in Guatemala City, capital of the Republic of Guate-
mala, and shall be headed by a Secretary-General 
appointed for a period of three years by the Central 
American Economic Council. The Secretariat shall 
establish such departments and sections as may be 
necessary for the performance of its functions. Its 
expenses shall be governed by a general budget adopted 
annually by the Central American Economic Council 
and each Contracting Party shall contribute annually 
to its support an amount equivalent to not less than 
fifty thousand United States dollars (US$50,000), payable 
in the respective currencies of the Signatory States. 
Members of the Secretariat shall enjoy diplomatic 
immunity. Other diplomatic privileges shall be granted 
only to the Secretariat and to the Secretary-General. 
Article XXIV 
The Secretariat shall ensure that this Treaty, the 
Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and Central American 
Economic Integration, the Agreement on the Régime 
for Central American Integration Industries, the Central 
American Agreement on the Equalization of Import 
Duties and Charges, bilateral or multilateral treaties on 
free trade and economic integration in force between 
any of the Contracting Parties, and all other agreements 
relating to Central American economic integration 
already signed or that may be signed hereafter, the 
interpretation of which has not been specifically entrusted 
to another organ, are properly executed among the 
Contracting Parties. 
The Secretariat shall ensure implementation of the 
resolutions adopted by the Central American Economic 
Council and the Executive Council established under 
this Treaty and shall also perform such functions as 
are assigned to it by the Executive Council. Its regula-
tions shall be approved by the Economic Council. 
The Secretariat shall also undertake such work and 
studies as may be assigned to it by the Executive Council 
and the Central American Economic Council. In per-
forming these duties, it shall avail itself of the studies 
and work carried out by other Central American and 
international organs and shall, where appropriate, 




The Signatory States agree not to sign unilaterally 
with non-Central American countries any new treaties 
that may affect the principles of Central American 
economic integration. They further agree to maintain 
the " Central American exception clause " in any trade 
agreements they may conclude on the basis of most-
favoured-nation treatment with any countries other 
than the Contracting States. 
Article XXVI 
The Signatory States agree to settle amicably, in the 
spirit of this Treaty, and through the Executive Council 
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or the Central American Economic Council, as the case 
may be, any differences which may arise regarding the 
interpretation or application of any of its provisions. 
If agreement cannot be reached, they shall submit the 
matter to arbitration. For the purpose of constituting 
the arbitration tribunal, each Contracting Party shall 
propose to the General Secretariat of the Organization 
of Central American States the names of three magis-
trates from its Supreme Court of Justice. From the 
complete list of candidates, the Secretary-General of 
the Organization of Central American States and the 
Government representatives in the Organization shall 
select, by drawing lots, one arbitrator for each Contract-
ing Party, no two of whom may be nationals of the 
same State. The award of the arbitration tribunal shall 
require the concurring votes of not less than three mem-
bers, and shall have the effect of res judicata for all the 
Contracting Parties so far as it contains any ruling 
concerning the interpretation or application of the pro-
visions of this Treaty. 
Article XXVII 
The present Treaty shall, with respect to the Contract-
ing Parties, take precedence over the Multilateral Treaty 
on Free Trade and Central American Economic Inte-
gration and any other bilateral or multilateral free-
trade instruments signed between the Contracting Par-
ties; it shall not, however, affect the validity of those 
agreements. 
The provisions of the trade and economic integration 
agreements referred to in the previous paragraph shall 
be applied between the respective Contracting Parties 
in so far as they are not covered in the present Treaty. 
Pending ratification of the present Treaty by any of 
the Contracting Parties, or in the event of its denuncia-
tion by any of them, the trade relations of the Party 
concerned with the other Signatory States shall be 
governed by the commitments entered into previously 
under the existing instruments referred to in the preamble 
of the present Treaty. 
Article XXVIII 
The Contracting Parties agree to hold consultations 
in the Executive Council prior to signing any new treaties 
among themselves which may affect free trade. 
The Executive Council shall examine each case and 
determine the effects that the conclusion of such agree-
ments might produce on the free-trade régime established 
in the present Treaty. On the basis of the Executive 
Council's examination, the Party which considers itself 
affected by the conclusion of these new treaties may 
adopt whatever measures the Council may recommend 
in order to protect its interests. 
Article XXIX 
For the purposes of customs regulations relating to 
free trade, the transit of goods and the application of the 
Central American Standard Import Tariff, the Contracting 
Parties shall, within a period of one year from the date 
of entry into force of the present Treaty, sign special 
protocols providing for the adoption of a Central Ameri-
can Standard Customs Code and the necessary trans-
port regulations. 
CHAPTER X I 
FINAL PROVISIONS 
Article XXX 
This Treaty shall be submitted for ratification in each 
State in conformity with its respective constitutional 
or legislative procedures. 
The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with 
the General Secretariat of the Organization of Central 
American States. 
The Treaty shall enter into force, in the case of the 
first three States to ratify it, eight days following the 
date of deposit of the third instrument of ratification 
and, in the case of the States which ratify it subsequently, 
on the date of deposit of the relevant instrument. 
Article XXXI 
This Treaty shall remain effective for a period of 
twenty years from the date of its entry into force and 
shall be renewable indefinitely. 
Upon expiry of the twenty-year period mentioned in 
the previous paragraph, the Treaty may be denounced 
by any of the Contracting Parties. Denunciation shall 
take effect, for the denouncing State, five years after 
notification, and the Treaty shall remain in force among 
the other Contracting States so long as at least two of 
them remain parties thereto. 
Article XXXII 
The General Secretariat of the Organization of Central 
American States shall act as depositary of this Treaty 
and shall send a certified copy thereof to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of each of the Contracting States 
and shall also notify them immediately of the deposit 
of each instrument of ratification as well as of any 
denunciation which may be made. When the Treaty 
enters into force, it shall also transmit a certified copy 
thereof to the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
for the purposes of registration as set forth in Article 102 
of the United Nations Charter. 
Article XXXIII 
The present Treaty shall remain open for the accession 
of any Central American State not originally a party 
thereto. 
Provisional article 
As soon as the Government of the Republic of Costa 
Rica formally accedes to the provisions of this Treaty, 
the organs hereby established shall form part of the 
Organization of Central American States (OCAS) by 
an incorporation agreement; and the OCAS shall be 
reorganized in such a way that the organs established 
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by this Treaty retain all their structural and functional 
attributes. 
I N WITNESS WHEREOF the respective plenipotentiaries 
have signed the present Treaty in the City of Managua, 
capital of the Republic of Nicaragua, this thirteenth 
day of the month of December nineteen hundred and 
sixty. 
For the Government of Guatemala: 
Julio Prado Garcia Salas 
Minister for Co-ordinating Central 
American Integration 
Alberto Fuentes Mohr 
Head of the Economic Integration Bureau 
For the Government of El Salvador: 
Gabriel Pilona Araujo 
Minister of Economic Affairs 
Abelardo Torres 
Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs 
For the Government of Honduras: 
Jorge Bueso Arias 
Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs 
For the Government of Nicaragua: 
Juan José Lugo Marenco 
Minister of Economic Affairs 
H. CENTRAL AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON THE EQUALIZATION 
OF IMPORT DUTIES AND CHARGES 
(San José, Costa Rica, 1 September 1959) 
The Governments of the Republics of Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, 
Bearing in mind the commitments contracted under the 
terms of the Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and 
Central American Economic Integration, signed at 
Tegucigalpa on 10 June 1958, and being convinced 
that, if the Central American free-trade area is to 
be established in its final form within ten years, pur-
suant to the provisions of the said Treaty, their re-
spective customs tariffs must be equalized, 
Have decided to conclude the present Agreement, and 
for that purpose have appointed as their respective 
plenipotentiaries: 
H.E. The President of the Republic of Guatemala: 
Eduardo Rodriguez Genis, Minister of Economy; 
H.E. The President of the Republic of El Salvador: 
Alfonso Rochac, Minister of Economy; 
H.E. The President of the Republic of Honduras: Jorge 
Bueso Arias, Minister of Economy and Finance; 
H.E. The President of the Republic of Nicaragua: 
Enrique Delgado, Minister of Economy; 
H.E. The President of the Republic of Costa Rica: 
Alfredo Hernández Volio, Minister of Economy and 
Finance; 
who having exchanged their full powers, found to be 
in good and due form, have agreed as follows: 
CHAPTER I 
SYSTEM OF EQUALIZATION OF IMPORT DUTIES 
AND CHARGES 
Article I 
The Contracting States agree to establish a common 
tariff policy and decide to set up a Central American 
import tariff consistent with the integration and economic 
development requirements of Central America. To this 
end, they agree to equalize import duties and charges 
within not more that five years from the date on which 
the present Agreement enters into force. 
The Signatory States shall maintain the Standard 
Central American Tariff Nomenclature as the basis of 
the customs tariff for imports. 
Article II 
For the purposes of article I hereof and of article IV 
of the Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and Central 
American Economic Integration, the Contracting States 
agree to adopt forthwith the tariffs and tariff denomina-
tions specified in Schedule A. They likewise agree to 
establish an interim system of exemptions, with a view to 
progressive equalization, in respect of the items included 
on Schedule B. The two schedules form an integral part 
of the present Agreement. 
Article III 
The Contracting Parties, besides aiming at tariff equali-
zation in conformity with article IV of the Multilateral 
Treaty on Free Trade and Central American Economic 
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Integration and with a view to expediting the establish-
ment of the Central American import tariff, pledge 
themselves, with respect to additions to Schedules A 
and B, to observe, by preference, the following order 
of priorities: 
(a) Commodities in respect of which the immediate 
or progressive liberalization of trade is provided for 
under the terms of bilateral free-trade treaties concluded 
between the Contracting Parties to this Agreement; 
(b) Goods manufactured in Central America; 
(c) Imported goods for which goods produced in 
Central America may be substituted over the short term; 
(d) Raw materials, intermediate products and con-
tainers, priority being given to those required for the 
production and sale of the items included in the fore-
going sub-paragraphs; and 
(e) Other goods. 
Article IV 
Once tariff equalization has been achieved in respect 
of the items comprised in the groups of products referred 
to in the foregoing article, the Contracting States pledge 
themselves to apply to these same items multilateral free-
trade treatment within not more than five years, without 
exceeding the ten-year time limit stipulated in article I 
of the Multilateral Treaty for the establishment of the 
free-trade area in its final form. 
Article V 
The Parties engage not to impose or levy any tax 
other than those provided for in this Agreement on 
imports of goods included in Schedules A and B. The 
bases for valuation adopted are the c.i.f. import value 
in the case of the ad valorem part, and, for the specific 
component, the standard physical units set forth in 
Schedules A and B. 
If any of the Signatory States is not in a position to 
abolish consular fees immediately in respect of the goods 
included in Schedules A and B, it shall be entitled to 
maintain the fees as such, discounting the value they 
represent from the ad valorem part of the duty and/or 
charge agreed upon. The term " duty and/or charge 
agreed upon " shall be understood to mean the duty 
and/or charge immediately applicable by all Parties to 
the goods included in Schedule A; that which all Parties 
pledge themselves to reach by the end of the interim 
period, in the case of goods included in Schedule B; 
and the tariffs established by any of the Parties with a 
view to progressive equalization in respect of the goods 
included in Schedule B and to attainment of the stipu-
lated standard duty by the end of the interim period. 
In the case of items which are equalized at levels below 
the consular fees — either immediately (Schedule A) 
or by the end of the interim period (Schedule B) — the 
Signatory States shall not charge consular fees. 
Article VI 
The Contracting States agree to the establishment 
of fixed equivalences, solely for equalization purposes, 
between the currency units in which each country's 
tariff duties are expressed and a common currency unit 
equivalent to the United States dollar. These equivalences, 
which are those existing at the date of signature of the 
present Agreement, are established as follows : Guatemala, 
1 quetzal; El Salvador, a currency unit equivalent to 
the United States dollar; Honduras, 2 lempiras; Nica-
ragua, a currency unit equivalent to the United States 
dollar; and Costa Rica, 5.67 or 6.65 colons, according 
to the exchange provisions applicable to the item in 
question. If a country makes any change in the equiva-
lence of its currency unit vis-à-vis the United States 
dollar in respect of goods included in Schedules A and 
B, it shall be under the obligation to alter its tariffs 
immediately in the proportion necessary to maintain 
equalization. 
Article VII 
In order to make the equalization of import duties 
and charges effective, the Contracting Parties shall 
renegotiate any multilateral or bilateral pacts that remain 
in force with non-signatories of the present Agreement 
whereby tariffs lower than those established herein are 
consolidated, and shall release themselves from the conso-
lidation commitment assumed within not more than 
one year from the date of deposit of the corresponding 
instrument of ratification of this agreement. Likewise, 
the Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from signing 
new agreements or tariff concessions with other countries 
which are contrary to the spirit and objectives of the 
present Agreement and, in particular, to the provisions 
of this article. 
Article VIII 
Wheresoever the duty agreed upon for a specific 
product is higher than the tariff in force in one or more 
of the Contracting Parties, the countries concerned shall 
apply, in all inter-Central American trade not covered 
by the free-trade régime, the lower tariff in force, unless 
the Central American Trade Commission decides other-
wise. 
The preferential tariffs which the Parties pledge them-
selves to establish are set forth in Schedule A and in 
Annex 6 of Schedule B (this annex forms an integral part 
of the Schedule in question). 
" Tariff in force " shall be understood to mean the 
sum of the tariff duties, consular fees and other duties, 
charges and surcharges levied on imports of the goods 
listed in Schedules A and B at the time the present 
Agreement is signed. Legal rates and charges for ser-
vices rendered are not included. 
As this Agreement is specifically Central American in 
character and constitutes one of the bases for the cus-
toms union of the Contracting Parties, the Signatory 
States agree to maintain the " Central American exemp-
tion clause " with respect to third countries, to the 
extent that the application of the preferential tariff 
system established by the present article is concerned. 
Article IX 
The Schedules appended to this Agreement shall be 
expanded, by agreement among the Contracting States, 
through the signing of successive protocols and in accor-
dance with respective constitutional procedures. 
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CHAPTER I I 
CENTRAL AMERICAN TRADE COMMISSION 
Article X 
The Signatory States agree to set up a Central Ame-
rican Trade Commission, made up of representatives of 
each of the Contracting Parties, which shall meet as 
often as its work requires or when any of the Contracting 
States so requests. 
The Commission (or any of its members) shall be 
entitled to travel freely in the territory of the Contracting 
Parties in order that matters within its purview may be 
studied on the spot, and the authorities of the Signatory 
States shall provide such information and facilities as 
it/they may need for the discharge of its/their functions. 
The Commission shall have a permanent Secretariat, 
which shall be responsible to the Secretariat of the 
Organization of Central American States. 
The Commission shall adopt its own rules of proce-
dure unanimously. 
Article XI 
The following shall be the terms of reference of the 
Central American Trade Commission: 
(a) To recommend to the Contracting Parties mea-
sures conducive to the establishment of the Central 
American customs tariff referred to in this Agreement; 
(b) To study, at the request of one or more Govern-
ments, topics or matters relating to the development 
of tariff equalization and in particular to the implemen-
tation of the present Agreement and to propose the 
measures that should be adopted in order to solve such 
problems as may arise; 
(c) To study production and trade activities in the 
signatory States and recommend additions to Schedules 
A and B; 
(id) To act as the agency responsible for co-ordinating 
tariff equalization, taking into special consideration the 
progress made in this field by virtue of bilateral treaties 
signed between Central American countries, with a 
view to submitting early proposals for standard duties 
and charges and endeavouring to promote their adop-
tion by all the Contracting Parties. In this connexion, 
the Parties undertake to notify the Commission of bila-
teral tariff equalization agreements as soon as these are 
negotiated; 
(e) To study the various aspects of the maintenance 
of uniformity in the application of the Standard Central 
American Tariff Nomenclature and to recommend to 
the Contracting Parties such amendments as may seem 
advisable in the fight of experience and from the stand-
point of increased diversification of production in Cen-
tral America; 
{J) To take steps calculated to establish and maintain 
uniformity in customs regulations. 
In the discharge of its functions, the Commission shall 
utilize the studies carried out by other Central American 
and international bodies. 
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CHAPTER I I I 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article XII 
The Contracting Parties agree to renegotiate at the 
request of any one of their number, and through the 
Central American Trade Commission, the standard 
duties and charges agreed upon and the standardized 
tariff classification. The renegotiation shall affect only 
those goods in respect of which it is applied for. 
Decisions in this connexion shall be adopted by the 
unanimous vote of the States for which the Agreement 
is in force. In any event, every change shall be introduced 
at uniform levels. 
Article XIII 
The Signatory States agree that differences arising in 
connexion with the interpretation or application of any 
of the provisions of this Agreement shall be settled 
amicably, in accordance wiih the spirit of the Agreement, 
through the Central American Trade Commission. 
In the event of failure to reach agreement, controversies 
shall be decided by arbitration. To form the tribunal 
of arbiters, each of the Contracting Parties shall submit 
to the Secretariat of the Organization of Central Ameri-
can States the names of three magistrates from its re-
spective Supreme Court of Justice. From the complete 
list of candidates, the Secretary-General of the Orga-
nization of Central American States and Government 
representatives to this Organization shall choose by 
lot five arbiters to form the tribunal, each of whom must 
be of a different nationality. The ruling of the tribunal 
of arbiters shall be awarded on the affirmative vote of 
at least three of the members present, and shall have 
the effect of res judicata for all the Contracting Parties 
in respect of any point settled in connexion with the 
interpretation or application of the provisions of this 
Agreement. 
CHAPTER I V 
INTERIM SYSTEM 
Article XIV 
To facilitate the equalization of import duties and 
charges in the case of products with respect to which, for 
economic, fiscal or other motives, it is impossible to 
establish a standard tariff to be applied immediately by 
all Parties, the Contracting States establish an interim 
system of progressive equalization. 
The Contracting States agree to adopt progressively, 
for the goods included in Schedule B, the standard duties 
given in column 1 of the said Schedule, each Party 
conforming to the time limit (column II), to the initial 
tariffs (column III) and to the tariff denomination estab-
lished therein. 
The first change in the initial tariffs shall be introduced 
twelve months after the date on which the present Agree-
ment enters into force, and succeeding modifications 
shall be affected for periods of 12 months exactly, until 
the duty agreed upon is reached. 
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In annexes 1 to 5 of Schedule B, the tariffs applicable 
by the Contracting Parties during each year of the inte-
rim period are set forth. These annexes form an integral 
part of Schedule B. 
When progressive equalization is being put into effect, 
the annual decrease or increase in tariffs which must be 
introduced by each Contracting Party shall not be less 
than the quotient resulting from division of the total 
amount of the decrease or increase to be effected by the 
number of years in the interim period. This commit-
ment shall be binding on the Contracting States except in 
so far as, during the interim period, they may have 
introduced annual changes exceeding those agreed 
upon. 
This interim system does not preclude the immediate 
adoption of the standard duty by a group of countries 
smaller than the total number of the Contracting Parties, 
or release the remaining country or countries from the 
commitment to attain the said standard duty by means 
of progressive equalization. 
When the interim period ends for each of the goods or 
articles included in Schedule B, these shall be automa-




This Agreement shall be submitted by each State for 
ratification in conformity with its pertinent constitu-
tional and legal procedure and shall enter into force, 
for the first three countries to deposit the instrument 
of ratification, on the date of deposit of the third such 
instrument, and, for countries acceding thereafter, on 
the date of deposit of their respective instruments of 
ratification. Its duration shall be twenty years from the 
date of its entry into force, and it shall be tacitly renewed 
for successive ten-year periods. 
The Contracting States agree that the tariff equaliza-
tion of goods included in Schedule B shall be completed 
by the end of the interim period which shall begin upon 
the entry into force of the Agreement. Consequently, 
they agree to effect progressive tariff equalization within 
the time limit established at the end of the interim 
period, without changing the year-by-year tariffs estab-
lished in the relevant annex of Schedule B, each State 
taking as a base the level which it would have reached 
if it had deposited its instrument of ratification upon 
the entry into force of the Agreement. 
The present Agreement may be denounced by any of 
the Signatory States at least two years before the date 
of expiry of the initial period or of the succeeding periods 
during which it is in force. Denunciation shall become 
effective for the denouncing State at the date on which 
the corresponding period of validity of the Agreement 
ends, and the Agreement shall remain in force for the 
other Parties so long as at least two of them continue 
to uphold it. 
Article XVI 
The present Agreement shall be deposited with the 
Secretariat of the Organization of Central American 
States, which shall send certified copies to the Chancelle-
ries of each of the Contracting States and shall also 
notify them of the deposit of the pertinent instruments 
of ratification, as well as of any denunciation which may 
take place within the time limits established in that 
connexion. Upon the entry into force of the Agreement, 
it shall also transmit a certified copy to the Secretariat 
of the United Nations for registration in conformity with 
Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. 
Provisional article 
With respect to the implementation of article X of 
this Agreement, the Contracting Parties agree that pre-
ferential duties shall not be applicable to the items or 
sub-items of the Standard Central American Tariff 
Nomenclature which are included both in annex A of 
the Multilateral Treaty and in Schedules A and B of 
the present Agreement. 
Provisional article 
The Signatory States agree that representatives of the 
Parties for which the Agreement has not entered into 
force shall be entitled to attend meetings of the Central 
American Trade Commission as observers with the right 
to speak but not to vote. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective plenipotentiaries 
sign the present Agreement at the city of San José, 
capital of the Republic of Costa Rica, this first day 
of September one thousand nine hundred and fifty-
nine. 
For the Government of Guatemala: 
Eduardo Rodríguez Genis 
Minister of Economy 
For the Government of El Salvador: 
Alfonso Rochac 
Minister of Economy 
For the Government of Honduras: 
Jorge Bueso Arias 
Minister of Economy and Finance 
For the Government of Nicaragua: 
Enrique Delgado 
Minister of Economy 
For the Government of Costa Rica: 
Alfredo Hernández Volio 
Minister of Economy and Finance 
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m . PROTOCOLS TO THE CENTRAL AMERICAN AGREEMENT 
ON EQUALIZATION OF IMPORT DUTIES AND CHARGES 
1. Central American Preferential Tariff 
(San José, Costa Rica, 1 September 1959) 
The Governments of the Republics of Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, 
Whereas the Contracting States have signed the Central 
American Agreement on the Equalization of Import 
Duties and Charges, the purpose whereof is to pro-
mote free trade in Central America, 
Being convinced that the establishment of a Central 
American preferential tariff will be conducive to the 
expansion of their reciprocal trade and will further 
the creation of new productive activities, 
Have decided to conclude the present Protocol, and 
for that purpose have appointed as their respective 
plenipotentiaries: 
H.E. The President of the Republic of Guatemala: 
Eduardo Rodríguez Genis, Minister of Economy; 
H.E. The President of the Republic of El Salvador: 
Alfonso Rochac, Minister of Economy; 
H.E. The President of the Republic of Honduras: Jorge 
Bueso Arias, Minister of Economy and Finance; 
H.E. The President of the Republic of Nicaragua: 
Enrique Delgado, Minister of Economy; 
H.E. The President of the Republic of Costa Rica: 
Alfredo Hernández Volio, Minister of Economy and 
Finance; 
who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good 
and due form, have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
The Contracting States agree to grant one another, 
as from the date on which this Protocol enters into force, 
a preferential tariff of 20 per cent on imports of the 
natural products of their territories and goods manufac-
tured therein. The reduction shall be applicable to the 
sum total of import duties and charges including tariff 
duties, consular fees and other surcharges and taxes. 
Article II 
The Signatory States agree to maintain the " Central 
American exemption clause " with respect to the appli-
cation of the preferential tariff established in the preced-
ing article. 
Article III 
This Protocol shall be subject to ratification by each 
State, in conformity with its pertinent constitutional and 
legal regulations, and shall enter into force for the 
first three countries to deposit the instrument of ratifica-
tion on the date of deposit of the third such instrument, 
and for countries subsequently acceding on the date 
of deposit of their respective instruments of ratification. 
Its duration shall be twenty years from the date of its 
entry into force, and it shall be tacitly renewed for 
successive ten-year periods. 
The present Protocol may be denounced by any of 
the Signatory States at least two years before the date of 
expiry of the initial period or of the succeeding periods 
during which it is in force. Denunciation shall become 
effective for the denouncing State at the date on which 
the corresponding period of validity of the Agreement 
ends, and the Agreement shall remain in force for the 
other Parties so long as at least two of them continue 
to uphold it. 
Article IV 
Ratification of this Protocol is independent of the 
ratification of the Central American Agreement on the 
Equalization of Import Duties and Charges signed on 
the same date by the Contracting Parties, and denuncia-
tion of this instrument is likewise independent of denun-
ciation of the aforesaid Agreement. 
Article V 
The Secretariat of the Organization of Central Ame-
rican States shall be the depositary of the present Pro-
tocol, of which it shall send certified copies to the Chan-
celleries of each of the Contracting States, notifying 
them likewise of the deposit of the pertinent instruments 
of ratification, as well as of any denunciation which 
may take place within time limits established in that 
connexion. Upon the entry into force of the Protocol, 
it shall also transmit a certified copy to the United 
Nations Secretariat for registration purposes^ in confor-
mity with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective plenipotentiaries 
sign the present Agreement at the city of San José, 
capital of the Republic of Costa Rica, this first day of 
September one thousand nine hundred and fifty-nine. 
For the Government of Guatemala: 
Eduardo Rodriguez Genis 
Minister of Economy 
For the Government of El Salvador : 
Alfonso Rochac 
Minister of Economy 
For the Government of Honduras: 
Jorge Bueso Arias 
Minister of Economy and Finance 
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For the Government of Nicaragua: 
Enrique Delgado 
Minister of Economy 
For the Government of Costa Rica: 
Alfredo Hernández Volio 
Minister of Economy and Finance 
2. Amplification of Schedules 
(Managua, 13 December 1960) 
The Governments of the Republics of Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, 
By virtue of commitments contracted under article I of 
the Central American Agreement on the Equalization 
of Import Duties and Charges, signed at San José, 
Costa Rica, on 1 September 1959, and under articles II 
and IV of the General Treaty on Central American 
Economic Integration, signed at Managua, Nicaragua, 
on this same date, 
Convinced that the liberalization of trade and the equa-
lization of customs tariffs should proceed simulta-
neously, in order that conditions favourable to the 
expansion and diversification of production in Central 
America may be created as promptly as possible and 
that artificial differences in production costs as among 
the Signatory States may be eliminated, 
Have decided to sign the Present Protocol, and for that 
purpose have appointed as their respective plenipo-
tentiaries : 
H.E. The President of the Republic of Guatemala: 
Julio Prado García Salas, Minister for Co-ordinating 
Central American Integration, and Alberto Fuentes 
Mohr, Head of the Economic Integration Bureau; 
The H. Junta de Gobierno of the Republic of El Sal-
vador: Gabriel Pilona Araujo, Minister of Economic 
Affairs, and Abelardo Torres, Under-Secretary for 
Economic Affairs; 
H.E. The President of the Republic of Honduras: Jorge 
Bueso Arias, Minister of Economic and Financial 
Affairs; 
H.E. The President of the Republic of Nicaragua: 
Juan José Lugo Marenco, Minister of Economic Affairs; 
who, having exchanged their full powers, found to be 
in good and due form, have agreed as follows : 
Article I 
The Contracting States agree, in accordance with 
article IX of the Central American Agreement on the 
Equalization of Import Duties and Charges, to amplify 
Schedules A and B of the said Agreement by means of 
the present Protocol. 
Article II 
The Contracting Parties agree to adopt forthwith the 
tariffs and tariff descriptions specified in Schedule A of 
the present Protocol 
Article III 
In compliance with the interim régime of progressive 
tariff equalization, established by virtue of article XIV 
of the Central American Agreement on the Equalization 
of Import Duties and Charges, the Contracting Parties 
agree to adopt, for the goods included in Schedule B 
of the present Protocol, the standard duties specified in 
column I of the said Schedule, each Party conforming 
to the time limit (column II), to the initial tariffs (column 
III) and to the tariff descriptions established therein. 
In annexes 1 to 4 of Schedule B, the tariffs applicable 
by the Contracting Parties during each year of the 
interim period are set forth. These annexes form an 
integral part of Schedule B. 
Article IV 
Among such Contracting Parties as shall have agreed 
upon the liberalization of their reciprocal trade as a 
general interim régime, besides granting one another 
specific preferential treatment in exceptional cases, the 
provisions in the first and second paragraphs of 
article VIII of the Central American Agreement on the 
Equalization of Import Duties and Charges relating to 
preferential tariffs shall be null and void. 
Article V 
This Protocol shall be submitted to each State for rati-
fication in conformity with its pertinent constitutional 
or legal procedures. 
The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with 
the General Secretariat of the Organization of Central 
American States. The Protocol shall enter into force, for 
the first three countries to deposit the instrument of 
ratification, eight days after the date of deposit of the 
third such instrument and, for countries acceding there-
after, on the date of deposit of their respective instruments 
of ratification. 
Article VI 
The General Secretariat of the Organization of Central 
American States shall be the depositary of the present 
Protocol and shall send certified copies thereof to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of each of the Contracting 
States, notifying it likewise of the deposit of each of 
the pertinent instruments of ratification. Upon the 
entry into force of the Protocol, it shall also transmit 
a certified copy thereof to the United Nations Secre-
tariat, for registration purposes, in conformity with 
Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. 
Article VII 
The duration of the present Protocol shall be contin-
gent upon that of the Central American Agreement on 
the Equalization of Import Duties and Charges. 
Article VIII 
The present Protocol shall be open to accession by 
any Central American State which is a Party to the 
Central American Agreement on the Equalization of 
Import Duties and Charges. 
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Provisional article 
The Contracting Parties agree to sign, not later than 
six months from the date of entry into force of the 
present instrument, such additional protocols as may 
be needed for the equalization of import duties and 
charges on the goods listed in the Central American 
Agreement on the Equalization of Import Duties and 
Charges, article III, paragraphs (a), {b), (c) and (d). 
Provisional article 
The Contracting Parties agree that the tariffs established 
by virtue of the present Protocol and in the Central 
American Agreement on the Equalization of Import 
Duties and Charges shall not necessarily be applicable 
to goods imported from the Republic of Costa Rica. 
Provisional article 
The Contracting Parties agree that the tariffs and other 
provisions set forth in the present Protocol and in the 
Central American Agreement on the Equalization of 
Import Duties and Charges are not applicable to natural 
products imported from the territory of Belize to which 
Guatemala grants special treatment. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective plenipotentiaries 
sign the present Protocol in the city of Managua, capital 
of the Republic of Nicaragua, this thirteenth day of 
the month of December nineteen hundred and sixty. 
For the Government of Guatemala: 
Julio Prado Garcia Salas 
Minister for Co-ordinating 
Central American Integration 
Alberto Fuentes Mohr 
Head of the Economic Integration Bureau 
For the Government of El Salvador: 
Gabriel Pilona Araujo 
Minister of Economic Affairs 
Abelardo Torres 
Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs 
For the Government of Honduras: 
Jorge Bueso Arias 
Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs 
For the Government of Nicaragua: 
Juan José Lugo Marenco 
Minister of Economic Affairs 
IV. MULTILATERAL TREATY ON FREE TRADE AND CENTRAL AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
(Tegucigalpa, 10 June 1958) 
The Governments of the Republic of Guatemala, 
El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, 
desirous of intensifying and strengthening their com-
mon bonds of origin and brotherhood, and with 
a view to effecting the progressive integration of their 
economies, ensuring the development of their markets, 
promoting the production and exchange of goods and 
services and raising the standards of living and employ-
ment of their respective populations, thereby contributing 
to the re-establishment of the economic unity of Central 
America, have agreed to conclude the present Multilateral 
Treaty on Free Trade and Central American Economic 
Integration, which shall be progressively implemented, 
and for that purpose have appointed as their respective 
plenipotentiaries : 
H.E. The President of the Republic of Guatemala: 
José Guirola Leal, Minister of Economic Affairs; 
H.E. The President of the Republic of El Salvador: 
Alfonso Rochac, Minister of Economic Affairs; 
H.E. The President of the Council of Ministers, exercis-
ing the powers of the Executive of the Republic of 
Honduras: Fernando Villar, Minister of Economic 
Affairs and Finance; 
H.E. The President of the Republic of Nicaragua: 
Enrique Delgado, Minister of Economic Affairs; 
H.E. The President of the Republic of Costa Rica: 
Wilburg Jiménez Castro, Vice-Minister of Economic 
Affairs and Finance; 
who, having exchanged their respective full powers, 




With a view to creating a customs union between their 
respective territories as soon as conditions are favourable, 
the Contracting States hereby agree to establish a free-
trade régime, which they shall endeavour to perfect 
within a period of ten years from the date on which 
the present Treaty enters into force. To that end, they 
resolve to abolish as between their territories the customs 
duties, charges and conditions hereinafter mentioned, 
in respect of the commodities specified in the appended 
schedule constituting annex A to this Treaty. 
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Consequently, the natural products of the Contracting 
States and the articles manufactured in their territories, 
provided that they are included in the aforesaid schedule, 
shall be exempt from import and export duties as well 
as taxes, dues and charges levied on imports or exports 
or on the occasion of importation or exportation, whether 
they be of a national, municipal or any other nature 
and whatever their purpose. 
The exemptions stipulated in this article shall not 
include charges for lighterage, wharfage, warehousing or 
handling of goods or any other charges which may legi-
timately be levied for port, warehouse or transport 
services; nor shall they include exchange differentials 
resulting from the existence of two or more rates of ex-
change or from other exchange regulations in any of 
the Contracting States. 
When a commodity or article included in the annexed 
schedule is subject to internal taxes, charges or duties 
of any kind levied on production, sale, distribution or 
consumption in any of the Contracting States, the State 
concerned may levy an equivalent amount on similar 
goods imported from another Contracting State. 
Article II 
Goods originating in the territory of any of the Con-
tracting States and included in the schedule appended 
to this Treaty shall be accorded in all the Contracting 
States the same treatment as domestic goods and shall 
be exempt from any quota or other restrictions except 
for such measures as may be legally applicable in the 
territories of the Contracting States for reasons of public 
health, security or police control. 
Article III 
Goods originating in any of the Contracting States 
and which are not included in the annexed schedule shall 
be accorded unconditional and unlimited most-favoured-
nation treatment in the territory of the other Contracting 
States. 
The above treatment shall not, however, be extended 
to concessions granted pursuant to other free trade 
treaties concluded between Central American States. 
Article IV 
The Contracting States, convinced of the necessity of 
equalizing their customs tariff's and firmly determined 
to establish a customs union between their territories, 
undertake, subject to the opinion of the Central American 
Trade Commission referred to hereinbelow, to equalize 
the duties and other charges imposed by them individually 
on imports of goods listed in the schedule appended 
hereto, or which may be subsequently included therein, 
and on their principal raw materials and the necessary 
containers. 
For the purposes indicated in the preceding paragraph, 
the Commission shall prepare and submit to the Con-
tracting Governments, within a period not exceeding one 
year, the appropriate draft contractual agreement or 
agreements for the equalization of import duties. 
Article V 
The Governments of the Contracting States shall 
endeavour to refrain from obtaining or granting customs 
exemptions on imports from outside Central America 
of articles produced in any of the Contracting States 
and listed in the schedule appended hereto. 
The Contracting States shall further endeavour to 
equalize the advantages granted by them to industries 
producing any of the articles listed in the schedule, to 
the extent that such advantages might, in the opinion 
of the Central American Trade Commission, entail 
unfair competition in the said goods. 
Article VI 
Subject to the opinion of the Central American Trade 
Commission, the schedule appended to this Treaty may 
be extended by mutual agreement between the Contract-
ing States, by means of additional protocols and in 
accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. 
Article VII 
In order that they may enjoy the advantages stipulated 
in this Treaty, the goods listed in the schedule appended 
hereto shall be entered on a customs form, signed by 
the exporter and containing a declaration of origin. That 
form shall be produced for inspection to the customs 
officers of the countries of origin and destination, in 
conformity with annex B of this Treaty. 
Article VIII 
The Central Banks of the Contracting States shall 
co-operate closely with a view to preventing any currency 
speculation that might affect the rates of exchange and 
maintaining the convertibility of the currencies of the 
respective countries on a basis which, in normal condi-
tions, shall guarantee the freedom, uniformity and 
stability of exchange. 
Any of the Contracting States which establishes quota 
restrictions on international currency transfers shall 
adopt the measures necessary to ensure that such re-
strictions do not discriminate against the other States. 
In case of serious balance of payments difficulties 
which affect or are apt to affect the monetary and pay-
ments relations between the Contracting States, the 
Central American Trade Commission, acting of its own 
motion or at the request of one of the Governments, 
shall immediately study the problem for the purpose 
of recommending to the Contracting Governments a 
satisfactory solution compatible with the multilateral 
free trade régime. 
CHAPTER I I 
D I S C R I M I N A T O R Y P R A C T I C E S 
Article IX 
Subject to the provisions of the bilateral Central 
American treaties in force and to any provisions that 
may be agreed upon in future treaties between Central 
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American States, the Contracting States agree to the 
following provisions with a view to ensuring a broad 
application of the principle of non-discrimination in 
their trading relations: 
(a) Any goods not included in the schedule appended 
to this Treaty and subject to quota restrictions imposed 
by a Contracting State shall, upon importation from 
the territory of another Contracting State or upon 
exportation to such a territory, be accorded treatment 
no less favourable than that accorded to similar goods 
of any other origin or destination; 
(b) No Contracting State shall establish or maintain 
any internal duty, tax or other charge on any goods, 
whether or not included in the appended schedule, 
originating in the territory of another Contracting State, 
nor shall it enact or impose any regulations regarding 
the distribution or retailing of such goods, when such 
charge or regulations place or tend to place the said 
goods in an unfavourable position by comparison with 
similar goods of domestic origin or imported from any 
other country; 
(c) Should a Contracting State establish or maintain 
a place of business or an agency or grant special privi-
leges to a specific establishment to attend exclusively 
or principally, permanently or occasionally, to the pro-
duction, exportation, importation, sale or distribution of 
any goods, such State shall grant to the traders of the 
other Contracting States equitable treatment with respect 
to purchases or sales which the said place of business, 
agency or establishment effects abroad. The institution 
concerned shall act in accordance with private business 
practice and shall afford the traders of the other countries 
reasonable opportunity to compete for participation in 
such purchases or sales. 
CHAPTER I I I 
INTERNATIONAL TRANSIT 
Article X 
Each of the Contracting States shall ensure full freedom 
of transit through its territory for goods proceeding to 
or from another Contracting State. 
Such transit shall not be subject to any deduction, 
discrimination or quota restriction. In the event of any 
traffic congestion or any form of force majeure, each 
Contracting State shall handle consignments intended 
for its own population and those in transit to the other 
States on an equitable basis. 
Transit operations shall be carried out by the routes 
prescribed by law for that purpose and subject to the 
customs and transit laws and regulations applicable in 
the territory of transit. 
Goods in transit shall be exempt from all duties, 
taxes and other fiscal charges of a municipal or other 
character imposed for any purpose whatsoever, except 
charges generally applicable for services rendered or for 
reasons of security, public health or police control. 
CHAPTER I V 
EXPORT SUBSIDIES AND UNFAIR BUSINESS 
PRACTICES 
Article XI 
No Contracting State shall grant any direct or indirect 
subsidy towards the export of any goods intended for 
the territory of the other States, or establish or maintain 
any system resulting in the sale of such goods for export 
to any other Contracting State at a price lower than the 
comparable price charged for similar goods on the 
domestic market, due allowance being made for differ-
ences in the conditions of sale or in taxation and for 
any other factors affecting price comparability. 
Any measure which involves fixing of prices or price 
discrimination in a Contracting State shall be deemed 
to constitute an indirect export subsidy if it involves the 
establishment of a sales price for specific goods in the 
other Contracting States which is lower than that 
resulting from normal competition in the market of the 
exporting country. 
However, tax exemptions or refunds of a general 
nature granted by a Contracting State with a view to 
encouraging the production in its territory of specified 
goods, shall not be deemed to constitute an export 
subsidy. 
Similarly, any exemption from internal taxes chargeable 
in the exporting State on the production, sales or con-
sumption of goods exported to the territory of another 
State shall not be deemed to constitute an export subsidy. 
Furthermore, the differences resulting from the sale of 
foreign currency on the free market at a rate of exchange 
higher than the official rate shall not normally be deemed 
to be an export subsidy; in case of doubt, however, on 
the part of one of the Contracting States, the matter 
shall be submitted to the Central American Trade Com-
mission for its consideration and opinion. 
Article XII 
As a means of precluding a practice which would be 
inconsistent with the purposes of this Treaty, each 
Contracting State shall employ all the legal means at 
its disposal to prevent the exportation of goods from 
its territory to the territories of other States at a price 
lower than their normal value, if such exportation would 
prejudice or jeopardize the production of the other 
States or retard the establishment of a domestic or a 
Central American industry. 
Goods shall be considered to be exported at a price 
lower than their normal value if their price on export 
is less than: 
{a) the comparable price, in ordinary trading condi-
tions, of similar goods destined for domestic consump-
tion in the exporting country; or 
(b) the highest comparable price of similar goods on 
their export to any third country in ordinary trading 
conditions; or 
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(c) the cost of production of the goods in the country 
of origin, plus a reasonable addition for sales cost and 
profit. 
Due allowance shall be made in each case for differ-
ences in conditions of sale or in taxation and for any 
other factors affecting price comparability. 
Article XIII 
If, notwithstanding the provisions of this chapter, 
an unfair business practice is discovered, the State 
affected shall take steps with the competent authorities 
of the other State to ensure the elimination of that 
practice and, if necessary, may adopt protective measures, 
provided that the matter is then referred to the Central 
American Trade Commission for study and appropriate 
recommendations. 
CHAPTER V 
T R A N S P O R T A N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N S 
Article XIV 
The Contracting States shall endeavour to construct 
and maintain lines of communication to facilitate and 
increase traffic between their territories. 
They shall also endeavour to standardize the transport 
rates between their territories as well as the relevant 
laws and regulations. 
Article XV 
Commercial and private vessels and aircraft of any 
of the Contracting States shall be accorded in ports 
and airports of the other States open to international 
traffic the same treatment as is extended to national 
vessels and aircraft. The same treatment shall be extended 
to passengers, crews and freight of the other Contracting 
States. 
Land vehicles registered in one of the Contracting 
States shall enjoy the same treatment in the territory of 
the other States, for the duration of their temporary 
stay there, as is accorded to vehicles registered in the 
State of visit. 
Motor transport undertakings of any Contracting 
State engaged in providing inter-Central American 
services for passengers and freight shall enjoy in the 
territory of the other States the same treatment as 
domestic undertakings. 
Private vehicles and vehicles which are not used for 
the regular inter-Central American transport of persons 
and goods shall be admitted to the territory of the other 
Contracting States under a temporary duty-free importa-
tion system and shall be subject to the relevant legislative 
provisions. 
Vessels of any Contracting State plying between the 
ports of Central America shall be subject, in the ports 
of the other States, to the same coastal shipping régime 
as domestic vessels. 
The provisions of this article shall not affect the duty 
to comply with the formalities of registration and control 
prescribed in each country in respect of the entry, stay 
or exit of vessels, aircraft or vehicles for reasons of public 
health, security or police control, public policy or fiscal 
necessity. 
Article XVI 
The Contracting States shall endeavour to improve 
the telecommunications systems between their respective 
territories and shall direct their combined efforts towards 
the attainment of that objective. 
CHAPTER V I 
INVESTMENTS 
Article XVII 
Each of the Contracting States, acting within the 
framework of its constitution, shall grant national 
treatment to capital investments made by nationals of 
the other States, and shall recognize the right of such 
persons to organize or manage production, commercial 
or financial undertakings, or to participate therein, on 
the same footing as its own nationals ; each Contracting 
State shall also extend equitable and nondiscriminatory 
treatment to applications for transfers of funds accruing 
from capital investments made by nationals of the other 
States. 
CHAPTER V I I 
CENTRAL AMERICAN TRADE COMMISSION 
Article XVIII 
The Contracting States agree to establish a Central 
American Trade Commission, to which each of the 
Contracting States shall appoint a representative; the 
Commission shall meet as frequently as its work may 
require or at the request of any of the Contracting 
States. 
The Commission or any of its members may travel 
freely in the Contracting States to study matters within 
the Commission's competence in the field, and the 
authorities of the Contracting States shall provide them 
with whatever information and facilities may be necessary 
for the proper discharge of their functions. 
The Commission shall have a permanent secretariat, 
which shall be under the responsibility of the General 
Secretariat of the Organization of Central American 
States. 
The Commission shall adopt its rules of procedure 
unanimously. 
Article XIX 
The functions of the Central American Trade Com-
mission shall be as follows: 
(a) To propose to the Contracting States measures 
conducive to the development and improvement of the 
Central American free-trade zone referred to in this 
Treaty as well as measures designed to attain the objectives 
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of Central American economic integration, and to pre-
pare a specific plan for such purposes including a customs 
union and the establishment of a Central American 
common market; 
(b) At the request of one or several Governments to 
study questions and matters relating to the development 
of inter-Central American trade, in particular those 
connected with the application of this Treaty, and to 
propose measures for the solution of any problem which 
may arise; 
(c) To study production and trade in the Contracting 
States, to recommend additions to the appended schedule 
and to take appropriate measures to ensure: 
(i) The standardization of customs tariffs and 
regulations; 
(ii) The establishment of a single fiscal system for 
articles under State monopoly and for goods 
subject to production, sales and consumption 
taxes; 
(iii) The conclusion of agreements designed to avoid 
double taxation in the matter of direct taxes; 
(iv) The improvement of inter-Central American 
transport through the conclusion of appropriate 
agreements; 
(v) The application of the decimal metric system of 
weights and measures. 
(d) To collect and analyse statistics and other data 
relating to trade between the Contracting States. 
In fulfilling these functions, the Commission shall 
avail itself of the reports and studies made by other 
Central American and international organizations and 
agencies. 
The Central American Trade Commission shall give 
priority attention to the problem of equalizing customs 
tariffs and shall submit to the Economic Council of the 
Organization of Central American States, for considera-
tion at its ordinary sessions, draft contractual agreements 
covering the greatest possible number of products. 
Article XX 
The competent authorities of the Contracting States 
shall collect, classify and publish the statistical data 
relating to import, export and transit operations carried 
out under the terms of this Treaty, in accordance with 
the rules laid down, by mutual agreement, by the Central 
American Trade Commission and the statistical organiza-




With a view to promoting industrial development 
consistent with the purpose of this Treaty, the Contract-
ing States shall adopt, by mutual agreement, measures 
designed to further the establishment or expansion of 
regional industries directed towards a Central American 
common market and of particular interest to the economic 
integration of Central America. 
CHAPTER I X 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article XXII 
The Contracting States shall adopt, as a basis for 
their customs tariffs and statistics, the Uniform Central 
American Customs Nomenclature {Nomenclatura 
Arancelaria Uniforme Centroamericana (NAUCA)) and 
the Uniform Central American Nomenclature for 
Exports. 
Article XXIII 
The nationals of any Contracting State shall enjoy 
in the territory of all other Contracting States national 
treatment in commercial and civil matters, in accordance 
with the internal legislation of each State. 
Article XXIV 
Considering that this Treaty is specifically Central 
American in character and is designed to lay the founda-
tions for a customs union of the Contracting States and 
for the progressive integration of their economies, the 
Contracting States agree that before signing or ratifying 
any multilateral agreements relating to commodities, 
trade or customs concessions, and before acceding to 
any international organization established under those 
agreements or negotiating any arrangements within the 
framework of such an organization, they shall consult 
each other with a view to agreeing, if possible, on a 
common and united policy. 
The Contracting States shall also endeavour to adopt 
a common position at inter-American or world economic 
conferences or meetings. 
The Contracting States agree to maintain the " Central 
American exception clause " in any trade agreements 
they may conclude on the basis of most-favoured-nation 
treatment with any countries other than the Contracting 
States. 
The Contracting States declare that, in concluding 
this Treaty, they are prompted by the desire to establish 
closer mutual links, as States of Central America governed 
by the special principles of a Central American public 
law. To that end, they agree that if any of the trade 
agreements they may conclude with other countries or 
their participation in other international arrangements 
should constitute an obstacle to this Treaty, particularly 
as a result of the provisions embodied in the other 
treaties permitting other countries to claim no less 
favourable treatment, they shall renegotiate or, as the 
case may be, denounce them at the earliest opportunity, 
with a view to avoiding the difficulties or prejudice 
which might ensue for the Contracting States as a result 
of claims of that nature. 
The Contracting States also undertake not to conclude 
any new agreements with other countries which are 
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contrary to the spirit and purposes of this Treaty and, 
in particular, to the provisions of this article. 
Article XXV 
The Contracting States agree to settle amicably, in 
the spirit of this Treaty, and through the Central Ameri-
can Trade Commission, any differences which may arise 
in the interpretation or application of any of its pro-
visions. If agreement cannot be reached, they shall 
submit the matter to arbitration. For the purpose of 
constituting the arbitral tribunal, each Contracting 
State shall propose to the Secretariat of the Organiza-
tion of Central American States the names of three 
judges from its Supreme Court of Justice. From the 
complete list of candidates, the Secretary-General of the 
Organization of Central American States and the Gov-
ernment representatives in the Organization shall select, 
by drawing lots, a tribunal composed of five arbitrators, 
no two of whom may be nationals of the same State. 
The award of the arbitral tribunal shall require the 
concurring votes of not less than three members, and 
shall be binding on all the Contracting States so far 
as it contains any ruling concerning the interpretation 
or application of the provisions of this Treaty. 
Article XXVI 
Any provisions of this Treaty which are broader in 
scope than those contained in other trade treaties between 
Central American countries shall prevail over the latter. 
With a view to promoting the consolidation and 
enlargement of the multilateral free trade régime, the 
Contracting States shall endeavour to extend free trade 




With a view to the gradual application, whenever 
advisable, of the free-trade régime established by virtue 
of the present Treaty, the Contracting States may con-
clude special protocols for the adoption of temporary 
régimes introducing progressive tariff reductions, which 
shall be carried into effect by stages and shall be applicable 
to products not listed in annex A with the ultimate 
purpose of incorporating them in the said annex. 
The Contracting States may also, in like manner, 
establish special temporary régimes for products not 
included in annex A which may be subject to import 
or export quota restrictions. 
In exceptional cases and for specified products, there 
may also be established, by means of additional protocols 
between all of the Contracting States, a free trade régime 
applicable only to certain specified Contracting States 
and providing for progressive reductions in customs 
tariffs with the remaining country or countries, with the 
ultimate aim of securing the incorporation of the pro-
ducts concerned in annex A. 
CHAPTER X I 
FINAL PROVISIONS 
Article XXVIII 
This Treaty shall enter into force, in the case of the 
first three States to ratify it, on the date of deposit of 
the third instrument of ratification; and in the case of 
the States which ratify it subsequently, on the date of 
deposit of the relevant instruments of ratification. 
This Treaty shall remain valid for a period of ten 
years from the initial date of its entry into force; it shall 
be tacitly renewable for successive periods of ten years. 
Any Contracting State may denounce this Treaty by 
giving notice to that effect not later than six months 
before the date on which the initial or any subsequent 
period of validity expires. Denunciation shall take effect, 
for the denouncing State, as from the date of expiry 
of the relevant period of validity of the Treaty. The 
Treaty shall remain in force as between the other Con-
tracting States so long as at least two States continue 
to be parties thereto. 
This Treaty shall be submitted for ratification in each 
Contracting State in conformity with their respective 
constitutional or legislative procedures. 
The General Secretariat of the Organization of Central 
American States shall act as depository of this Treaty 
and shall send a certified copy thereof to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of each of the Contracting States. It 
shall also notify the Contracting States of the deposit 
of the relevant instruments of ratification as well as of 
any denunciation which may occur within the prescribed 
time-limit. When the Treaty comes into force, it shall 
also transmit a certified copy thereof to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, for registration in con-
formity with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective plenipotentiaries 
have signed this Treaty. 
DONE at the City of Tegucigalpa, D.C., Honduras, 
this 10th day of June 1958. 
For the Government of Guatemala: 
1. With reservation to article XXV of this Treaty, 
in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3, sub-
paragraph (b), of article 149 of the Constitution of the 
Republic. 
2. With the reservations made by Guatemala to the 
schedule of articles covered by the free trade agreement 
(annex A), as indicated in the notes to the said schedule. 
José Guirola Leal 
Minister of Economic Affairs 
For the Government of El Salvador: 
With the reservations made by El Salvador to the 
schedule of articles covered by the free trade agreement 
(annex A), as indicated in the notes to the said schedule. 
Alfonso Rochac 
Minister of Economic Affairs 
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For the Government of Honduras: 
With the reservations made by Honduras to the 
schedule of articles covered by the free trade agreement 
(annex A), as indicated in the notes to the said schedule. 
Fernando Villar 
Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance 
For the Government of Nicaragua: 
With the reservations made by Nicaragua to the 
schedule of articles covered by the free trade agreement 
(annex A), as indicated in the notes to the said 
schedule. 
Enrique Delgado 
Minister of Economic Affairs 
For the Government of Costa Rica: 
With the reservations made by Costa Rica to the 
schedule of articles covered by the free trade agreement 
(annex A), as indicated in the notes to the said schedule. 
Wilburg Jiménez Castro 
Vice-Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance 
V. AGREEMENT ON THE RÉGIME FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN 
INTEGRATION INDUSTRIES 
(Tegucigalpa, 10 June 1958) 
The Governments of the Republic of Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, 
Having regard to the objectives of the Central 
American Economic Integration Programme which was 
undertaken through the Central American Economic 
Co-operation Committee and, in particular, to article XXI 
of the Central American Multilateral Free Trade and 
Integration Treaty, 
Desirous of strengthening the natural and traditional 
bonds of brotherhood which unite their countries, and 
of co-operating towards the solution of their common 
economic problems, 
Having as their basic aim the improvement of the 
living standards of the Central American peoples and 
the rational use, for that purpose, of their natural re-
sources, and being convinced that, within the economic 
development programmes of the Central American 
Isthmus, the integration of their economies offers favour-
able prospects for the expansion of trade between their 
countries and for a more rapid industrialization process 
on the basis of mutual interest, 
Have decided to conclude the present Agreement, 
which prescribes a Régime for Central American Inte-
gration Industries, and for that purpose have appointed 
as their respective plenipotentiaries : 
H.E. the President of the Republic of Guatemala: José 
Guirola Leal, Minister of Economic Affairs; 
H.E. the President of the Republic of El Salvador: 
Alfonso Rochac, Minister of Economic Affairs; 
H.E. the President of the Council of Ministers exercising 
the powers of the Executive of the Republic of Hon-
duras: Fernando Villar, Minister of Economic Affairs 
and Finance; 
H.E. the President of the Republic of Nicaragua: Enri-
que Delgado, Minister of Economic Affairs; and 
H.E. the President of the Republic of Costa Rica: 
Wilburg Jiménez Castro, Vice-Minister of Economic 
Affairs and Finance 
who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good 
and due form, have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
The Contracting States undertake to encourage and 
promote the establishment of new industries and the 
specialization and expansion of existing industries within 
the framework of Central American economic integra-
tion, and agree that the development of the various 
activities which are or may be included in such a pro-
gramme shall be effected on a reciprocal and equitable 
basis in order that each and every Central American 
State may progressively derive economic advantages. 
Article II 
The Contracting States declare their interest in the 
development of industries with access to a common 
Central American market. These shall be designated 
Central American integration industries and shall be 
so declared jointly by the Contracting States, through 
the agency of the Central American Industrial Integra-
tion Commission established in conformity with 
article VIII of this Agreement. 
The Contracting States shall regard as Central Ame-
rican integration industries those industries which, in 
the judgement of the Central American Industrial 
Integration Commission, comprise one or more plants 
which require access to the Central American market 
in order to operate under reasonably economic and 
competitive conditions even at minimum capacity. 
Article III 
The application of the present Régime to the Central 
American integration industries is subject to signature 
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by the Contracting States, in respect of each of the said 
industries, of an additional protocol stipulating: 
(а) The country or countries in which the industrial 
plants covered by this Régime are to be initially situated, 
the minimum capacity of the said plants and the condi-
tions under which additional plants are to be subsequently 
admitted into the same or other countries; 
(б) The quality standards for the products of the 
said industries and any other requirements that may be 
deemed convenient for the protection of the consumer; 
(c) The regulations that may be advisable as regards 
the participation of Central American capital in the 
enterprises owning the plants; 
(id) The common Central American tariffs which shall 
be applied to the products of Central American integra-
tion industries; and 
(e) Any other provisions designed to ensure the 
attainment of the objectives of this Agreement. 
Article IV 
The products of plants which form part of a Central 
American integration industry and which are covered 
by the present Régime, shall enjoy the benefits of free 
trade between the territories of the Contracting States. 
The products of plants which form part of the same 
industry but which are not covered by the Régime, shall 
enjoy in the Contracting States successive annual reduc-
tions of ten per cent in the applicable uniform Central 
American tariff, from the date specified in the relevant 
additional protocol. As from the tenth year, such pro-
ducts shall enjoy the full benefits of free trade. 
Except as provided in the preceding paragraph and 
in any other provisions of this Agreement or of the 
additional protocols, all trade in commodities produced 
by the Central American integration industries shall be 
governed by the provisions of the Central American 
Multilateral Free Trade and Economic Integration 
Treaty. 
Article V 
In Conformity with the provisions of article IV of the 
Central American Multilateral Free Trade and Economic 
Integration Treaty, the Central American Trade Com-
mission shall give priority consideration to the equaliza-
tion of the customs duties and other charges levied upon 
imports of commodities that are similar to or substitutes 
for the commodities produced by the Central American 
integration industries covered by the additional protocols 
to this Agreement, as well as upon imports of raw 
materials and of the containers necessary for their pro-
duction and distribution. 
Article VI 
Since the Contracting States intend to grant to the 
Central American integration industries ample fiscal 
incentives, the enterprises owning industrial plants 
covered by the present Régime shall enjoy, in the terri-
tory of the countries where such plants are or may be 
established, the benefits and exemptions prescribed by 
the national legislation of the country concerned. 
Article VII 
Except in cases of emergency, the Governments of 
the Contracting States shall not grant customs duty 
exemptions or reductions below the Central American 
common tariff on any imports from countries outside 
Central America of goods which are equal or similar 
to or substitutes for goods manufactured in any of the 
Central American countries by plants of industrial 
integration industries, nor shall they apply to such imports 
preferential exchange rates equivalent to such exemp-
tions or reductions. 
The Governments and other State bodies shall also 
give preference in their official imports to the products 
of the Central American integration industries. 
Article VIII 
In order to ensure due application of this Agreement 
and of the additional protocols, the Contracting States 
agree to establish a Central American Industrial Inte-
gration Commission, to which each of the Contracting 
States shall appoint a special representative; the Com-
mission shall meet as frequently as its work may require 
or at the request of any of the Contracting States. 
The Commission or any of its members may travel 
freely in the Contracting States in order to study matters 
within the Commission's competence in the field, and 
the authorities of the Contracting States shall provided 
them with whatever information and facilities may be 
necessary for the proper discharge of their functions. 
The Commission shall have a permanent secretariat 
which shall be under the responsibility of the General 
Secretariat of the Organization of Central American 
States. 
The Commission shall adopt its rules of procedure 
unanimously and shall prescribe the regulations relating 
to the conduct of matters within its competence, in 
particular the regulations relating to the conditions and 
form in which, in each specific case, the views of private 
enterprise shall be heard. 
Article IX 
Individuals or bodies corporate desiring the incorpora-
tion of a given plant into the present Régime shall present 
an application to that effect to the Secretariat of the 
Central American Industrial Integration Commission 
and accompany it with the required information. 
When the Secretariat has sufficient information 
available, it shall advise the Commission of the appli-
cation. If the Commission finds that the project meets 
the aims of this Agreement, the application shall be 
referred for an opinion to the Central American Research 
Institute for Industry or to any other person or body 
that the Commission considers competent. Such opinion 
shall take into account the technological and economic 
aspects of the project and, in particular, the market 
prospects, and the costs incurred shall be borne by the 
interested parties. 
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The Commission shall decide on the project on the 
basis of the said opinion, and if it finds the project 
capable of being realized, shall make whatever recommen-
dations it considers pertinent to the Governments of the 
Contracting States on the conclusion of the protocol 
covering the industry concerned and on the conditions 
to be stipulated. 
When the project refers to a plant which forms part 
of an industry already covered by a protocol, the Com-
mission may, in conformity with the terms of the relevant 
protocol and of this article, declare that the plant shall 
be admitted to the benefits of the present Régime and 
advise to that effect the Governments of the Contracting 
States. 
Article X 
The Central American Industrial Integration Commis-
sion shall submit an annual report on its activities to the 
Contracting States. 
The Commission shall periodically carry out studies 
with a view to enabling the Governments to evaluate 
the results of the application of the present Régime. 
The Commission may propose to the Contracting 
States measures favourable to the development of the 
Central American integration industries and to the effi-
cient functioning of their plants. The Commission may 
also propose to the Governments any measures neces-
sary to resolve any problems arising from the application 
of this Agreement. 
Article XI 
The Contracting States agree to settle amicably, in 
the spirit of this Agreement, any differences which may 
arise in the interpretation or application of any of its 
provisions or of the additional protocols. If agreement 
cannot be reached, they shall submit the matter to 
arbitration. For the purpose of constituting the arbitral 
tribunal, each Contracting State shall propose to the 
General Secretariat of the Organization of Central 
American States the names of three judges from its 
Supreme Court of Justice. From the complete fist of 
candidates, the Secretary-General of the Organization of 
Central American States and the Government repre-
sentatives in the Organization shall select, by drawing 
lots, a tribunal composed of five arbitrators, no two of 
whom may be nationals of the same State. The award 
of the arbitral tribunal shall require the concurring 
votes of not less than three members and shall be binding 
on all the Contracting States so far as it contains any 
ruling concerning the interpretation or application of 
the provisions of this Agreement and of the additional 
protocols. 
Article XII 
This Agreement shall be submitted for ratification in 
each Contracting State in conformity with its respective 
constitutional or legislative procedures. 
This Agreement shall come into force on the date 
of deposit of the last instrument of ratification. It shall 
remain in force for twenty years and shall be tacitly 
renewable for successive periods of ten years. 
Any Contracting State may withdraw from this 
Agreement provided that notice of withdrawal is given 
not later than two years before the date on which the 
initial or any other subsequent period of validity expires. 
If a Contracting State gives notice of withdrawal 
after the prescribed time limit but before a new period 
of validity has commenced, such notification shall be 
valid, but the Agreement shall remain in force for two 
further years after the beginning of the new period. 
In the event of denunciation of this Agreement, the 
same shall remain in force as regards its additional pro-
tocols until the expiry of the latter. 
Should a Contracting State denounce this Agreement, 
the other Contracting States shall determine whether 
the Agreement shall cease to have effect between all 
the Contracting States or whether it shall be maintained 
between such Contracting States as have not denounced 
it. 
The additional protocols to this Agreement shall be 
approved in conformity with the constitutional or legis-
lative procedures of each country. 
Article XIII 
The General Secretariat of the Organization of Central 
American States shall act as depository of this Agreement 
and shall send a certified copy thereof to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of each of the Contracting States. 
It shall also notify the Contracting States of the deposit 
of the relevant instruments of ratification as well as of 
any denunciation which may occur within the prescribed 
time-limit. When the Agreement comes into force, it 
shall also transmit a certified copy thereof to the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations, for registration in 
conformity with Article 102 of the United Nations 
Charter. 
Transitional Article 
In order to promote an equitable distribution of the 
Central American industrial integration plants, the Con-
tracting States shall not award a second plant to any 
one country until all of the five Central American coun-
tries have each been assigned a plant in conformity with 
the protocols specified in article III. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective plenipotentiaries 
have signed this Agreement. 
DONE in the city of Tegucigalpa, D.C., capital of 
the Republic of Honduras, on 10 June 1958. 
For the Government of Guatemala: 
With a reservation regarding article XI of this Treaty, 
in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3, sub-
paragraph (b) of article 149 of the Constitution of the 
Republic. 
José Guirola Leal 
Minister of Economic Affairs 
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For the Government of El Salvador: For the Government of Nicaragua: 
Alfonso Rochac Enrique Delgado 
Minister of Economic Affairs Minister of Economic Affairs 
For the Government of Honduras: For the Government of Costa Rica: 
Fernando Villar Wilburg Jiménez Castro 
Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance Vice-Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance 
VI. AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE CENTRAL AMERICAN BANK 
FOR ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
(Managua, 13 December 1960) 
The Governments of the Republics of Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua agree to create, by 
virtue of the present Agreement, the Central American 
Bank for Economic Integration, in accordance with the 
following provisions: 
CHAPTER I 
NATURE, PURPOSE AND HEADQUARTERS 
Article 1 
The Central American Bank of Economic Integration 
is an international juridical person and shall perform 
its functions in conformity with the present Agreement 
and with its Regulations. 
Article 2 
The purpose of the Bank shall be to promote the 
economic integration and balanced economic develop-
ment of the member countries. In pursuance of this 
objective, its activities shall be primarily designed to 
meet the needs of the following investment sectors: 
(a) Infrastructural projects to complete existing 
regional systems or counterbalance disparities in basic 
sectors which hinder the balanced economic develop-
ment of Central America. Consequently, the Bank shall 
not finance infrastructural projects of purely local or 
national scope which will not contribute to the comple-
tion of the said systems or to the counterbalancing of 
significant disequilibria as between the member countries; 
(b) Projects for long-term investment in industries of 
a regional character or of importance for the Central 
American market, which will help to increase the supply 
of goods available for intra-Central American trade, 
or for such trade and the export sector. The Bank's 
activities shall not include investment in essentially local 
industries; 
(c) Co-ordinated agricultural projects aiming at the 
improvement or expansion of farms or the replacement 
of less economic by more economic farms and conducive 
to Central American regional self-sufficiency; 
(id) Projects for the financing of enterprises that need 
to expand their operations, modernize their processes 
or change the structure of their production in order to 
improve their efficiency and their competitive capacity 
within the common market with a view to facilitating 
free trade among the Central American countries; 
(e) Projects for financing services vital to the operation 
of the common market; 
( / ) Other productive projects calculated to create 
economic complementarity among the member countries 
and to expand intra-Central American trade. 
Article 3 
The Bank shall have its headquarters and head office 
in the city of Tegucigalpa, in the Republic of Honduras, 
and shall be empowered to establish branch offices, 
agencies and correspondents. 
CHAPTER I I 
C A P I T A L , R E S E R V E S A N D R E S O U R C E S 
Article 4 
The Bank's initial authorized capital shall be a sum 
equivalent to sixteen million United States dollars, to 
which each of the States members shall subscribe four 
million dollars, payable in its respective national currency. 
One half of the capital subscribed by each member 
State shall be paid as follows: the equivalent of one 
mihion dollars within sixty days from the date of entry 
into force of the present Agreement, and the equivalent 
of one milhon dollars within fourteen months of the 
said date. 
The rest of the capital subscribed shall be payable as 
and when called in by decision of the Board of Governors, 
with the concurring vote of at least one Governor from 
each member State. 
The Bank shall be empowered to augment its capital 
if all the members of the Board of Governors adopt a 
unanimous decision to that effect. 
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Article 5 
The shares of the member States in the capital of 
the Bank shall be represented by stock certificates issued 
in favour of the States concerned. These certificates 
shall confer upon their holders equal rights and obliga-
tions, shall not yield interest or dividends and shall not 
be taxable or transferable. 
Such net profits as may accrue to the Bank in the 
course of its operations shall be deposited in a capital 
reserve fund. 
The responsibility of the members of the Bank, as 
such, shall be confined to the amount of their capital 
subscription. 
The capital contributed in national currency by each 
of the member States shall enjoy a guarantee of free 
convertibility at the official exchange rate most favourable 
to the Bank. 
Each of the member States engages to maintain the 
value in United States dollars of the capital contribution 
which it has disbursed to the Bank. Should a change 
take place in the external official exchange rate for any 
of the national currencies concerned, the Bank's resources 
in that currency shall be adjusted in the exact proportion 
required to maintain their value in United States dollars. 
Article 6 
In addition to its own capital and reserves, the 
resources of the Bank shall include the product of 
loans and credits obtained in capital markets and any 
other resources received in any legal form. 
CHAPTER I I I 
OPERATIONS 
Article 7 
The capital, capital reserves and other resources of 
the Bank shall be used solely for the fulfilment of the 
purpose set forth in article 2 of the present Agreement. 
To this end, the Bank shall be empowered: 
(a) To study and promote the investment opportu-
nities created by the economic integration of the member 
States, duly programming its activities and establishing 
the necessary financing priorities; 
(b) To make or participate in long and medium-term 
loans; 
(c) To issue bonds of its own, which may or may not 
be guaranteed by means of sureties, pledges or mort-
gages; 
(id) To participate in the issuance and placing of 
credit documents of all kinds, related to the fulfilment 
of its purpose; 
(e) To obtain loans, credits and guarantees from 
Central American, international and foreign financial 
institutions; 
( f ) To act as intermediary in the concerting of loans 
and credits for the Governments, public institutions 
and established enterprises of the member States, to 
which end it shall institute such arrangements for co-
operation with other Central American, international 
and foreign institutions as it may deem expedient in 
that connexion, and shall be empowered to take part 
in the preparation of the specific projects concerned; 
(g) To guarantee the commitments of public institu-
tions or private enterprises up to such amounts and for 
such periods as the Board of Governors may determine; 
(h) To obtain guarantees from the member States for 
the purpose of securing loans and credits from other 
financial institutions; 
(0 To provide, using its own resources or those it 
may obtain for the purpose, executive, administrative 
and technical advisory services for the benefit of appli-
cants for credit; 
(J) To conduct all such additional business as may 
be necessary, under the terms of the present Agreement 
and its Regulations, for the furtherance of its purpose 
and operation. 
Article 8 
The Bank shall finance only economically sound and 
technically feasible projects and shall refrain from mak-
ing loans or assuming any responsibility whatsoever 
for the payment or refinancing of earlier commitments. 
CHAPTER I V 
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 
Article 9 
The Bank shall have a Board of Governors, a Board 
of Directors, a President and such other officials and 
employees as may be deemed necessary. 
Article 10 
All the powers of the Bank shall be vested in the Board 
of Governors. Each member country shall provide two 
Governors, who shall be absolutely independent in the 
exercise of their functions and shall have separate votes; 
one of them shall be the Minister of Economic Affairs 
or his equivalent, and the other shall be the president 
or manager of each country's Central Bank, 6T his 
equivalent. From among the Governors the Board 
shall elect a President, who shall remain in office until 
the next regular meeting of the Board. 
Article 11 
The Board of Governors shall be at liberty to delegate 
all its powers to the Board of Directors, except those 
relating to the following procedures: 
(a) Calling-in of capital contributions; 
(b) Augmentation of the authorized capital; 
(c) Determination of capital reserves on the basis of 
proposals made by the Board of Directors; 
(d) Election of the President and determination of 
his emoluments; 
(e) Determination of the emoluments of the Directors; 
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( / ) Examination of the interpretations placed upon 
the present Agreement by the Board of Directors and 
ruling thereon in case of appeal; 
(g) Authorization of the conclusion of general agree-
ments relating to co-operation with other agencies; 
(h) Appointment of outside auditors to check financial 
statements; 
(/) Adoption and publication, following the auditor's 
report, of the over-all balance-sheet and the statement 
of profits and losses; 
( j ) Adoption of decisons, in the event of the Bank's 
terminating its operations, with respect to the distribu-
tion of its net assets. 
Article 12 
The Board of Governors shall retain full control over 
all the powers which, in accordance with article 11, it 
may delegate to the Board of Directors. 
Article 13 
The Board of Governors shall convene in regular 
session once a year. It shall also be at liberty to meet in 
special session whenever it so determines or whenever 
it is convened by the Board of Directors. The Board 
of Directors shall convene the Board of Governors 
whenever one of the member States so requests. 
Article 14 
At the meetings of the Board of Governors, one half of 
the total number of Governors plus one shall constitute 
a quorum. In all cases except that provided for in 
article 4, decisions shall be made by the concurring 
votes of one half of the total number of Governors plus 
one. 
Article 15 
The Board of Directors shall be responsible for the 
conduct of the operations of the Bank and to this end 
shall be entitled to exercise all the powers delegated to 
it by the Board of Governors. 
Article 16 
There shall be one Director for each State member 
of the Bank, elected by the Board of Governors. The 
Directors shall be appointed for a term of five years 
and shall be eligible for re-election for successive periods. 
They shall be citizens of the member States and persons 
of acknowledged capacity and wide experience in eco-
nomic, financial and banking affairs. 
Article 17 
The Directors shall remain in office until their succes-
sors are appointed or elected. When a Director's post 
falls vacant, the Governors shall proceed to appoint 
a deputy for the remainder of the period. 
In the event of a Director's absence for legitimate 
reasons, the Board of Directors shall be empowered to 
appoint his temporary substitute. 
Article 18 
The Directors shall work full time in the Bank and 
shall, in addition, discharge such functions as the Presi-
dent may assign to them. 
Article 19 
The Board of Directors shall be of a permanent cha-
racter and shall operate at the headquarters of the 
Bank. 
The Board of Directors shall determine the basic 
organization of the Bank, including the number of major 
administrative and professional posts and the general 
responsibilities attaching, shall adopt the budget, and 
shall lay before the Board of Governors proposals for 
the establishment of reserves. 
Article 20 
The Board of Governors shall elect from among the 
Directors the President of the Bank, who shall be its 
legal representative. Similarly, it shall appoint the person 
who, should the President himself be prevented from so 
doing, shall exercise'his authority and his functions. 
The President shall take the chair at the meetings of the 
Board of Directors and shall conduct the ordinary 
business of the Bank. His vote shall carry the same 
weight as that of the other members, except in the event 
of a tie, in which case he shall have two votes. 
Article 21 
There shall be an Executive Vice-President who shall 
be appointed by the Board of Directors on the proposal 
of the President of the Bank. He shall exercise the autho-
rity and discharge the administrative functions deter-
mined by the Board of Directors. 
The Executive Vice-President shall attend the meetings 
of the Board of Directors, but without the right to vote. 
Article 22 
In the discharge of their functions, the President, 
officials and employees of the Bank shall be answerable 
to it alone and shall acknowledge no other authority. 
The member States shall respect the international cha-
racter of this obligation. 
Article 23 
The primary consideration to be borne in mind by 
the Bank in appointing its staff and determining their 
conditions of service shall be the need to ensure the 
highest possible degree of efficiency, competence and 
integrity. Staff shall also be recruited with due regard 
to equitable geographical distribution. 
Article 24 
The Bank, its officials and its employees — with the 
exception of the Governors in their respective countries — 
shall be debarred from taking active part in political 
affairs. 
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CHAPTER V 
INTERPRETATION AND ARBITRATION 
Article 25 
Any difference of opinion as to the interpretation of 
the provisions of the present Agreement which may arise 
between any member and the Bank or among member 
States shall be submitted for a ruling to the Board of 
Directors. 
The member States especially affected by the difference 
in question shall have the right to direct representation 
before the Board of Directors. 
Any member State shall be entitled to demand that 
the solution proposed by the Board of Directors in 
accordance with the first paragraph of this article shall 
be submitted to the Board of Governors, whose decision 
shall be final. Pending the Board's decision, the Bank 
shall be empowered to take such action as it may deem 
necessary on the basis of the decision reached by the 
Board of Directors. 
Article 26 
Should any disagreement arise between the Bank and 
a State which has ceased to be a member, or between the 
Bank and one of its members after it has been agreed 
that the operations of the institution shall be terminated, 
the controversy shall be submitted for arbitration to a 
tribunal composed of three persons. The Bank and the 
State concerned shall each appoint one of the arbiters, 
and shall jointly appoint a third and disinterested party. 
Should agreement not be reached with respect to the 
last mentioned appointment, the third member shall be 
chosen by lot from among the Presidents of the Supreme 
Courts of Justice of the member States, with the excep-
tion of that of the country concerned. 
The third arbiter shall be empowered to decide upon 
all questions of procedure in cases where the parties 
are not in agreement. 
CHAPTER V I 
IMMUNITIES, EXEMPTIONS AND PRIVILEGES 
Article 27 
The Bank, in the discharge of its functions and in 
conformity with its purposes, shall enjoy in the terri-
tory of the member States the immunities, exemptions 
and privileges which are set forth in this chapter or 
which may be otherwise granted to it. 
Article 28 
It shall be possible to institute judicial proceedings 
against the Bank only before a competent tribunal in 
the territory of a member State where the Bank shall 
have established an office, or where it shall have appointed 
an agent or legal representative empowered to accept 
the writ or notice of a judicial complaint, or where it 
shall have issued or guaranteed securities, 
s 
Article 29 
The Bank's property and other assets, wheresoever 
situated and whosoever be the holder thereof, shall 
enjoy immunity from attachment, sequestration, embargo, 
distraint, auction, adjudication or any other form of 
seizure or alienation or forfeiture, so long as no defini-
tive judgement has been pronounced against the Bank. 
The property and other assets of the Bank shall be 
deemed to be international public property and shall 
enjoy immunity in respect of investigation, requisition, 
confiscation, expropriation or any other form of seizure 
or forfeiture by executive or legislative action. 
The Bank's property and other assets shall be exempt 
from restrictions, regulations, controls and moratoria 
of every kind, except as otherwise provided in the present 
Agreement. 
Article 30 
The files and records of the Bank shall be inviolable 
and shall enjoy absolute immunity. 
Article 31 
In territories of the member States the Bank's commu-
nications shall be entitled to the same franchises as are 
granted to official communications. 
Article 32 
The personnel of the Bank, whatever their category, 
shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities: 
(a) Immunity in respect of judicial, administrative 
and legislative proceedings relating to acts performed 
by them in their official capacity, unless the Bank waives 
such immunity; 
(b) In the case of non-nationals of the member State 
concerned, the same immunities and privileges in respect 
of immigration restrictions, registration of aliens and 
military service requirements, and other facilities relating 
to exchange and travel regulations, which the State 
grants to other member States in respect of personnel 
of comparable rank. 
Article 33 
(a) The Bank, its income, property and other assets, 
as well as any operations and transactions which it may 
effect in accordance with the present Agreement, shall 
be exempt from taxes of every kind and from customs 
duties and other charges of a similar nature. The Bank 
shall likewise be exempt from all responsibility in con-
nexion with the payment, withholding or collection 
of any tax, impost or duty; 
(b) The bonds or securities issued or guaranteed by 
the Bank, including dividends or interest thereon, whoso-
ever be their holder, shall not be subject to duties or 
taxes of any kind; 
(c) The salaries and emoluments paid by the Bank 
to its personnel of whatsoever category shall be exempt 
from taxation. 
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CHAPTER V I I 
REQUIREMENTS FOR OBTAINING 
GUARANTEES OR LOANS 
Article 34 
It is hereby established that the members of the Bank 
shall not be entitled to obtain guarantees or loans from 
the said institution unless they have previously deposited 
the instruments of ratification of the following inter-
national agreements: 
General Treaty on Central American Economic Inte-
gration, signed on the same date as the present Agree-
ment; 
Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and Central 
American Economic Integration, signed on 10 June 
1958; 
Agreement on the Régime for Central American 
Integration Industries, signed on 10 June 1958; 
Central American Agreement on the Equalization of 
Import Duties and Charges, signed on 1 September 
1959, and the Protocol signed on the same date as 
the present Agreement. 
CHAPTER V I I I 
A C C E S S I O N O F N E W M E M B E R S 
Article 35 
Central American States not signatories of the present 
Agreement shall be entitled to accede to it at any time. 
CHAPTER I X 
DISSOLUTION AND LIQUIDATION 
Article 36 
The Bank shall be dissolved: 
(a) By unanimous decision of the member States; or 
(b) When only one of the Parties continues to uphold 
the present Agreement. 
In the event of dissolution, the Board of Governors 
shall determine the conditions under which the Bank 
shall terminate its operations, liquidate its obligations 
and distribute among the member States the surplus 
capital and reserves remaining after the discharge of 




The present Agreement shall be of unlimited duration 
and cannot be denounced earlier than twenty years from 
the date of its entry into force. Denunciation shall become 
effective five years after its presentation. The Agreement 
shall remain in force if at least two countries continue 
to uphold it. 
Article 38 
The present Agreement shall enter into force as from 
the date on which the third instrument of ratification 
is deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organiza-
tion of Central American States. For Central American 
countries acceding to it subsequently, it shall enter into 
force from the date of deposit of the pertinent instru-
ment with the said Secretariat. 
Article 39 
In the event of a signatory State's separation from the 
Bank, the State shall continue to be responsible for its 
obligations to the Bank, whether direct or deriving 
from loans, credits or guarantees obtained prior to the 
date on which the State ceases to be a member. However, 
it shall not be responsible in respect of loans, credits 
or guarantees effected subsequently to its withdrawal. 
The rights and obligations of the seceding State shall 
be determined in conformity with the Special Liquidation 
Balance Sheet which shall be drawn up for the purpose 
on the date on which the country's separation becomes 
effective. 
Article 40 
The Bank shall be empowered to make its facilities 
available for the organization and operation of a clearing-
house on behalf of the Central Banks if and when they 
so request. 
Article 41 
The General Secretariat of the Organization of Central 
American States shall be the depository of the present 
Agreement and shall transmit certified copies thereof to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of each of the Contract-
ing States, which it shall immediately notify of the 
deposit of each of the instruments of ratification, as 
well as of any denunciation which may be presented. 
On the entry into force of the Agreement, it shall also 
transmit a certified copy thereof to the United Nations 
Secretariat for registration purposes in conformity with 
Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. 
Article 42 
The Bank constituted by virtue of the present Agree-
ment is the institution referred to in resolutions 84 and 
101 of the Central American Economic Co-operation 
Committee, and, in founding it, Guatemala, El Salvador 
and Honduras are complying with the provisions respect-
ing the establishment of the Development and Assistance 
Fund laid down in the Economic Association Treaty 
and the Protocol concluded by them on 8 June 1960. 
Provisional article 
The amounts advanced by the Governments for the 
initial expenditure arising from the establishment of the 
Bank shall be deemed to constitute part of their capital 
contributions to the Bank. 
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Provisional article 
The first meeting of the Board of Governors of the 
Bank shall be convened by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Honduras at the earliest 
opportunity and not later than sixty days from the date 
of entry into force of the present Agreement. 
In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries sign 
the present Agreement in the city of Managua, capital 
of the Republic of Nicaragua, this thirteenth day of the 
month of December, nineteen hundred and sixty. 
For the Government of the Republic of Guatemala: 
Julio Prado Garcia Salas 
Minister for Co-ordinating Central 
American Integration 
Alberto Fuentes Mohr 
Head of the Economic Integration Bureau 
For the Government of the Republic of El Salvador: 
Gabriel Piloha Araujo 
Minister of Economic Affairs 
Abelardo Torres 
Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs 
For the Government of the Republic of Honduras: 
Jorge Bueso Arias 
Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs 
For the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua: 
Juan José Lugo Marenco 
Minister of Economic Affairs 
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L REPORTS OF THE FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS OF THE WORKING GROUP 
ON THE LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL MARKET 
1. Bases for the formation of the Latin American 
regional market 
Report of the first session of the Working Group 
(Santiago, Chile, 3 to 11 February 1958) 
BACKGROUND DATA 
Pursuant to resolution 116 (VII), adopted by the 
Commission at its seventh session, the secretariat invited 
a group of prominent Latin Americans to take part in 
a discussion on the problems of the regional market in 
Latin America, under the terms of reference specified in 
the said resolution for the Working Group on this topic. 
The Group was composed of the following members: 
Mr. José Garrido Torres, President of the National 
Council of Economy of Brazil 
Mr. Rodrigo Gómez, Director-General of the Banco 
de México, S.A., Mexico 
Mr. Flavián Levine, Professor of the University of 
Chile and Executive Vice-President of the Com-
pañía de Acero del Pacífico (Huachipato) 
Mr. Eustaquio Méndez Delfino, President of the 
Buenos Aires Stock Exchange and former Presi-
dent of the Honorary National Commission of 
Economy and Finance of Argentina 
Mr. Juan Pardo Heeren, former Minister of Finance 
of Peru 
Mr. Galo Plaza, former President of the Republic of 
Ecuador 
Mr. Joaquin Vallejo, former Minister of Development 
of Colombia 
The Group met at the headquarters of the ECLA 
secretariat from 3 to 11 February 1958. Its members 
elected Mr. Galo Plaza Chairman, and Mr. Joaquin 
Vallejo Rapporteur. 
The secretariat of the Group was constituted by the 
following: 
Executive Secretary: Mr. Raúl Prebisch 
Deputy Director: Mr. Louis N. Swenson 
Secretary of the Commission: Mr. Alfonso Santa 
Cruz 
Secretary of the session: Mr. Esteban Ivovich, Chief, 
Inter-Latin American Trade Section 
Consultants: Mr. Fernando Illanes, Consultant on 
Trade Policy 
Mr. Jorge Ahumada, Chief, Economic Development 
Division 
Mr. Carlos Quintana, Chief, Industrial Development 
Division 
Mr. Nuno de Figueiredo, Co-ordinator of Regional 
Market Studies 
Mr. Santiago Macario, Deputy Chief, Inter-Latin 
American Trade Section 
Bearing in mind the substance of the resolutions 
discussed in Annex I, the Group based its discussions 
on the studies and reports transmitted to it by the 
secretariat and the documents submitted to it in the 
course of its deliberations, details of which are given in 
the same annex. 
As a result of its discussions, the Group adopted the 
report which follows, resolving at its final meeting that 
the secretariat should transmit the said report, with the 
suggestions and recommendations contained therein and 
with such comments as the secretariat might deem 
appropriate, to the Governments members of the Com-
mission. The Group likewise agreed that its conclusions 
should be disseminated as widely and as quickly as 
possible. 
INTRODUCTION 
The social need to develop the Latin American coun-
tries makes it a matter of increasing urgency to devise 
effective ways and means of accelerating the rate of 
growth of their real per capita income. It is now fully 
recognized that such ways and means must necessarily 
be based on the technical improvements in agriculture 
and the progressive industrialization of the countries in 
question. Modern technology offers an almost unlimited 
potential for the attainment of these ends, as is testified 
by the experiments of paramount historical importance 
which are being carried out before our eyes. Will Latin 
America be able to take full advantage of this potential ? 
A formidable obstacle stands in the way. Industrializa-
tion calls for an extensive market without which the 
countries of the region will be unable to achieve the 
high level of productivity characteristic of the great 
industrial centres. Such a market could be available to 
Latin America, but it has been broken up into twenty 
watertight compartments. Now that a common market 
has been formed in Western Europe, that the Scan-
dinavian peoples are making efforts in the same direction 
and that the countries of Eastern Europe are apparently 
engaged in a process of integration, Latin America 
constitutes the only large population group in the world 
which, in a vast territory endowed with a wealth of 
natural resources, is wasting for want of economic inte-
gration the immense potential represented by modern 
technology. 
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In 1955 the population of Latin America numbered 
some 175 million persons, and it is estimated that it will 
have increased by a further 100 million by 1975. The 
share of the active population in this increment should 
amount to approximately 38 million. If the trends 
registered in the last twenty years continue, out of this 
substantial addition to the region's labour force only 
5 million will be absorbed by agricultural activities, or 
fewer still if, as is greatly to be desired, technical pro-
gress in agriculture is expedited. Thus about 33 million 
persons will be left to seek productive employment in 
other sectors; and of these a considerable proportion 
will have to be absorbed by the process of industrializa-
tion and under conditions of continuous technological 
progress. There will be a very serious waste of resources 
if the Latin American countries continue to pursue a 
policy of industrialization in watertight compartments. 
ECLA has viewed this problem in a clear light, and 
the member Governments agreed in principle upon the 
need to set up a regional market, first at the initial 
session of the Trade Committee, held in November 1956, 
and subsequently, in May 1957, at the seventh session 
of the Commission in La Paz. Likewise, at the recent 
inter-American economic conference in Buenos Aires 
(August 1957), the Governments categorically endorsed 
the proposal to create a Latin American regional 
market.1 
In compliance with the instructions issued to it at the 
La Paz session, the secretariat has invited the present 
Working Group to co-operate in the preparatory work 
for putting this vitally important project into effect. For 
this purpose the Group has had a series of prior studies 
at its disposal. The concept of the economic integration 
of Latin America, which found early expression in 
ECLA's Economic Survey of Latin American, 1949, has 
been progressively developed in subsequent documents. 
In this connexion, it should be pointed out that definite 
ideas on the regional market's structure first appear in 
the study entitled Payments and the regional market in 
inter-Latin American trade.2 All this material has been 
1 [Note by the secretariat] Annex II of this report contains the 
text of the relevant resolutions adopted by ECLA and OAS. 
2 [Note by the secretariat] The report in question was pub-
lished under this title by the secretariat in 1956 and was prepared 
by the economists Mr. José Garrido Torres (Brazil) and Mr. Eusebio 
Campos (Argentina) in their capacity as consultants, after they 
had carried out a survey in various South American countries 
with the co-operation of the secretariat. The following were among 
the recommendations with which the report closed; 
" It is considered that agreements should be concluded with 
a view to promoting — by means of collaboration among several 
countries, and on a basis of financial contributions from both 
regional and foreign sources — the establishment or develop-
ment of industries that require substantial capital and wide 
markets.. . 
"It is felt to be expedient that in the field of trade policy 
steps should be taken to establish general principles and certain 
specific procedures conducive to the gradual building up of a 
regional market on multilateral and competitive bases. This 
regional market would permit the intensification of those Latin 
American lines of industrial production in which a reduction 
in costs and future expansion basically depend upon an increase 
in consumer capacity. 
" At this level, and as a preliminary phase, the drawing up 
of an industrial map of Latin America is suggested, mainly 
very useful to the Working Group, as have also the 
additional reports presented by the secretariat before 
and during the meetings of the Group. 
Thus, the concept of the Latin American regional 
market has long been gradually taking shape, and the 
Group deems it a privilege to have had the present 
opportunity of giving it new impetus by formulating 
what should, in the Group's opinion, constitute the 
market's essential bases. The establishment of the 
European common market has rendered the creation of 
a Latin American regional market a more pressing 
need; in the first place because it shows how an idea 
that some years ago might have been considered Utopian 
quickly gains ground when enlightened statesmen give 
it the support of their prestige and define it with con-
viction; and, secondly, because the European common 
market, undeniable as are its advantages to its six 
member countries and beneficial as its indirect reper-
cussions may prove for Latin America, will produce in 
addition some adverse effects mainly as a result of the 
preferential measures introduced in favour of the 
member's overseas territories. However much concerted 
action on the part of the Latin American countries may 
mitigate such effects, it would not be feasible to imagine 
that they can be entirely averted. Furthermore, the 
European common market will powerfully stimulate the 
technological revolution which is already taking place 
in the agriculture of the countries concerned as well as 
in their production of synthetic raw materials; and all 
this is bound to have unfavourable consequences for the 
producer countries of Latin America. 
A negative reaction, however, is not enough. Latin 
America's positive reaction must be the creation of the 
regional market. The time is ripe to take this step reso-
lutely and without detriment to the region's advantageous 
trade relations with the great industrial centres. Latin 
America will continue to buy from them in so far as they 
absorb its exports, which the countries of the region will 
have to promote to the fullest possible extent. But the 
composition of Latin American imports must be further 
modified and brought into line with the capacity for 
external payments. If this process is carried out within 
the broad framework of the regional market, Latin 
American industry will be vigorously spurred on towards 
new and more efficacious forms of expansion, with 
favourable consequences for the economic development 
of the region. In the course of this task of substituting 
domestic production for imports, the sooner Latin 
America speeds up its production of capital goods, 
which at present are imported because their manufacture 
in watertight compartments is anti-economic, the sooner 
will the region be able to counter such foreign trade 
setbacks as may accompany the advantages attendant 
upon the European common market. 
From another point of view, it would be a mistake to 
consider that the main justification of the common 
with a view to the determination of possible and advisable 
action." 
The study referred to was published in Inter-Latin American 
trade: current problems (E/CN.12/423), United Nations publica-
tion, Sales No.: 57.II.G.5, pp. 93 et seq. 
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market lies in the incentives it will afford to the pro-
duction of capital goods and intermediate products that 
require complex processing. This applies especially to 
the more advanced of the Latin American countries, 
where conditions have been becoming increasingly 
favourable for the establishment of such activities; but 
the vast possibilities for expansion, consolidation and 
specialization among existing consumer goods industries, 
as well as those others which will undoubtedly come into 
being by virtue of the regional market, must not be 
overlooked. 
The situation of the less advanced countries is also 
of vital importance. The system of watertight compart-
ments has virtually cut them off from the favourable 
effects of industrialization in the more highly developed 
countries. The significance of this problem is obvious, 
and the regional market must provide the indispensable 
conditions for its solution. The less developed countries 
of the region will have to find the decisive stimulus to 
their own industrialization in rising levels of consumption 
in those that have reached a higher stage of develop-
ment. This calls for special treatment. If the treatment 
accorded in the regional market were to be exactly the 
same for countries at different stages of the industrializa-
tion process, the inequalities would tend to be per-
petuated. To reduce and finally eliminate them, special 
incentives to the industrial development of the less 
advanced countries will have to be provided, for the 
mutual benefit of both groups. 
Bearing in mind these considerations and others which 
will be discussed later, and in conformity with its terms 
of reference, the Group presents the following bases on 
which the Latin American regional market may be 
established. In formulating them, the Group has been 
guided first and foremost by the idea that such bases 
will be effective only in so far as they offer ample 
opportunities to private enterprise and its achievements. 
The Governments will plan the structure of the regional 
market, but it will be for private enterprise to give it 
life; and in the pursuit of this aim, the countries con-
cerned will have to take special care that their legitimate 
efforts towards industrialization do not deprive agri-
culture and the infrastructure of essential resources, thus 
jeopardizing the balanced development of their economy 
and, in the final issue, weakening their rate of growth. 
On these foundations it will be possible to build up 
the specific projects which the Governments members 
of the Commission have requested this Working Group 
to recommend. To this end a series of analyses will have 
to be carried out on the lines suggested to the secretariat 
in the third part of the present document, in which 
comments are presented concerning the bases enu-
merated below. 
ENUMERATION OF THE BASES 
I. Universality of membership in the regional market 
Membership in the regional market must be open to 
all the Latin American countries, for which reason it is 
essential that conditions acceptable to all of them be 
established from the outset. 
The universal nature of the regional market agree-
ment does not, however, imply that countries closely 
linked by geographical proximity or common economic 
interests shall not be empowered to enter into negotia-
tions among themselves. But it is essential that these 
negotiations be effected within the framework of a 
general agreement, and along such lines that the reci-
procal concessions involved are not exclusive and are 
automatically extended to other member countries, or 
to such countries as may become members in the future 
if all do not accede to the initial agreement. 
II. Range of the regional market in respect of 
commodities 
The ultimate aim of the regional market must be the 
inclusion of all goods produced within its area. This 
concept does not mean, however, that the regional 
market must become effective immediately for all such 
goods. It only implies that the agreement will have to 
establish procedures and time-limits for the progressive 
abolition of those customs duties and restrictions which 
nowadays hamper or prevent inter-Latin American 
trade. In other words, the agreement must be immediate 
but its implementation gradual. 
Once this principle is established, various ways of 
putting it into practice are conceivable, which must be 
carefully examined before final recommendations are 
made. 
III. Development of the less advanced countries 
The less advanced countries must be accorded special 
treatment to enable them, through progressive indus-
trialization and the over-all strengthening of their 
economies, to share fully in the benefits of the regional 
market. 
With this end in view, their import duties and re-
strictions must be reduced more slowly than in the 
more advanced countries, in accordance with formulae to 
be studied; and such formulae must further establish 
facilities for exports from the countries in question, and 
especially for goods produced by their new industries 
and other activities, so as to ensure equitable trade 
reciprocity. In addition, other measures must be devised, 
especially of a financial nature, conducive to the more 
rapid development of the less advanced countries. 
IV. The tariff system vis-à-vis the rest of the world 
One implication of the regional market is that it will 
be desirable eventually to establish a single customs 
tariff vis-à-vis the rest of the world. But in some coun-
tries the tariff has been deprived of its protectionist role, 
and has been superseded by restrictive measures of 
various kinds. Until these are replaced by a new tariff, 
an interim system will have to be established to ensure 
the progressive abolition of such restrictions in the 
countries in question to an extent equivalent to the tariff 
reductions effected by other member countries. 
V. Specialization in industries and other activities 
The specialization in industries and other activities 
which is one of the objectives of the regional market 
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must be the outcome of the free interplay of economic 
forces within the over-all conditions established by the 
agreement, and without precluding the pursuance of an 
investment policy calculated to further as effectively as 
possible the aims of the said agreement. 
It is inconsistent with this principle .to accord specific 
countries the exclusive right to install certain industries 
or activities, or to impose restrictions on free com-
petition, except as regards the special features of the 
integration programme of the Central American coun-
tries, which in this context must be considered as a 
single unit, if such is the form of membership they desire. 
VI. The payments system 
In the interest of greater efficiency, the regional 
market must have a special system of multilateral pay-
ments conducive to maximum inter-Latin American 
trade reciprocity, and not detrimental to the possible 
participation of Latin America in the re-establishment 
of a more general multilateralism. It is essential that, 
under the system established, the member countries be 
protected against all exchange risks. 
VII. Temporary import restrictions 
Member countries must have the right to impose 
temporary import restrictions, in accordance with regu-
lations to be laid down in the agreement, and provided 
that basic remedial measures of monetary, fiscal and 
economic policy are also adopted, when such a step is 
rendered necessary by: 
(a) The magnitude and persistence of the dis-
equilibrium in their balance of payments with the 
other member countries; and 
(b) The need to facilitate reabsorption of manpower, 
in the course of the readjustments consequent upon the 
changing industrial structure. 
VIII. Safeguard for agriculture 
Member countries must have the right to restrict 
imports of agricultural commodities, limiting them to 
given proportions of the increment in consumption, 
should this be indispensable for the normal maintenance 
of agricultural activities. 
IX. Rules of competition 
To promote the smooth functioning of the regional 
market, steps must be taken to prevent the export trade 
of a member country from prejudicing, by means of 
unfair competitive practices, the activities of other 
member countries, either through competitive currency 
depreciation or by any other method. 
Member countries must also refrain from discrimi-
natory practices, so that export prices may be the same 
for any given commodity, irrespective of the market of 
destination. 
X. Credit and technical assistance 
The regional market must be provided with an 
effective system of credit and technical assistance, both 
in order to stimulate intra-regional exports and with a 
view to furthering the installation and development of 
the industries concerned. 
XI. The advisory body 
The problems that the functioning of the regional 
market will involve call for the creation of an advisory 
body constituted by the member Governments, and the 
establishment of a system of arbitration. 
XII. Role of private enterprise 
For the formation of the regional market the agree-
ment of the respective Governments is required. But the 
making of such a market a going concern will depend 
to a large extent on private enterprise, on its under-
standing of the problem and on its ability to turn to 
account the immense advantages offered by the regional 
market for industrialization, for the introduction of more 
advanced agricultural techniques and for over-all 
economic development. 
It is, therefore, deemed highly desirable to enlist the 
active co-operation of the organizations representing 
private enterprise, in both the national and the inter-
national field, for the study and discussion of these 
problems. 
COMMENTS ON THE BASES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Bases I and II. Universality of membership in 
the regional market 
The greater the number of countries and the wider 
the range of commodities included in the regional 
market, the greater will be the possibilities of reciprocal 
trade and the more flexible the market's operations, 
inasmuch as the liquidation of balances among member 
countries will be facilitated. 
It therefore appears desirable that the agreement 
should be open for accession to all the Latin American 
countries and, at the same time, that formulae should 
be evolved flexible enough to allow countries in close 
geographical proximity or with specific interest in 
common to make mutual concessions. While such con-
cessions may originally be designed to promote the 
mutual interests of the countries concerned, they should 
be extended to other member countries without any 
intent of exclusiveness. 
As regards the commodities, a careful examination 
will have to be made of ways and means of gradually 
and progressively reducing duties and restrictions. 
Because of their complementarity or the fact that they 
have not yet been produced or are produced in only one 
country, in the case of certain commodities — for 
example, some traditional items of trade and also, to a 
large extent, capital goods and durable consumer goods, 
as well as some important intermediate products — the 
reduction of duties and restrictions could be embarked 
upon without any limitations. At the other extreme are 
the industries producing goods for current consumption. 
Here, reduction must be gradual and progressive in 
B . LATIN AMERICAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION 3 9 
order to allow for adjustments and increased specializa-
tion in the various sectors and to avoid the serious 
maladjustments which would otherwise occur. 
In considering this aspect of the regional market, the 
secretariat should take into account various methods of 
reduction, whether they refer to all commodities, to 
groups of similar or related commodities or to individual 
trade items. 
Basis III. Development of the less advanced countries 
It is essential for the success of the regional market 
that the less advanced countries should find in it incen-
tives, lacking at present, for vigorous industrialization. 
However, if such countries acceded to the agreement on 
the same terms as the more advanced countries, this 
objective would not be achieved because of the greater 
industrial productivity of the latter. To prevent this, 
various procedures must be studied. For example, it 
might be possible to maintain for a judicious period the 
reasonable amount of protection required by the indus-
tries of the less advanced countries which are working 
for their own internal market, while the duties and 
restrictions for the same and other industries in the 
more advanced countries are gradually eliminated. 
Another possibility would be to promote the establish-
ment of export industries in the less advanced countries 
and to grant the necessary facilities for importing the 
products of these industries to the more advanced coun-
tries. All these alternatives must be considered. 
At the same time, an analysis will have to be made 
of the manner in which credit facilities could be granted 
to these countries to help them finance their export 
industries. Furthermore, it is to be hoped that foreign 
capital might well find in the countries in question the 
incentives for industrial investment which are lacking 
today, since such investment would have at its disposal 
an extensive regional market instead of the narrow range 
of markets at present available. 
This does not mean that the more advanced countries 
should make a sacrifice in favour of the others. Quite 
clearly, the interests involved are reciprocal. Under the 
preferential trade system which the regional market 
implies, the exports made by the less developed to the 
more developed countries will give the former a pur-
chasing power that will largely be used to buy the 
manufactured products of the latter, particularly when 
the countries concerned succeed in establishing a multi-
lateral system of payments which will encourage the 
utilization of credit balances within the regional market 
itself and which will reduce to a minimum the outflow 
of dollars or other freely convertible currencies to the 
rest of the world. 
Without these special arrangements, the more 
advanced countries would have great difficulty in selling 
their capital goods and other goods whose costs are 
higher than those in other parts of the world. Certainly, 
the enlargement of the market and the consequent 
increase in productivity will gradually bring costs closer 
to world levels. In the meanwhile, it would be logical 
to expect that the less developed countries will be 
unwilling to grant preferences in respect of such goods 
if they have to spend their hard currencies in order to 
purchase them, but if they are able to pay for them with 
additional exports, especially of manufactured goods, a 
wide field of mutual interest will be opened for both 
groups of countries. 
Basis IV. The tariff system vis-à-vis the rest of the world 
There are two ways of tackling the problem of a 
preferential policy: that of the free trade zone and that 
of adopting a single customs tariff vis-à-vis the rest of 
the world. The first method would have the advantage 
of not requiring any readjustment of existing tariffs 
vis-à-vis third countries: each country would maintain 
or establish vis-à-vis the rest of the world the duties 
which it desired — subject to the limitations imposed by 
the treaties in force — and would undertake only to grant 
those progressive reductions which the agreement re-
quired for the other countries operating within the 
same system. However, in certain circumstances, the 
lack of a common tariff for certain commodities 
imported from third countries would have serious 
disadvantages. 
On the other hand, it is no easy task to work out a 
common tariff. In particular, there are countries where 
the tariff has disappeared as the result of inflation and 
has been replaced by restrictions of a different kind. It 
might take time to re-establish the tariff, but there is no 
need to wait for this to happen before the common 
market agreement is concluded. Intermediate stages may 
be envisaged at once. The progressive reduction of duties 
and restrictions could be started within a free trade zone, 
while the decisive steps were being taken for the establish-
ment of a common tariff. It would be advisable for the 
secretariat to analyse the various alternatives in this 
field, including that for which provision is made in 
article XXV of GATT, and, at the same time, to devise 
suitable ways and means of gauging the magnitude of 
both the restrictions and the customs duties introduced 
for the purposes of reductions contemplated in this 
report. 
Basis V. Specialization in industries and other activities 
Many consumer goods industries in the Latin 
American countries may possibly have attained an 
apparently satisfactory size in comparison with their 
counterparts in the advanced industrial centres. How-
ever, a close examination will reveal that the smallness 
of the market in Latin America compels factories to 
produce an excessive variety of articles, while factories 
in the more advanced centres have reached a high degree 
of specialization. The regional market will stimulate 
such specialization in Latin America. The time required 
for the reduction of duties and restrictions will allow the 
gradual introduction of the necessary readjustments and 
may possibly encourage the merger of industrial inter-
ests between firms of different countries or the con-
clusion of mutual agreements to attain the necessary 
specialization in this and other cases. 
All this should come about as the result of the free 
interplay of interests, which is not incompatible with 
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effective guidance through financial agencies. But in no 
case should it lead to exclusive arrangements which 
prevent competition or the entry of new enterprises. 
Basis VI. The payments system 
In the abstract, a regional market without a special 
payments system is conceivable; but, in practice, the full 
potential of the market will not be realized without it. 
A system in which any credit balance in favour of one 
country might give rise to an immediate outflow of 
foreign exchange to the rest of the world would mean a 
substantial weakening of the regional market. It is there-
fore necessary to create incentives to ensure that such 
balances are used within the market itself. 
For this purpose, it will be necessary to examine the 
possibility of organizing a credit system at the same time 
as the multilateral payments system. 
The Group noted with satisfaction that the meeting of 
representatives of some of the Central Banks in Monte-
video, convened by ECLA, recommended parity for 
units of account in bilateral agreements and laid the 
foundations for the voluntary transfer of balances. It is 
to be hoped that the second meeting, to which all the 
Latin American Central Banks should be invited, will 
work out wider formulae for multilateral compensation 
and that an immediate programme for the elimination of 
certain restrictions which interfere with trade will open 
the way for the automatic transferability of intra-regional 
balances. 
Basis VII. Temporary import restrictions 
The incentive to use balances within the regional 
market itself referred to in the preceding section 
(Basis VI) will be a powerful stabilizing factor. But it 
is possible that certain transitory factors or inflationary 
pressure may produce disequilibria which, because of 
their nature and magnitude, cannot be remedied by 
additional credits. Such a situation may compel the 
debtor countries to impose restrictions on imports from 
the regional market. However, it is essential that such 
restrictions should conform to certain norms and that 
they should be applied for a limited time, since other 
measures must be adopted to attack the disequilibrium 
at its source. In this respect, the bodies to be established 
under the agreement could provide useful advice and 
guidance. 
Consideration must also be given to cases in which the 
disequilibrium is of a structural character, or, in other 
words, when a country has not succeeded in attaining a 
rate of economic development similar to that of others 
without a persistent trend towards external disequili-
brium. In this instance, firm action must be taken to 
stimulate exports and replace imports by domestic pro-
duction. Monetary readjustment in accordance with the 
provisions and practices of the International Monetary 
Fund is one possible method. But some thought should 
be given to protective measures of limited scope which 
could be introduced only after the views of the bodies 
concerned had been heard. These are delicate matters 
which require careful consideration. 
There is another type of disequilibrium which will 
have to be taken into account. The regional market will 
tend to accelerate the rate of growth of the Latin 
American countries. This fact and the more or less 
prolonged period of time which will have to be allowed 
for the reduction of duties and restrictions will facilitate 
the readjustment of the economic activities of a country 
when it is faced with competition from other member 
countries. 
Cases may arise, however, where, because of the 
nature of an activity or its geographical position, it is 
not easy to transfer labour no longer required by that 
activity to others in process of development. In these 
cases, it is logical that a country should be able to 
impose temporary restrictions on imports which give 
rise to such difficulties. 
Basis VIII. Safeguards for agriculture 
From the point of view of the foregoing comments 
agriculture is in a special position. In certain cases, 
safeguards have been necessary to protect it against 
competition from other Latin American countries. This 
is a fact towards which no hard-and-fast attitude can be 
adopted. On the one hand the introduction of advanced 
techniques in agriculture in the countries concerned may 
enable them to face such competition on favourable 
terms. On the other hand it must not be forgotten that 
with the passage of time a marked increase in con-
sumption may require that those activities now enjoying 
protection be maintained and stimulated, because the 
surplus of the exporting countries may gradually be 
reduced through the growth of their own consumption. 
In the light of these possible changes it is necessary to 
proceed with caution and to accord special treatment to 
agricultural activities, without losing sight of the need 
to draw up programmes for the gradual replacement of 
certain costly lines of production by others in which 
productivity is higher, both for the benefit of the con-
sumer and in order to promote the more efficient 
utilization of available productive resources. 
Basis IX. Rules of competition 
The essence of a regional market lies in its com-
petitive character. But the success of such competition 
must be the result of better productive ability and not 
of arbitrary factors. These factors may be of different 
kinds. If the external depreciation of a country's cur-
rency is continually higher than internal depreciation, 
export prices might fall, to the detriment of other coun-
tries competing on the market. 
In other cases unfair competition might be rather 
the result of deliberate procedures, taking the form of 
apparent or concealed subsidies. These practices are not 
compatible with the regional market. 
Basis X. Credit and technical assistance 
In this field also it is necessary to proceed with 
caution, for, while the accelerated development brought 
about by the regional market will give rise to greater 
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need for investment resources, there is the risk of 
embarking on over-ambitious projects which, however 
well conceived, may prove difficult to carry out in 
practice. A beginning should be made with modest 
undertakings which could extend their field of action as 
they proved to be reliable and efficient. 
The credit requirements inherent in the regional 
market are of two types: first, the financing of exports 
and, second, the financing of industries which produce 
these exports. So far as the former is concerned, a 
system of medium-term credits designed specifically to 
encourage exports of capital goods will have to be 
organized. Consideration should be given to the pos-
sibility of entrusting these credit operations to the same 
body which is responsible for the system of multilateral 
payments, without precluding the appropriate use of 
existing financial organizations, both domestic and 
foreign. 
As regards the financing of industries, particularly 
those producing for exports, the enlargement of the 
market will undoubtedly provide private domestic and 
foreign capital with more powerful incentives than at 
present. These incentives will encourage the pooling of 
capital from different countries for the development of 
industries which serve the regional market, and other 
forms of financial co-operation. Yet national resources 
will clearly be insufficient and recourse will have to be 
had to international credit resources. It will therefore 
be necessary to consider the possibility of establishing a 
special development agency to carry out these financing 
operations, which should be complemented by measures 
of technical assistance in regard to which international 
organizations could provide very valuable support. 
The secretariat should study the possible repercussions 
on the regional market of the different kinds of treat-
ment now accorded by the Latin American countries to 
investors. 
Basis XI. The advisory body 
The Group does not consider that the Latin American 
countries are yet ready to establish at the outset an 
executive authority for the regional market although this 
might constitute an objective for the future. Accordingly, 
it would prefer an organization of an advisory type but 
whose influence might in time become decisive if its 
efficiency and impartiality conferred upon it an un-
questionable moral authority. This report has dealt with 
various circumstances in which a country has to take 
emergency measures which run counter to the aims of 
the agreement and which might cause harm to third 
countries. The advisory body would intervene in all such 
cases. What is more, its opinion should first be sought 
so that the country which considers itself prejudiced by 
measures taken by other countries may apply for a 
ruling. For this purpose, it would suffice to establish a 
procedure for appointing arbitrators in the specific cases 
which may arise. 
Besides these functions, the advisory body should be 
responsible for following the development of the regional 
market, giving guidance to the organization previously 
referred to and fostering increasing co-ordination 
between the economic policies of the various countries, 
in order to ensure the efficient operation of the market 
itself. 
Basis XII. Role of private enterprise 
A perusal of the text in which the basis is described 
will suffice to show the desirability of requesting the 
secretariat that, in carrying out the studies and research 
entrusted to it in connexion with the regional market, 
it should explore the views of the private sector on this 
problem and seek the necessary ways and means of 
obtaining its active co-operation, both in the national 
and in the international field. 
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARIAT 
The trade agreements in force between Latin 
American countries on the one hand and the rest of 
the world on the other are usually based on the uncon-
ditional application of the most-favoured-nation clause. 
With few exceptions, these agreements contain no pro-
visions excluding from the application of this clause the 
special treatment which the Latin American countries 
would have to accord one another in order to establish 
the regional market. 
Consequently, whatever the juridical procedure selected 
in due course for the establishment of the market — 
customs union, free-trade zone or any other — before 
it can be put into effect, changes in a certain number 
of existing agreements will have to be negotiated with 
countries in other parts of the world. 
To facilitate this process, it would be advisable 
henceforward for the Latin American countries, while 
continuing to honour their existing trade treaties, to 
endeavour to introduce, whenever they sign new agree-
ments with countries in other regions or renew or modify 
instruments currently in force, a proviso couched in 
broad terms in favour of the regional market and of 
inter-Latin American trade in general. 
The Group therefore recommends to the secretariat 
that it bring these opinions to the attention of Govern-
ments, laying stress on the advantages for the re-nego-
tiation of existing agreements with third countries, and 
for the incorporation therein of the proviso referred to, 
which would be afforded by the establishment of a 
regular system of consultation utilizing the Trade Com-
mittee mechanism. Such a system would permit the co-
ordination of measures of trade policy, and, more-
over, would make it easier to implement the suggestions 
put forward at a similar level in ECLA resolution 121 
(VII), which recommends to the Latin American coun-
tries that they consider the desirability of carrying out 
consultations, especially on the possible repercussions of 
the European common market. 
Similarly, it would be advisable for the secretariat to 
call the attention of Governments to the fact that certain 
situations arising out of the Rome Treaty seem to offer 
an opportunity of including reservations or provisos 
that may facilitate the establishment of the regional 
market. 
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In this context, the secretariat might usefully carry 
out a study of the contractual aspects of the establish-
ment of the regional market, first collecting data and 
opinions from the appropriate Latin American govern-
mental organizations and from experts in this field. 
In addition, an examination should be made of how 
far the concessions granted to member countries of the 
regional market might be prejudicial to the interests of 
non-member countries, especially in cases where certain 
special arrangements were in force between the latter 
and some of the members of the market. 
Another of the Group's recommendations to the secre-
tariat relates to maritime transport. The Group has 
taken note of the studies already carried out in this 
field and of the secretariat's instructions to pursue them. 
It would be highly desirable for them to be completed 
as soon as possible, as the shortcomings of the transport 
system constitute a serious obstacle to trade. 
In this and other aspects of the work of compiling the 
information and background data needed for the pre-
paration of the regional market project, the secretariat 
will have to maintain close and constant contact with 
the Latin American Governments. To this end the 
secretariat should, in the Group's opinion, recommend 
to the Governments that each country set up a body 
responsible for dealing with all matters relating to the 
study of regional market problems. 
Similarly, it would be well for the secretariat to con-
sider the most effective means whereby, through the 
expansion and diversification of trade, the present 
structural disequilibria in the latter could be remedied, 
in conformity with resolution 119 (VII). 
Again, in view of the interest aroused by the pro-
posed Latin American regional market and its poten-
tialities, the Group feels that it would be useful if data 
on new industrial projects in the various countries were 
available at regular intervals. It consequently suggests 
that the secretariat consult the Governments as to their 
views on this idea and the possibilities of putting it into 
practice. 
This seems to the Group to bring to a close the first 
phase of the important task entrusted to it by the United 
Nations. According to the instructions it has received 
from the Governments members of ECLA, its ultimate 
objective is to prepare a project for the structure of the 
regional market in Latin America. At this first session it 
has had to confine itself to establishing certain essential 
bases, which are, however, far from constituting even a 
preliminary project; this would be premature from every 
point of view. The bases in question are merely points 
of departure, so that the new studies which the secre-
tariat is asked to undertake, in addition to those recom-
mended to it by the Governments, may provide the data 
required for the drawing-up of specific and final pro-
posals. 
It would be impossible to conclude this report without 
express mention of the fact that all the members of the 
Group, who have taken part in these discussions in their 
own personal capacity, wish to place on record their 
satisfaction at the high quality of the technical studies 
prepared by the secretariat and its collaborators ever 
since the idea that ECLA should organize the prepara-
tory work for the creation of a regional market was first 
broached. The Group recognizes the great progress made 
by the Central Banks Working Group, which established 
the bases for an orderly, safe and practical payments 
system, as well as the Trade Committee's invaluable 
more general contributions to the rapid attainment of 
the proposed objective. It therefore wishes to thank and 
congratulate both these bodies, as well as the permanent 
staff of the ECLA secretariat, under the guidance of 
its Executive Secretary, Mr. Raul Prebisch, and the 
consultants who were invited to collaborate with the 
secretariat prior to and during the Group's preliminary 
work. The members of the Group also wish to express 
their gratitude to the Chilean Government and the 
various national authorities for their generous hospitality, 
which provided a propitious and pleasant setting for 
the work of the Group, and faithfully reflected Chile's 
traditions of courtesy. 
Annex I 
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED PRIOR TO THE SESSION AND LIST OF 
BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS 
1. In the course of its work, the Group took into account the 
following points connected with the terms of reference assigned 
to it by the Trade Committee. 
(a) Under the terms of resolution 101 (VI), adopted on 
15 September 1955, the Economic Commission for Latin America, 
after considering the secretariat document entitled Study of Inter-
Latin American Trade (E/CN. 12/369), resolved to set up a Trade 
Committee, as a permanent organ of the Commission. 
The purpose of the Committee is to intensify inter-Latin 
American trade without losing sight of " the fundamental necessity 
of increasing over-all world trade In the resolution mentioned 
the Commission recommended to the Committee that it should 
prepare specific proposals with a view to solving the practical 
problems of inter-Latin American trade as well as bases to facilitate 
intra-regional trade negotiations, in keeping with existing inter-
national commitments. 
(b) At its first session (Santiago, November 1956) the Trade 
Committee adopted the following resolutions with a view to the 
gradual accomplishment of its tasks: 
Resolution 1 (I) on the gradual introduction of a multilateral 
payments system. A permanent Working Group was formed by 
the Central Banks of some of the Latin American clearing-accounts 
countries in order to study the establishment of the system in 
question. For the intervening period of transition the resolution 
adopts certain principles — in particular that of parity for units 
of account and convertible currencies for the same operations — 
designed to co-ordinate existing bilateral payments mechanisms a 
and to pave the way for the multilateral transferability of balances. 
Resolution 2 (I) relating to the problems arising from the 
parallelism and idle capacity existing in certain Latin American 
industries, and partly attributable to the small size of the individual 
a The Central Banks Working Group held its first session in 
Montevideo from 29 April to 10 May 1957. The result of its work 
was the drafting of a standard payments agreement and also an 
inter-bank agreement — now in force — on the compilation and 
exchange of comparable data relating to inter-Latin American 
clearing accounts. The Group resolved to hold a second session 
during 1958. 
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countries' markets. The resolution recommended to the secretariat 
that, in order to determine what measures were advisable to remedy 
the situation, it should make an inventory of existing industries 
in Latin America, and that it should report to the Trade Com-
mittee on the progress of the studies concerned. 
Resolution 3 (I) on procedures for the creation of a regional 
market. As the future industrial development of Latin America 
requires markets larger than those at present in existence, this 
resolution set up a Group of Experts to complete the studies 
carried out by the secretariat to date and also to undertake the 
following tasks: 
(i) To define the characteristics of the regional market, bearing 
in mind the differing degrees to which the countries of the region 
are industrialized; 
(ii) To study its possibilities and projections; and 
(iii) To submit recommendations on basic principles and pro-
cedures for its establishment, within the terms of reference of 
the Trade Committee as defined in resolution 101 (VI). 
Resolution 4 (I) recommending to Governments the adoption 
of a policy for the gradual liberalization — either unilaterally or 
through bilateral or multilateral agreements — of intra-regional 
trade in natural products, raw material and foodstuffs.b 
(c) At the Commission's seventh session (La Paz, Bolivia, 
15-29 May 1957), member Governments recommended that the 
secretariat should " call the attention of the Group of Experts 
to the specific situation of those Latin American countries which 
are landlocked or whose economic structure is dependent on a 
single branch of production or lacks diversification, so that the 
Group may consider, in planning the structure of the regional 
market, the possibilities for the absorption of the exportable 
commodities of such countries and for facilitating their industrial 
development within such a market" (resolution 116(VII).C At 
the same time the Group was requested to consider the desirability 
of facilitating the formation of enterprises with capital supplied 
jointly from two or more countries and to study the problems 
facing the development of a regional market, with due regard to 
each and every Latin American country and to its situation and 
possibilities. 
id) At the Economic Conference of the Organization of American 
States (Buenos Aires, Argentina, 15 August to 4 September 1957) 
the Governments of this hemisphere adopted a resolutionc in 
which, after referring to the studies and projects already undertaken 
by the Economic Commission for Latin America, its Trade Com-
mittee and the Central Banks Working Group on behalf of the 
expansion of trade within the area, they unanimously proclaimed 
" the desirability of gradually and progressively establishing a 
Latin American regional market on multilateral and competitive 
bases 
(e) Furthermore, in resolution 3 (I) of the Trade Committee, 
to which reference has already been made, it was stated that the 
conclusions reached by the Group of Experts of the Regional 
Market, together with the comments made by the ECLA secretariat 
and those received from other international organizations, would 
be submitted directly to the member Governments for their con-
sideration and comments. When this procedure had been complied 
with the secretariat should in due course disseminate as widely 
as possible the documents transmitted to the member Governments. 
In addition, the study prepared by the Group of Experts, or a 
b See the text of resolutions 1(1) to 4 (I) of the Trade Committee 
in Inter-Latin American trade: Current problems, op. c/V., pages 14 
to 17. 
c See complete text in annex II of the present report. 
progress report, together with the comments of the secretariat 
and the Governments, would be presented to the next session of 
the Trade Committee. 
2. Besides taking into consideration the foregoing resolutions, 
the Group utilized as background documents in the course of 
its proceedings the studies prepared by the ECLA secretariat, 
and in some cases by its consultants, in connexion with inter-
Latin American trade and the regional market, together with 
those of other organizations, as listed below: 
A. Background documents 
(1) Study of Inter-Latin American Trade (E/CN.12/369/Rev.l), 
United Nations publication, Sales No.: 56.11.G.3. 
(2) Inter-Latin American trade: current problems (E/CN. 12/423), 
United Nations publication, Sales No.: 57.II.G.5; with 
special reference to the account of proceedings of the first 
session of the Trade Committee (pages 7 to 14), and to part II, 
section 3, " Payments and the regional market to inter-Latin 
American trade " (pages 93 to 105). 
(3) Resolutions 116 (VII) of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America, given in Annual Report (15 May 1956-29 May 1957) 
(E/CN.12/451), pages 106 to 108 and 113 to 115. 
(4) ECLA activities relating to payments and the regional market 
in Latin America (E/CN.12/483). 
(5) Final Act of the Economic Conference of the Organization 
of American States (Buenos Aires, Republic of Argentina, 
15 August-4 September 1957), with special reference to 
resolution XL, " Recommendation on a Latin American 
regional market " (pages 86-87). 
(6) Liberalización del Comercio Interlatinoamericano (documents 
3.1957 of the Organization of American States). 
(7) Outline of the problems of the regional market (E/CN. 12/ 
C.l/WG.2/1). 
(8) Some problems of the Latin American regional market 
(E/CN. 12/C.l / WG.2/2). 
(9) Pierre Uri, Suggestions concerning the Latin American 
regional market (E/CN.12/C.1/WG.2/3). 
(10) Main background data relating to the Working Group 
(E/CN. 12/C.l /WG.2/4). 
(11) Hollis B. Chenery, Alternative approaches to economic 
integration in Latin America (E/CN.12/C.1/WG.2/5). 
(12) El movimiento de integración económica centroamericana 
(Information document). 
B. Documents distributed during the session 
(1) Exposición del Dr. Raúl Prebisch, Director Principal a cargo 
de la Secretarla Ejecutiva de la CEP AL en la sesión inau-
gural, el dia 3 de febrero de 1958 (Conference Room 
Paper No. 1). 
(2) Sugestiones del Dr. José Garrido Torres en cuanto al método 
de trabaio del Grupo (Conference Room Paper No. 2). 
(3) Notas del Dr. José Garrido Torres sobre los conceptos generales 
y procedimientos a considerar a la luz de las cuestiones planteadas 
en los capítulos la V del documento E/CN.12/C.1/WG.2/1 
(Conference Room Paper No. 3). 
(4) Notas del Dr. José Garrido Torres sobre el problema del finan-
ciamiento del comercio interlatinoamericano y sobre la eventual 
necesidad de un organismo operativo para el sistema de pagos 
multilaterales (Conference Room Paper No. 4). 
(5) Compilación de informaciones sobre política comercial (Con-
ference Room Paper No. 5). 
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Annex II 
RESOLUTIONS ON THE REGIONAL MARKET ADOPTED BY THE ECONOMIC 
COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND BY THE ECONOMIC CON-
FERENCE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 
A 
The Economic Commission for Latin America, 
Considering: 
(a) That the Trade Committee, established under the terms of 
resolution 101 (VI) adopted at the sixth session of the Commission, 
held its first session at Santiago, Chile, in November 1956, and 
has presented a report on the result of its work (E/CN. 12/423) 
to the current session of the Commission; 
(b) That it is desirable to complete the studies specifically 
relating to the creation of a regional market in Latin America; 
(c) That the trends indicated in document E/CN. 12/C. 1/4, 
presented at the first session of the Trade Committee, have become 
more clearly marked since that date, a development which might 
have unfavourable repercussions on Latin America's extra-regional 
and intra-regional trade; 
(d) That resolutions 46 (V), 69 (V) and 101 (VI) recommended 
to the secretariat and to the Trade Committee that they devote 
special attention to the trade of those Latin American countries 
which are landlocked, or whose economic structure is based on 
a single branch of production or is little diversified; 
(e) That greater mobility of capital among the Latin American 
countries would be advantageous; 
( f ) That it is desirable for the regional market to be gradually 
extended until it covers Latin America as a whole, in order to 
increase the benefits and possibilities of fuller development and 
economic integration which such a market may offer; 
Decides: 
1. To congratulate the secretariat on the efficiency with which 
it has discharged its responsibilities pursuant to resolution 101 (VI); 
2. To express satisfaction at the success of the Trade Com-
mittee's first session, to take note with satisfaction of all those 
aspects of its report relating to the regional market, and to endorse 
resolutions 2(1) and 3 (I) of the aforesaid Committee; 
3. To take note of the instructions to the secretariat both as 
regards the inventory of existing industries in Latin America 
and with respect to the convening of a group of experts to under-
take the work pursuant to resolution 3 (I); 
4. To recommend to the secretariat: 
(a) That it consider the desirability of expediting the imple-
mentation, within the shortest possible time, of resolutions 2 (I) 
and 3 (I) of the Trade Committee, with a view to taking a more 
decisive step towards their underlying objective; 
(ib) That it conduct research and compile all data that may 
serve as a basis for the work of the Group of Experts mentioned 
in resolution 3 (I), at the earliest opportunity, so that the availability 
of such background information may facilitate the task of the 
Group; 
(c) That it call the attention of the Group of Experts to the 
specific situation of those Latin American countries which are 
landlocked or whose economic structure is dependent on a single 
branch of production or lacks diversification, so that the Group 
may consider, in planning the structure of the regional market, 
the possibilities for the absorption of the exportable commodities 
of such countries and for facilitating their industrial development 
within such a market; 
{d) That it also request the Group of Experts to consider, in 
planning the structure of the regional market, the desirability of 
facilitating the formation of enterprises with capital supplied 
jointly from two or more countries; 
(e) That it request this Group to study the problems facing 
the development of a regional market, in which study considera-
tion would be given to each and every Latin American country, 
bearing in mind its situation and possibilities; 
5. To empower the secretariat to request, should it deem this 
necessary, the collaboration of other competent international 
agencies in the preparation of the studies or compilation of the 
data referred to in paragraph 4, items (a) and (b). 
B 
The Economic Conference of the Organization of American 
States, 
Bearing in mind: 
The study presented by the secretariat of the Organization of 
American States on Liberalizaciôn del Comercio Interlatino-
americano (Document 3); 
The report presented to this Conference by the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America, entitled "ECLA activities 
relating to payments and a regional market in Latin America" 
(E/CN. 12/483); and resolution 117 adopted at the seventh session 
of the Economic Commission for Latin America; 
Considering: 
That the increasing economic development of the Latin American 
countries calls for a greater expansion of inter-Latin American 
trade which will enable the available human and material resources 
to be turned to better account; 
That the future development of certain industries, especially 
the basic industries, requires, among other factors, high capital 
density and more complex production techniques, and, consequently, 
the stimulus provided by markets larger that that of any one 
country; 
That it would be advisable to study measures and suggest possible 
approaches to economic integration which take into account all 
the countries of Latin America and which will be conducive to 
the creation of a broad Latin American market; 
That in this connexion it is particularly important to bear in 
mind the processes of economic integration which are taking 
place in other regions of the world, and which, according to 
the methods adopted, may have perceptible effects on the trade 
and development of the Latin American economies, as stated in 
resolution 121 (VII) of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America; 
That the Economic Commission for Latin America, through 
its appropriate organs, has made progress in its studies on pay-
ments systems and other subjects connected with the creation 
of the Latin American regional market; 
That a group of central bank experts from Latin American 
countries between which bilateral accounts are in force is studying 
the establishment of a régime that will gradually lead to a multi-
lateral payments system, which in turn constitutes a preliminary 
step towards the creation of conditions favourable to a regional 
market; and 
That co-ordination and co-operation between the Inter-American 
Economic and Social Council and the Economic Commission for 
Latin America is advisable from every point of view, so as to pre-
vent duplication of work and expenditure, as well as the dissipation 
of effort, and that such co-ordination has been shown by experience 
to constitute a satisfactory method of work. 
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Declares 
That it is desirable gradually and progressively to establish a 
Latin American regional market on multilateral and competitive 
bases; and 
Decides: 
1. To recommend to the Inter-American Economic and Social 
Council that, to avoid duplication, after consultation between 
its secretariat and the secretariat of the Economic Commission 
for Latin America, and subject to the terms of the co-operation 
agreements in force between these two organizations, it take 
part in studies and other work preparatory to the creation of 
the Latin American regional market; 
2. To request the Inter-American Economic and Social Council 
that it inform the Economic Commission for Latin America of 
the substance of this resolution, and of the points of view on the 
Latin American regional market expressed by the various repre-
sentatives attending the present conference, so that they may be 
taken into account in the further pursuit of the studies undertaken 
on this topic; 
3. To express its gratitude to the Economic Commission for 
Latin America for the valuable data supplied to this session in 
document E/CN.12/483. 
( Resolution XL of the Economic 
Conference of the Organization 
oj American States) d 
2. Recommendations concerning the structure and basic 
principles of the Latin American common market 
Report of the second session of the Working Group 
(Mexico City, 16 to 27 February 1959) 
BACKGROUND DATA 
Pursuant to resolution 116 (VII), adopted by the 
Economic Commission for Latin America at its seventh 
session, and the decision taken by the Working Group 
on the Latin American Regional Market at its first 
session, held at Santiago, Chile, in February 1958, the 
secretariat convened this second session to enable the 
Group to consider in more specific terms the bases for 
the formation of the Latin American common market 
outlined at the first session. 
The Group was composed of the following members: 
Carlos D'Ascoli, Senator (Venezuela) 
José Garrido Torres, Executive Director of the 
Department of Currency and Credit of Brazil 
Rodrigo Gómez, Director-General of the Banco de 
México 
Flavian Levine, Director of the Banco Central de 
Chile, Professor of the University of Chile, Mana-
ger of the Compañía de Acero del Pacífico 
Carlos Lleras Restrepo, Senator (Colombia) 
Eustaquio Méndez Delfino, President of the Buenos 
Aires Stock Exchange and former President of the 
Honorary National Commission of Economy and 
Finance of Argentina 
Raymond F. Mikesell, Professor of the Economics 
Department of the University of Oregon, United 
States 
d Unofficial translation. 
4 
Juan Pardo Heeren, Former Minister of Finance of 
Peru 
Galo Plaza, Former President of the Republic of 
Ecuador 
The Group met at the Mexico Office of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America from 16 to 27 February 
1959. Mr. Galo Plaza and Mr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo 
were elected Chairman and Rapporteur respectively. 
Mr. Philippe de Seynes, Under-Secretary for Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs, opened the session and con-
veyed to the Group the good wishes of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. 
The ECLA secretariat collaborated closely with the 
Group both in the preparation of documents and in the 
discussions themselves. The following staff members 
attended: 
Raúl Prebisch, Executive Secretary of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America 
Esteban Ivovich, Chief, Trade Policy Division (secre-
tary of the session) 
Santiago Macario, Economist, Trade Policy Division 
Consultants from the ECLA Mexico Office 
Cristobal Lara Beautell, Acting Director 
Pedro Abelardo Delgado, Secretary of the Central 
American Economic Co-operation Committee 
Rafael Izquierdo, Economist, Trade Section 
Salvador Vilaseca, Assistant to the Director 
Officials specially invited by the secretariat 
Cecilio Morales, Director of the Economic Depart-
ment, Organization of American States 
Ricardo Almanza, General Secretary of the Board of 
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico 
Rafael Urrutia Millán, Director-General of Financial 
Studies, Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, 
Mexico 
Octaviano Campos Salas, Director-General of Trade, 
Ministry of Industry and Trade, Mexico 
Agustín López Munguía, Technical Sub-Director of 
Financial Studies, Ministry of Finance and Public 
Credit, Mexico 
Guillermo Ramos Uriarte, Chief, Department of 
Trade Policy, Ministry of Industry and T rade, 
Mexico 
Julio Ocádiz, Deputy Chief of Economic Research, 
Nacional Financiera de México, S.A. 
The Group took as a basis for its work the report 
prepared by the secretariat, " Possible alternatives for the 
establishment of the Latin American regional market" 
(E/CN. 12/C. 1 /WG.2/7). 
As the result of the session, the Group adopted the 
attached report which will be submitted by the secretariat 
to the Trade Committee at its second session to be held 
in Panama during May 1959. 
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At the end of the session, both the Chairman of the 
Group and the Executive Secretary of ECLA expressed 
their gratitude to the Government of Mexico and the 
Banco de México for all the attention and facilities which 
the Group members had received during their stay in 
Mexico. 
INTRODUCTION 
At its first session, the Working Group prepared a 
series of bases or points of view designed to serve as a 
guide for further studies on the gradual and progressive 
establishment of the Latin American common market. 
At the same time, it requested the secretariat of the 
Economic Commission for Latin America to carry out 
additional studies and research which would help the 
Group to continue its work during its recently completed 
second session. 
The secretariat's contribution proved highly useful 
during that session and enabled the members of the 
Group to crystallize, in the form described in this report, 
their ideas on the structure which the common market 
should assume and on the basic principles which should 
govern its operation. 
The Group feels that if, at the eighth session of ECLA 
to be held at Panama City in May 1959, member 
Governments give their general approval to the recom-
mendations set out in this report, the secretariat could 
then prepare, in close collaboration with the Govern-
ments concerned, an initial common market draft agree-
ment which would help to bring together those countries 
interested in putting the idea into immediate effect. 
The task is not easy. But the existence of a ready-
made structure and of some clearly-defined working 
principles, approved by Governments, would make it 
less difficult. Even so, the method of expressing this 
structure in terms of specific projects and of setting 
targets for reductions in duties and similar taxes and 
restrictions will require an effort of considerable magni-
tude as regards both time and concentration. However, 
this work must be done, and one of the advantages of 
approving these recommendations would be that a spe-
cific model would be provided. Otherwise, the work 
would prove extremely complicated and time-consuming. 
Given the essential character of these recommen-
dations, which are presented to the secretariat for 
transmission to member Governments, and given the 
Group's terms of reference, the members of the Group 
have never had any intention of formulating a specific 
agreement.3 The definition of terms and their scope, 
required in such a draft, have not been considered in 
this case. It was felt preferable to put forward basic 
ideas, bring out their general content and avoid those 
special cases or problems which require individual inter-
3 Trade Committee resolution 3 (T), under which the Working 
Group was set up, assigned to it the following functions: (a) to 
define the characteristics of the regional market, bearing in mind 
the differing degrees to which the countries of the region are 
industrialized; (b) to study its possibilities and projections; (c) to 
submit recommendations on basic principles and procedures for 
its establishment, within the terms of reference of the Trade Com-
mittee as defined in resolution 101 (VI) (E/CN. 12/410). 
pretation. The Group feels that what is required at the 
moment is to sketch the general outline of the common 
market so as to provide the secretariat with a basis for 
entering upon a new stage in its work. Governments, 
with this clear outline before them, will be in a better 
position to weigh the advantages of the common market 
and its repercussions on their respective economies. 
Progress towards an agreement for actually setting up 
such a market will thus be facilitated. 
Of course, more time than was available to the Group 
at this second session would have been needed to tackle 
further problems of the common market's establishment 
and operation. Approval of these recommendations by 
Governments would constitute the essential starting-
point for entering into these other matters. 
Mr. Raymond Mikesell pointed out that he was 
unable to agree with every point of detail in the report.4 
BASIS FOR A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT SETTING UP 
THE LATIN AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 
A. Structure 
I. Objectives 
1. The agreement setting up the common market is 
designed to help expedite the balanced economic develop-
ment of Latin America, its progressive industrialization 
and the introduction of improved techniques in its 
agriculture and other primary activities, with a view to 
promoting higher levels of living for its people, through: 
(a) The establishment of a preferential system for 
trade between Latin American countries; and 
(b) The growth of its foreign trade as a result of the 
expansion of industrial exports and the promotion of 
exports of agricultural and other primary commodities, 
both within Latin America and with the rest of the 
world. 
II. Juridical form 
2. The juridical form contemplated in this agree-
ment is that of a free-trade zone designed to be trans-
formed gradually into a customs union, it being under-
stood that this form may be adapted to the actual 
requirements of Latin America. 
III. Customs and liberalization régime 
3. In order to establish the common market gradually 
and progressively for all products included in the inter-
national trade of the Latin American countries, the 
reduction of customs duties and other similar taxes and 
restrictions will be carried out in two stages. 
The first stage, lasting ten years, will involve the 
substantial reduction, among the parties to the agree-
ment, of customs duties and other taxes similar in their 
effect and the elimination of other restrictions converted, 
where necessary, into customs duties. 
4 See the annex to this report. 
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The reductions referred to in this section will be 
irrevocable, except as provided in sections II and IX of 
the Basic Principle, and will be effected in the following 
manner: 
(a) Within one year from the entry into force of the 
agreement, a uniform percentage reduction will be 
applied to each of the customs duties, together with an 
equivalent reduction of other restrictions; 
(b) Within five years from the entry into force of the 
agreement, non-tariff restrictions will be eliminated or 
converted into customs duties, except as provided in 
section IX of the Basic Principles; and 
(c) During the first stage of ten years, customs duties 
and other taxes similar in their effect will continue to be 
reduced to the point where they reach the average levels 
fixed in accordance with the criteria laid down in para-
graphs 5 and 8 below. 
The Committee on Trade Policy and Payments 
referred to in point XI (henceforward " the Committee ") 
will supervise the implementation of the provisions set 
forth in this section and of any additional pacts entered 
into by member countries in carrying out the agreement, 
for the purpose of effecting gradually and progressively 
the specified reductions. 
4. During the second stage, the reduction of duties 
and similar taxes will proceed further, and, as this 
reduction progresses, the preferences referred to in para-
graph 10 will be gradually abolished in order to complete 
the organization of the common market. 
Before the end of the first stage, the Committee will 
make arrangements for negotiations to fulfil the above 
purpose. 
IV. Classification of products 
5. With a view to carrying out the measures referred 
to in paragraph 3, products will be divided into the 
following three categories: 
Category I. Primary goods; 
Category II. Capital goods, motor vehicles, other 
durable goods, intermediate articles and others for which 
demand tends to grow relatively intensively or a large 
import substitution margin exists; 
Category III. Manufactured goods for current con-
sumption in respect of which demand tends to grow 
relatively slowly and import substitution possibilities may 
become exhausted or considerably strained, except for 
the import substitution margin in those countries in the 
incipient stage of development referred to in paragraph 7. 
V. Programme for the first stage 
6. During the first stage, the reduction of customs 
duties and of other taxes similar in their effect will be 
carried out in the following manner: 
(a) Abolition of such duties and taxes in the case of 
products in category I, with the exceptions to be agreed 
upon — when they are indispensable and with particular 
reference to agricultural commodities — in order not to 
affect certain branches of production so long as it is 
impossible to put the productive factors involved to 
more economic use; 
(6) For products in category II, the target will be 
the reduction or abolition of customs duties to the point 
where, within this category, the lowest possible average 
is achieved in order to intensify regional trade in these 
items; 
(c) For products in category III, the target for the 
reduction of customs duties will be lower than that for 
category II to ensure that the specialization of existing 
industries and their adaptation to common market con-
ditions is effected gradually and without creating dif-
ficulties which impede the regular employment of the 
productive factors involved. 
VI. Régime for relatively less developed countries 
7. In order to encourage the development of coun-
tries in the early stages of industrialization and to make 
the benefits of the common market available to them on 
bases of effective reciprocity with the industrially more 
advanced countries, they will be given differential treat-
ment. 
For this purpose, the Latin American countries will 
be classified as follows according to their respective 
available margins of import substitution and their 
respective export possibilities in each of the categories 
of goods listed in paragraph 5: 
Group A. Countries of more advanced development 
in categories II and III. 
Group B. Countries of relatively advanced develop-
ment as regards manufactured goods for current con-
sumption (category III), and whose production of 
capital goods and other goods in category II is incipient 
or non-existent. 
Group C. Countries of incipient development as 
regards manufactured goods for current consumption 
(category III) and undeveloped as regards capital goods 
and other goods in category II. 
8. The following procedure will be adopted for 
according differential treatment to countries of incipient 
development in Groups B and C; 
{a) The agreement will establish their reduction targets 
during the first stage, for categories of products in 
which their development is incipient, at average levels 
of duty moderately higher than those generally laid 
down for parties to the agreement; 
(b) Negotiations will be held within the Committee 
whereby a given group of countries will grant special 
concessions to countries whose development is incipient 
as regards products in categories II and III. (Such con-
cessions may be made by countries in Group A to those 
in Group B or C or by countries in Group B to those in 
Group C.) If the concession is made to a country in 
Group C, it will be automatically extended to the other 
countries of this group; if it is granted by a country in 
Group B, it will be extended automatically to countries 
in Groups B and C. 
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In return for these special concessions, countries in 
the early stages of development may in turn grant 
facilities for imports of capital goods or other goods in 
Category II from countries in Group A or B or for 
imports of current consumer goods from countries in 
Group B, either by reducing customs duties below or 
within the average level fixed for them or by increasing 
their duties vis-à-vis the rest of the world if that should 
prove necessary to establish an effective preference in 
respect of given items. The facilities which countries in 
Groups A and B receive by virtue of this reciprocity will 
be extended automatically to all the parties to this 
agreement. 
VII. Size of the market and initial groupings 
9. The common market must include all the Latin 
American countries or the greatest possible number of 
them. This aim will not prevent an initial group of 
countries from launching the common market, provided 
(a) all the countries of Latin America are invited to 
the initial negotiations; and (b) those that do not sign 
the agreement at the outset are allowed to do so later 
in one of the following ways; 
(i) within the first year of operation of the agreement, 
in which case the new members will be allowed the same 
periods of time for reducing their customs duties as those 
fixed for the original signatories; 
(ii) after the agreement has been in operation for 
more than one year, in which case the new members 
will be allowed the periods of time still remaining to the 
original signatories for achieving the targets specified. 
However, it may be agreed upon after negotiation that 
the period of ten years laid down in paragraph 3 should 
start from the date of accession of the new signatory, 
both as regards the reductions it is to grant and those 
to be granted to it by the other signatories. 
VIII. Specific complementarity and specialization agree-
ments 
10. For the purpose of promoting industrial comple-
mentarity or specialization, two or more participants, 
linked by geographical proximity or common economic 
interests, may, with the Committee's approval, agree 
upon reductions or abolitions in respect of customs 
duties which are not designed to be extended auto-
matically to the other members. Such reductions or 
abolitions will not be calculated at the average level of 
customs duties laid down as a general target for all 
parties to the agreement. 
IX. Treaties on trade or economic matters not covered 
by the agreement 
11. Member countries which consider it necessary 
may enter into treaties among themselves for settling 
specific trade or economic matters not covered by the 
agreement, such as those relating to their border trade 
or the pooling of natural resources from adjacent 
national zones. 
Such treaties must be submitted for the Committee's 
approval. 
X. Most-favoured-nation treatment 
12. In each signatory country, the products and 
services originating in the other signatory countries, or 
exported to them, will enjoy in all respects treatment 
no less favourable than that granted to any country, 
whether a party to the agreement or not. 
Hence, all the reductions of customs duties — as well 
as the reduction or abolition of taxes and other re-
strictions which, in fulfilment of the established targets 
or of any higher ones, a country may make unilaterally, 
bilaterally or multilaterally — will be extended to the 
other signatories, except for the following: 
(a) special concessions granted reciprocally to coun-
tries in the early stages of industrial development, in 
accordance with paragraph 8; 
(b) reductions resulting from the industrial com-
plementarity and specialization agreements referred to 
in paragraph 10, and the treaties mentioned in para-
graph 11; 
(ic) existing preferential concessions, the elimination 
of which must be brought about gradually in order to 
avoid disrupting normal trade channels; 
(d) the concessions provided for in the instruments 
of the Central American common market. 
The temporary differences in customs duties resulting 
from the accession of additional countries to the agree-
ment, in accordance with paragraph 9, will not be 
affected by the application of the rules set forth in the 
first and second sub-paragraphs of this section. 
XI. Committee 
13. For the purpose of administering the agreement 
and facilitating the attainment of its ends, a Committee 
on Trade Policy and Payments composed of repre-
sentatives of all the member countries will be set up to 
carry out the negotiations arising from the agreement. 
B. Basic principles 
The Working Group considers that the structure which 
has been recommended for the establishment of the 
Latin American common market should be supple-
mented with a series of basic principles which cover 
various aspects of the actual operation of the market, 
so as to ensure the successful attainment of its aims. 
For this purpose, the Working Group recommends 
the adoption of the following basic principles which will 
have to be worked out in further detail during the 
negotiations required for the adoption of the agreement 
itself: 
I. Reciprocal trade benefits of the common market 
1. For the success of the common market it is 
important that all the member countries should have the 
opportunity of expanding their exports at the same time 
as they take action to reduce their duties, taxes and 
other restrictions on imports. To this end, member 
countries which, as a result of the facilities granted to 
them, increase their exports to the common market 
without a proportionate increase in their imports, should 
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accelerate the rate at which they reduce their duties, 
taxes and other restrictions. 
The Committee, after consulting member countries, 
will submit recommendations for the attainment of this 
objective. 
II. Stability in reciprocal treatment 
2. Member countries will not increase among them-
selves the duties, taxes and other restrictions in force in 
each of them at the time of their accession to the agree-
ment nor those resulting from the reductions and 
abolitions they may subsequently make, either in ful-
filment of the targets set in the agreement or within the 
régime of special concessions referred to in paragraph 8 
of this report relating to the structure. 
The following cases will constitute exceptions to this 
rule: 
(a) cases in which a member country wishes to modify 
its customs tariff in order to enable the tariff to absorb 
the effects of non-tariff restrictions. Such a transfer may 
be effected only during the first five years of operation 
of the agreement; 
(b) emergency cases provided for in section VIII of 
the Basic Principles; 
(c) other exceptional cases agreed upon between the 
member countries during their negotiations preceding 
the conclusion of the agreement. 
III. Determination of the origin of goods 
3. As soon as it has been constituted, the Committee 
will lay down the criteria or principles to be followed 
for determining when a product originates from one of 
the member countries, for the purposes of applying the 
preferential treatment accorded in the free-trade zone. 
IV. Equalization of customs duties 
4. At regular intervals, the Committee will specify 
the products in respect of which it will be necessary 
to arrange for the equalization of customs duties for 
imports from third countries, either for the purpose of 
establishing an adequate regional preference or in order 
to solve other problems resulting from lack of uniformity 
in existing duties. As regards these products, member 
countries will agree, through negotiations in the Com-
mittee and bearing in mind the Committee's recom-
mendations, upon the common duties to be adopted and 
the form and time-limit or gradual stages of their 
adoption. 
V. Co-ordination of trade policy 
5. Through the Committee, the member countries will 
endeavour to conduct jointly or, if this is not possible, 
in co-ordination, trade negotiations with third countries 
to ensure the common protection of their interests and 
to see that any concessions which may be granted to 
third countries do not preclude a suitable margin of 
preference within the common market or that such con-
cessions do not impede the application of the agreement 
and the attainment of its objectives. 
VI. Special programme for the reduction of high 
customs duties 
6. The Committee will consider the desirability of 
drawing up regulations to secure the reduction among 
member countries of very high customs duties. To this 
end, the Committee may establish a periodic compulsory 
percentage reduction of those customs duties which 
exceed the value of the products in question by a certain 
percentage. 
VII. Rules of competition 
7. In order to contribute to the smooth working of 
the common market, exports from one member country 
should not be allowed to interfere, through unfair com-
petitive practices, with the activities of other participants, 
either as a result of competitive currency depreciation 
or in any other way. 
Member countries must also refrain from discrimi-
natory practices, so that the export prices of each article 
remain the same irrespective of the market of destination. 
The Committee will be the judge of when a member 
country is engaging in discriminatory or unfair practices 
in its trade with the others and will take action to remedy 
the situation. 
VIII. Measures to remedy balance-of-payments dis-
equilibrium 
8. Member countries whose over-all balance-of-pay-
ments has improved as a result of the reduction policy 
will accelerate the rate at which they lower their duties, 
taxes and other restrictions. The Committee will make 
recommendations for the achievement of this objective. 
Those members which, as a result of this reduction 
policy, have incurred a deficit, or increased an existing 
one, may temporarily slow down the rate of reduction 
after consulting the Committee. However, this slowing 
down will not absolve the debtor countries from the 
obligation of taking action to correct their disequilibrium. 
IX. Emergency measures (safeguard clauses) 
9. If the application of the measures for reducing 
customs duties and other taxes and restrictions provided 
for in the agreement should give rise to serious distur-
bances in any important sector of a country's economic 
activity, or cause considerable unemployment of labour 
which cannot be absorbed in other activities, the country 
concerned may suspend temporarily, as an emergency 
measure, the application of concessions already granted 
as well as the granting of new concessions. At the same 
time, it may put into effect special measures to protect 
the national interests involved. 
The Committee will be duly informed of the sus-
pension; will promptly examine the underlying causes; 
and will initiate whatever collective measures it deems 
necessary for remedying it. 
If the suspension of concessions should be prolonged 
for more than one year, negotiations will be held, at the 
request of any member country, with a view to re-
establishing the reciprocal situation prevailing before, or 
to finding new ways and means of ensuring equilibrium. 
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X. Customs and statistical co-ordination 
10. Within five years from the entry into force of the 
agreement, member countries will adopt a standard 
customs nomenclature, as well as common customs 
definitions, procedures and regulations, and will co-
ordinate their national statistics, bearing in mind the 
different needs which will arise from the implementation 
of the agreement and the operation of the common 
market. 
The Committee will lay down the necessary criteria 
in order to facilitate the implementation of this pro-
vision. 
XI. Participation of representatives of economic acti-
vities 
11. In the organization and operation of the common 
market, the Committee will maintain close contact with 
representatives of the different economic activities and 
enlist their help in the preparation of appropriate 
measures. 
XII. Payments régime 
12. The effective operation and development of the 
common market will require the organization of a pay-
ments and credit régime to facilitate the multilateral 
liquidation of transactions between member countries. 
The criteria to be adopted in this respect should envisage 
the opening of sufficient credit to encourage a substantial 
growth of trade within the common market. 
COMMENTS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Comments on the structure 
I. Objectives 
In support of the conclusions reached by the Working 
Group during its first session at Santiago in February 
1958, the report recommends to Governments the 
gradual and progressive formation of a Latin American 
preference zone as a further step towards constituting 
the common market. In this zone, all products, both 
primary and industrial, of Latin American origin should 
receive, in trade between the various countries, prefer-
ential treatment vis-à-vis the rest of the world.5 
5 As regards this trade in traditional commodities, the Trade 
Committee, in resolution 4(1), paragraph 2, recommends to 
Governments: 
"... (b) That such products be marketed among the Latin 
American countries at international prices and on terms similar 
to those prevailing for the region's trade with the rest of the 
world; and that, prices and other conditions being equal, the 
commodities in question be purchased as far as possible 
wthin Latin America, to the extent permitted by the foreign 
trade régime of the countries of the region; 
" (c) That in accordance with prevailing world market con-
ditions, countries which cannot meet their own needs purchase 
such products as far as possible from the usual sources of supply 
within Latin America, in so far as the producer countries are 
in a position to meet the requirements of their regular customers, 
and, in the case of countries maintaining payments agreements, 
when the payment availabilities created in the consumer countries 
so permit." 
The Group considers that, at the present stage of 
Latin American economic development, this preferential 
system is essential to boost industrialization. Apart from 
the beneficial effects which it will have on the level of 
living of the population, it will enable Latin American 
industry to develop its industrial exports to the rest of 
the world and thus invigorate its international trade. 
II. Juridical form 
The Group considered that, to begin with, the 
common market should be legally constituted as a free-
trade zone. It thus does not explicitly recommend the 
immediate establishment of a common customs tariff for 
all the Latin American countries vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world, as in the case of a customs union, although 
gradual progress must be made towards this objective to 
facilitate the development of the common market.6 
In this respect the Group feels that Latin America 
should work out a solution suited to its action require-
ments, i.e., in harmony both with the conditions and 
with the possibilities of its economic development. Con-
sequently, the choice of the free-trade zone and its 
gradual evolution towards a customs union does not in 
any way imply strict adherence to pre-conceived for-
mulae, but an effort to adapt these formulae to the 
actual Latin American situation. 
III. Specific objectives and stages for their attainment 
The final objective of the common market is the 
elimination of all duties and restrictions between the 
Latin American countries. 
The Group began by considering in detail whether: 
(a) an attempt should be made from the outset to secure 
an absolute undertaking by all the participating Govern-
ments to abolish completely customs duties and other 
similar restrictions within a given period; or (b) whether 
it would be more desirable to divide the common market 
process into stages and to try to fix limited objectives for 
an initial stage, leaving for subsequent negotiation, 
during a second stage, whatever measures seem advisable 
in the light of the experience gained. 
To accept an absolute undertaking from the outset in 
a field in which Latin America is completely lacking in 
experience might prove to be a real leap in the dark. 
Fortunately, such a course is unnecessary. The final aim 
of achieving the common market and the possibility 
of reaching initial agreement on limited but very specific 
and well-defined objectives are perfectly compatible. 
The gradual attainment of such objectives should pro-
vide Governments with experience of the best way of 
reaching the final objective within a more or less short 
period. 
In this context, it is felt — and this report so recom-
mends — that the most suitable type of agreement would 
be one under which participating Governments would 
undertake to eliminate all their restrictions or convert 
6 Under Basic Principle IV, the Committee is to specify at 
regular intervals the products in respect of which customs duties 
on imports from outside the common market should be equalized 
or standardized in the member countries. 
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them into customs duties and reduce the amount of 
these duties in such a way that, after a period of ten 
years, the average level of customs protection does not 
exceed a certain level. Once this aim has been achieved, 
the Governments, profiting from the experience gained, 
would enter into new general negotiations with a view 
to agreeing in what form, to what extent and within 
what period of time the reduction of duties could be 
continued during a second stage. 
The main advantage of a formula of this kind is that 
it combines a cautious attitude with a firm decision to 
reduce the present levels of protection among the Latin 
American countries. Even though the undertaking is only 
a partial one, it nevertheless sets specific objectives 
which pave the way towards the common market. The 
idea would court failure in actual practice if Govern-
ments merely expressed pious intentions without any 
agreement on a substantial reduction of present tariff 
levels. In the Group's opinion, such an undertaking is 
the minimum required as a starting-point for the for-
mation of the common market. 
Reference has just been made to the idea of reducing 
import duties to a certain average level, after a period 
consisting of a given number of years.7 This procedure 
offers two essential advantages: (a) it will allow Govern-
ments great flexibility in the application of reductions; 
and (b) it will facilitate negotiations for the accession of 
new countries. 
So far as flexibility is concerned, the average will 
enable each Government to initiate and continue the 
reduction of duties and restrictions in the form best 
suited to its interests, always provided that the average 
level agreed upon is finally reached. Within the margin 
of flexibility of this average-level procedure, each 
Government would be free to continue introducing 
unilaterally the reductions to be effected in fulfilment of 
the undertaking made, or to negotiate such reductions 
bilaterally or multilaterally with other contracting coun-
tries. However, it is important to stress again that these 
reductions would not be carried out haphazardly but 
according to a clear-cut plan: that of not exceeding, at 
the end of the first stage, the average level of import 
duties agreed upon. 
An example will throw further light on this idea. 
Suppose that, within a given category of goods, the 
present level of customs duties in a given country is 
40 per cent and that the Governments agree to reduce 
the average in question to 10 per cent at the end of the 
ten-year period. This in no way signifies that customs 
duties will have to be reduced to 10 per cent for all the 
products in that category. On the contrary, the Govern-
ment of the country in question may reduce duties in 
the manner it considers most convenient. It is con-
ceivable, for example, that for a third of the imports in 
this category duties may be eliminated altogether; for 
another third, the average might be reduced to 5 per 
7 It should be emphasized that what is contemplated under 
the average-level procedure is not an undertaking to reduce the 
initial level of duties by a given percentage but an undertaking 
to bring those duties to a certain agreed average level on the 
completion of a stipulated period of years. 
cent; and hence for the remaining third an average of 
25 per cent could be maintained.8 This latter average 
would include duties higher than 25 per cent to com-
pensate for other relatively low duties. In other words, 
the system is extremely flexible and will enable Govern-
ments to take expedient measures without infringing the 
undertaking to reduce the average level to the agreed 
figure. 
In order to achieve even greater flexibility, the manner 
in which these reductions in the average are to be carried 
out periodically would not be laid down in the agree-
ment but would be left for a subsequent decision by 
Governments in a committee of representatives, whose 
establishment is also recommended by the Working 
Group. In this way, if the gradual reduction of import 
duties among member countries were not proceeding at 
the proper speed for the purpose of the agreement, 
measures might be worked out for increasing the tempo, 
and intermediate targets might even be adopted. 
The average system also offers great advantages in 
connexion with the accession of new countries. For if an 
initial group of countries had begun to form the common 
market, any country wishing to join it later could be 
incorporated simply by accepting the averages agreed on 
by the others. 
If this procedure were not followed, the incorporation 
of a new country would give rise to difficult and trouble-
some negotiations, which would be the more protracted 
the greater the number of contracting countries. More-
over, it would be difficult to determine the equivalence 
of concessions between the countries already in the 
common market and the one wishing to join it. 
All this is avoided by the averages system. The new 
participant will merely have to undertake to reduce 
average customs duties in the manner agreed on by the 
other parties to the agreement to become a member. 
The Working Group did not consider it advisable to 
specify the amount of the desirable reduction in duties 
in exact terms. It believes that for the moment it is 
enough to establish the procedure for making the 
reduction, and the stages by which the plan should be 
carried out. If at the forthcoming session at Panama, 
Governments should take a decision with regard to the 
procedure recommended in this report, the problem of 
the actual target figure for the reduction of import duties 
can then be taken up. Once the relevant recommendation 
had been approved by Governments, the secretariat, 
together with such experts as it may be decided to 
appoint, would carry out a careful investigation with a 
view to submitting to Governments for their considera-
tion, the alternatives considered most suitable. 
In addition to the averages system as a means of 
reducing customs duties and equivalent charges within 
a period of ten years, the Working Group recommends 
that this process should be initiated at once, within the 
first year of operation of the agreement, by means of an 
8 This would happen if the import figure, and hence the weighting 
in the average, is equal for each of the three parts into which 
the products in this category have been divided for the purpose 
of the illustration. 
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initial reduction (not in the form of an average) of each 
and every customs duty and restriction (of the order say 
of 5 to 10 per cent) with a view to introducing the 
preferential system forthwith and giving it an initial 
impetus which might perhaps be decisive for Latin 
American trade. These cuts would later be counted as 
part of the reductions towards the average to which 
reference has already been made. 
Similarly, the Group recommends to Governments 
that within the first five years of operation of the agree-
ment all currency, quota or financial difficulties, etc. 
hampering Latin American trade should be lifted. Since 
these restrictions are due, in a number of countries, to 
the fact that the customs tariff has lost its effectiveness in 
practice, partly as a result of inflation, the Group 
recommends that Governments should be left to decide 
whether or not and to what extent to convert these 
restrictions into customs duties before abolishing them.9 
Naturally, the customs duties thus increased would be 
subject to the levels agreed on and to the reduction rate 
or procedure fixed for the gradual attainment of those 
levels. 
The Group recommends that in principle the reduction 
of customs duties and other equivalent charges (as also 
the elimination of other restrictions) should be irrevo-
cable, so as to ensure the stability of the reciprocal 
treatment — with exceptions which will be dealt with in 
the appropriate place.10 
TV and V. Classification of products and programme for 
the first stage 
The Group considered it advisable to recommend to 
Governments that in the initial common market agree-
ment products should be divided into three categories 
according to their nature and to the degree of develop-
ment of the industries concerned in the various Latin 
American countries. These three categories are as 
follows: 
Category I. Primary goods. 
Category II. Capital goods, motor vehicles, other 
durable goods, intermediate articles and others for which 
demand tends to grow relatively intensively or a large 
import substitution margin exists; and 
Category III. Manufactured goods for current con-
sumption in respect of which demand tends to grow 
relatively slowly and import substitution possibilities 
may become exhausted or considerably strained. 
The position of these three groups from the point 
of view of possibilities for the reduction of duties and the 
addition of restrictions recommended for the first ten-
year stage is very different. Thus, for example, the 
primary goods which are for the most part traditional 
items in inter-Latin American trade offer the greatest 
immediate possibilities, in the Group's view. Many of 
them, especially mineral products and other raw mate-
9 See sub-paragraph (a) of Basic Principle II. 
10 Basic Principle II provides more specifically for an obliga-
tion not to increase the duties, charges and restrictions referred 
to, whether original or already reduced, but indicates certain excep-
tions which should be made, in the Group's opinion, to this rule. 
rials, could in a relatively short time be freed from tariff 
and other restrictions. 
In the sphere of agriculture, however, there are 
important instances in which the Working Group urges 
proceeding with caution, for the two reasons given in 
the comments on Basis II in its previous report.11 In the 
case of some of these products, the gradual improvement 
of agricultural techniques would be a first step towards 
their full incorporation in the common market, with 
a view to establishing satisfactory conditions of inter-
Latin American competition. As regards other articles 
it is possible that future increases in their consump-
tion will in some cases tend to reduce the exportable 
surpluses of producing countries in Latin America and 
that that will compel other Latin American countries 
to maintain or increase their production even at costs 
above international prices, with a consequent need for 
protection against the rest of the world.12 
To look at the matter from another point of view, the 
rapid growth of the population of Latin America and 
the absolute need to improve the quality of their diet call 
more and more urgently for the better use of the land 
available through a gradual improvement of techniques. 
The common market will greatly assist this productive 
development by permitting countries which, owing to 
unsuitable ecological conditions, are able to produce 
certain foods (or raw materials) only at relatively high 
costs, to obtain them on more favourable terms from 
other Latin American countries and use their land for 
other types of production. 
The lack of a common market, and more particularly 
the lack of satisfactory payments arrangements between 
the Latin American countries, has been one of the 
factors hampering this better use of the productive 
capacity of the land. To change this situation will 
require a careful combination of measures of trade policy 
with adequate programmes of agricultural develop-
ment. 
It will be seen from, the foregoing that special attention 
needs to be given to the agricultural products at present 
subject to duties or restrictions, and that they should be 
dealt with, in view of their small number and the special 
problems they present, through product by product 
negotiations. 
The other two categories relate to industrial products. 
Category II comprises products of industries which 
might be described as dynamic, in view of the intensive 
expansion which may be expected of them in coming 
decades in the industrially more advanced countries of 
Latin America without, however, excluding the pos-
sibility that they may take root and prosper in the 
hitherto less developed countries. 
11 See document E/CN.12/C.1/WG.2/6, p. 10. 
18 Since the Working Group made this observation, recent 
studies by the Secretariat have shown that this is in fact taking 
place in such important products as wheat, with regard to which 
it is very unlikely that the present supply-deficit of Latin America 
as a whole can be reduced in the next twenty years. It would be 
unwise therefore to drop the present system of protection without 
introducing other measures to stimulate domestic production of 
this and of other foodstuffs. 
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The dynamic industries are in the main those produc-
ing capital goods, intermediate or semi-finished pro-
ducts and certain durable consumer goods (in particular 
the products of the metal transforming industries). These 
industries are characterized by their high degree of 
capital intensity, their reliance on a substantially 
expanding market — by virtue both of the growth of 
demand and of the extensive possibilities such goods 
offer for import substitution — and by the fact that they 
are new industries or industries which do not yet exist 
in Latin America. They thus have rapid growth prospects 
and offer broad and immediate possibilities of com-
plementarity, specialization and reconstruction without 
the serious adjustment problems which the regional 
market would entail for already established and con-
solidated industries or industries limited to a vegetative 
rate of growth. In other words, it is in these dynamic 
industries that the greatest benefits could be derived 
with the least disturbances and adverse reactions. 
This fact is of decisive importance for the common 
market. It is not a matter of one country — in any static 
sense — increasing its production at the expense of 
others; there is room for all, if the basic conditions are 
created which will permit the specialization of pro-
duction; and this will be the easier the more rapid the 
growth of demand and production in the dynamic 
development of the common market. 
The position of the dynamic industries would thus 
seem to be highly suited to a policy of relatively rapid 
reductions of tariffs and restrictions, subject to the 
differential treatment provided for in the case of coun-
tries in which these industries are at an early stage of 
development. 
The situation is quite different as regards the in-
dustries included in Category III, industries producing 
goods for current consumption. In the more developed 
countries, these industries are already fully established; 
in many of them, import substitution has been com-
pleted for some time, and the growth of production will 
tend to be slower than in the dynamic industries, 
gradually following the population growth. It is clear, 
however, that if a common market is established and 
export possibilities are opened up, some of these 
industries might receive a strong impetus towards 
expansion. 
With regard to the less developed countries, although 
they offer room for the expansion of these industries 
because the import substitution margin has not yet been 
closed — on the contrary, it remains very wide in some 
of them — the competition of the more developed coun-
tries could, if caution is not exercised, have unfavourable 
immediate consequences for certain branches of industry. 
These considerations induced the Working Group to 
recommend different targets for these two different 
groups of industrial products. For Category II, which 
covers capital goods and other products of the dynamic 
industries, it recommends as a target a low average rate 
of duties which will stimulate Latin American trade in 
these products to the greatest extent possible. For 
Category III, consisting of manufactured goods for 
current consumption, a higher average is recommended, 
in order not to force during the initial stage of ten years, 
a reduction of duties which could perhaps cause distur-
bances to existing industries. The reduction will have to 
be graduated in such a way as to facilitate the progressive 
development of these industries towards forms of specia-
lization and greater productivity which will enable 
them to develop within a broad system of inter-Latin 
American competition. 
Furthermore, to set a higher average rate of duties as 
the target for this category of products would not pre-
vent those countries in which the manufacture of certain 
goods of current consumption showed dynamic cha-
racteristics from obtaining from others — with respect 
to such products and within the general programme of 
reductions — substantial tariff cuts, perhaps even greater 
than those fixed for products in Category II. 
VI. System for less developed countries 
It will be recalled that the main concern of the 
Working Group at its first session was to arrive at 
common market formulae which, far from placing 
difficulties in the way of the industrial growth of the less 
developed Latin American countries, would give them a 
vigorous impetus towards industrialization; at the 
present session the Working Group reached final con-
clusions on this very important aspect of the matter. 
The Group accordingly considers it advisable that the 
agreement should contain a classification of countries 
according to the degree of development in them of the 
industries in Categories II and III, as follows: 
Group A should comprise the countries which might 
be called the economically more advanced countries of 
Latin America, countries in which the industries pro-
ducing goods for current consumption — those in Cate-
gory III — are in full process of development, while the 
capital and other durable goods industries — those in 
Category II — are already making steady progress in 
response to the demands of their economic development. 
Group B comprises those countries in which the indus-
tries manufacturing goods for current consumption have 
also developed in a manner similar to those of countries 
in the previous group, while yet retaining a wider import 
substitution margin, but in which, on the other hand, 
the capital-goods and other industries in Category II are 
either incipient or non-existent. Group C comprises 
countries in which the industries producing goods for 
current consumption are still in the early stages of 
development and in which there is a wide import-
substitution margin and no capital-goods industries — 
apart from certain exceptions, usually concerned with 
intermediate products. 
The Working Group believes that diffential treatment 
should be given for the benefit of countries in groups B 
and C. To this end, it proposes that in the common 
market agreement, with respect to these two groups of 
countries, and as a target to be achieved during the first 
stage, a moderately higher average level of duties should 
be established for the categories of goods produced by 
industries at the incipient stage of development. Thus, 
for instance, if it were established as a general target 
for the capital and other goods in Category II that in ten 
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years a level of customs duties should be reached of not 
more, on an average, than 10 per cent of the value of 
imports, then for the countries in groups B and C an 
average level of duties of, for instance, 15 per cent could 
be established for this category of products. The same 
could be done with respect to consumer goods in cate-
gory III; in the case of these, an average level could 
be established for countries in group C higher than that 
generally agreed on for countries in groups A and B.13 
The Working Group attaches considerable importance 
to such differential treatment, for if all countries were 
considered equal from the point of view of economic 
development the common market agreement would 
embody a manifest inequality of treatment. In point of 
fact, if treatment is to be equal the inequality of coun-
tries must be fully recognized. But this is not the only 
way in which the Group has tried to provide for 
favourable treatment of the less developed countries; it 
also recommends that Governments should make special 
concessions in favour of these groups of countries. This 
requires some explanation. 
In establishing a higher level of customs duties as the 
target for the less developed countries the Working 
Group, while not wanting to encourage them to adopt 
anti-economic forms of industrialization, wishes to 
recognize the fact that owing to their lower productivity 
and their smaller over-all resources — in comparison with 
the more advanced countries — they require a greater 
degree of protection for the time being. These countries, 
however, will have to be given strong additional incen-
tives in order to ensure that, while receiving this greater 
degree of average protection, they are able to embark on 
vigorous industrialization with the common market in 
mind. This is the idea behind the special concessions. 
An example will help to give a clearer idea of the scope 
and purposes of the latter. Let us suppose that a country 
in group C at an early stage of development agrees by 
negotiation — through the Committee — with one or 
more advanced countries in group A to abolish customs 
duties for certain capital goods in which the latter are 
interested, either within the average applicable to them 
or within a lower average, if the country in question con-
sidered that desirable. In exchange for the facilities it 
thus granted, the group C country would receive special 
concessions from the more advanced countries, for 
example, exemption from duties for the entry into their 
territory of certain products which the group C country 
was in a position to produce economically and to export 
to the group A countries' market. In order that the con-
cession thus received by the group C country should be 
effective, it would be extended automatically only to 
other countries at an early stage of development in the 
same group, and not to countries in groups A and B. 
Thus, the group C countries would have available to 
them the broad and growing market of the group A 
13 One member of the Working Group particularly urged the 
secretariat, in its report to Governments, to consider the case 
of countries with a high level of internal costs. He felt that it 
would be advisable, in order to facilitate the incorporation of 
these countries in the common market agreement, for them to be 
allowed the average fixed countries in group C, even if they had 
well-developed consumer industries. 
country as a stimulus to their industrialization and 
their industrial export trade. 
For their part, the group B countries which have made 
considerable advances in their consumer industries could 
similarly enter into special negotiations with the coun-
tries at an early stage of development in these goods — 
those in group C — in order to arrange reciprocal con-
cessions of the same kind. 
All this means that within the preferential Latin 
American system there would be a system of special 
preferences for the relatively small countries, with a view 
to creating conditions likely to attract domestic or 
foreign capital and to ensuring the use of their skills in 
progressive and rational industrialization, not only for 
the benefit of their domestic markets, but also for that of 
the common market. It should, however, be pointed out 
that these preferences would be in their favour only 
and that whatever facility an industrially advanced — 
group A — or moderately advanced — group B — coun-
try received in return for these concessions, would auto-
matically be extended to all member countries by virtue 
of the most-favoured-nation clause. 
VII. Extent of the market and initial groupings 
The Working Group has already, in its first report, 
expressed the view that the common market should 
embrace the largest possible number of countries. This 
does not necessarily mean that it could not begin with 
an initial nucleus of countries having a more active 
interest in its formation. But in order that the market 
should from the very outset be of the kind desired, the 
Working Group considers it of vital importance to put 
two proposals before Governments: the first, that all 
Latin American countries should be invited to the initial 
drafting of the agreement; the second, that countries 
which for one reason or another decide not to par-
ticipate at the beginning should be enabled to do so at 
any later stage without entering into complicated nego-
tiations. This possibility has already been referred to in 
commenting on the advantages offered by the averages 
system in connexion with the accession of new countries. 
There are possible identities of interest which might 
facilitate the formation of a broad orbit of countries. 
Thus, the fact that the trade of seven countries in the 
southern area makes up about 90 per cent of the total 
trade among Latin American countries (petroleum 
excluded) readily suggests that these countries might act 
as the initial nucleus of the common market. But there 
are other countries geographically remote from them 
which, for reasons of common interests, might wish to 
participate in this nucleus. The area of identity of 
interest might well be found in the field of the dynamic 
industries. Apart from other things, this common deno-
minator would be a very strong factor, both for the 
present and for the future, in broadening the initial 
nucleus of the common market, and in the opinion of 
the Working Group everything should be done to 
prevent any weakening of this constructive force. 
Nothing of all this, however, can be hoped for if a 
static viewpoint is adopted. The common market is not 
intended as a means for freezing present trade relations; 
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on the contrary, the intention is to create a new pattern 
of trade in accordance with the profound structural 
changes which the Latin American economy must 
undergo in coming decades if it is to show vigorous 
growth. And geographical distance in a rapidly in-
dustrializing Latin America cannot have the same 
significance as it had when the countries of Latin America 
concentrated almost entirely on primary production 
for the large industrial centres. All this tends to reinforce 
the idea of the broadest possible grouping. 
The Working Group believes that the formation of 
other types of groupings of countries, through exclusive 
arrangements, could be an obstacle to the creation of a 
Latin American common market. On the other hand, it 
is clear that geographical proximity will create, within 
the common market, very tightly-knit trading areas 
among certain groups of countries; this, however, must 
be the spontaneous result of the facts themselves, and 
not the consequence of a policy of excluding other Latin 
American countries solely because of their remoteness — 
a remoteness which will, in any case, be overcome as 
transport improves. 
VIII. Specific agreements for complementarity and 
specialization 
The above considerations should not prevent coun-
tries which are closely linked by their geographical 
proximity or by an identity of interests from making 
complementarity or specialization arrangements between 
themselves in order to increase the productivity and 
reduce the costs of certain industries. These arrange-
ments would not — as would be desirable — be easy to 
put into effect if the exemptions from or reductions of 
customs duties agreed on between the countries con-
cerned were at once extended to other countries by 
virtue of the most-favoured-nation clause. Hence, the 
latter clause should not be applied in such cases. This 
situation would, of course, have to be temporary in 
character, lasting until such time as the industries in 
question had been able to strengthen themselves through 
their complementarity or specialization. In addition, the 
Working Group considers it essential that the customs 
duties thus abolished or reduced should not be counted 
in connexion with the average levels laid down in the 
agreement; they would, in other words, be additional to 
those granted generally and would in no way affect the 
obligation to fulfil promises undertaken in the agreement. 
IX. Other special agreements 
In addition to the special arrangements just men-
tioned, the Working Group considers that the agreement 
should permit other special agreements between coun-
tries designed to stimulate border trade of the develop-
ment of zones or basins of interest to two or more of 
them. It therefore recommends that such agreements 
should be permitted, subject, however, to the Com-
mittee's approval. 
X. Most-favoured-nation treatment 
The members of the Working Group are convinced 
that the sound operation of the regional market depends 
on the granting of equality of opportunity to all par-
ticipating countries, apart from the differential treatment 
to be accorded, for the reasons already explained, to 
countries at the earliest stage of industrial development 
and that resulting from specialization and comple-
mentarity agreements and other arrangements of a 
temporary nature. In addition, the Group explicitly 
recognized an exception in favour of the preferences and 
other concessions resulting from Central American 
economic integration — which amounts to considering 
the Central American countries as an economic unity. 
XI. Trade and payments policy committee 
The common market agreement will have to lay the 
foundations o£ a policy for the gradual and continuous 
economic integration of Latin America within the mar-
ket. But, in addition, this policy must pursue constant 
aims and must be continuously adapted to changing 
circumstances. With this end in view the Group con-
siders it advisable that there should be set up an inter-
governmental committee formed of high-ranking repre-
sentatives of the contracting countries. This committee 
would be responsible for considering problems of trade 
policy, payments and the administration of the agree-
ment. Mention has been made in the course of this 
report of the need for countries to undertake nego-
tiations on particular matters dealt with in the agree-
ment; it would be useful if these negotiations could take 
place within the committee even if they were to be 
carried on between restricted groups of countries, in 
order to ensure the correlation of common interests. 
Owing to the nature of the Working Group, this report 
does not go into detail regarding the functions of the 
committee; it would be desirable that in preparing the 
draft agreement the secretariat should expressly 
enumerate these functions and clearly specify which 
matters should be decided by a simple majority and 
which should require the unanimous assent of the 
member countries. 
B. Comments on the basic principles 
As they supplement or amplify the principles recom-
mended in the part of this report dealing with structure, 
the meaning and purpose of most of the so-called " basic 
principles " proposed is obvious. However, the Group 
felt that some comments were called for on certain of 
them to which it has given special attention. 
I. Reciprocal trade benefits of the common market 
The Group considered the possibility that the pro-
gressive establishment of the common market through 
the gradual reduction or abolition of customs duties and 
other taxes and restrictions might bring substantially 
greater benefits to some member countries than to 
others. These greater benefits would probably be 
reflected in a persistent tendency, on the part of those 
to whom this was more advantageous, to export more 
to other common-market countries than they imported 
from them. In the Group's view the countries which 
find themselves in this position should increase the rate 
of reduction of their duties and other taxes and re-
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strictions in order to promote their imports and so offer 
the others greater opportunities of participating ade-
quately in the reciprocal trade benefits of the common 
market. 
II. Co-ordination of trade policy 
Apart from the recommendation concerning the need 
for member countries to carry out their trade nego-
tiations in co-ordination with third countries, the 
Working Group agreed to recommend that the Latin 
American countries should endeavour forthwith to 
initiate negotiations with a view to securing recognition 
of regional preference through the inclusion of a Latin 
American waiver clause in the agreement in force, or in 
process of approval, with third countries; and that they 
should also bear in mind the advantages of this objective 
in the negotiations they will have to undertake with the 
members of the European Common Market or with 
other countries members of GAIT. 
The Working Group also recommended the renego-
tiation of trade treaties with third parties which might 
impede the participation of the Latin American country 
concerned in the common market. 
III. Special programme for the reduction of high 
customs duties 
Customs duties which, because they are too high, 
restrict or even render impossible the importation of the 
products on which they are levied will have very little 
effect on the determination of the weighted average level 
of duties, and perhaps none at all, since such weighting 
is based precisely on actual imports of each product. It 
might thus be possible for a member country, by the 
end of the first stage contemplated in the agreement, to 
reach the duty averages set as the target, or even much 
lower ones, while maintaining high duties on a large 
number of items. Furthermore, it is conceivable that the 
average level of duties reached by a given country (cal-
culated in the manner described) will rise as that country 
reduces the duties on certain items, if the volume of 
imports of these is thereby increased to any great extent. 
It is for this reason that the Working Group stresses 
the advisability of the Committee's laying down rules 
designed to ensure or promote the effective reduction of 
very high duties, for example by establishing a com-
pulsory periodic percentage reduction for customs duties 
whose effect on the value of the products concerned 
exceeds a certain percentage. 
IV. Measures to remedy balance-of-payments disequi-
librium 
The success of measures to reduce duties, taxes and 
restrictions will depend to a large extent on the attitude 
of the contracting countries towards the achievement 
and maintenance of their balance-of-payments equili-
brium. It is possible that, as a result of such a policy, 
a contracting country might improve its balance-of-pay-
ments situation. In that event, the Committee should 
advise it to adopt further liberalization measures so that, 
through the resultant increase in its imports, it can help 
the debtor countries in their development. 
Similarly, countries in the reverse position could, after 
consulting the Committee, take steps to reduce the rate 
of liberalization if that proved necessary. 
V. Escape or safeguard clauses 
Similarly, the Group considered the possibility that 
the concessions granted by a member country within 
the common market might provoke serious disturbances 
in some important industry or substantial unemployment 
among workers who cannot be absorbed in other 
branches of economic activity. In this case it recom-
mends that the agreement should contain safeguard or 
escape clauses to allow countries in this kind of situation 
temporarily to suspend the concessions granted, or to 
withhold the granting of further rebates, without pre-
judice to any other measures which it may or ought to 
take to correct its imbalance, especially if it is of a 
structural kind. 
VI. Payments system 
The Group also noted with satisfaction the efforts of 
the secretariat to formulate a draft payments system 
between the Latin American countries, and hopes that 
it will be possible, at the next session of the Central 
Banks, to reach definitive formulae, because an effective 
payments arrangement and the smooth working of the 
common market are closely inter-related. Without 
wishing to interfere in the deliberations of the Central 
Banks, the Working Group would like to stress the 
desirability of considering, in these arrangements, the 
possibility of granting extensive credits, through a 
suitable payments system, in order to facilitate inter-
Latin American trade and to prevent restrictive measures 
from being taken owing to payment difficulties. 
VII. The inter-Latin American financing agency and the 
common market 
The Working Group took note with satisfaction of the 
statements made by the observer sent by the Inter-
American Economic and Social Council to the effect 
that, at the meetings being held at Washington with a 
view to the establishment of a Latin American financing 
agency, special interest is being taken in the credits and 
investments intended for setting up industries for the 
common market. The Group also considers it pertinent 
at this stage to point out the desirability of introducing 
a system of short- and medium-term credits in order to 
encourage exports from the industries of the Latin 
American countries, and it would welcome a study of 
this aspect of the problem. 
Annex 
After this report was published, the secretariat received a com-
munication from Mr. Raymond Mikesell in which he amplified 
the observations referred to in the final paragraph of the introduc-
tion.® His comments are as follows: 
1. The agreement establishing the Latin American common 
market should stipulate a specific date or range for the complete 
liberalization of trade within the area to be covered by the market. 
a See p. 46. 
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Unless this is done, it might well appear from point 1 (a) of the 
Structure, which concerns the creation of a preferential system 
for inter-Latin American trade, that the principal objective of 
the common market agreement is to establish a preferential trading 
area instead of a true free trade area or customs union. This impres-
sion would be strengthened by the statement made in the comments 
on the Structure that the juridical form of the agreement would 
not necessarily have to conform to a pre-established pattern. 
2. Article VIII of the Structure seems to leave the door open 
to bilateral negotiations of a discriminatory nature. It is under-
standable that provisions might be made for accelerating the 
establishment of a common market in particular commodities, 
provided such arrangements conform to reasonable standards 
and all countries that wish to do so may take part. Special agree-
ments might also be made to liberalize border traffic between 
adjacent frontier zones. But the provisions contained in the Structure 
as it stands are too broad and contain no safeguard other than 
the prerequisite that the agreement concerned should be adopted 
by the Committee. As this does not seem to provide adequate 
protection, the Working Group should make recommendations 
as to the criteria which the Committee should follow in the case 
of special agreements of this nature. 
3. Lastly, Mr. Miskesell considers that, as he pointed out on 
several occasions during the Working Group's session, exceptions 
to the most-favoured-nation principle referred to in point X of 
the Structure should have a definite time limit or range. 
II. TREATY ESTABLISHING A FREE-TRADE AREA AND INSTITUTING 
THE LATIN AMERICAN FREE-TRADE ASSOCIATION * 
(Montevideo, 18 February 1960) 
The Governments represented at the Inter-Govern-
mental Conference for the Establishment of a Free-Trade 
Area among Latin American Countries, 
Persuaded that the expansion of present national 
markets, through the gradual elimination of barriers to 
intra-regional trade, is a prerequisite if the Latin Ame-
rican countries are to accelerate their economic develop-
ment process in such a way as to ensure a higher level 
of living for their peoples, 
Aware that economic development should be attained 
through the maximum utilization of available produc-
tion factors and the more effective co-ordination of the 
development programmes of the different production 
sectors in accordance with norms which take due ac-
count of the interests of each and all and which make 
proper compensation, by means of appropriate measures, 
for the special situation of countries which are at a 
relatively less advanced stage of economic development, 
Convinced that the strengthening of national econo-
mies will contribute to the expansion of trade within 
Latin America and with the rest of the world, 
Sure that, by the adoption of suitable formulae, con-
ditions can be created that will be conducive to the 
gradual and smooth adaptation of existing productive 
activities to new patterns of reciprocal trade, and that 
further incentives will thereby be provided for the im-
provement and expansion of such trade, 
Certain that any action to achieve such ends must 
take into account the commitments arising out of the 
international instruments which govern their trade, 
Determined to persevere in their efforts to establish, 
gradually and progressively, a Latin American common 
* The Montevideo Treaty was originally concluded and signed 
by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. The 
signatory Governments deposited their respective instruments of 
ratification on 2 May 1960. The instruments of accession by 
Colombia and Ecuador were deposited on 30 September 1961 
and 3 November 1961 respectively. 
market and, hence, to continue collaborating with the 
Latin American Governments as a whole in the work 
already initiated for this purpose, and 
Motivated by the desire to pool their efforts to achieve 
the progressive complementarity and integration of their 
national economies on the basis of an effective recipro-
city of benefits, decide to establish a Free-Trade Area 
and, to that end, to conclude a Treaty instituting the 
Latin American Free-Trade Association; and have, for 
this purpose, appointed their plenipotentiaries who have 
agreed as follows: 
CHAPTER I 
NAME AND PURPOSE 
Article 1 
By this Treaty the Contracting Parties establish a Free-
Trade Area and institute the Latin American Free-Trade 
Association (hereinafter referred to as " the Associa-
tion "), with headquarters in the city of Montevideo 
(Eastern Republic of Uruguay). 
The term " Area ", when used in this Treaty, means 
the combined territories of the Contracting Parties. 
CHAPTER I I 
PROGRAMME FOR TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
Article 2 
The Free-Trade Area, established under the terms of 
the present Treaty, shall be brought into full operation 
within not more than twelve (12) years from the date 
of the Treaty's entry into force. 
Article 3 
During the period indicated in article 2, the Contracting 
Parties shall gradually eliminate, in respect of substan-
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tially all their reciprocal trade, such duties, charges and 
restrictions as may be applied to imports of goods 
originating in the territory of any Contracting Party. 
For the purposes of the present Treaty the term 
" duties and charges " means customs duties and any 
other charges of equivalent effect — whether fiscal, mone-
tary or exchange — that are levied on imports. 
The provisions of the present article do not apply 
to fees and similar charges in respect of services rendered. 
Article 4 
The purpose set forth in article 3 shall be achieved 
through negotiations to be held from time to time among 
the Contracting Parties with a view to drawing up: 
(a) National Schedules specifying the annual reduc-
tions in duties, charges and other restrictions which each 
Contracting Party grants to the other Contracting Parties 
in accordance with the provisions of article 5; and 
(b) a Common Schedule listing the products on 
which the Contracting Parties collectively agree to eli-
minate duties, charges and other restrictions completely, 
so far as intra-Area trade is concerned, within the period 
mentioned in article 2, by complying with the minimum 
percentages set out in article 7 and through the gradual 
reduction provided for in article 5. 
Article 5 
With a view to the preparation of the National 
Schedules referred to in article 4, sub-paragraph (a), each 
Contracting Party shall annually grant to the other Con-
tracting Parties reductions in duties and charges equi-
valent to not less than eight (8) per cent of the weighted 
average applicable to third countries, until they are 
eliminated in respect of substantially all of its imports 
from the Area, in accordance with the definitions, 
methods of calculation, rules and procedures laid down 
in the Protocol. 
For this purpose, duties and charges for third parties 
shall be deemed to be those in force on 31 December 
prior to each negotiation. 
When the import régime of a Contracting Party con-
tains restrictions of such a kind that the requisite equi-
valence with the reductions in duties and charges granted 
by another Contracting Party or other Contracting 
Parties is unobtainable, the counterpart of these reduc-
tions shall be complemented by means of the elimination 
or relaxation of those restrictions. 
Article 6 
The National Schedules shall enter into force on 
1 January of each year, except that those deriving from 
the initial negotiations shall enter into force on the date 
fixed by the Contracting Parties. 
Article 7 
The Common Schedule shall consist of products which, 
in terms of the aggregate value of the trade among the 
Contracting Parties, shall constitute not less than the 
following percentages, calculated in accordance with the 
provisions of the Protocol: 
Twenty-five (25) per cent during the first three-year 
period; 
Fifty (50) per cent during the second three-year 
period; 
Seventy-five (75) per cent during the third three-year 
period; 
Substantially all of such trade during the fourth three-
year period. 
Article 8 
The inclusion of products in the Common Schedule 
shall be final and the concessions granted in respect 
thereof irrevocable. 
Concessions granted in respect of products which 
appear only in the National Schedules may be withdrawn 
by negotiation among the Contracting Parties and on a 
basis of adequate compensation. 
Article 9 
The percentages referred to in articles 5 and 7 shall be 
calculated on the basis of the average annual value of 
trade during the three years preceding the year in which 
each negotiation is effected. 
Article 10 
The purpose of the negotiations —based on recipro-
city of concessions — referred to in article 4 shall be to 
expand and diversify trade and to promote the pro-
gressive complementarity of the economies of the coun-
tries in the Area. 
In these negotiations the situation of those Contract-
ing Parties whose levels of duties, charges and restric-
tions differ substantially from those of the other 
Contracting Parties shall be considered with due fairness. 
Article 11 
If, as a result of the concessions granted, significant 
and persistent disadvantages are created in respect of 
trade between one Contracting Party and the others as 
a whole in the products included in the liberalization 
programme, the Contracting Parties shall, at the request 
of the Contracting Party affected, consider steps to 
remedy these disadvantages with a view to the adoption 
of suitable, non-restrictive measures designed to pro-
mote trade at the highest possible levels. 
Article 12 
If, as a result of circumstances other than those re-
ferred to in article 11, significant and persistent dis-
advantages are created in respect of trade in the products 
included in the liberalization programme, the Contracting 
Parties shall, at the request of the Contracting Party 
concerned, make every effort within their power to remedy 
these disadvantages. 
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Article 13 
The reciprocity mentioned in article 10 refers to the 
expected growth in the flow of trade between each Con-
tracting Party and the others as a whole, in the products 
included in the liberalization programme and those which 
may subsequently be added. 
CHAPTER I I I 
EXPANSION OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC 
COMPLEMENTARITY 
Article 14 
In order to ensure the continued expansion and 
diversification of reciprocal trade, the Contracting 
Parties shall take steps: 
(a) To grant one another, while observing the prin-
ciple of reciprocity, concessions which will ensure that, 
in the first negotiation, treatment not less favourable 
than that which existed before the date of entry into 
force of the present Treaty is accorded to imports from 
within the Area; 
(b) To include in the National Schedules the largest 
possible number of products in which trade is carried 
on among the Contracting Parties; and 
(c) To add to these Schedules an increasing number 
of products which are not yet included in reciprocal 
trade. 
Article 15 
In order to ensure fair competitive conditions among 
the Contracting Parties and to facilitate the increasing 
integration and complementarity of their economies, 
particularly with regard to industrial production, the 
Contracting Parties shall make every effort — in keeping 
with the liberalization objectives of the present Treaty — 
to reconcile their import and export régimes, as well 
as the treatment they accord to capital, goods and 
services from outside the Area. 
Article 16 
With a view to expediting the process of integration 
and complementarity referred to in article 15, the Con-
tracting Parties: 
(a) Shall endeavour to promote progressively closer 
co-ordination of the corresponding industrialization 
policies, and shall sponsor for this purpose agreements 
among representatives of the economic sectors concerned; 
and 
(ib) May negotiate mutual agreements on comple-
mentarity by industrial sectors. 
Article 17 
The complementarity agreements referred to in 
article 16, sub-paragraph (b), shall set forth the liberaliza-
tion programme to be applied to products of the sector 
concerned and may contain, inter alia, clauses designed 
to reconcile the treatment accorded to raw materials 
and other components used in the manufacture of 
these products. 
Any Contracting Party concerned with the comple-
mentarity programmes shall be free to participate in 
the negotiation of these agreements. 
The results of these negotiations shall, in every case, 
be embodied in protocols which shall enter into force 
after the Contracting Parties have decided that they are 
consistent with the general principles and purposes of 
the present Treaty. 
CHAPTER I V 
MOST-FAVOURED-NATION TREATMENT 
Article 18 
Any advantage, benefit, franchise, immunity or pri-
vilege applied by a Contracting Party in respect of a 
product originating in or intended for consignment to 
any other country shall be immediately and uncon-
ditionally extended to the similar product originating in 
or intended for consignment to the territory of the other 
Contracting Parties. 
Article 19 
The most-favoured-nation treatment referred to in 
article 18 shall not be applicable to the advantages, 
benefits, franchises, immunities and privileges already 
granted or which may be granted by virtue of agreements 
among Contracting Parties or between Contracting 
Parties and third countries with a view to facilitating 
border trade. 
Article 20 
Capital originating in the Area shall enjoy, in the 
territory of each Contracting Party, treatment not less 
favourable than that granted to capital originating in 
any other country. 
CHAPTER V 
TREATMENT IN RESPECT OF INTERNAL 
TAXATION 
Article 21 
With respect to taxes, rates and other internal duties 
and charges, products originating in the territory of a 
Contracting Party shall enjoy, in the territory of another 
Contracting Party, treatment no less favourable than 
that accorded to similar national products. 
Article 22 
Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to ensure that 
the charges or other domestic measures applied to 
products included in the liberalization programme which 
are not produced, or are produced only in small quantities, 
in its territory, do not nullify or reduce any concession 
or advantage obtained by any Contracting Party during 
the negotiations. 
If a Contracting Party considers itself injured by 
virtue of the measures mentioned in the previous para-
graph, it may appeal to the competent organs of the 
Association with a view to having the matter examined 
and appropriate recommendations made. 
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CHAPTER V I 
S A V I N G C L A U S E S 
Article 23 
The Contracting Parties may, as a provisional measure 
and providing that the customary level of consumption 
in the importer country is not thereby lowered, authorize 
a Contracting Party to impose non-discriminatory restric-
tions upon imports of products included in the libera-
lization programme which originate in the Area, if 
these products are imported in such quantities or under 
such conditions that they have, or are liable to have, 
serious repercussions on specific productive activities of 
vital importance to the national economy. 
Article 24 
The Contracting Parties may likewise authorize a Con-
tracting Party which has adopted measures to correct 
its unfavourable over-all balance of payments to extend 
these measures, provisionally and without discrimina-
tion, to intra-Area trade in the products included in the 
liberalization programme. 
The Contracting Parties shall endeavour to ensure 
that the imposition of restrictions deriving from the 
balance-of-payments situation does not affect trade, 
within the Area, in the products included in the liberaliza-
tion programme. 
Article 25 
If the situations referred to in articles 23 and 24 call 
for immediate action, the Contracting Party concerned 
may, as an emergency arrangement to be referred to the 
Contracting Parties, apply the measures provided for in 
the said articles. The measures adopted must immediately 
be communicated to the Committee mentioned in 
article 33, which, if it deems necessary, shall convene a 
special session of the Conference. 
Article 26 
Should the measures envisaged in this chapter be pro-
longed for more than one year, the Committee shall 
propose to the Conference, referred to in article 33, 
either ex officio or at the request of any of the Contract-
ing Parties, the immediate initiation of negotiations with 
a view to eliminating the restrictions adopted. 
The present article does not affect the provisions of 
article 8. 
CHAPTER V I I 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING 
AGRICULTURE 
Article 27 
The Contracting Parties shall seek to co-ordinate their 
agricultural development and agricultural commodity 
trade policies, with a view to securing the most efficient 
utilization of their natural resources, raising the standard 
of living of the rural population, and guaranteeing 
normal supplies to consumers, without disorganizing the 
regular productive activities of each Contracting Party. 
Article 28 
Providing that no lowering of its customary consump-
tion or increase in anti-economic production is involved, 
a Contracting Party may apply, within the period men-
tioned in article 2, and in respect of trade in agricultural 
commodities of substantial importance to its economy 
that are included in the liberalization programme, 
appropriate non-discriminatory measures designed to: 
(a) Limit imports to the amount required to meet 
the deficit in internal production; and 
(b) Equalize the prices of the imported and domestic 
product. 
The Contracting Party which decides to apply these 
measures shall inform the other Contracting Parties 
before it puts them into effect. 
Article 29 
During the period prescribed in article 2 an attempt 
shall be made to expand intra-Area trade in agricultural 
commodities by such means as agreements among the 
Contracting Parties designed to cover deficits in domestic 
production. 
For this purpose, the Contracting Parties shall give 
priority, under normal competitive conditions, to pro-
ducts originating in the territories of the other Contract-
ing Parties, due consideration being given to the tradi-
tional flows of intra-Area trade. 
Should such agreements be concluded among two or 
more Contracting Parties, the other Contracting Parties 
shall be notified before the agreements enter into force. 
Article 30 
The measures provided for in this chapter shall not 
be applied for the purpose of incorporating, in the 
production of agricultural commodities, resources which 
imply a reduction in the average level of productivity 
existing on the date on which the present Treaty enters 
into force. 
Article 31 
If a Contracting Party considers itself injured by a 
reduction of its exports attributable to the lowering of 
the usual consumption level of the importer country as 
a result of the measures referred to in article 28 and/or 
an anti-economic increase in the production referred to 
in the previous article, it may appeal to the competent 
organs of the Association to study the situation and, if 
necessary, to make recommendations for the adoption 
of appropriate measures to be applied in accordance 
with article 12. 
CHAPTER VIII 
MEASURES IN FAVOUR OF COUNTRIES AT A 
RELATIVELY LESS ADVANCED STAGE OF 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Article 32 
The Contracting Parties, recognizing that fulfilment of 
the purpose of the present Treaty will be facilitated by 
the economic growth of the countries in the Area that 
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are at a relatively less advanced stage of economic 
development, shall take steps to create conditions con-
ducive to such growth. 
To this end, the Contracting Parties may: 
(a) Authorize a Contracting Party to grant to another 
Contracting Party which is at a relatively less advanced 
stage of economic development within the Area, as long 
as necessary and as a temporary measure, for the 
purposes set out in the present article, advantages not 
extended to the other Contracting Parties, in order to 
encourage the introduction or expansion of specific 
productive activities; 
(b) Authorize a Contracting Party at a relatively less 
advanced stage of economic development within the 
Area to implement the programme for the reduction of 
duties, charges and other restrictions under more favour-
able conditions, specially agreed upon; 
(ic) Authorize a Contracting Party at a relatively less 
advanced stage of economic development within the 
Area to adopt appropriate measures to correct an 
unfavourable balance of payments, if the case arises; 
(id) Authorize a Contracting Party at a relatively less 
advanced stage of economic development within the 
Area to apply, if necessary and as a temporary measure, 
and providing that this does not entail a decrease in its 
customary consumption, appropriate non-discriminatory 
measures designed to protect the domestic output of 
products included in the liberalization programme which 
are of vital importance to its economic development; 
(e) Make collective arrangements in favour of a 
Contracting Party at a relatively less advanced stage of 
economic development within the Area with respect to 
the support and promotion, both inside and outside the 
Area, of financial or technical measures designed to 
bring about the expansion of existing productive activities 
or to encourage new activities, particularly those intended 
for the industrialization of its raw materials; and 
(J) Promote or support, as the case may be, special 
technical assistance programmes for one or more Con-
tracting Parties, intended to raise, in countries at a 
relatively less advanced stage of economic development 
within the Area, productivity levels in specific production 
sectors. 
CHAPTER I X 
O R G A N S O F T H E A S S O C I A T I O N 
Article 33 
The organs of the Association are the Conference of 
the Contracting Parties (referred to in this Treaty as 
" the Conference ") and the Standing Executive Com-
mittee (referred to in this Treaty as " the Committee "). 
Article 34 
The Conference is the supreme organ of the Associa-
tion. It shall adopt all decisions in matters requiring 
joint action on the part of the Contracting Parties, and 
it shall be empowered, inter alia: 
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(a) To take the necessary steps to carry out the 
present Treaty and to study the results of its imple-
mentation; 
(b) To promote the negotiations provided for in 
article 4 and to assess the results thereof; 
(c) To approve the Committee's annual budget and 
to fix the contributions of each Contracting Party; 
(d) To lay down its own rules of procedure and to 
approve the Committee's rules of procedure; 
(e) To elect a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen for 
each session; 
( f ) To appoint the Executive Secretary of the Com-
mittee; and 
(#) To deal with other business of common interest. 
Article 35 
The Conference shall be composed of duly accredited 
representatives of the Contracting Parties. Each delega-
tion shall have one vote. 
Article 36 
The Conference shall hold: {a) a regular session once 
a year; and (b) special sessions when convened by the 
Committee. 
At each session the Conference shall decide the place 
and date of the following regular session. 
Article 37 
The Conference may not take decisions unless at least 
two-thirds (2/3> of the Contracting Parties are present. 
Article 38 
During the first two years in which the present Treaty 
is in force, decisions of the Conference shall be adopted 
when affirmative votes are cast by at least two-thirds 
(2/3) of the Contracting Parties and providing that no 
negative vote is cast. 
The Contracting Parties shall likewise determine the 
voting system to be adopted after this two-year period. 
The affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/s) of the Con-
tracting Parties shall be required: 
(a) To approve the Committee's annual budget; 
(b) To elect the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the 
Conference, as well as the Executive Secretary; and 
(c) To fix the time and place of the sessions of the 
Conference. 
Article 39 
The Committee is the permanent organ of the Associa-
tion responsible for supervising the implementation of 
the provisions of the present Treaty. Its duties and 
responsibilities shall be, inter alia: 
(a) To convene the Conference; 
(b) To submit for the approval of the Conference an 
annual work programme and the Committee's annual 
budget estimates; 
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(c) To represent the Association in dealings with third 
countries and international organs and entities for the 
purpose of considering matters of common interest. It 
shall also represent the Association in contracts and 
other instruments of public and private law; 
(id) To undertake studies, to suggest measures and to 
submit to the Conference such recommendations as it 
deems appropriate for the effective implementation of 
the Treaty; 
(e) To submit to the Conference at its regular sessions 
an annual report on its activities and on the results of 
the implementation of the present Treaty; 
( / ) To request the technical advice and the co-opera-
tion of individuals and of national and international 
organizations; 
(g) To take such decisions as may be delegated to it 
by the Conference; and 
(h) To undertake the work assigned to it by the Con-
ference. 
Article 40 
The Committee shall consist of a Permanent Repre-
sentative of each Contracting Party, who shall have a 
single vote. 
Each Representative shall have an Alternate. 
Article 41 
The Committee shall have a Secretariat headed by an 
Executive Secretary and comprising technical and ad-
ministrative personnel. 
The Executive Secretary, elected by the Conference 
for a three-year term and re-eligible for similar periods, 
shall attend the plenary meetings of the Committee with-
out the right to vote. 
The Executive Secretary shall be the General Secre-
tary of the Conference. His duties shall be, inter alia: 
(a) To organize the work of the Conference and of 
the Committee; 
(b) To prepare the Committee's annual budget esti-
mates; and 
(c) To recruit and engage the technical and admi-
nistrative staff in accordance with the Committee's 
rules of procedure. 
Article 42 
In the performance of their duties, the Executive Secre-
tary and the Secretariat staff shall not seek or receive 
instructions from any Government or from any other 
national or international entity. They shall refrain from 
any action which might reflect on their position as in-
ternational civil servants. 
The Contracting Parties undertake to respect the 
international character of the responsibilities of the 
Executive Secretary and of the Secretariat staff and shall 
refrain from influencing them in any way in the dis-
charge of their responsibilities. 
Article 43 
In order to facilitate the study of specific problems, the 
Committee may set up Advisory Commissions composed 
of representatives of the various sectors of economic 
activity of each of the Contracting Parties. 
Article 44 
The Committee shall request, for the organs of the 
Association, the technical advice of the secretariat of 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA) and of the Inter-American Economic 
and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC) of the Organization 
of American States. 
Article 45 
The Committee shall be constituted sixty days from 
the entry into force of the present Treaty and shall 
have its headquarters in the city of Montevideo. 
CHAPTER X 
JURIDICAL PERSONALITY — IMMUNITIES 
AND PRIVILEGES 
Article 46 
The Latin American Free-Trade Association shall 
possess complete juridical personality and shall, in 
particular, have the power: 
(a) To contract; 
(b) To acquire and dispose of the movable and im-
movable property it needs for the achievement of 
its objectives; 
(c) To institute legal proceedings; and 
(d) To hold funds in any currency and to transfer 
them as necessary. 
Article 47 
The representatives of the Contracting Parties and the 
international staff and advisers of the Association shall 
enjoy in the Area such diplomatic and other immunities 
and privileges as are necessary for the exercise of their 
functions. 
The Contracting Parties undertake to conclude, as 
soon as possible, an Agreement regulating the provisions 
of the previous paragraph in which the aforesaid privi-
leges and immunities shall be defined. 
The Association shall conclude with the Government 
of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay an Agreement for 
the purpose of specifying the privileges and immunities 
which the Association, its organs and its international 
staff and advisers shall enjoy. 
CHAPTER X I 
M I S C E L L A N E O U S P R O V I S I O N S 
Article 48 
No change introduced by a Contracting Party in its 
régime of import duties and charges shall imply a level 
of duties and charges less favourable than that in force 
before the change for any commodity in respect of 
which concessions are granted to the other Contracting 
Parties. 
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The requirement set out in the previous paragraph 
shall not apply to the conversion to present worth of 
the official base value (aforo) in respect of customs 
duties and charges, providing that such conversion cor-
responds exclusively to the real value of the goods. In 
such cases, the value shall not include the customs duties 
and charges levied on the goods. 
Article 49 
In order to facilitate the implementation of the pro-
visions of the present Treaty, the Contracting Parties 
shall, as soon as possible: 
(a) Determine the criteria to be adopted for the 
purpose of establishing the origin of goods and for 
classifying them as raw materials, semi-manufactured 
goods or finished products; 
(b) Simplify and standardize procedures and formali-
ties relating to reciprocal trade; 
(c) Prepare a tariff nomenclature to serve as a com-
mon basis for the presentation of statistics and for 
carrying out the negotiations provided for in the present 
Treaty; 
(d) Determine what shall be deemed to constitute 
border trade within the meaning of article 19; 
{e) Determine the criteria for the purpose of defining 
" dumping " and other unfair trade practices and the 
procedures relating thereto. 
Article 50 
The products imported from the Area by a Contracting 
Party may not be re-exported save by agreement be-
tween the Contracting Parties concerned. 
A product shall not be deemed to be a re-export if 
it has been subjected in the importer country to industrial 
processing or manufacture, the degree of which shall be 
determined by the Committee. 
Article 51 
Products imported or exported by a Contracting Party 
shall enjoy freedom of transit within the Area and shall 
only be subject to the payment of the normal rates for 
services rendered. 
Article 52 
No Contracting Party shall promote its exports by 
means of subsidies or other measures likely to disrupt 
normal competitive conditions in the Area. 
An export shall not be deemed to have been subsidized 
if it is exempted from duties and charges levied on 
the product or its components when destined for internal 
consumption, or if it is subject to drawback. 
Article 53 
No provision of the present Treaty shall be so construed 
as to constitute an impediment to the adoption and execu-
tion of measures relating to: 
(а) The protection of public morality; 
(б) The application of security laws and regulations; 
(c) The control of imports or exports of arms, am-
munition and other war equipment and, in exceptional 
circumstances, of all other military items, in so far as 
this is compatible with the terms of article 51 and of 
the treaties on the unrestricted freedom of transit in 
force among the Contracting Parties; 
(id) The protection of human, animal and plant life 
and health; 
(e) Imports and exports of gold and silver bullion; 
( / ) The protection of the nation's heritage of artistic, 
historical and archaeological value; and 
(g) The export, use and consumption of nuclear mate-
rials, radioactive products or any other material that 
may be used in the development or exploitation of nuclear 
energy. 
Article 54 
The Contracting Parties shall make every effort to 
direct their policies with a view to creating conditions 
favourable to the establishment of a Latin American 
common market. To that end, the Committee shall 
undertake studies and consider projects and plans 
designed to achieve this purpose, and shall endeavour 
to co-ordinate its work with that of other international 
organizations. 
CHAPTER X I I 
FINAL PROVISIONS 
Article 55 
The present Treaty may not be signed with reservations 
nor shall reservations be admitted at the time of ratifica-
tion or accession. 
Article 56 
The present Treaty shall be ratified by the signatory 
States at the earliest opportunity. 
The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with 
the Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, 
which shall communicate the date of deposit to the 
Governments of the signatory and successively acceding 
States. 
Article 57 
The present Treaty shall enter into force for the first 
three ratifying States thirty days after the third instru-
ment of ratification has been deposited; and, for the 
other signatories, thirty days after the respective instru-
ment of ratification has been deposited, and in the 
order in which the ratifications are deposited. 
The Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay 
shall communicate the date of the entry into force of 
the present Treaty to the Government of each of the 
signatory States. 
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Article 58 
Following its entry into force, the present Treaty shall 
remain open to accession by the other Latin American 
States, which for this purpose shall deposit the relevant 
instrument of accession with the Government of the 
Eastern Republic of Uruguay. The Treaty shall enter 
into force for the acceding State thirty days after the 
deposit of the corresponding instrument. 
Acceding States shall enter into the negotiations re-
ferred to in article 4 at the session of the Conference 
immediately following the date of deposit of the instru-
ment of accession. 
Article 59 
Each Contracting Party shall begin to benefit from 
the concessions already granted to one another by the 
other Contracting Parties as from the date of entry into 
force of the reductions in duties and charges and other 
restrictions negotiated by them on a basis of reciprocity, 
and after the minimum obligations referred to in article 5, 
accumulated during the period which has elapsed since 
the entry into force of the present Treaty, have been 
carried out. 
Article 60 
The Contracting Parties may present amendments to 
the present Treaty, which shall be set out in protocols 
that shall enter into force upon their ratification by all 
the Contracting Parties and after the corresponding 
instruments have been deposited. 
Article 61 
On the expiry of the twelve-year term starting on the 
date of entry into force of the present Treaty, the Con-
tracting Parties shall proceed to study the results of 
the Treaty's implementation and shall initiate the neces-
sary collective negotiations with a view to fulfilling more 
effectively the purposes of the Treaty and, if desirable, 
to adapting it to a new stage of economic integration. 
Article 62 
The provisions of the present Treaty shall not affect 
the rights and obligations deriving from agreements 
signed by any of the Contracting Parties prior to the 
entry into force of the present Treaty. 
However, each Contracting Party shall take the neces-
sary steps to reconcile the provisions of existing agree-
ments with the purposes of the present Treaty. 
Article 63 
The present Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 
Article 64 
A Contracting Party wishing to withdraw from the 
present Treaty shall inform the other Contracting Parties 
of its intention at a regular session of the Conference, 
and shall formally submit the instrument of denuncia-
tion at the following regular session. 
When the formalities of dununciation have been 
completed, those rights and obligations of the denouncing 
Government which derive from its status as a Contract-
ing Party shall cease automatically, with the exception 
of those relating to reductions in duties and charges and 
other restrictions, received or granted under the libera-
lization programme, which shall remain in force for 
a period of five years from the date on which the denun-
ciation becomes formally effective. 
The period specified in the preceding paragraph may 
be shortened if there is sufficient justification, with the 
consent of the Conference and at the request of the 
Contracting Party concerned. 
Article 65 
The present Treaty shall be called the Montevideo 
Treaty. 
In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, 
having deposited their full powers, found in good and 
due form, have signed the present Treaty on behalf 
of their respective Governments. 
Done in the city of Montevideo, on the eighteenth 
day of the month of February in the year one thousand 
nine hundred and sixty, in one original in the Spanish 
and one in the Portuguese language, both texts being 
equally authentic. The Government of the Eastern Re-
public of Uruguay shall be the depositary of the present 
Treaty and shall transmit duly certified copies thereof 
to the Governments of the other signatory and acceding 
States. 
For the Government of the Argentine Republic: 
(Signed) Diogenes Taboada 
For the Government of the United States of Brazil: 
(Signed) Horacio Lafer 
For the Government of the Republic of Chile: 
(Signed) Germán Ver gar a Donoso 
For the Government of the Republic of the United 
Mexican States: 
(Signed) Manuel Tello 
For the Government of the Republic of Paraguay: 
(Signed) Raúl Sapena Pastor 
Pedro Ramón Chamorro 
For the Government of Peru: 
(Signed) Hernán Bellido 
Gonzalo L. de Aramburu 
For the Government of the Eastern Republic of 
Uruguay: 
(Signed) Horacio Martínez Montero 
Mateo Magariños de Mello 
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Protocol No. 1 
ON NORMS AND PROCEDURES FOR NEGOTIATIONS 
On the occasion of the signing of the Treaty establish-
ing a free-trade area and instituting the Latin American 
Free-Trade Association (Montevideo Treaty), the sig-
natories, thereunto duly authorized by their Govern-
ments, hereby agree upon the following Protocol: 
TITLE I 
Calculation of weighted averages 
1. For the purposes of article 5 of the Montevideo 
Treaty, it shall be understood that, as a result of the 
negotiations for the establishment of the National 
Schedules, the difference between the weighted average 
of duties and charges in force for third countries and 
that which shall be applicable to imports from within 
the area shall be not less than the product of eight 
per cent (8%) of the weighted average of duties and 
charges in force for third countries multiplied by the 
number of years that have elapsed since the Treaty 
became effective. 
2. The reduction mechanism shall therefore be based 
on two weighted averages: one corresponding to the 
average of the duties and charges in force for third 
countries; and the other to the average of the duties and 
charges which shall be applicable to imports from within 
the Area. 
3. In order to calculate each of these weighted averages, 
the total amount that would be represented by the duties 
and charges on aggregate imports of the goods under 
consideration shall be divided by the total value of these 
imports. 
4. This calculation will give a percentage (or ad valorem 
figure) for each weighted average. It is the difference 
between the two averages that shall be not less than the 
product of the factor 0.08 (or eight per cent) multiplied 
by the number of years elapsed. 
5. The foregoing formula is expressed as follows: 
t < T (1-0.08«) in which 
t = weighted average of the duties and charges that 
shall be applicable to imports from within the 
area; 
T = weighted average of duties and charges in force 
for third countries; 
n = number of years since the Treaty entered into 
force. 
6. In calculating the weighted averages for each of 
the Contracting Parties, the following shall be taken 
into account: 
(a) Products originating in the territory of the other 
Contracting Parties and imported from the Area during 
the preceding three-year period and further products 
included in the National Schedule concerned as a result 
of negotiations; 
(b) The total value of imports, irrespective of origin, 
of each of the products referred to in sub-paragraph (a), 
during the three-year period preceding each negotiation; 
and 
(c) The duties and charges on imports from third 
countries in force as on 31 December prior to the nego-
tiations, and the duties and charges applicable to imports 
from within the Area entering into force on 1 January 
following the negotiations. 
7. The Contracting Parties shall be entitled to exclude 
products of little value from the group referred to in 
sub-paragraph (a), provided that their aggregate value 
does not exceed five per cent (5%) of the value of 
imports from within the Area. 
TITLE I I 
Exchange of information 
8. The Contracting Parties shall provide one another, 
through the Standing Executive Committee, with informa-
tion as complete as possible on: 
(a) National statistics in respect of total imports and 
exports (value in dollars and volume, by countries both 
of origin and of destination), production and consump-
tion; 
(b) Customs legislation and regulations; 
(c) Exchange, monetary, fiscal and administrative 
legislation, regulations and practices bearing on exports 
and imports; 
{d) International trade treaties and agreements whose 
provisions relate to the Treaty; 
(e) Systems of direct or indirect subsidies on produc-
tion or exports, including minimum price systems; and 
(f) State trading systems. 
9. So far as possible, these data shall be permanently 
available to the Contracting Parties. They shall be 
specially brought up to date sufficiently in advance of 
the opening of the annual negotiations. 
TITLE I I I 
Negotiation of National Schedules 
10. Before 30 June of each year, the Contracting 
Parties shall make available to one another, through the 
Standing Executive Committee, the list of products in 
respect of which they are applying for concessions and, 
before 15 August of each year (with the exception of 
the first year, when the corresponding final date shall 
6 6 MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
be 1 October), the preliminary list of items in favour of 
which they are prepared to grant concessions. 
11. On 1 September of each year (with the exception 
of the first year, when the corresponding date shall be 
1 November), the Contracting Parties shall initiate the 
negotiation of the concessions to be accorded by each 
to the others as a whole. The concessions shall be assessed 
multilaterally, although this shall not preclude the 
conduct of negotiations by pairs or groups of countries, 
in accordance with the interest attaching to specific 
products. 
12. Upon the conclusion of this phase of the negotia-
tions, the Standing Executive Committee shall make 
the calculations referred to in title I of this Protocol and 
shall inform each Contracting Party, at the earliest pos-
sible opportunity, of the percentage whereby its indi-
vidual concessions reduce the weighted average of the 
duties and charges in force for imports from within 
the Area, in relation to the weighted average of duties 
and charges applicable in the case of third countries. 
13. When the concessions negotiated fall short of 
the corresponding minimum commitment, the negotia-
tions among the Contracting Parties shall be continued, 
so that the list of reductions of duties and charges and 
other restrictions to enter into force as from the following 
1 January may be simultaneously published by each of 
the Contracting Parties not later than 1 November of 
each year. 
TITLE I V 
Negotiation of the Common Schedule 
14. During each three-year period and not later than 
on 31 May of the third, sixth, ninth and twelfth years 
from the time of the Treaty's entry into force, the Stand-
ing Executive Committee shall supply the Contracting 
Parties with statistical data on the value and volume 
of the products traded in the Area during the preceding 
three-year period, indicating the proportion of aggre-
gate trade which each individually represented. 
15. Before 30 June of the third, sixth and ninth years 
from the time of the Treaty's entry into force, the Con-
tracting Parties shall exchange the lists of products 
whose inclusion in the Common Schedule they wish 
to negotiate. 
16. The Contracting Parties shall conduct multilateral 
negotiations to establish, before 30 November in the 
third, sixth, ninth and twelfth years, a Common Schedule 
comprising goods whose value meets the minimum com-
mitments referred to in article 7 of the Treaty. 
TITLE V 
Special and temporary provisions 
17. In the negotiations to which this Protocol refers, 
consideration shall be given to those cases in which 
varying levels of duties and charges on certain products 
create conditions such that producers in the Area aTe 
not competing on equitable terms. 
18. To this end, steps shall be taken to ensure prior 
equalization of tariffs or to secure by any other suitable 
procedure the highest possible degree of effective reci-
procity. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective representatives 
have signed the Protocol. 
DONE at the City of Montevideo, on the eighteenth 
day of the month of February in the year one thousand 
nine hundred and sixty, in one original in the Spanish 
and one in the Portuguese language, both texts being 
equally authentic. 
The Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay 
shall act as depositary of the present Protocol and shall 
send certified true copies thereof to the Governments of 
the other signatory and acceding countries. 
For the Government of the Argentine Republic: 
Diógenes Taboada 
For the Government of the Republic of the United 
States of Brazil: 
Horacio Lafer 
For the Government of the Republic of Chile: 
Germán Vergara Donoso 
For the Government of the Republic of the United 
Mexican States: 
Manuel Tello 
For the Government of the Republic of Paraguay: 
Raúl Sapena Pastor 
Pedro Ramón Chamorro 
For the Government of Peru: 
Hernán Bellido 
Gonzalo L. de Aramburu 
For the Government of the Eastern Republic of 
Uruguay: 
Horacio Martínez Montero 
Mateo Magariños de Mello 
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Protocol No. 2 
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE 
On the occasion of the signing of the Treaty establish-
ing a free-trade area and instituting the Latin American 
Free-Trade Association (Montevideo Treaty), the signa-
tories, thereunto duly authorized by their Governments, 
taking into consideration the need to adopt and co-
ordinate measures to facilitate the entry into force of 
the Treaty, hereby agree as follows: 
1. A Provisional Committee shall be set up, composed 
of one representative of each signatory State. Each re-
presentative shall have an alternate. 
At its first meeting the Provisional Committee shall 
elect from among its members one Chairman and two 
Vice-Chairmen. 
2. The terms of reference of the Provisional Committee 
shall be as follows: 
(a) To draw up its rules of procedure; 
(b) To prepare, within sixty days from the date of 
its inauguration, its work programme, and to establish 
its budget of expenditure and the contributions to be 
made by each country; 
(c) To adopt the measures and prepare the docu-
ments necessary for the presentation of the Treaty to 
the Contracting Parties of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT); 
(<d) To convene and prepare for the first Conference 
of Contracting Parties; 
(e) To assemble and prepare the data and statistics 
required for the first series of negotiations connected 
with the implementation of the liberalization programme 
provided for in the Treaty; 
(/) To carry out or promote studies and research, 
and to adopt whatsoever measures may be necessary 
in the common interest during its period of office; and 
(g) To prepare a preliminary draft agreement on the 
privileges and immunities referred to in article 47 of 
the Treaty. 
3. In technical matters, the Provisional Committee 
shall be assisted in an advisory capacity by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA) and the Inter-American Economic and Social 
Council (IA-ECOSOC), of the Organization of American 
States, in accordance with the relevant Protocol. 
4. The Provisional Committee shall appoint an Ad-
ministrative Secretary and other requisite staff. 
5. The Provisional Committee shall be inaugurated 
on 1 April 1960, and its quorum shall be constituted by 
not less than four members. Up to that date, the Officers 
of the Inter-Governmental Conference for the Establish-
ment of a Free-Trade Area among Latin American 
Countries shall continue to discharge their functions, 
for the sole purpose of establishing the Provisional 
Committee. 
6. The Provisional Committee shall remain in office 
until the Standing Executive Committee, provided for 
in article 33 of the Treaty, has been set up. 
7. The Provisional Committee shall have its head-
quarters in the City of Montevideo. 
8. The Officers of the above-mentioned Conference 
are recommended to request the Government of the 
Eastern Republic of Uruguay to advance the necessary 
sums to cover the payment of staff salaries and the in-
stallation and operational expenses of the Provisional 
Committee during the first ninety days. These sums shall 
be subsequently reimbursed by the States signatories of 
the present Treaty. 
9. The Provisional Committee shall approach the 
signatory Governments with a view to obtaining for 
the members of its constituent delegations, as well as 
for its international staff and advisers, such immunities 
and privileges as may be needful for the performance of 
their duties. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective representatives 
have signed the present Protocol. 
DONE at the City of Montevideo, on the eighteenth 
day of the month of February in the year one thousand 
nine hundred and sixty, in one original in the Spanish 
and one in the Portuguese language, both texts being 
equally authentic. The Government of the Eastern 
Republic of Uruguay shall act as the depositary of the 
present Protocol and shall send certified true copies 
thereof to the Governments of the other signatory and 
acceding countries. 
For the Government of the Argentine Republic: 
Diógenes Taboada 
For the Government of the Republic of the United 
States of Brazil: 
Horacio Lafer 
For the Government of the Republic of Chile: 
Germán Vergara Donoso 
For the Government of the Republic of the United 
Mexican States: 
Manuel Tello 
For the Government of the Republic of Paraguay: 
Raúl Sapena Pastor 
Pedro Ramón Chamorro 
For the Government of Peru: 
Hernán Bellido 
Gonzalo L. de Aramburu 
For the Government of the Eastern Republic of 
Uruguay: 
Horacio Martinez Montero 
Mateo Magariños de Mello 
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Protocol No. 3 
ON THE COLLABORATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN 
AMERICA (ECLA) AND OF THE INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL 
(IA-ECOSOC) OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 
On the occasion of the signing of the Treaty establish-
ing a free-trade area and instituting the Latin American 
Free-Trade. Association (Montevideo Treaty), the signa-
tories, thereunto duly authorized by their Governments, 
hereby agree as follows: 
1. With reference to the provisions of article 44 of the 
Treaty and in view of the fact that the secretariats of 
ECLA and of IA-ECOSOC have agreed to assist the 
organs of the Latin American Free-Trade Association 
with advice on technical matters, a representative of 
each of the secretariats in question shall attend the 
meetings of the Standing Executive Committee of the 
above-mentioned Association when the business to be 
discussed is, in the Committee's opinion, of a technical 
nature. 
2. The appointment of the representatives referred 
to shall be subject to the prior approval of the members 
of the said Committee. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective representatives 
have signed the present Protocol. 
DONE at the City of Montevideo, on the eighteenth day 
of the month of February in the year one thousand 
nine hundred and sixty, in one original in the Spanish 
and one in the Portuguese language, both texts being 
equally authentic. The Government of the Eastern Re-
public of Uruguay shall act as the depositary of the 
present Protocol and shall send certified true copies 
thereof to the Governments of the other signatory and 
acceding countries. 
For the Governement of the Argentine Republic : 
Diógenes Toboada 
For the Government of the Republic of the United 
States of Brazil: 
Horacio Lafer 
For the Government of the Republic of Chile: 
Germán Vergara Donoso 
For the Government of the Republic of the United 
Mexican States: 
Manuel Tello 
For the Government of the Republic of Paraguay: 
Raúl Sapena Pastor 
Pedro Ramón Chamorro 
For the Government of Peru: 
Hernán Bellido 
Gonzalo L. de Aramburu 
For the Government of the Eastern Republic of 
Uruguay: 
Horacio Martínez Montero 
Mateo Magariños de Mello 
Protocol No. 4 
ON COMMITMENTS TO PURCHASE OR SELL PETROLEUM AND PETROLEUM DERIVATIVES 
On the occasion of the signing of the Treaty establish-
ing a free-trade area and instituting the Latin American 
Free-Trade Association (Montevideo Treaty), the sig-
natories, thereunto duly authorized by their Govern-
ments, hereby agree: 
To declare that the provisions of the Montevideo 
Treaty, signed on 18 February 1960, are not applicable 
to commitments to purchase or sell petroleum and 
petroleum derivatives resulting from agreements con-
cluded by the signatories of the present Protocol prior 
to the date of signature of the above-mentioned Treaty. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective representatives 
have signed the present Protocol. 
DONE at the City of Montevideo, on the eighteenth 
day of the month of February in the year one thousand 
nine hundred and sixty, in one original in the Spanish 
and one in the Portuguese language, both texts being 
equally authentic. 
The Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay 
shall act as depositary of the present Protocol and shall 
send certified true copies thereof to the Governments 
of the other signatory and acceding countries. 
For the Government of the Argentine Republic: 
Diogenes Taboada 
For the Government of the Republic of the United 
States of Brazil: 
Horacio Lafer 
For the Government of the Republic of Chile: 
Germán Vergara Donoso 
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For the Government of the Republic of the United 
Mexican States: 
Manuel Tello 
For the Government of the Republic of Paraguay: 
Raúl Sapena Pastor 
Pedro Ramón Chamorro 
For the Government of Peru: 
Hernán Bellido 
Gonzalo L. de Aramburu 
For the Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay: 
Horacio Martínez Montero 
Mateo Magariños de Mello 
Protocol No. 5 
ON SPECIAL TREATMENT IN FAVOUR OF BOLIVIA AND PARAGUAY 
On the occasion of the signing of the Treaty establish-
ing a free-trade area and instituting the Latin American 
Free-Trade Association (Montevideo Treaty), the signa-
tories, thereunto duly authorized by their Governments, 
hereby agree: 
To declare that Bolivia and Paraguay are at present 
in a position to invoke in their favour the provisions 
in the Treaty concerning special treatment for countries 
at a relatively less advanced stage of economic develop-
ment within the Free-Trade Area. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective representatives 
have signed the present Protocol. 
DONE at the City of Montevideo, on the eighteenth 
day of the month of February in the year one thousand 
nine hundred and sixty, in one original in the Spanish 
and one in the Portuguese language, both texts being 
equally authentic. 
The Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay 
shall act as depositary of the present Protocol and shall 
send certified true copies thereof to the Governments of 
other signatory and acceding countries. 
For the Government of the Argentine Republic: 
Didgenes Taboada 
For the Government of the Republic of the United 
States of Brazil: 
Horacio Lafer 
For the Government of the Republic of Chile: 
Germán Vergara Donoso 
For the Government of the Republic of the United 
Mexican States: 
Manuel Tello 
For the Government of the Republic of Paraguay: 
Raúl Sapena Pastor 
Pedro Ramón Chamorro 
For the Government of Peru: 
Hernán Bellido 
Gonzalo L. de Aramburu 
For the Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay: 
Horacio Martínez Montero 
Mateo Magariños de Mello 
Resolution I 
MEETINGS OF GOVERNMENTAL REPRESENTATIVES OF CENTRAL BANKS 
The Inter-Governmental Conference for the Establishment 
of a Free-Trade Area among Latin American Countries, 
In view of the report submitted to the Conference by 
the Meeting of Governmental Representatives of Central 
Banks, held at Montevideo in January 1960, 
Considering the desirability of continuing the studies 
on payments and credits to facilitate the financing of 
intra-Area transactions and therefore the fulfilment of 
the purposes of the Treaty establishing a Free-Trade 
Area and instituting the Latin American Free-Trade 
Association, 
Decides : 
1. To take note of the above-mentioned report; 
2. To request the Provisional Committee to convene 
informal meetings of governmental experts from the 
central banks of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, which shall be organized 
by the secretariat of the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Latin America (ECLA); 
3. To establish that the object of these meetings shall 
be the continuance of the studies on credits and pay-
ments to facilitate the financing of intra-Area transac-
tions and therefore the fulfilment of the purposes of 
the aforesaid Treaty; 
4. To request the United Nations Economic Commis-
sion for Latin America (ECLA), the Inter-American 
Economic and Central Council (IA-ECOSOC) of the 
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Organization of American States and the International 
Monetary Fund for their advice and technical assistance; 
5. To extend the invitation to experts from the central 
banks of such countries as may have acceded to the 
said Treaty. 
Montevideo, 18 February 1960 
For the Government of the Argentine Republic: 
Diogenes Taboada 
For the Government of the Republic of the United 
States of Brazil: 
Horacio Lafer 
For the Government of the Republic of Chile: 
Germán Vergara Donoso 
For the Government of the Republic of the United 
Mexican States: 
Manuel Tello 
For the Government of the Republic of Paraguay: 
Raúl Sapena Pastor 
Pedro Ramón Chamorro 
For the Government of Peru: 
Hernán Bellido 
Gonzalo L. de Aramburu 
For the Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay: 
Horacio Martínez Montero 
Mateo Magariños de Mello 
Resolution II 
MORATORIUM GRANTED TO BOLIVIA FOR SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY 
The Inter-Governmental Conference for the Establishment 
of a Free-Trade Area among Latin American Countries, 
Considering the generous spirit of co-operation dis-
played by Bolivia in its participation in the negotiations 
for the conclusion of the Treaty establishing a Free-
Trade Area and instituting the Latin American Free-
Trade Association, 
Mindful of the motives adduced by the delegation of 
Bolivia to explain why, for reasons of force majeure, 
it is unable to sign the above-mentioned Treaty on the 
present occasion, 
Decides to grant the Government of Bolivia a mora-
torium of four (4) months during which it will be free 
to accede to the aforesaid Treaty as a signatory State. 
Montevideo, 18 February 1960 
For the Government of the Argentine Republic: 
Diogenes Taboada 
For the Government of the Republic of the United 
States of Brazil: 
Horacio Lafer 
For the Government of the Republic of Chile: 
Germán Vergara Donoso 
For the Government of the Republic of the United 
Mexican States: 
Manuel Tello 
For the Government of the Republic of Paraguay: 
Raúl Sapena Pastor 
Pedro Ramón Chamorro 
For the Government of Peru: 
Hernán Bellido 
Gonzalo L. de Aramburu 
For the Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay: 
Horacio Martínez Montero 
Mateo Magariños de Mello 
m . REPORT OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE TRADE COMMITTEE * 
(Santiago, Chile, 8 to 12 May 1961) 
1. The present report reviews the proceedings of the 
Trade Committee of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America, which met at Santiago, Chile, from 8 to 
12 May 1961. 
2. The report is divided into two parts. Part I gives 
* Issued earlier in mimeographed form as document E/CN.12/ 
C.l/19/Rev.l (25 May 1961). 
the membership of the Committee and describes the 
organization of its work, reproduces the agenda on 
which its meetings were based and summarizes the 
discussions. The resolutions adopted by the Committee 
at the close of its proceedings are given in part II. 
3. The text of the present report was approved by the 
Committee for submission to the Commission, at the 
closing meeting on 12 May 1961. 
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PART I 
THIRD SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE 
A . MEMBERSHIP, ATTENDANCE AND ORGANIZATION 
OF WORK 
Opening and closing meetings 
4. The opening meeting of the Committee was held 
on 8 May 1961. Addresses were delivered by Mr. Esteban 
Ivovich of the Economic Commission for Latin America, 
Mr. Leopoldo Hugo Tettamanti, of the delegation of 
Argentina, and Mr. Mateo J. Magarinos de Mello, 
representative of the Latin American Free-Trade As-
sociation. 
5. The closing meeting of the Committee was held 
on 12 May 1961. Addresses were delivered by Mr. Placido 
Garcia Reynoso, head of the delegation of Mexico, 
Mr. Jorge Mendez, head of the delegation of Colombia 
and Chairman of the third session of the Committee, 
and Mr. Esteban Ivovich of the Economic Commission 
for Latin America. 
Membership and attendance 
6. The session was attended by representatives of all 
the States members of the Committee, namely, Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Kingdom of the Nether-
lands, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela. The 
complete list of representatives is given in annex I of 
the present report. 
7. Representatives of British Guiana and British 
Honduras attended the third session of the Committee 
in the capacity of associate members of the Commission. 
8. In accordance with paragraph 6 of the Commission's 
terms of reference, the representatives of the following 
States Members of the United Nations but not members 
of the Commission attended the third session in a con-
sultative capacity: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, 
Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic and Yugo-
slavia (see annex I). The Federal Republic of Germany 
sent an observer, under the terms of resolution 632 (XXII) 
of the Economic and Social Council. 
Organization of the work 
Election of officers 
9. At its first meeting, on 8 May 1961, the following 
officers were elected: 
Chairman: Jorge Mendez (Colombia) 
First Vice-Chairman: Leopoldo Hugo Tettamanti 
(Argentina) 
Second Vice-Chairman : Guillermo Stewart Vargas 
(Uruguay) 
Rapporteur: Julio Prado García Salas (Guatemala) 
Secretariat 
10. The secretariat of the Committee was composed 
of the following members: 
Esteban Ivovich, Director, Trade Policy Division 
Alejandro Power, Secretary 
Technical advisers: 




B . AGENDA 
11. At its first meeting the Committee adopted the 
following agenda: 
1. Opening addresses 
2. Election of officers 
3. Adoption of the agenda 
4. Regional economic integration: recent trends 
(a) The Latin American Free-Trade Association 
(Montevideo Treaty) 
(i) Analysis of the recommendations of the 
Trade Committee and of the Montevideo 
Treaty with respect to establishing the Latin 
American common market 
(ii) Work carried out or in course of execution 
by the Latin American Free-Trade Associa-
tion 
(b) Central American economic integration 
(c) Trade problems of Colombia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela 
Documents : 
The Latin American movement towards multi 
lateral economic collaboration (E/CN. 12/567) 
Report of the tenth session of the Central American 
Trade Sub-Committee (E/CN.12/CCE/234) 
Note by the secretariat on the Central American 
common market (E/CN. 12/587) 
Consultative meetings on trade policy: report of 
the third series of meetings between Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela (Quito, 7-10 December 
1960) (E/CN. 12/555) 
5. Financial problems of the Latin American common 
market 
Documents : 
Foreign private investments in the Latin American 
Free-Trade Area (E/CN.12/550) United Nations 
publication, Sales No.: 60.II.G.5 
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Papers on financial problems prepared by the 
secretariat of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America for the Latin American Free-Trade 
Association (E/CN. 12/569) 
6. Customs policy and the Latin American common 
market 
Documents : 
Report of the first session of the Working Group 
on Customs Questions (Montevideo, 1-12 August 
1960), submitted to the ECLA Trade Committee, 
with a Note by the secretariat (E/CN. 12/568) 
Customs duties and other import charges and 
restrictions in Latin American countries : average 
levels of incidence (E/CN.12/554 and Add.l, 
Argentina; Add.2, Bolivia; Add.3, Brazil; Add.4, 
Colombia; Add.5, Chile; Add.6, Ecuador; Add.7, 
Mexico; Add.8, Paraguay; Add.9, Peru; Add.10, 
Uruguay; and Add.l 1, Venezuela) 
7. Consideration and adoption of the report of the 
third session of the Trade Committee (E/CN. 12/ 
C.l/19) 
8. Date and place of the fourth session of the Trade 
Committee 
C . ACCOUNT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Regional economic integration: recent trends 
12. At the opening of the Committee's proceedings, 
the secretariat called attention to the great advances made 
in the field of economic co-operation among Latin 
American countries, as reflected in the progress achieved 
by the committee responsible for the Central American 
Economic Integration Programme and the entry into 
force of the Montevideo Treaty. Those developments 
had been possible because — unlike former attempts 
which had failed — both the Central American move-
ment and the Montevideo Treaty were based on thorough 
research into real conditions in the countries likely 
ultimately to accede to them. 
13. Speaking on behalf of the delegations, the repre-
sentative of Argentina expressed the satisfaction of the 
Governments members of the Committee with the excel-
lent background documents prepared by the secretariat, 
and stressed that the latter's work should now be extended 
to Latin America's extra-regional trade problems, and, 
in particular, to collaboration in the formulation of 
Latin America's trade policy vis-à-vis trade associations 
in other continents. 
14. The Committee studied the report on the Latin 
American movement towards multilateral economic co-
operation (E/CN. 12/567). Prior to the actual discussion 
the representative of the Latin American Free-Trade 
Association and Chairman of the Montevideo Provisional 
Committee explained the present status of the process 
which had begun with the conclusion of the Montevideo 
Treaty. To that end, he reviewed the activities of the 
Provisional Committee between the signing of the Treaty 
on 18 February 1960 and the simultaneous deposit of 
the instruments of ratification by the signatories on 
2 May 1961. Outstanding among those activities was the 
preparation of the information required by the Con-
tracting Parties of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), which had studied the Montevideo 
Treaty at their sessions in May and October 1960. He 
also gave an account of the meetings of experts which 
the Provisional Committee had been convening, covering 
such fields as customs problems, transport and the pro-
cessing of foreign trade statistics. With regard to the 
next steps to be taken, he stated that the Montevideo 
Treaty would enter into force on 1 June 1961, i.e., thirty 
days from the date of deposit of the instrument of ratifica-
tion, that the first conference of the contracting parties 
would be convened in July, and that the Standing 
Executive Committee would be set up on 1 August, 
the month in which the first series of negotiations was 
expected to begin. 
15. The Committee expressed its satisfaction at the 
secretariat's contribution to the preparation of the 
Montevideo Treaty and requested it to continue to give 
technical advice to the organs of the Latin American 
Free-Trade Association, in conformity with the terms 
of article 44 of the Treaty. (See resolution 11 (III).) 
16. The Committee discussed the relationship between 
the provisions of the Montevideo Treaty and the general 
principles it suggested in its resolution 6 (II) should be 
observed for the formation of the Latin American com-
mon market. The result of the discussion was that the 
Committee recognized with satisfaction that the Treaty 
conformed to those principles. 
17. It was pointed out that the apparent weakness 
of the Treaty was that its provisions for the automatic 
implementation of the liberalization programme was 
determined not only by political considerations, but 
mainly by the economic conditions prevailing in the 
Latin American countries. In that connexion, it was 
suggested that an automatic liberalization mechanism 
applicable to all goods indiscriminately might seriously 
affect existing structures of production and give rise to 
disinvestment in many sectors. Consequently, and in 
view of the shortage of available capital and the need 
to safeguard current levels of employment, it was consi-
dered preferable that the liberalization process should 
take place very gradually on the basis of negotiations 
each year so that without undue prejudice to interests 
already established there should be an opportunity for 
the gradual development of new trade flows and the 
promotion of investment in the most needful and desir-
able fields. 
18. The consensus of opinion was that the Treaty 
constituted a suitable instrument for securing economic 
complementarity in Latin America and that its conclu-
sion therefore represented a highly significant advance 
towards the attainment of that objective. It was stressed, 
however, that the Treaty represented only a first step in 
that direction, since the time had come for the interested 
Governments to avail themselves of its provisions with 
the resolute intention of linking up the individual natio-
nal markets in respect of all those economic sectors for 
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which the existence of a broader market was a necessary 
or indispensable requisite, if maximum utilization of 
resources was to be achieved, the economic development 
process expedited and a better level of living ensured 
for the peoples of the region. 
19. The Committee considered that, in accordance 
with the recommendation contained in its resolution 6 (II) 
regarding participation by the greatest possible number 
of countries, and in accordance with the provisions of 
the Montevideo Treaty designed to facilitate member-
ship by other Latin American countries, it would be 
desirable for the Governments which had not so far 
decided to become parties to the multilateral treaties 
concluded in Latin America, to give careful considera-
tion to the problems which their ultimate participation 
might involve. In that connexion, the secretariat was 
requested to help to clarify the problems concerned so 
that all the Latin American countries could with the 
least possible delay associate themselves with the multi-
lateral economic co-operation movements. (See resolu-
tion 11 (III).) 
20. The delegation of Bolivia expressed its Govern-
ment's regret at being unable for the moment to accede 
to the Montevideo Treaty. The economic, social and 
political problems which his country was facing prevented 
it from enjoying the benefits it might derive from par-
ticipation in the Latin American Free-Trade Association, 
at least until the country had consolidated the progress 
made in land reform and industrialization. 
21. Furthermore, in connexion with the position of 
the Latin American countries which were not yet members 
of the existing multilateral groups, the Committee con-
sidered that the secretariat should in its studies take 
special account of the problems of trade relations between 
such countries and the multilateral groups, with a view 
to the gradual establishment of conditions necessary for 
a future economic association among all the republics 
of Latin America. 
22. The representative of GATT expressed his orga-
nization's satisfaction at the entry into force of the 
Montevideo Treaty and took note of the efforts made 
by the signatory countries to ensure that their Associa-
tion was in line with the GATT rules regarding the 
establishment of free-trade areas. As to the interest of 
the Latin American countries in the activities carried 
on within GATT, he drew attention to the impor-
tance of the activities resulting from the establishment 
of the common external tariff by the European 
Economic Community. The tariff obliged the States 
members of the Community to raise certain duties 
hitherto consolidated in the GATT machinery. To do 
so they had to show that the benefits resulting from 
reductions in the common tariff for the same product 
in other member States offset the increases introduced. 
Otherwise, the Community must provide compensation 
in respect of other products or allow countries not 
satisfied with the compensation offered to withdraw 
equivalent concessions. The negotiations on the subject 
had run into many difficulties and it was hoped that 
the negotiations due to commence within GATT in the 
near future would lessen the unfavourable effects it was 
feared would result from the application of the common 
tariff. The European Economic Community had an-
nounced its intention of offering a 20 per cent reduction 
in its duties provided it met with an adequate response 
from the industrialized countries but it would be pre-
pared to refrain from claiming an equivalent counter-
part from the less developed countries. 
23. The GATT representative further stated that 
according to the estimates made by his organization, 
price fluctuations for raw materials in the world markets 
during the last three years had meant a loss of income 
of nearly 7,000 million dollars to the under-developed 
countries as compared with what they would have earned 
if 1957 price levels had been maintained. To counteract 
price fluctuations, recourse was being had to international 
agreements on products to prevent the disorganization 
of markets and provide a cushion for falling prices. 
GATT considered that basic solutions to the problems 
of the under-developed countries could be found when 
such countries were in a position to export manufac-
tured goods competitively. To achieve that, the industrial 
countries must understand that a change in the structure 
of international trade was essential. 
24. The Committee considered the situation deriving 
from the trade relations between the Latin American 
countries and those of other regions, including Africa, 
and recommended to the secretariat that as part of its 
work programme it should study the problems relating 
to the expansion of Latin America's trade with the rest 
of the world, taking into account the trade problems 
which might arise in connexion with groups of countries 
in the other regions concerned. 
25. In view of the new turn being taken by intra-Latin 
American trade relations through the multilateral associa-
tions in operation, the Committee considered that the 
training of national technical experts specializing in 
trade policy was a vital necessity. Some delegations 
reported on the difficulties their countries had ex-
perienced in that direction owing to the shortage 
of personnel technically qualified to deal with such 
matters. With that in view, the Committee requested 
the secretariat to organize special training courses in 
trade policy, with particular reference to matters con-
nected with the current movement towards multilateral 
economic co-operation. (See resolution 14 (III).) In 
that connexion, mention was made of the valuable 
experience gained by GATT, and attention was drawn 
to the desirability of taking advantage of it in the orga-
nization of the training courses contemplated by ECLA. 
26. The Committee recognized that among the most 
important problems affecting the development of intra-
Latin American trade flows were those arising from the 
shortage of satisfactory transport media, from the 
conditions in which existing transport facilities operated 
and from certain relevant problems of trade policy. 
27. In the opinion of the Committee, the points which 
the secretariat should study in the course of its work 
included the determination of the tonnage to be trans-
ported— and, bound up with that, the availability of 
shipping, storage facilities and other matters affecting 
the regular operation of transport services — as well as 
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the possible bases for solving certain trade problems 
connected with transport which affected the progress 
of market integration programmes. Consequently, the 
Committee agreed to recommend to the secretariat that 
in carrying out its activities in connexion with the 
gradual implementation of the Trade Committee's pro-
gramme it should devote special attention to the influence 
of transport problems on intra-Latin American trade 
and study ways and means of solving such problems, 
including those relating to trade policy. The Committee 
pointed out the desirability of carrying out such studies 
in co-operation with the appropriate organs of the 
multilateral agreements on economic integration in 
Latin America, when they related to the contracting 
parties to such agreements. (See resolution 15 (III).) 
28. The Committee unanimously agreed that in many 
Latin American countries the tourist industry constituted 
an important source of foreign exchange earnings, 
and that in some of them it was quite as important as 
other basic sectors of national income. 
29. It was also recognized that certain measures to 
restrict tourist trade adopted by countries from which 
there was a substantial flow of tourists might be seriously 
prejudicial to the interests of the countries towards which 
the tourist flow was directed. The Committee therefore 
agreed that its members should be invited, in drafting 
customs or similar regulations, to take into account the 
possible effects of such provisions on the flow of tourists 
into other countries of the region, and to avoid such 
measures where they were likely to have an adverse 
effect on the tourist industry. (See resolution 16 (III).) 
30. The delegation of the United States, while endors-
ing the Committee's recommendations in that field, said 
that " in voting for this resolution, members should 
recognize that the United States is considering terminat-
ing, at least temporarily, the extraordinary exemption 
of 400 dollars which it allowed to returning United 
States residents as a post-war recovery measure, but 
continuing the 100-dollar exemption. The United States 
does not consider this action on its part as being incon-
sistent with the resolution." 
Agricultural problems in relation to the regional 
integration programme 
31. The Trade Committee held a joint meeting with 
the Agriculture Committee of the ninth session of the 
Commission to consider the study on the role of agri-
culture in the Latin American agreements on the forma-
tion of common markets or free-trade areas (E/CN.12/ 
551), prepared by the joint ECLA/FAO group. It was 
stressed that the solution of Latin America's agricultural 
problems could contribute enormously to the success 
of the programmes for regional economic integration, 
and that the latter, in turn, would play a decisive part in 
solving such problems. The document also described 
the main aspects of intra-regional trade in agricultural 
commodities and analysed the possible repercussions 
of economic integration agreements on the agricultural 
sector. 
32. The secretariat stressed the part to be played by 
agriculture in the Montevideo Treaty, and pointed out 
that the Treaty provided a valuable opportunity for 
remedying certain distortions apparent in the agricul-
tural structure of Latin America, resulting, inter alia, 
from the complete isolation from regional competition 
in which agriculture had been developing in the countries 
of the area, where agricultural production lagged behind 
demand. 
33. Some delegations pointed out that ECLA should 
undertake studies to provide the bases for possible co-
ordination of agricultural and industrial development 
policies within the Latin American Free-Trade Area, 
with a view to solving both the above-mentioned problem 
and others, particularly that of productivity. 
Economic Integration of Central America 
34. The Committee considered and noted with satis-
faction the effort made in 1960 by the Governments of 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua to 
further the process of integration of their economies. 
The decision of those Governments to expedite the estab-
lishment of the common market and integrated regional 
development culminated in December 1960 in the 
conclusion of the General Treaty on Central American 
Economic Integration, the Protocol to the Central 
American Agreement on the Equalization of Import 
Duties and Charges and the Agreement establishing 
the Central American Bank for Economic Integration. 
The General Treaty and the Equalization Protocol were 
at present being formally ratified and it was hoped that 
they would enter into force within a matter of months. 
The Central American Bank would start operations in 
May 1961 and the negotiations for uniform customs 
tariffs would be completed in June 1961. 
35. In virtue of the above-mentioned treaties and 
agreements, the countries concerned were tending to 
broaden considerably the initial scope of the free-trade 
system between their territories. To that effect they had 
fixed a maximum time-limit of five years for the proper 
establishment of the free trade area, that period coincid-
ing with the time-limit previously allowed for the adop-
tion of a uniform customs import tariff. They had decided 
to establish an institute for financing integration and 
had adopted a series of measures in other fields: fiscal 
incentives and specialization of their industrial activities. 
36. The Government of Costa Rica was not a signa-
tory of the Managua treaties. However, the treaties 
contained clauses which explicitly left Costa Rica free 
to take a decision unilaterally and whenever it thought 
fit regarding its accession. The Committee was glad to 
hear from the Costa Rican delegation that once the 
studies being carried out had been concluded, his 
Government would decide how and when to join the 
Central American common market. 
37. The delegations of El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Nicaragua drew attention to the work carried out in 
the matter of tariff nomenclature, which had led to the 
adoption of a standard nomenclature for imports and 
exports among the six countries of Central America. 
All agreements and negotiations regarding free trade and 
tariff equalization had been based on that nomenclature. 
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They also stated that for that reason the Central Ameri-
can countries must make a reservation concerning the 
recommendation adopted by other Latin American 
countries regarding the adoption of the Brussels nomen-
clature. 
38. The delegation of Nicaragua said that Nicaragua 
was the only country in Central America which was a 
Contracting Party of GATT, and expressed the hope 
that, as on a previous occasion, GATT would approve 
the commitments Nicaragua had assumed in signing the 
new treaties on regional economic integration. 
39. The delegation of Honduras referred to the bene-
fits that Honduras would derive from its participation 
in the Central American Programme, which would be 
of assistance in raising the level of living of its popula-
tion by intensive public action in regard to public health, 
transport, communications and education. The delegation 
of El Salvador referred to various problems which had 
had to be resolved so as to establish a methodology 
suited to the needs of tariff equalization and negotiations 
regarding free trade. It also made reference to some 
of the other activities which were being carried out, 
including industrial integration and specialization, stan-
dardization of tariff and tax legislation, port facilities and 
co-ordination of rational agricultural policies. 
40. Lastly, the delegation of Guatemala stressed that 
the Central American Bank for Economic Integration 
would facilitate the integrated development of the 
member countries and enable them to act with greater 
independence in regard to the financing of integrated 
development. The Guatemalan delegation also referred 
to the Central American Economic Council and to the 
Executive Council, the governing and executive bodies 
established under the General Treaty for the general 
organization and administration of the common market. 
Trade problems of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela 
41. The secretariat reported to the Committee on the 
work carried out in connexion with the study of prob-
lems deriving from the trade relations of Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela with one another and with the 
rest of the Latin American countries, and of possible 
ways and means of solving them. 
42. In this context, the Committee took note of the 
report of the third series of meetings on trade policy 
between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela (E/CN.12/ 
555). At the meetings in question, which took place at 
Quito in December 1960, it had been possible to state 
that the three countries considered the multilateral 
framework to be the most propitious setting for the 
fuller and more balanced development of the Latin 
American economies. Such a framework was provided 
by the Montevideo Treaty. 
43. They agreed that, while bilateral trade treaties — 
or agreements among the three countries concerned — 
might constitute a satisfactory solution for certain speci-
fic problems, they did not, in view of the low level of 
complementarity of the three economies, afford the neces-
sary base for the smooth and co-ordinated development 
of trade or integration programmes. 
44. For that reason Colombia, Ecuador and Vene-
zuela had declared that they would take the necessary 
steps to accede to the Montevideo Treaty when they 
deemed it opportune, and with due regard to the cha-
racteristics of their respective economies. Ecuador and 
Venezuela stated their intention of requesting the States 
members of the Latin American Free-Trade Association 
to grant them special treatment for that would take 
into account the conditions to which they referred. 
45. The delegation of Colombia informed the Com-
mittee that its Government has submitted a bill to 
Congress requesting authorization for Colombia's acces-
sion to the Montevideo Treaty. Passage of the bill, 
which was virtually assured in view of the favourable 
reception accorded to it by Parliament and by certain 
sectors of public opinion, would enable Colombia to 
participate almost from the outset in the negotiations 
of the contracting parties. 
46. The delegation of Colombia also reaffirmed the 
pledge given by Colombia at the Quito meetings that 
within the organs of the Latin American Free-Trade 
Association it would support the treatment which Ecua-
dor and Venezuela hoped to receive so that they could 
join the Association. It also told the meeting that 
Colombia was prepared to bring its bilateral agreements 
with Ecuador into line with the provisions of the Monte-
video Treaty. 
47. The delegation of Colombia also recognized that 
accession to the Montevideo Treaty would lead to certain 
readjustments in the productive activities of the Con-
tracting Parties which, under the principle of free com-
petition, would tend to seek the level of the most pro-
ductive activities. In its opinion, regional integration 
would be hard to achieve if new industries with a high 
level of productivity, looking mainly towards the regional 
market, were to exist alongside others, already estab-
lished and less efficient, which produced only for domes-
tic markets. According to Colombia, the success of the 
Treaty depended not so such on the instrument itself 
as on the Contracting Parties' capacity to promote their 
internal development and on the scale of external aid 
while the process of import substitution was still in its 
initial stages. Again, the structure of production would 
have to be given the necessary capacity to adapt itself to 
regional specialization. Like other delegations, the delega-
tion of Colombia deemed it necessary to co-ordinate 
the development policies of individual countries with 
the targets established under the regional economic 
integration programme. 
48. The delegation of Ecuador pointed out that the 
positive effects of the Montevideo Treaty could be 
secured only by ensuring the smoothly co-ordinated 
development of all the Contracting Parties. That was 
why Ecuador hoped to obtain recognition in the Latin 
American Free-Trade Association as a country at a 
relatively less advanced stage of economic development, 
since the treatment it would then receive, by contributing 
to the solution of Ecuador's current industrial develop-
ment problems, would remove one of the chief obstacles 
to its accession to the Montevideo Treaty. 
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49. Like the delegations which had already spoken, 
the delegation of Venezuela also declared its interest 
in the Latin American integration movement as embodied 
in the Montevideo Treaty. It stated, however, that its 
country could not yet adopt a decision on the matter 
until it had been guaranteed special treatment consonant 
with the present features of its economic structure. 
50. The delegations of Ecuador and Venezuela re-
affirmed to the Trade Committee the desire they had 
expressed at the Quito meetings that the secretariat 
should co-operate with the Governments concerned in 
the study of obstacles to the possible future accession 
of the two countries to the Montevideo Treaty and that 
it should suggest ways and means of solving them. 
51. The delegation of a Contracting Party of the 
Treaty and the representative of the Provisional Com-
mittee of the Latin American Free-Trade Association 
thanked the delegations of Colombia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela for their statements and agreed that the 
appropriate organs of the Association would give due 
consideration to the position of the three Greater-
Colombia countries. 
Financial problems 
52. The Committee considered documents E/CN.12/ 
550 and E/CN. 12/569 containing, respectively, the report 
prepared by an advisory group on foreign private invest-
ment in the Latin American Free-Trade Area and some 
papers on financial problems prepared by the secretariat 
for the use of the Latin American Free-Trade Associa-
tion. 
53. It was considered that the recent trend towards 
eliminating bilateral payments agreements which had 
until recently been the main channel for intra-Latin 
American trade offered a solution to the possible prob-
lem arising out of the existence of heterogenous types 
of payments systems within the sphere of the Free-
Trade Area. It was pointed out, however, that the disap-
pearance of bilateral credits might cause some difficulty 
in regard to the maintenance of certain flows of trade, 
particularly when such flows involved products offered 
in the international markets under very liberal pay-
ments conditions as a result of agricultural surplus 
disposal programmes. 
54. The delegation of Brazil considered the trend 
towards the elimination of bilateral accounts to be a 
good sign, but believed that the process of liberalization 
would be facilitated by the establishment of a credit 
mechanism within the framework of the Free-Trade Area. 
To that end, it pointed out that, particularly in the first 
years of operation of the Latin American Free-Trade 
Association, the rate of liberalization would be higher 
if the participating countries could be sure of financial 
assistance to cover the disequilibria likely to arise as 
a result of the removal of import restrictions which in 
some cases had limited or prevented imports for many 
years. 
55. The delegation of Peru stated that its Govern-
ment's policy was based on monetary stability as a 
condition for furthering economic development. The 
position of the under-developed countries was not such 
that they could grant one another automatic credits, 
since the foreign currencies earned by their exports had 
to be used within a very short period for the acquisition 
of capital goods which the Area did not yet produce at 
competitive prices. The Peruvian delegation reaffirmed 
the position it had taken at the Lima meetings and at 
the session of the Central Banks Working Group at 
Montevideo. 
56. The representative of the International Monetary 
Fund expressed his organization's confidence that the 
forms taken by intra-Latin American co-operation for 
development would be in keeping with the prevailing 
trends in the world towards the reduction of restrictions 
and discriminatory practices. In that connexion, he said 
that free convertibility and monetary stability could 
contribute effectively to establishing the Latin American 
common market firmly. As to temporary payments 
imbalances which might arise from the execution of 
liberalization programmes, the Fund would give favour-
able consideration to granting financial assistance, pro-
vided that the interested countries did not go back on 
their intention of ensuring the stability and convertibility 
of their currencies. 
57. The delegation of the United Kingdom stressed 
the need to avoid any retrogression from the convertibility 
of currencies already achieved in Latin America. The 
European Payments Union had been created at a time 
when all the currencies concerned were inconvertible; 
Latin America was already beyond that stage. As regarded 
the question of reciprocal credits, given the generally 
low level of the Latin American countries' exchange 
reserves, it would seem unwise to try to commit countries 
in advance to grant automatic credits. Reference had been 
made in the documents to the possibility of an arrange-
ment on the lines of the European Monetary Agreement 
and it would be useful to recall that credit granted under 
that Agreement had to be justified by the pursuance of 
appropriate external and internal policies — it was not 
automatic. 
58. Another problem which commanded the Com-
mittee's attention was the financing of exports, par-
ticularly of equipment and production goods. It was 
considered that the development of trade in such goods 
in Latin America would necessarily mean the establish-
ment of machinery enabling exporters in the area to 
offer financing conditions, in the matter of time limits 
and rates of interest, equal to those made available by 
exporters in large industrial countries. Apart from the 
difficulty of obtaining the necessary resources, it was 
also pointed out that there was no insurance system 
such as existed in almost all the industrialized countries, 
and that the rates of interest prevailing in Latin Amer-
ica were higher than those in Western Europe and the 
United States. 
59. The representative of the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank said that his organization shared the concern 
as to the need to provide means of finance for inter-
Latin American exports of capital goods, and within 
the limits of the resources available, and in so far as its 
statutes allowed, the Bank was prepared to give full 
attention to the solution of the problem. 
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60. Reference was also made to the difficulties that 
might arise from the lack of proper relations between 
commercial banks in the Latin American countries owing 
to the fact that trade had developed largely on the basis 
of direct negotiations established between the central 
banks. The representative of the Centro de Estudios 
Monetarios Latinoamericanos (CEMLA) stated that mis-
givings had been expressed on that point at the last 
executive meeting of the Centre, since it was recognized 
that Latin American banks were not sufficiently expe-
rienced to provide skilled co-operation in dealing with 
the highly complex problems of payments, transfers of 
funds, Latin American foreign exchange holdings and 
so forth, which could not be solved without an expansion 
in Latin American trade. 
61. The Committee reviewed the report on foreign 
investment (E/CN. 12/550) in the countries signatories of 
the Montevideo Treaty, prepared by an advisory group 
appointed by ECLA and OAS. During the discussions 
prior to the signing of the Montevideo Treaty, two 
points had been of particular concern: first, possible 
competition among the participating countries to pro-
vide disproportionate incentives with a view to attract-
ing foreign investment, thereby affecting the establish-
ment of productive activities in the most economic sites 
and, second, the unfavourable position in which national 
entrepreneurs were liable to find themselves in the face 
of an influx of new and modern industries financed by 
foreign investment and encouraged by the prospects of 
expansion afforded by the Free-Trade Area. The first 
problem called for the reconciliation of the treatment 
applicable to foreign investment, but the marked dis-
parities in the aims and mechanism of the policies 
adopted in that matter by Latin American countries 
made it very difficult — for the present at least — to 
formulate general principles for the mutual observance 
of rules sufficiently elastic to compare with the liberal 
methods prevailing in certain countries, and at the same 
time sufficiently rigid to fit in with the restrictive approach 
observable in others. There were, however, certain fields 
in which the possibility of such reconciliation might be 
explored by making the necessary studies, e.g. those 
systems related to movement of capital and remittance 
of profits, interest and royalties, the adjustment of tax 
systems in so far as they affected the competitive position 
of the manufactured goods in trade, the adoption of 
common standards for the revaluation of assets, and 
the establishment of the bases for a general agreement 
on double taxation. The problem of the situation of 
local capital called for the creation of means and incen-
tives to promote the modernization of existing enter-
prises, and the exploration of appropriate methods for 
bringing national capital into association with the flow 
of new investment deriving from the formation of 
expanded trading areas. 
62. The delegation of Mexico, endorsing the views of 
the secretariat, expressed the hope that the Latin Ameri-
can countries would take steps to ensure that the en-
hanced opportunities offered by the Free-Trade Area 
were not monopolized by foreign investors armed with 
greater technical and financial resources. Mexico, realiz-
ing the possible unfavourable repercussions of certain 
6 
foreign investments on economic development pro-
grammes, was restricting the inflow of foreign capital 
to the basic sectors of the economy or to those in which 
national capital was operating at a satisfactory level of 
efficiency and in other cases, favoured the formation 
of joint enterprises in which the major proportion of 
the capital was of domestic origin, represented by re-
gistered shares. 
63. The delegation of Chile stressed that, as part of 
the regional integration process in the Latin American 
countries, a new approach should be made to various 
aspects of their respective domestic policies which would 
necessarily become the concern of the region as a whole. 
The fiscal, monetary and exchange policies of each 
country in the Area would play an increasingly important 
part at the regional level. The Chilean delegation also 
considered that an endeavour should be made to solve 
such problems by means of concerted action, since they 
might otherwise act as a brake on the movement towards 
the common market. At the same time, it would be 
desirable to consider the best way of assuring the un-
trammelled movement of capital from one country in 
the Area to another. 
Customs policy and the Latin American common market 
64. In its consideration of customs policy, with par-
ticular reference to the Latin American common market, 
the Committee began by taking note of the report of 
the first session of the Working Group on Customs 
Questions (Montevideo, Uruguay, 1 to 12 August i960).1 
The Working Group, which was set up in accordance 
with Trade Committee resolution 7 (II), dealt on that 
occasion with various aspects of customs techniques, 
such as the adoption by the countries of Latin America 
of a standard customs nomenclature, a standard defini-
tion of customs value and standard definitions of basic 
customs terms and also other topics related to the train-
ing of customs personnel, the study of the simplification 
and standardization of customs procedures and docu-
ments, special customs régimes, etc. and also certain 
items related to the interpretation and execution of the 
Montevideo Treaty. 
65. One of the delegations stated that the resolutions 
approved by the Working Group met the requirements 
which arose, in the matter of customs techniques, from 
the programmes for making the economies of the Latin 
American countries complementary and from the need 
to improve and modernize the import régimes of those 
countries and their customs operations. Accordingly, the 
States members of the Latin American Free-Trade 
Association had already decided, through the Provisional 
Committee, to adopt the decisions and recommendations 
set forth in the report of the Working Group and had 
suggested to the remaining Latin American countries 
that they should follow suit with a view to facilitating 
their possible participation in the Free-Trade Area. 
66. The countries participating in the Central American 
Economic Integration Programme were in a special 
position, for some years earlier they had adopted a 
1 E/CN.12/568. 
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standard tariff nomenclature (NAUCA), drawn up in 
conformity with the specific characteristics of their 
economies and with the structure of their foreign trade. 
Those countries also followed standard practices in 
other aspects of their customs régimes. 
67. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Com-
mittee decided to approve the report of the first session 
of the Working Group on Customs Questions and to 
endorse the resolutions and recommendations adopted 
at that session. It also recommended to the Latin 
American countries not participating in the Central 
American Economic Integration Programme that they 
should adopt the Brussels Nomenclature, as well as the 
Customs Co-operation Council's definition of customs 
value, and the standard definition of basic customs terms 
as indicated by the Working Group. Stress was laid on 
the desirability of adopting the foregoing classifications 
and definitions at the earliest opportunity in the case 
of States signatories of Latin American trade liberaliza-
tion agreements and in the case of other countries which 
were considering adherence to those agreements. (See 
resolution 13 (III).) 
68. The Committee recognized that by way of sup-
plementing the adoption of the Customs Co-operation 
Council's definition of customs value, every country 
which had not yet done so should establish a central 
valuation office, as recommended in the relevant resolu-
tion of the Working Group. It also acknowledged the 
advantages, from the standpoint of trade policy, that 
would be represented by the adoption of ad valorem 
duties in national tariffs, in so far as each individual 
country was in a position to do so. With respect to the 
training of customs personnel, the Committee reaffirmed 
the recommendation of the Working Group to the Latin 
American countries to the effect that customs training 
schools should be established. 
69. The Committee agreed to request the ECLA 
secretariat to give priority, in compliance with the deci-
sions of the Working Group, to studies relating to 
customs procedures and documentation and to special 
customs régimes; to request for the purpose, when it 
deemed such action advisable, the collaboration of the 
Customs Co-operation Council and other international 
agencies ; and to convene, in due course, a second session 
of the Working Group on Customs Questions. 
70. In connexion with some of the foregoing topics, 
the observer from the Customs Co-operation Council 
described the work of that agency in the field of tariff 
nomenclature, customs value and other aspects of 
customs technique, as well as the collaboration between 
the Council and the ECLA secretariat. 
71. The Committee also discussed certain problems of 
customs policy in relation to the secretariat study on 
customs duties and other import charges and restrictions 
in eleven Latin American countries, and their average 
levels of incidence (E/CN. 13/554 and Adds.l to 11). In 
that context, the Committee, endorsing some of the 
conclusions deriving from the aforesaid study, decided, 
in its resolution 12 (III), to recommend to the Latin 
American countries that they should build up a customs 
policy designed to encourage the most efficient pro-
ductive activities and those considered to be of basic 
importance for the development of their national eco-
nomies and the expansion of foreign trade, in view of 
the importance of co-ordinating national economic 
development programmes and promoting the increasing 
complementarity of their economies. For the attain-
ment of the above-mentioned objectives, as well as 
others pursued through agreements on the liberalization 
of trade and on economic complementarity, it was 
essential that the Latin American countries should 
simplify and co-ordinate their import régimes and re-
store the status of the customs tariff as a basic — although 
not necessarily the only — instrument of their trade 
policy. (See resolution 12 ( I I I ) . ) 
72. Finally, in the same resolution, the Committee 
agreed to request the secretariat to continue and expand 
its studies on tariff policy in the Latin American coun-
tries, endeavouring to bring to light and suggest the 
measures best calculated to achieve the ends referred to 
in the preceding paragraph. 
PART I I 
R E S O L U T I O N S A D O P T E D 
73. At its third session, the Trade Committee adopted 
the following resolutions: 
11 ( I I I ) . Multilateral economic co-operation 
12(111). Customs policy 
13(111). Customs questions 
14 ( I II ) . Special training courses in trade policy 
15(111). Transport 
16(111). Development of the tourist industry 
17 ( I II ) . Place and date of the fourth session of the 
Trade Committee 
11 (III ) . MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
The Trade Committee, 
Cognizant of document E/CN. 12/567, relating to the 
Latin American movement towards multilateral economic 
co-operation, in which the ECLA secretariat reviews the 
relevant developments in Latin America during the last 
two years, 
Having established that the Montevideo Treaty, where-
by the Latin American Free-Trade Association is in-
stituted and a Free-Trade Area created, adheres in all 
essentials to the principles which, in its resolution 6 (II), 
this Committee recommended should be complied with 
in the formation of the Latin American common market, 
Convinced that the establishment of the above-men-
tioned Free-Trade Area constitutes a real advance 
towards the integration of the markets of the individual 
Latin American countries which is necessary in order to 
improve productivity, expedite economic growth and, as 
a result, afford better levels of living and more employ-
ment opportunities to the populations of Latin America, 
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Bearing in mind that, in view of current trends in the 
world economy, it is extremely important for the studies 
and other activities of ECLA to take into consideration 
the problems connected with foreign trade and trade 
policy as between Latin America and other regions of 
the world, 
Decides : 
1. To take note with satisfaction of the part played 
by the secretariat of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America in the preparation of the Montevideo 
Treaty; 
2. To recognize with satisfaction that the Montevideo 
Treaty is in harmony with the general principles which 
this Committee recommended should be complied with 
in the formation of the Latin American common market, 
and that the said Treaty constitutes a satisfactory instru-
ment for establishing a free-trade area and for advanc-
ing towards the desired complementarity between the 
Latin American economies; 
3. To request the secretariat of the Economic Com-
mission for Latin America to continue giving technical 
advice to the organs of the Latin American Free-Trade 
Association, in conformity with the terms of the Monte-
video Treaty; 
4. To request the secretariat of the Economic Com-
mission for Latin America, likewise, to devote special 
attention in its studies to the problems of trade rela-
tions between currently existing multilateral groups and 
those countries of the region which are not yet members 
of the groups in question; 
5. To recommend to those Latin American Govern-
ments which have not yet signed or decided to sign the 
multilateral treaties so far concluded in Latin America 
to study with the co-operation of the ECLA secretariat 
the problems raised by their possible accession to such 
instruments; 
6. To recommend to the secretariat that, in carrying 
out its studies on trade policy, it give special considera-
tion to those concerning the expansion of trade between 
the Latin American countries and those of other regions, 
and examine the problems of trade relations with coun-
tries or groups of countries in other parts of the world; 
7. To recognize that the Trade Committee should, at 
its next session, review the progress achieved in the 
implementation of the integration programme of the 
Central American common market and of the pro-
gramme relating to the Latin American Free-Trade 
Association. 
10 May 1961 
12 (III ) . CUSTOMS POLICY 
The Trade Committee, 
Having noted the ECLA secretariat document E/CN.12/ 
544, which analyses the situation with respect to customs 
duties and other import charges and restrictions in 
Latin American countries, together with their average 
levels of incidence, 
Bearing in mind that, according to the conclusions 
drawn from the said study, the import régimes in force 
in the majority of the Latin American countries are 
characterized by their decided complexity, by the secon-
dary importance often assigned in them to customs 
tariffs, by frequent changes in the treatment accorded 
to imports of specific goods and by systems of duties 
and charges which are sometimes incompatible with 
the efficient use of available resources, 
Bearing in mind likewise that this situation is an obstacle 
to the application and extension of agreements conducive 
to the liberalization of intra-regional trade, 
Considering that fuller and more efficacious use could 
be made of the customs tariff as the basic instrument 
of a trade policy aiming at increased specialization and 
complementarity among the Latin American economies, 
as well as at the establishment of export flows of manu-
factured goods to countries outside the region and, in 
general, the expansion and diversification of Latin 
America's existing export trade, 
Decides: 
1. To take note with satisfaction of document E/CN.12/ 
554 and to request the ECLA secretariat to continue 
and extend such studies; 
2. To recommend the Latin American countries to 
build up a customs policy designed to encourage the 
most efficient productive activities and those considered 
to be of basic importance for the development of their 
national economies and the expansion of foreign trade, 
in view of the importance of co-ordinating national eco-
nomic development programmes and promoting the 
increasing complementarity of their economies; 
3. To stress the fact that for the attainment of the 
above-mentioned objectives, as well as others pursued 
through agreements on the liberalization of trade and 
on economic complementarity, it is essential that the 
Latin American countries simplify and co-ordinate their 
import régimes and restore the status of customs tariff 
as a basic instrument of their trade policy, giving it the 
necessary flexibility for its adaptation to the structural 
changes inherent in the process of economic develop-
ment; 
4. To request the ECLA secretariat to endeavour, in 
carrying out its studies on tariff policy in the Latin 
American countries, to bring to light and suggest the 
measures best calculated to achieve the aforesaid ends. 
10 May 1961 
13 (III). CUSTOMS QUESTIONS 
The Trade Committee, 
Cognizant of document E/CN. 12/568, containing the 
Report of the first session of the Working Group on 
Customs Questions which was set up in compliance 
with resolution 7 (II) of this Committee, 
Considering that the points discussed at the session in 
question, and the resolutions adopted, meet the require-
ments in the field of customs techniques arising from 
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the economic complementarity programmes of the 
Latin American countries and from the need to improve 
and bring up to date the la tiers' import régimes, 
Bearing in mind moreover that several years ago the 
Central American countries adopted extended tariff 
nomenclatures drawn up in consonance with the specific 
characteristics of their economies and the structure of 
their foreign trade, on the basis of which they have 
already made considerable progress in the preparation 
of the Central American common tariff, having likewise 
adopted standard criteria in relation to other aspects of 
their customs régimes, 
Decides: 
1. To take note with satisfaction of the Report of 
the first session of the Working Group on Customs 
Questions (document E/CN. 12/568); 
2. To endorse the resolutions adopted by the said 
Working Group in relation to the definition and verifica-
tion of customs value, definitions of basic customs 
terms, customs procedures and training of customs 
officials, save with respect to countries participating in 
the Central American Economic Integration Programme 
in the case of points which affect or diverge from the 
standard criteria upon which they have already agreed; 
3. To recommend to those Latin American countries 
not covered by the Central American Economic Integra-
tion Programme that as their standard nomenclature 
they adopt the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature, as suggested 
by the Working Group on Customs Questions in its 
resolution 1(1); 
4. To stress the need for the standard tariff nomen-
clature, definition of customs value and definition of 
basic customs terms whose adoption has been recom-
mended by the Working Group to be put into effect 
at the earliest possible date by countries participating 
in Latin American agreements on the liberalization 
of trade or expecting to accede thereto in the near 
future; 
5. To urge that, by way of supplementing the adop-
tion of the Customs Co-operation Council's definition 
of customs value, those Latin American countries which 
have not yet done so establish a central valuation office, 
on the lines recommended in the relevant resolution of 
the Working Group on Customs Questions; 
6. To call attention to the advantages represented 
by the adoption of ad valorem duties in the tariffs of the 
Latin American countries, in so far as the special con-
ditions prevailing in each country permit, since this 
would considerably facilitate the use of the tariffs as 
effective instruments of trade policy; 
7. To reiterate the Working Group's recommendation 
to the Latin American countries that training schools 
for customs officials be created; 
8. To request the ECLA secretariat that, in continuing 
its studies on customs questions, it devote special atten-
tion to those relating to customs procedures and docu-
ments, special customs régimes, and other matters 
indicated by the Working Group or considered to be 
of interest by the secretariat itself, and that to this end 
it request, when appropriate, the collaboration of the 
Customs Co-operation Council and other international 
agencies, and that it convene in due course a second 
session of the Working Group to discuss such questions. 
10 May 1961 
14(111) . SPECIAL TRAINING COURSES IN TRADE POLICY 
The Trade Committee, 
Bearing in mind that the current Latin American 
movement towards multilateral economic co-operation 
has found tangible expression in the agreements relating 
to the Central American Economic Integration Pro-
gramme and to the Latin American Free-Trade Associa-
tion established by the Montevideo Treaty, 
Considering that in other parts of the world important 
associations of countries have been formed and are in 
process of formation within the framework of economic 
and trade agreements established on multilateral bases, 
Cognizant of the need for economic programming 
in the Latin American countries to be carried out on 
bases which must often take into account larger trade 
areas and, therefore, the corresponding aspects of trade 
policy, 
Realizing that the adaptation of Latin America to 
the trends of the world economy in respect of multilateral 
relations and the consequent negotiation between coun-
tries or groups of countries substantially increases the 
complexity and scope of trade policy, creating situations 
and problems which can be dealt with only by specialists, 
of whom there is a marked scarcity in the field in ques-
tion in Latin America, 
Decides: 
1. To recommend to the secretariat that it organize, 
to the extent to which its resources permit and as syste-
matically as possible, courses on specialized training in 
trade policy, covering in particular subjects relating to 
the current movement towards multilateral economic 
co-operation; 
2. To request the secretariat that, in the conduct of 
these courses, it endeavour to enlist the co-operation 
of the public and private, national and international agen-
cies whose activities are connected with trade policy, 
and that, in determining the place where the courses 
are to be given, it bear in mind the geographical situa-
tion of the Latin American countries. 
10 May 1961 
15 (III). TRANSPORT 
The Trade Committee, 
Bearing in mind that the availability of means of 
transport and the conditions in which they operate 
are basic features of the development of inter-Latin 
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American trade as a whole, as well as of the effectiveness 
of the multilateral agreements by which it is hoped to 
integrate the markets, 
Decides: 
1. To recommend to the ECLA secretariat that in 
carrying out the studies comprised in the programme 
of the Trade Committee, it should devote special atten-
tion to problems relating to the availability and operat-
ing conditions of transport for inter-Latin American trade 
commodities and the incidence of freight charges on 
their final cost, and examine the other aspects of the 
trade policy problems associated with these matters; 
2. To recommend likewise that in so far as the said 
studies relate to the transport problems of countries 
participating in multilateral economic integration agree-
ments, they be carried out in close co-operation with the 
competent organs of the agreements in question. 
10 May 1961 
16 ( I I I ) . DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOURIST INDUSTRY 
The Trade Committee, 
Considering that the expansion of exports of goods 
and services from the Latin American region is condu-
cive to improvement in the level of living of its peoples, 
Considering that the foreign exchange income accruing 
from the tourist industry is of vital importance for the 
economy of some countries of the Latin American region, 
Deems that any new measure which is inconsistent with 
the development of the flow of tourists to such countries 
may create problems of supreme economic and social 
importance for the latter countries; 
Invites the States members of ECLA to take into 
account, in drafting legislation or regulations of a 
customs or other nature, the importance of encourag-
ing the flow of tourists into other countries of the region 
and to avoid measures which may jeopardize this flow. 
10 May 1961 
17 ( I II ) . PLACE AND DATE OF THE FOURTH SESSION 
OF THE TRADE COMMITTEE 
The Trade Committee, 
Considering that, in conformity with the agenda, the 
place and date of the next session should be determined, 
Considering that recent developments in the field of 
trade policy make it impossible to foresee exactly the 
most suitable date for the fourth session of the Com-
mittee, 
Decides to authorize the Executive Secretary of the 
Commission to convene the fourth session of the Com-
mittee, after consultation with the member Govern-
ments, at whatever place and on whatever date he deems 
most appropriate. 
10 May 1961 
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© 
C. OTHER ASPECTS OF MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC 
CO-OPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA 

I. PAYMENTS AND CREDITS 
Certain studies previously issued only for restricted 
circulation, and relating to various financial problems 
connected with the Latin American common market 
project, are reproduced below. The studies in question * 
were carried out as part of the work programme laid 
down in resolutions 1 (I) and 9 (II) of the Trade Com-
mittee, and were specially prepared at the request of the 
Inter-Governmental Conference for the Establishment 
of a Free-Trade Area among Latin American Countries. 
The secretariat was likewise requested to organize a 
meeting of governmental representatives of central 
banks, which was held at Montevideo, Uruguay, in 
January 1960, and the findings of which can be studied 
in the relevant report, also included in the following 
pages. 
1. Payments and credits in the Free-Trade Area: 
possible systems** 
I. G E N E R A L C O N S I D E R A T I O N S 
A . PURPOSE OF THE REPORT 
1. At the First Conference held by the Governments 
of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru 
and Uruguay at Montevideo in early September 1959, for 
the purpose of drafting a free-trade area treaty, it was 
agreed to invite governmental representatives of the 
Central Banks of these countries to meet, also at Monte-
video, in early December with a view to studying the 
payments questions arising in connexion with the opera-
tion of the area.1 
In order to facilitate the work of the Central Banks 
meeting, the Governments concerned requested the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund to carry out special studies 
on the payments problem and as to possible solutions, 
recommending that due account be taken, in making 
these studies, of the views expressed on the matter by 
the delegations at the Montevideo Conference. 
In resolution 9 (II) (Panama, May 1959), the Trade 
Committee requested the ECLA secretariat to study 
the problem of payments in an inter-Latin American 
* Issued earlier in mimeographed form under the title of 
"Papers on financial problems prepared by the secretariat of the 
Economic Commission for Latin America for the use of the Latin 
American Free-Trade Association" (E/CN.12/569, 1 March 1961). 
Issued for restricted distribution on 30 October 1959 as working 
paper No. 1 of the series presented at the meeting of governmental 
representatives of Central Banks (Montevideo, January 1960). 
1 Resolution 3, adopted at the Montevideo Conference for the 
Establishment of a Free-Trade Area, invites the Central Banks 
of other Latin American countries to send observers to the meeting. 
Common Market. Although this report refers parti-
cularly to the situation of the seven countries that are 
interested in creating the free-trade area, the evalua-
tions and conclusions in it are to a large extent valid 
for all the countries of Latin America and should be 
regarded in some measure as a prelude to the report 
requested by the Trade Committee. 
B. VIEWS EXPRESSED AT THE MONTEVIDEO CONFERENCE 
2. There was general agreement among the delega-
tions present to the effect that the efficient operation 
of the area would be assisted if all settlements for intra-
area trade and transactions could be effected on a 
uniform basis. If this should not prove practicable, it 
would be necessary to consider establishing some pay-
ments mechanism which would harmonize so far as 
possible the different systems in operation, from the 
point of view of their effect on intra-area trade. 
There was no disagreement as to the advisability of 
developing a credit mechanism which would contribute 
to the achievement of the following objectives: 
(a) To counter the depressive effects exerted on intra-
area trade by the seasonal imbalances in its flows; 
and 
(b) To facilitate the policy of trade expansion result-
ing from the programme for reducing and eliminating 
customs duties and other restrictions in the area. 
However, though there was agreement on the need 
for establishing some form of special credit facilities, 
the scope of the system and the sources from which such 
credit should come were not discussed in detail. 
3. In addition, individual delegations indicated the 
general position of their respective countries on certain 
aspects of the payments questions. These views may be 
broadly summarized as follows: 
(a) Countries which have long enjoyed convertibility — 
as is the case of one possible member of the area in par-
ticular — are not in favour of any system that would 
involve the adoption of restrictive practices with respect 
to such convertibility. Nor do they wish to endorse a 
system which would balance payments within the group 
of participants. In their opinion, the successful operation 
of the free-trade area so far as payments are concerned 
could be ensured if each country avoided persistent 
disequilibria in its balance-of-payments position vis-à-
vis the rest of the world;2 
2 It should be recalled in this connexion that article 4 of the 
projected treaty establishes the principle of reciprocity by virtue 
of which equivalence is to be maintained between the benefits 
resulting from trade concessions. 
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(b) Countries which, within their over-all programme 
of monetary reform, have lately been taking steps to 
apply and maintain a system of increasing converti-
bility— as several of those interested in joining the 
free-trade area — would not favour any approach con-
ducive to the strengthening or reinstatement of the 
restrictive or bilateral procedures, that their reforms 
would eliminate or tend to eliminate; and 
(c) Countries — such as one of those taking a leading 
part in inter-Latin American trade — which, for various 
reasons, find it neither possible nor advisable to abandon, 
either immediately or in a fairly short space of time, the 
bilateral accounts through which, without having to 
use convertible currency, they now settle the bulk of 
their transactions with most of Latin America, favour 
a payments system for the area that would be so con-
structed as to be compatible with the use of bilateral 
accounts and gradual progress towards convertibility 
and the expansion of multilateral procedures. 
C . CREDIT FACILITIES 
4. At this juncture, a brief commentary should be 
made on the general relationship between the movement 
towards eliminating artificial and selective barriers to 
the development of multilateral trade in the area, and 
the advisibility of maintaining credit mechanisms among 
the members of the area. 
5. Factors such as the unification of the multiple 
exchange rates into a single effective rate; the conse-
quent disappearance of the indirect import subsidies 
that frequently resulted from the existence of multiple 
exchange rates as well as of the duties originating in 
the same source which often had to be borne by exports 
and hence by certain productive activities; and the 
replacement of direct methods of payments control and 
import selection by those of an indirect nature, apart 
from other positive factors deriving from the monetary 
reforms, will undoubtedly have a salutary effect on 
foreign trade as a whole. 
6. Nevertheless, the movement towards uniform and 
more orthodox settlement arrangements does not appear 
to be helpful to the expansion of inter-Latin American 
trade as such, in view of the special circumstances sur-
rounding the development of such trade. The method 
of direct control over imports and exports enabled each 
country to grant preferences or special treatment to 
other countries in the region with respect to their reci-
procal trade and reduced the growth of competition 
by similar goods from other markets. With the aboli-
tion of direct controls, the possibility of retaining the 
special treatment granted through that channel has 
disappeared. The consequent slackening of trade flows 
has been followed by a drop in the production of certain 
items. And although, to a certain extent, recourse is 
now being had to another kind of preferential treat-
ment— that of exempting Latin American countries 
from the obligation to make prior deposits which is 
currently imposed on importers in many countries — 
the incentive it offers is less powerful than that given 
by the old method. Moreover, the concession of this 
new type of stimulus is essentially impermanent, since 
the amount of the prior deposit may be changed at any 
time, and as progress is achieved in granting freedom 
of trade and payments over a wider area, may be reduced 
and may ultimately disappear altogether. 
7. Once the free-trade area has been established, 
however, it will have other means at its disposal for giving 
substantial encouragement to area trade, since under 
the terms of the programme, it will reduce and eliminate, 
for its members, customs duties and charges and other 
general restrictions. As this elimination of barriers is 
expected to give a strong impulse to branches of trade 
that are today virtually non-existent, namely, durable 
manufactured goods and capital goods, concern is natu-
rally felt as to the possible impact on exchange holdings 
if settlements are effected in freely convertible currencies 
or in currencies that are freely transferable within the 
area. Moreover, one of the basic principles of the free-
trade area is that there should be reciprocity of benefits 
deriving from the operation of its rules, but these 
benefits — so far as individual countries are concerned — 
may accrue gradually and it might well be necessary, 
by the granting of credits, to bridge the gap between 
the immediate results of concessions granted by an 
individual country and the benefits of reciprocal conces-
sions from its partners that would not be felt until 
after a certain lapse of time. 
8. In general, it would seem fair to say that the pro-
vision of special credit facilities, linked to intra-area 
trade, would help to allay the doubts and hesitations 
that would naturally be aroused by the implementation 
of the trade liberalization measures provided for in 
the programme and would assist in ensuring reciprocity 
of concessions and advantages deriving therefrom. 
D . INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS 
9. In principle, the settlement of international transac-
tions in the area could take place in any of the following 
ways: 
(а) Exclusively in convertible currencies (including 
credits in such currencies); 
(б) Exclusively through bilateral accounts (including 
bilateral credit margins granted reciprocally thereunder); 
(c) Partly in convertible currencies and partly over 
bilateral accounts (including both credits in convertible 
currencies and bilateral credit margins). 
10. The views expressed at the Montevideo Conference 
indicate that the first possibility mentioned above is 
unlikely to prove — at least for the time being — gene-
rally acceptable, since there are some countries which 
consider it preferable to keep the existing bilateral 
payments accounts in operation, because they feel it 
would be premature to demolish a structure whose dis-
appearance might in their opinion be prejudicial to the 
trade levels attained in certain sectors. Moreover, they 
do not wish to find themselves obliged to settle seasonal 
imbalances, which are often high, in convertible currency. 
These are valid arguments and it only remains to ensure 
that, if settlements are effected through bilateral accounts, 
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the necessary measures are taken to prevent such mone-
tary arrangements from distorting the flow of trade in 
the area or from resulting in discrimination against 
those countries that wish to settle in convertible currencies. 
11. The second possibility (all settlements to be effected 
through bilateral accounts) would also seem unlikely 
to be generally acceptable. What is more, it would seem 
counter to the tendency that has developed in recent 
months towards the suppression of bilateral settlement 
procedures. But if, none the less, it should be agreed to 
adopt bilateral credit and settlement methods throughout 
the area, it is clear that some mechanism would have 
to be established (as was the case, for instance, in Europe, 
with the European Payments Union) which would effec-
tively multilateralize, at periodic intervals, the whole or 
a substantial part of the balances accruing on these 
accounts. If this were not achieved, intra-area trade 
would not develop, as is essential, on multilateral lines, 
there would exist the risk of trade flows being dictated 
by monetary and not by commercial considerations, 
and the resulting distortions, and almost inevitable 
discriminations, would tend to defeat the objectives of 
the free-trade area itself. 
12. Finally, there is the possibility that settlements 
within the area should take place both in convertible 
currencies and through the use of bilateral accounts, 
according to the arrangements adopted by individual 
pairs of countries. This method — which has the advan-
tage of being flexible and dynamic — would have the 
disadvantage that the basis of settlements within the area 
would not be uniform. But how serious is this disadvan-
tage ? And again the answer would seem to turn on 
the degree of transferability accorded to the balances 
held on the bilateral accounts and the extent to which 
bilateral arrangements would tend to introduce discri-
mination in intra-area trade. If the private trader is free 
to carry out authorized transactions anywhere in the 
area, without discrimination as to country, and, auto-
matically, to make or receive payment for this transaction, 
then the risk of discrimination can only arise in inter-
Government transactions; and this risk can to a large 
extent be eliminated by regular, periodic and multilateral 
compensation of the balances held on the bilateral 
accounts (or a substantial part thereof) through some 
central agency. 
13. Some suggestions as to how a mixed system of 
settlements of this sort (i.e. with some countries settling 
in convertible currencies and others through bilateral 
accounts) could operate in practice will be offered in 
another part of this paper. 
E . PAYMENTS SYSTEMS 
14. During recent years, consideration has frequently 
been given in Latin America to the setting-up of some 
form of payments system along the lines developed in 
Europe from 1947 onwards. In fact, in Europe, this 
development passed through three stages. The earliest — 
a somewhat limited multilateral payments agreement — 
lasted from 1947 until 1949. It was then succeeded by 
the European Payments Union (EPU), which provided 
for complete transferability inside the Organization for 
European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) area and a 
substantial system of mutual credits. In December 1958, 
when most European countries has restored external 
convertibility to their currencies, the EPU was replaced 
by the European Monetary Agreement, which had been 
expressly designed to enter into operation in this even-
tuality.3 
The development of a compensation system, as a 
preliminary step leading to a payments union, as occurred 
in Europe, presupposes the existence of a considerable 
number of bilateral accounts, since the volume of pos-
sible multilateral transfers that the system can produce 
increases with the number of surplus and deficit 
balances brought into compensation, and, conversely, 
if the number of bilateral accounts is relatively small, 
the system is unlikely to produce any worthwhile results. 
Until fairly recently, the number of bilateral accounts 
maintained by the Latin American countries and the 
tendency to establish new accounts, even towards the 
end of 1958, favoured a move towards multilateralism 
by gradual development from some simple system for 
compensating bilateral balances. However, the recent 
shift towards the suppression of bilateral accounts, 
the desire not to adopt new ones, and the possibility of 
taking more efficient steps to eliminate bilateralism would 
seem to suggest that progress through some compensa-
tion system — essentially based on the maintenance of 
bilateral accounts — is no longer the most suitable 
procedure for the Latin American area. 
F . AGENCY 
15. If the need for special credit facilities in the area 
is accepted and, even more, if some part of the settle-
ments for intra-area trade are effected through bilateral 
accounts and there is agreement on the need for some 
mechanism that will achieve periodic multilateralization 
3 It will be recalled that one of the cardinal points of policy of 
the Organization for European Economic Co-operation was that 
freedom of trade and freedom of payments must go forward 
together, and that some system of mutual credits was necessary 
to reinforce the reserves of member countries and enable them 
to expand their trade multilateralization measures. Thus the 
OEEC's trade liberalization code, which has been in operation 
since August 1950 and whose adoption was made conditional on 
the coming into force of the European Payments Union, states 
that " the need to create as wide a market as possible in which 
goods and services may be freely exchanged cannot be completely 
achieved until a sufficient equilibrium is restored to intra-European 
payments, as part of the effort towards establishment of a single 
system of multilateral trade in the world, an equilibrium which 
will enable member countries to exchange goods and services 
freely with each other without endangering their monetary 
reserves "; and one of the express purposes of the European Pay-
ments Union was "to facilitate in the largest possible measure 
the liberalization, on a non-discriminatory basis, of trade and 
visible transactions " and to " provide member countries, in par-
ticular, with reserves to play in part the role of gold and foreign 
currency reserves ". 
Finally, the European Fund, which was set up under the European 
Monetary Agreement that entered into force in December 1958, 
was established expressly " to provide the member countries with 
credit in order to aid them to withstand temporary over-all balance-
of-payments difficulties, in cases where these difficulties endanger 
the maintenance of the level of their intra-European liberalization 
measures 
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of some part or the whole of these balances, then it will 
be necessary to establish a central agency. 
The precise functions of such an agency will have 
to be established in full technical detail, but, in broad 
terms, it is suggested that its terms of reference could 
be: 
(a) To act as the channel through which the intra-
area credit arrangements, especially if these are auto-
matic, will be operated; 
(b) To provide the mechanism for the multilateraliza-
tion of the balances held on bilateral accounts; and 
(c) To provide a centre for the compilation of finan-
cial data and for financial studies, on the basis of which 
the area's monetary problems would be examined and 
discussed by the competent bodies. 
It is clear that, if the agency is to carry out efficiently 
the functions described above, it will have to have its 
own resources. And this in turn will mean that it will 
have to be endowed with its own independent personality 
in international law. 
16. The amount of the agency's capital or fund will 
depend on what arrangements are reached as to intra-
area credit facilities and for the multilateralization of 
balances on bilateral accounts and thus can only be 
determined at a later stage. Suffice it to say here that the 
agency's capital or fund: 
(a) Might be derived from quotas subscribed by the 
member countries and also, possibly, from contributions 
from non-member Governments and international or-
ganizations; 
(b) Need not be subscribed in full at the time of the 
agency's establishment. It would for instance be perfectly 
possible for a relatively small percentage to be paid 
over initially and for the balance of the agreed con-
tributions to be called up as and when the agency has 
need of further funds. 
It need hardly be added that the agency would have 
to maintain the closest relations with the Central Banks 
of the member countries and that it would be subject 
to the authority and directives of the competent bodies 
of the free-trade area. 
II. THE FUNCTIONS AND OPERATION 
OF A PAYMENTS SYSTEM 
17. Two of the major functions of a payments system 
designed to assist the full and harmonious development 
of the free-trade area will be: 
(a) To ensure as far as possible that the maintenance 
of bilateral accounts and credit margins does not have 
a discriminatory effect on intra-area trade, and 
(b) To act as a channel through which the intra-area 
swing credit arrangements — especially if these are auto-
matic— will be operated. 
These two functions of the system are to some extent 
inter-related, at least in so far as its multilateral credit 
arrangements must take account — in whole or in part — 
of the development of the balances on the bilateral 
accounts. For the sake of clarity, however, it will be 
preferable to consider separately the various ways in 
which the functions in question can be carried out. 
18. But first a word as to the general framework of 
the system. It is envisaged that: 
(a) A central agency would be established with which 
the Central Banks of all member countries would maintain 
an account; 
(b) These accounts would be kept in United States 
dollars and at regular intervals — every 60 or 90 days — 
the balance thereon would be determined, taking account 
of the payments and transfers which the rules of the 
system provide should be reported to the agency for 
incorporation by the latter in its books; 
(c) When the balances have thus been determined — at 
the end of each " accounting period " — the Agency 
would then proceed with the settlement of the balances; 
these settlements would be effected — as provided for 
under the rules of the system — either in credit, or in 
convertible currencies, or partly in credit and partly in 
convertible currencies. 
19. When intra-area transactions are settled freely in 
convertible currencies, there is clearly no need for any 
special mechanism to ensure the multilateralization of 
such payments. 
The position is however quite different where settle-
ments are effected over bilateral accounts, the balances 
on which can only be used for making payments to the 
bilateral partner in question. Here the danger is two-
fold. In the first instance, a country in approximate 
equilibrium with the area may find itself in considerable 
payments difficulties if its imports are having to be 
paid for, in the main, in convertible currencies, whilst 
the bulk of its exports are being settled over bilateral 
accounts and thus in currency which cannot be used 
to pay for its imports. 
The second danger arises from the pressures which 
settlements over non-transferable bilateral accounts may 
well create on the flows of trade. For instance, in the 
case cited above, the country in question may be com-
pelled to switch a substantial part of its imports to the 
bilateral partner in order to use its accumulating bilateral 
surplus and to diminish the strain on its convertible 
currency reserves. Similarly, substantial bilateral credit 
facilities might induce countries to favour the placing 
of imports where such credits are available, even though 
normal commercial considerations might suggest that 
the purchases be effected in some other country of the 
area. 
20. The simplest way of avoiding these difficulties 
would be to provide, through a payments mechanism, 
for the multilateralization, at regular intervals, of all 
balances on the bilateral accounts. This was, indeed, 
one of the major purposes of the European Payments 
Union, whose provisions in this regard effectively eli-
minated any real risk of trade distortions resulting from 
financial considerations. 
But whilst this must be the goal towards which Latin 
American payments arrangements should move as 
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rapidly as circumstances permit, it would seem clear 
that its immediate attainment is not possible, and that 
some interim arrangement must be developed which 
will allow, and indeed encourage, a more gradual pro-
gress towards complete monetary transferability within 
the area, and thence, to full convertibility. 
21. A number of possibilities might be considered to 
this end, of which, perhaps, the two following suggestions 
might be the easiest to operate in practice. It could be 
agreed that limits should be set to the swing credits 
available on bilateral accounts and that any balance in 
excess of this figure — at the end of the " accounting 
period" — should be transferred to the agency and 
thus rendered available for use by any creditor country 
in the area. Clearly, the efficacy of this provision would 
depend on the size of the credit margins within which 
bilateral balances would retain their strictly bilateral 
character. 
An alternative method for partially multilateralizing 
the bilateral accounts, would be to provide that at the 
end of each accounting period, a certain percentage — 
say 20 per cent to begin with — of the bilateral balances 
or of some of them should be transferred to the agency. 
A percentage figure of this order of magnitude would 
mean that credit extended bilaterally would be multi-
lateralized over a period of some 15 to 18 months and 
thus would allow ample time for the reversal of seasonal 
swings.4 It would, however, be necessary to reach agree-
ment on how the bilateral balances existing at the time 
of the coming into force of the payments system should 
be dealt with. 
22. But whatever method be adopted — another, for 
instance, would be to transfer balances that had been 
continuously outstanding for longer than a given time — 
the procedure in the agency would be the same. 
The creditor country's multilateral account in the 
agency would be credited with the amount transferred 
and the debtor country's account would be correspond-
ingly debited; and those credit or debit entries would 
then be taken into account in the agency's calculations 
of settlement against multilateral credit of resulting dollar 
payments. 
23. Another situation remains to be considered. There 
may be, and actually are, countries which export essential 
commodities such as sugar and cotton to other possible 
members of the area and which register persistent and 
substantial credit balances against the importers of these 
items. 
Once the area had been established, the system of 
reciprocity in respect of the concessions granted which it 
would bring into operation would perhaps influence such 
situations, but would probably do so by gradual degrees. 
Meanwhile, the country with a persistent credit balance 
would be able to incorporate into the system only a 
proportion of the value of its exports of the commodities 
in question. This proportion would gradually increase 
from year to year until it reached 100 per cent, or until 
4 Multilateral settlement does not preclude the reservation of 
certain bilateral balances in order to meet trade contingencies. 
the date at which the competent organs of the area 
reconsidered the problem. 
24. Another important function of the payments 
system will be to provide — through the agency — a 
channel for the granting and receipt of credits, in sup-
port of the area's trade liberalization policy. 
It would clearly be in the interests of the system that 
it should be able to operate with the maximum degree 
of automaticity; and thus that each country's credit 
margin in the agency — and the procedures under which 
these credit margins are to be operated — should be 
agreed on at the time the system is established. 
25. Once the amounts of the credit margins had been 
agreed on, two questions would have to be settled, 
namely:5 (a) how will the credit margins be operated 
in the context of the agency's periodic settlements ? and 
(b) how will the positions of individual countries be 
calculated in the agency for the purpose of determining 
their entitlement to receive credit or their obligation to 
grant it, and for the purpose of determining what pay-
ments in convertible currencies are due to or by the 
agency ? 
26. On the first point, any number of formulae can 
be conceived, but in the interests of simplicity (and also 
to avoid the risk of too severe a drain on the agency's 
assets) the choice would seem to lie between: (a) settling 
deficits and surpluses wholly in credit up to the limit of 
the credit margins, and thereafter wholly in convertible 
currencies; or (b) settling deficits and surpluses in part 
by the use of credit margins, the balance being settled 
in convertible currencies; and when the credit margin 
is exhausted, entirely in convertible currencies. 
Arguments can be advanced in favour of both systems 
and the decision — which does not, of course, affect the 
amount of credit available to, or made available by, 
each country in the system — is essentially a matter for 
discussion and negotiation between the Member coun-
tries in the light of their individual preferences. 
27. It should be noted that in both cases the agency 
would require a capital or fund of its own. This need 
arises from the possibility that one or more creditor 
countries might have exhausted their credit margins to 
the agency (and thus be entitled to receive settlement 
wholly in convertible currencies) at a time when the 
deficit countries had still not reached the limits of their 
credit margins and were thus settling with the agency 
wholly in credit, or partly in credit and partly in con-
vertible currencies. 
III. POSSIBLE SYSTEMS 
28. Before the formulas for harmonizing the different 
views on the payments problem currently held by the 
countries interested in joining the free-trade area are 
expounded, a brief account should be given of the 
recent general evolution of inter-Latin American pay-
ments. The bilateral accounts, through which most trade 
transactions used to be channelled, had extremely 
heterogeneous bases and procedures. The almost com-
5 See para. 41 et seq. 
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plete absence of parity between the value of units of 
account and that of convertible currency for equivalent 
operations distorted the price system and conduced to 
the perpetual freezing of balances. In the last two years 
the outlook has been favourable to the creation of the 
conditions required to pave the way for multilateral 
agreements. The initial stage is characterized by the 
adoption of the Standard Agreement and Standard 
Banking Procedure at the first session of the Central 
Banks Working Group (Montevideo, 1957) and their 
application to nearly all clearing-account trade. The 
establishment of parity between units of account and 
actual dollars, above all, and the consequent influence 
of this system on quotations of goods at international 
prices provided the fundamental elements for a continua-
tion of the movement towards multilateralism. 
At its second session the Central Banks Working 
Group (Rio de Janeiro, 1958) threw fresh light on the 
payments problem and its evolution and also drew up 
a Protocol to regulate, in the event that the countries 
continued to maintain accounts, the transfer of balances 
which were being effected, in an incidental way, on the 
basis of the Standard Agreement.6 
In view of these antecedents, of the lines of action 
that emerged from the recent Conference at Montevideo 
and of the tendency revealed in the last few months for 
the suppression of bilateral accounts, some payments 
formulae might be proposed for transactions within the 
free-trade area. 
Some of these formulae are based on the possibility 
of organizing a priori credit systems and might be adopted 
i f — as is the case in the countries which would constitute 
the area — the opinion continues to prevail that, because 
of general considerations related to the aggregate balance 
of payments, the use of dollars for current trade transac-
tions in the area should be reduced as much as practicable. 
Another formula, based on credits a posteriori, would 
take effect if all transactions through current accounts 
were settled in dollars. 
A . SYSTEM OF a priori CREDITS (COMBINED SYSTEM) 
29. The system would be developed at two different 
levels. The first would relate to transactions effected by 
countries not linked by bilateral accounts; and the 
second to countries members of the system and linked 
by bilateral accounts. The agency for the system would 
maintain one account per country, through which the 
multilateral payments and claims would be effected and 
into which the bilateral balances agreed on would be 
incorporated. 
30. The mechanism of the system might prove some-
what complicated if the agency registers individually all 
claims and payments inherent in the internal trade of 
6 See the following ECLA documents: Report submitted to the 
ECLA Trade Committee by the Central Banks Working Group on 
a multilateral payments system (E/CN. 12/484); Inter-Latin American 
payments (E/CN. 12/C.l/WG. 1/8 and annexes I and II); Report 
submitted to the Trade Committee of the Economic Commission 
for Latin America by the Central Banks Working Group on a multi-
lateral payments system (E/CN.12/C.l/WG.1/10/Rev.l). 
the area. In order to simplify the scheme, it would be 
necessary to choose operational decentralization.7 
Each Central Bank would determine which commercial 
banks or other institutions in its country were authorized 
to operate as part of the system. These authorized 
institutions would effect claims and payments through 
their representatives in the other countries of the area. 
At the end of each accounting period, or when convenient, 
the commercial banks would liquidate their net position 
in the corresponding Central Bank, which would thus 
register only one balance — debit or credit — for each 
authorized institution. The consolidation of these 
balances would of course be the position which each 
Central Bank would register with the agency. The latter 
would take cognizance of the positions of all Central 
Banks. 
31. Within this scheme it would not be difficult to 
locate any discrepancies that might appear when the 
operations were computed. All that would be required 
would be for the authorized institutions to declare, at 
the end of each accounting period, their balances with 
each of their representatives. As the declarations of each 
pair of representatives in respect of their reciprocal 
operations must be equal to each other — one with a 
plus and the other with a minus sign — discrepancies 
could be quickly cleared up by this means. 
32. From another point of view, the adoption of this 
scheme would channel inter-Latin American trade 
operations through the private banking system, whose 
intervention in such trade has hitherto, for various 
reasons, been less than its participation in trade with 
the rest of the world. 
33. Under the system, the countries maintaining 
bilateral accounts would operate in exactly the same 
way as the multilateral account countries as regards 
their relations with these latter. From this point of view, 
all the member countries' participation in the agency 
would be subject to common regulations and procedures. 
34. The establishment of the agency would not neces-
sarily involve the termination of bilateral relations based 
on extant payments agreements. While they deemed it 
preferable, the parties to such agreements would continue 
to effect their reciprocal payments through the accounts 
concerned, but, as has already been said, on condition 
that they adhered to the rules of the Montevideo Standard 
Agreement. 
Periodically, at the close of the same periods agreed 
upon for the regular liquidations effected by the agency, 
specific proportions of the bilateral-account balances 
would be transferred to the multilateral system. To this 
end, a fixed proportion of the balance registered in each 
7 Should such decentralization not exist, the following procedure 
would have to be followed. Payments under such heads as the 
value of the goods traded, transport and insurance expenditure 
and other items whose inclusion is agreed upon would be effected 
through each of these accounts. To liquidate operations use would 
be made of documentary or clean credits or orders for payment, 
opened or issued by Central Banks or directly by commercial 
banks or other institutions in the country concerned, notification 
of these being sent to the agency for book-keeping purposes and, 
as an authorization of reimbursement, to the Central Bank of 
the country on which payment is incumbent. 
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bilateral account on a given date, irrespective of the 
amount such balances represented, should be incor-
porated into the agency's multilateral compensation. This 
proportion might be, for instance, 20 per cent of the 
bilateral balance concerned. 
The proportion of the bilateral balances which would 
be transferred to the agency through the application of 
this arrangement, would determine the position of 
member countries in their bilateral relations and would 
be included in the position of each country deriving 
from its dollar transactions. 
35. The following example sheds some light on the 
foregoing procedure as regards the incorporation into 
the system of a proportion of the bilateral balances. 
For simplicity's sake, let it be supposed that there 
are only four members and that bilateral relations exist 
between countries B and D and between countries C 
and D. 
The bilateral balances susceptible of liquidation 
through the agency would be: 
B-3 D 3 
C-4 D 4 





Assuming that we are dealing with the first period of 
operations and that the initial position of each country 
shows no balance, the following result would be 
obtained: 
Multilateral Bilateral Net Balance with 
Country position position position the agency 
A 8 0 8 + 5 
B - 3 - 3 - 6 - 5 
C 2 - 4 - 2 - 2 
D - 7 + 7 0 0 
It is thus clear that, if the multilateral credit were, for 
example, 5 for each member, country A would obtain 
a reimbursement of 3 and country B would have to 
effect a payment of 1, which means that the agency 
would have to make a net disbursement of 2, offset 
by an equivalent increase in its credit balance. 
The model presented shows how greatly the use of 
convertible currency in the financing of intra-area trade 
could be reduced, especially if it is borne in mind that 
the multilateral positions correspond only to the dif-
ference between exports and imports. 
B. A posteriori CREDIT SYSTEM 
36. A scheme of this kind would be applied if it were 
considered desirable that current intra-area transactions 
between countries that practised or had adopted con-
7 
vertibility, or between such countries and the parties 
to bilateral accounts, should be negotiated daily in 
dollars. 
Bases for operation 
37. The system would comprise two phases, one 
corresponding to dollar payments, and the other deriv-
ing from the incorporation of part of the bilateral 
balances into the system for automatic multilateral 
settlement. 
38. As has already been pointed out, the agency 
would have at its disposal a capital or fund in dollars 
formed with the quotas subscribed by members, as well 
as with contributions — perhaps of a complementary 
nature — from Government or international institutions 
outside the area. 
Each country would grant a credit to the agency and 
would receive one from it in return. The amount of this 
swing credit would be established on the basis of con-
siderations such as those developed in paragraphs 41 
et seq. 
39. The members would compile and forward to the 
agency periodical data, relating to accounting periods 
of 60 or 90 days, on the net balance of the dollar claims 
and payments effected by each of them as a result of 
their reciprocal current transactions. To this end, each 
central bank would compute the data supplied to it by 
the commercial banks or other institutions authorized 
to effect exchange operations. 
Furthermore, at the same regular intervals of 60 or 
90 days, the countries maintaining accounts would 
transfer to the agency the previously stipulated propor-
tion of the balance on each bilateral account, with a 
view to its multilateral settlement. 
40. The agency would determine each member's net 
position at the end of the accounting period concerned, 
taking into consideration the two elements mentioned, 
i.e., the balance on dollar payments and the balance 
resulting from the multilateral settlement of proportions 
of bilateral balances. 
When a country's net position indicated that it had 
effected dollar payments in excess of its dollar receipts, 
the agency would automatically furnish it with a sum 
equivalent to the excess disbursement, to be debited 
against the credit due to it, always provided that this 
were still sufficient to cover the amount involved. Other-
wise, the automatic loan would be reduced to the amount 
of the credit margin available. 
Again, if a country's net position showed that its 
receipts had exceeded its payments, it would surrender 
to the agency a sum in dollars equivalent to the result-
ing net balance. But, as in the preceding case, this pro-
cedure would be put into effect in so far as the credit 
margin in question permitted. 
The procedure described could be illustrated by means 
of the figures in the example given in paragraph 35. 
On the basis of the hypothetical positions postulated 
for the four countries, and on the assumption that the 
multilateral credit were 5 for each member and that 
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the accounting period concerned was the first, the results 
would be as follows: 
Amounts surrendered 
Balance 
Multilateral Bilateral Net to the by the with the 
Country payments position position agency agency agency 
A 8 0 8 5 5 
B - 3 - 3 - 6 2 -5 
C 2 - 4 - 2 2 - 2 
D - 7 7 0 7 0 
The agency's receipts amount to 7 and its disburse-
ments to 9, with a net outflow of 2, equivalent to the 
amount by which the net debit balance of the member 
countries increases. 
Country A registers a favourable balance of 8 in its 
multilateral relations and shows no bilateral position. 
It therefore surrenders 5 to the agency, this being the 
limit of its swing credit. Thus its position vis-à-vis the 
agency stands at plus 5. 
Now comes the case of country B. It has disbursed 3 
under the head of dollar payments. It also has to meet 
a payment of 3 to the agency, for purposes of the settle-
ment of its bilateral position. As the agency will give 
it back 2 under this head — i.e., the difference between 
the amount payable and the limit of its swing credit — 
country B is left with its credit utilized (minus 5) and 
has effected a net disbursement of 1. 
Country C's earnings amount to 2, which it surrenders 
to the agency; it also has to surrender another 4 as the 
result of its bilateral movement. In this case, the latter 
sum is debited against the credit due to the country 
concerned, which will be left with a balance of minus 2. 
Country D loses 7 on its dollar claims and payments. 
In addition, it shows a positive bilateral balance of 7, 
which will be restored to it by the agency. The two 
positions will therefore compensate each other and its 
balance will stand at 0. 
If exactly the same situation were to recur in succeed-
ing periods, the results would be as follows: 
Amounts surrendered New 
Balance Multi- balance 
with the lateral Bilateral Net to the by the with the 
Country agency payments position position agency agency agency 
A . . . 5 8 0 13 
B . . . . - 5 - 3 - 3 - 11 
C . . . .. - 2 2 - 4 - 4 
D . . 0 - 7 7 0 
Country A is left with its surplus. Country B's dollar 
payments are not reimbursed and it pays its bilateral 
balance, since it has no credit margin available. Coun-
try C surrenders 2 to the agency, which assumes a 
bilateral commitment of 4 by increasing the same 
country's debit balance by 2. Country D compensates 
its positions; it receives 7 from the agency and maintains 
its balance at 0. 
If a third period with the same figures were to be 
assumed, the situation would be as shown below. 
The agency, which in the preceding period surrendered 
dollars to the amount of 2, now does so for 1. The net 
debit balance of the members increases by this amount. 
Amounts surrendered New 
Balance Multi- balance 
with the lateral Bilateral Net to the by the with the 
Country agency payments position position agency agency agency 
A . . . 5 8 0 13 
B . . . - 5 - 3 - 3 - 11 
C . . . .. - 4 2 - 4 - 6 
D . . . 0 - 7 7 0 
A change takes place in the situation of country C, 
which has used up its entire credit and in the future 
will have to meet the whole of its commitments with 
dollar payments. 
Finally, the results of a fourth period, given the same 
positions, are shown below: 
Amounts surrendered New 
Balance Multi- balance 
with the lateral Bilateral Net to the by the with the 
Country agency payments position position agency agency agency 
A . . . 5 8 0 13 5 
B . . . - 5 - 3 - 3 - 11 3 - 5 
C . . . .. - 5 2 - 4 - 7 4 - 5 
D . . . 0 - 7 7 0 7 0 
By the time this fourth period is reached, the agency's 
receipts and expenditure balance one another. The net 
amount it surrenders in dollars has risen to 5, and the 
net balance owed to it by the member countries represents 
the same sum. 
C . ASPECTS COMMON TO BOTH SYSTEMS 
1. Multilateral credit 
41. Upon entering the agency, the members would 
grant a standing credit. The granting of such credit 
would not constitute a new departure. Apart from exist-
ing in bilateral accounts, it also exists to a certain extent 
— with dollar coverage—in inter-Latin American trade, 
since trade credits are often granted for varying terms 
to facilitate specific exports payable in dollars. In addi-
tion, the country granting credit within the system 
would receive credit in return. The credit could be fixed 
at a suitably low level (the amount to be settled by negotia-
tion). Furthermore, credit must be granted if the objec-
tives of the free-trade area are to be attained. 
In the case of both the a priori and a posteriori systems, 
each country's swing credit with the agency would have 
to be established chiefly on the basis of the size of seasonal 
disequilibria in traditional trade. Some attempt to pro-
vide against a possible and perhaps a rapid expansion 
of imports as a result of the establishment of the free-
trade area would also have to be made. 
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Table 1 
Trade transactions between Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, 
Peru and Uruguay, 1958 a 
(F.o.b. values in millions of dollars) 
Exports Imports Balance 
Argentina 
Multilateral 7.9 13.2 - 5.3 
Bilateral 115.6 134.4 - 18.8 (With Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, 
Peru and Uruguay) 
Bolivia 
Multilateral — 3.9 - 3.9 
Bilateral 0.2 7.7 - 7.5 (With Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) 
Brazil 
Multilateral 1.9 1.5 0.4 
Bilateral 141.5 89.4 52.1 (With Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) 
Chile 
Multilateral 3.6 29.5 - 25.9 
Bilateral 28.5 32.9 - 4.4 (With Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil) 
Paraguay 
Multilateral 13.2 9.2 4.0 
Bilateral 0.5 0.5 — (With Uruguay) 
Peru 
Multilateral 35.0 4.7 30.3 
Bilateral 2.6 11.2 8.4 (With Argentina) 
Uruguay 
Multilateral 1.8 1.4 0.4 
Bilateral 10.9 23.7 - 12.8 (With Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and 
Paraguay) 
Source: Official foreign trade statistics. 
a According to ECLA's figures, 1958 is representative of the three-year period 1956-1958. 
Note: The classification of trade transactions as multilateral and bilateral transactions is approximate. 
To facilitate the formation of some idea of the pos-
sible magnitude of multilateral credits, it may be worth 
while to study table 1, which presents the values repre-
sented by trade among the seven countries interested in 
setting up the free-trade area. The table draws a distinc-
tion between trade on the basis of bilateral accounts 
and trade covered in dollars. On the basis of these values, 
some preliminary estimates may be hazarded as to the 
possible amount of each country's swing credits with 
the agency. 
42. One criterion on which to base an estimate of the 
possible magnitude of credits would be the assumption 
that these would have to be sufficient to cover in dollars 
the value of the transactions effected during one quarter, 
or, in other words, equivalent to one-fourth of the value 
of the annual trade of the country concerned with the 
area. As regards the proportions of the bilateral balances 
to be liquidated through the agency, since the credits 
established in the bilateral accounts would still exist, 
a smaller proportion could be fixed, such as, for example, 
10 per cent of the value of annual trade through the 
bilateral accounts concerned. 
Accordingly, the estimates given in table 2 were 
prepared. 
Table 2 
Inter-Latin American Free-Trade Area: estimate 
of possible magnitude of multilateral credit 









Argentina  5.3 25.0 30.3 15.2 
1.0 0.8 1.8 0.9 
Brazil  0.8 23.1 23.9 11.9 
Chile  8.3 6.1 14.4 7.2 
Paraguay  5.6 0.1 5.7 2.9 
9.9 1.4 11.3 5.7 
Uruguay  0.7 3.5 4.2 2.1 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of the figures in table 1. 
a The credits in column A were estimated for each country on the basis of 
25 per cent of the value of the trade effected in 1958 in convertible currency, and 
10 per cent of the value of trade thorough bilateral accounts. 
b The credits in column B were calculated on the same bases as in the case 
of column A, but the average value of imports and exports was taken. 
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43. It is of interest to compare the credits of which 
the possible amount is indicated in table 2 with trade 
balances in 1958 as between the countries that would 
be organizing the area, in order to form some idea of 
what would have been the size of the surpluses to be 
multilaterally liquidated through the agency. This is the 
purpose of table 3. The estimates presented in this table 
must be taken with some degree of caution, since the 
f.o.b. value of exports on which they had to be based 
is not altogether representative of the balance-of-pay-
ments situation, because the statistics for services and 
other invisible items are not available. Furthermore, as 
the bilateral balances would in the first place be absorbed 
outside the agency by the credits provided for in the 
bilateral accounts concerned, table 3 was based on the 
hypothesis that a proportion equivalent to 20 per cent 
of the value of the balances in question would be incor-
porated in the multilateral liquidation process. Lastly, 
it should be pointed out that the estimates had to be 
worked out on the basis of annual balances, whereas 
in practice the agency would effect liquidations at shorter 
intervals of 60 or 90 days. Consequently, there might 
well be seasonal disequilibria sharper than those reflected 
in the annual balance. 
44. Once the magnitude that would be registered by 
the multilateral swing credits as a result of the negotia-
tion conducted on the organization of the system has 
been ascertained, it will be possible to make an accurate 
estimate of the maximum amount of the capital or fund 
within the agency. 
Time-lags would derive, as has already been pointed 
out, from the following circumstance. It may happen 
that several debtor countries have not exceeded the 
limit of their credits as at a given date, and are thus 
free from any obligation to effect payments to the agency. 
The latter, in turn, might find itself compelled to effect 
payments on the same date to a creditor country which 
had concentrated all the deficits of the debtor members 
in its positive balance. It would thereby have exceed its 
Table 3 
Estimate of receipts and payments deriving 
from transactions in 1958 a 






A B A B 
Argentina 30 15 - 9 
Bol iv ia 2 1 - 6 - 4 - 5 
Brazil 24 12 14 — 2 
Chi le 14 7 - 27 - 13 - 2 0 
Paraguay 6 3 4 — 1 
Peru 11 6 28 17 22 
U r u g u a y 4 2 - 4 — - 2 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of the figures in table 1. 
a Based on example given in table 2 above. 
b See note to table 2. Figures are rounded. 
c Multilateral plus 20 per cent of bilateral balances. 
credit level and would thus be in a position to claim 
payment of the surplus. 
The mode of operation of this capital or fund would 
resemble, up to a point, that of the cash assets or cash 
reserve of a commercial bank. 
In the case of the agency, the assets in its balance would 
comprise the stock of dollars constituting its capital, plus 
its credits against debtor countries. Its liabilities, on 
the other hand, would include credits against the agency 
in favour of creditor countries and the book values of 
dollar holdings as registered in favour of the countries 
or institutions which supplied them. If trade movements 
in the area develop in conditions of relative equilibrium 
and members' balances do not exceed the credit limits 
established, the agency's cash holding will register no 
movement whatsoever. On the other hand, disequilibria 
in either direction in so far as they exceed the credit 
level, may reduce or augment the cash reserve, within 
limits that can be calculated with complete accuracy. 
In these circumstances, the less favourable hypothesis 
is that by which six of the seven members of the area 
might reach at one and the same time their debtor credit 
limit, and the seventh country, with the lowest credit 
level, would be the creditor of all of them. In such an 
event, the maximum amount which the agency would 
be obliged to disburse would be 87 million dollars in 
the case of estimate A and 44 million in that of 
estimate B. 
This hypothesis is extremely unlikely to materialize. 
The figures in table 3, prepared in accordance with the 
assumptions explained above, suggest that the agency 
would not have had to make any payment in case A 
(income and expenditure to the amount of 17 million 
dollars) and a net disbursement of 2 million in case B 
(income 25 million dollars and expenditure 27 million). 
The establishment of certain special interim condi-
tions to facilitate accession to the system in the case of 
countries whose balances in the trade that would be 
covered by the area are persistently favourable, would 
help to prevent the occurrence of a phenomenon such 
as that visualized in the foregoing hypothesis. 
2. Situation of surviving bilateral accounts 
45. As has already been mentioned, the surviving 
bilateral accounts would be connected with the a priori 
or a posteriori credit system by the surrender of a fixed 
proportion of the balance (which would be revised from 
time to time) for purposes of the periodical and 
automatic liquidation effected by the agency. 
It is useful to consider how this provision would 
affect accounts registering high seasonal balances, like 
the account between Argentina and Brazil, the countries 
which maintain the largest inter-Latin American trade 
flow. In this account a great deal of weight is carried by 
certain goods in respect of which trade values fluctuate 
appreciably from one year to another. Moreover, the 
operations arising out of trade in the goods in question 
are concentrated in certain periods of each year. The 
sharpest fluctuations are registered in the case of wheat, 
trade in which is conditioned by the following two main 
o 
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variables: the volume of production, both in Argentina 
and in Brazil, and the size of Brazil's purchases in other 
markets. Fluctuations are also observable in trade in 
fresh fruit and timber. 
Table 4 presents the balance of the Argentine-Brazilian 
payments account at the close of each of the last four 
years. It may be noted that in the period as a whole 
the balance of payments between the two countries 
showed a net surplus of 61 million dollars, in favour of 
Brazil, with disequilibria reaching 35 million dollars in 
a single year. 
Table 4 
Balances of the account held between Argentina 
and Brazil as on 31 December of each year 
(Millions of dollars) 
Difference in respect 
Year Balancea to the preceding year 
1955 + 10.1 
1956 - 12.1 22.2 
1957 - 15.8 3.7 
1958 + 19.2 35.0 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco Central de la Repú-
blica Argentina and the Department of Currency and Credit (Superintendencia 
da Moeda e Crédito) of Brazil. 
a The signs refer to the position of Brazil. 
These extremely marked fluctuations tend to cancel 
each other out, but over very long terms. Argentina and 
Brazil have therefore established an unlimited swing 
credit in their payments account, so that neither country 
runs the risk of having to divert dollars to the financing 
of its trade. 
Situations like this account for the caution with which 
the prospect of a change in the existing payments system 
among some Latin American countries is viewed in 
some circles and for the anxiety that progress towards 
multilateralism and convertibility should be gradual 
enough to allow time for the expansion of trade in such 
items as manufactured goods — trade in which might 
attain a more even and steady flow than the commerce 
in primary commodities at present prevailing — to impart 
some degree of stability to trade flows between the two 
countries and in the area as a whole. 
3. Credits and internal means of payment 
46. How far would the credits granted under the 
a priori or a posteriori system have inflationary effects 
in each country ? 
It is common knowledge that the inflationary effect 
of an export against credit is exactly the same as that 
deriving from another whose value has been received 
in dollars which have gone to increase the foreign 
exchange reserve of the exporter country. In other words, 
the expansionist effect depends on the possibility of 
applying the resources obtained from such exports to 
new imports, which would be facilitated within the 
system by the participation of the largest possible num-
ber of countries. 
The expansionist monetary repercussions of the credits 
which would be required under the agency system may 
be regarded as fairly limited if their possible magnitude 
is related to the volume of internal means of payment 
of the countries interested in the formation of the area. 
According to the preliminary calculations in this paper, 
possible credits would represent between 0.9 and 1.8 
per cent of the means of payments of the countries as 
a whole. 
IV. FINAL REMARKS 
47. In this paper, two possible systems for multi-
lateral credits and the periodic settlement of transac-
tions among the participating countries have been 
outlined. 
The main differences between the two systems may 
be summed up as follows: 
(a) With respect to transactions effected through 
bilateral accounts, the two systems are identical. In both 
cases, part of the bilateral balances would be liquidated 
multilaterally and the resulting net surplus incorporated 
into the over-all position of each member so that it can 
be subjected to the settlement rules that are agreed upon. 
(b) When transactions are effected in dollars, each 
system will be applied in a different way: (i) under the 
a priori credit system, countries with a surplus would 
grant internal credits to countries with a deficit for the 
duration of each accounting period, i.e., for the 60-day 
or 90-day interval between the agency's settlements. Such 
credits differ fundamentally from, and are supplementary 
to, the multilateral credits agreed upon with the agency. 
Their amount would, of course, be equal to the amount 
of the surplus recorded for multilateral credits during 
the whole of the accounting period; (ii) under the a 
posteriori credit system, there would be no internal credit. 
48. The operation of the two systems would also 
differ to some extent: 
(0 Under the a posteriori system, dollar payments 
for daily transactions would be effected by commercial 
banks as usual through letters of credit, payment orders 
or drafts, chargeable to the accounts held by the partner 
banks among themselves and cleared on New York or 
any other centre adopted for the same purpose. Under 
the a priori system, on the other hand, operations among 
commercial banks would be undertaken as usual, except 
that settlements among partner banks would be cleared 
on the corresponding Central Banks. 
(ii) Both systems would require an accurate computa-
tion of transactions in order to establish the balance 
between payments and claims. In either case, it should 
be possible to decentralize the computation so that the 
Central Banks would receive from commercial banks 
only the final balance for the operations of each bank 
with its partner banks in the area. In the one case, the 
Central Banks would naturally take these balances, 
against payment or claim in local currency, whereas, 
in the other, they would have a purely statistical value 
and would be used to ascertain the final position for 
payments and claims actually effected during each 
accounting period. 
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(Hi) The accounts maintained under either system by 
each Central Bank with the agency would also be alike 
inasmuch as they would reflect each country's position 
vis-a-vis the other participants in the area as a whole. 
Under one system, each country would debit or credit 
its account with the amount accruing from its daily 
transactions, whereas, under the other, the results of 
periodic settlements would not be shown until the close of 
each accounting period. In both cases, however, that 
part of the bilateral balances agreed upon for transfer 
to the agency for multilateral settlement would be 
periodically incorporated. 
49. Either of the two formulas outlined, or any other 
of a similar nature, would provide the credit facilities 
required to forge ahead boldly with the programme of 
trade liberalization and, at the same time, gradually 
to impart the necessary uniformity and convertibility 
to intra-area payments. The countries themselves would 
have to study the positive and negative features of each 
system in the light of their own interests and possibilities 
as well as of the common desire to attain the aims 
pursued by the free-trade area. 
2. Considerations on the system of reciprocal credits 
in the Free-Trade Area * 
During talks which representatives of the secretariat 
of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) 
held in Washington last November with officials of the 
International Monetary Fund, as well as with repre-
sentatives of the United States Government connected 
with the Fund, an explanation was given of the mean-
ing and scope of the two alternative proposals for a 
system of reciprocal credits submitted by the secretariat 
to the Governments participating in the forthcoming 
central banks meeting at Montevideo.1 The most 
important points elucidated in the Washington talks 
are briefly reviewed below, together with certain relevant 
comments. 
I 
1. The establishment of a system of reciprocal credits 
for the projected free-trade area is not dictated by bal-
ance-of-payments considerations. Indisputably, pay-
ments equilibrium must be sought in the aggregate, 
not bilaterally or with respect to a group of countries. 
The aim pursued is not to balance payments, but to 
stimulate an energetic liberalization policy in respect 
of trade among the countries of the area. Most of those 
that have already attained convertibility have done so 
through the application of heavy surcharges or prior 
deposits to restrict imports. The imposition of these 
restrictions has been decisively influenced by general 
motives connected with the balance of payments. 
* This section complements section 1. It was drafted on 
14 December 1959 and presented at the meeting of governmental 
representatives of Central Banks held at Montevideo in 
January 1960. 
1 See above " Payments and credits in the Free-Trade Area 
projected by Latin American countries 
In practice, apart from what might be achieved through 
negotiations within the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), a liberalization pact designed to 
abolish such restrictions vis-à-vis the rest of the world 
in general, in exchange for equivalent concessions, would 
be inconceivable. But such an agreement might well 
be feasible among the Latin American countries, since 
in each of them the increase in each one's imports brought 
about by the liberalization policy would be concomitant 
with the effect on its own exports of the liberalization 
measures applied by the other countries. This is a promis-
ing field for the expansion of trade. 
Presumably, no country would adopt such a liberaliza-
tion policy unless reciprocity existed. Moreover, the 
reciprocity principal was clearly defined by the Govern-
ments in the draft treaty on a free-trade area adopted 
at Montevideo. 
It would not be justifiable to import against dollars, 
from countries members of the area, goods which on ac-
count of the dollar shortage are not now imported from the 
rest of the world. As regards imports at present effected 
from the rest of the world, what would be the point 
of ceasing to purchase them in other regions and bringing 
them in from within the area if they still had to be bought 
with the dollars that are so hard to come by ? If such 
imports were not paid for on the basis of additional 
exports, no advantage would attach to the deflection of 
trade towards the area, as, commercially speaking, im-
ports from the rest of the world are usually more 
attractive. 
It may be useful to recall the essence of the principle 
of reciprocity. The countries of the area are proposing 
to expand their trade in order to expedite economic 
development. If a country increases its imports from the 
rest, it stimulates their development, and consequently 
may expect that its partner countries will encourage 
its own development by purchasing more of its exports. 
There is nothing in this which differs essentially from 
the principle of reciprocity as it is traditionally observed 
in any negotiation of commercial treaties. 
2. In the course of the Washington talks two 
criticisms of the reciprocity principle as formulated in 
the draft treaty were put forward. The more important 
was to the effect that mere correlation between the 
expansion of imports and that of exports did not neces-
sarily imply equivalent benefits. A country might in 
fact increase its exports of goods whose sale within the 
area depended only slightly or not at all upon prefe-
rences, and receive in return imports which could be 
effected only if they were granted markedly preferential 
treatment. 
The reply to this criticism is that such situations 
must be subject to negotiation. If a country has no 
difficulty in exporting certain goods to the world market, 
it may not have to depend on preferences in order to 
find a sale for them within the area. There would con-
sequently be no reason to apply the reciprocity prin-
ciple in the case of exports effected in this way, without 
need of preferential treatment. As stipulated in the 
draft treaty, this principle would be applicable only to 
goods enjoying such preferences. 
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Furthermore, each country will be free to choose the 
goods in respect of which it wishes to grant preferences, 
and will do so in the degree and measure in which it 
can obtain similar treatment from the other countries 
of the area. Thus, the application of the reciprocity 
principle, far from being automatic, would be dependent 
on negotiation among the contracting parties. 
The second criticism was that the reciprocity principle 
might give rise to arbitrarily-created situations. A per-
sistent excess of exports over imports might perhaps be 
the result of natural factors which would have to be 
respected. But what is meant by " natural factors 
and which of them are involved here ? Would the 
term be used in its proper sense, when the tariff 
system — the outcome of a specific policy—restricted 
imports ? Of course not. If, by virtue of the conces-
sions granted by its partner countries, a country 
develops a certain persistent excess of exports to the 
area, the logical inference seems to be that it should 
speed up its liberalization policy in order to increase its 
imports from the area. It is precisely thus that the appli-
cation of the reciprocity principle was visualized in the 
draft treaty. 
II 
3. In connexion with the system of reciprocal credits, 
attention was drawn to the following two essential 
aspects: 
(a) First, countries which, as a result of liberalization 
policy, develop an excess of imports from the area 
should have at their disposal credits up to a pre-deter-
mined limit to enable them to absorb the possible 
adverse effects of the policy in question, time being thus 
allowed for their exports to feel the benefit of the libera-
lization measures applied by the other countries. In 
default of such credits, prudence would dictate the 
greatest caution in putting liberalization policy into 
effect, lest new external payments problems should be 
created. 
(b) Secondly, countries developing an excess of exports 
would have to grant credits to the importer countries, 
again up to pre-determined limits. 
Unquestionably, if these latter creditor countries, 
without granting any credit at all, were immediately to 
receive payment for their excess exports, they would 
have little interest in taking prompt measures to expedite 
their liberalization policy. But if they were under the 
obligation to grant a credit, and this could be mobilized 
within the area for the purpose of effecting more imports, 
a strong incentive to liberalization would be generated. 
4. There would seem to be no fundamental objection 
to these two principles, which are grounded on considera-
tions of trade policy, not of payments policy. The objec-
tions raised related rather to the method of application. 
A great deal of stress was laid on the undesirability of 
granting credits to debtor countries automatically. 
Such credits, it was affirmed, should be made the subject 
of negotiation. They should preferably be granted only 
when a deterioration in the aggregate balance-of-pay-
ments rendered such a step essential, and always provid-
ing that it did not jeopardize the policy of monetary 
control which a country had to pursue in order to achieve 
balance-of-payments equilibrium. 
However, it is clear that the certainty of having credit 
available would help to induce countries to carry their 
liberalization policy as far as they considered feasible 
and that the lack of automaticity, at any rate to begin 
with, might seriously affect the scope and efficacy of 
the measures adopted. 
Undoubtedly, Governments will have to weigh the 
pros and cons of these arguments with great care, before 
finally deciding on the solution they will select for so 
important an aspect of the problem. 
5. The desirability of a lesser degree of automaticity 
was also discussed in connexion with the credits to be 
granted by countries with a favourable balance. In 
this context, it was suggested that the credit might be 
liquidated when the creditor country demonstrated that 
the disparity between imports and exports was due not 
to its own policy but to that of the debtor countries. 
How far the exercise of such a faculty could be carried 
would of course depend upon the degree of automati-
city of the credits granted to debtor countries, since these 
are two closely inter-related aspects of one and the 
same problem. 
Il l 
6. It was emphasized in the discussion that what was 
essential was the availability of a credit system which 
would facilitate liberalization within the area, always 
through the expansion, not the contraction, of trade. 
If this criterion is adopted, the selection of the credit 
system will depend mainly upon practical considerations. 
In the report submitted by the ECLA secretariat to the 
Governments concerned, two alternative formulae are 
put forward; one of these was prompted by certain 
aspects of the European Payments Union machinery, 
while the other takes into account certain features of 
the subsequent European Monetary Agreement. 
Strong objections were raised to the first formula. Its 
adoption would mean that accounts had to be kept of 
all the trade operations of each country with the other 
members of the area. It was feared that such a system 
might help to perpetuate bilateralism in those countries 
which had not yet succeeded in eliminating it, or to 
re-establish it in those where it had already been dis-
carded. To avert this risk, the avoidance of any kind of 
accounting system was felt to be desirable. 
The existence of the risk is undeniable, although it 
may be recalled that in Europe's experience the Pay-
ments Union, rather than perpetuating bilateralism, 
helped to get rid of it. The determinants of bilateralism 
are not accounting systems, since these did not previously 
exist, but phenomena of another sort, which are just 
what the policy of liberalization and reciprocity in the 
free-trade area would seek to remedy. 
There is yet another motive of concern. The fluctua-
tions of the exchange rate, in the course of daily opera-
tions, might give rise to speculative manoeuvres. The 
only way of preventing this would be to concentrate all 
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operations in the central bank of the country concerned, 
a procedure which would detract from the desired speed 
and simplicity as regards the formalities involved. 
7. To forestall such misgivings, the secretariat report 
also presents an alternative formula whereby operations 
in the area would be liquidated daily in dollars. Perio-
dically, countries which, according to a statistical reckon-
ing, had shown a surplus attributable to liberalization 
would have to deposit the dollars they had received, up 
to a certain pre-determined sum. These resources would 
be placed at the disposal of countries with a deficit, in 
the form of loans. Thus the unit of account, implicit 
in the preceding formula, would be completely eliminated. 
Alongside this advantage, the formula under discus-
sion has the drawback — as was pointed out — that 
a central bank might find itself compelled to purchase 
dollars on the market in order to make the deposit 
referred to at a time the surplus in its favour had not 
yet brought an inflow of dollars to strengthen its foreign 
exchange position. However, in so far as the countries 
of the area decided against making these reimbursements 
and deposits automatic, the disadvantage indicated, 
if indeed it is one, could be modified or eliminated. 
8. The trend towards the re-establishment of converti-
bility is unquestionably of great importance. But it 
must be accompanied by sweeping measures to libera-
lize trade among the countries members of the area. 
The more numerous these members become, the more 
effectively can the liberalization policy be implemented 
and the more faithfully the reciprocity principle be 
observed. 
Liberalization policy and the restoration of converti-
bility are perforce complementary to the introduction 
of the latter and a system of reciprocal credits creates 
no obstacle. On the contrary, the success of a liberaliza-
tion policy stimulated by the reciprocal credit system 
would help to make convertibility an established and 
lasting reality. 
3. Report of the meeting of governmental representatives 
of Central Banks to the second session of the Inter-
Governmental Conference for the Establishment of a 
Free-Trade Area among Latin American Countries * 
(Montevideo, 12 to 19 January 1960) 
1. This report summarises the conclusions reached 
at the Meeting of Governmental Representatives of 
Central Banks held at Montevideo, Uruguay, in Janu-
ary 1960, in compliance with resolution 3 adopted at the 
first session of the Inter-Governmental Conference for 
the Establishment of a Free-Trade Area among Latin 
American Countries (Montevideo, 16-30 September 
1959). 
2. In this resolution, the Conference, after taking 
note that the delegations present had reported on the 
payments systems in force in their respective countries 
and had voiced their opinions as to the best way of 
* This report, previously issued as a provisional document, is 
reproduced below, unrevised, because of the interest attaching to 
its content. 
effecting payments in the Area, expressed the view that 
their statements had raised special questions which 
should be examined at length. It therefore recommended 
that a meeting should be convened at which top-ranking 
experts would represent the Central Banks of the coun-
tries that were negotiating the establishment of the 
free-trade area. It also requested the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to undertake 
special studies on internal payments problems in the 
projected free-trade area on ways and means of solving 
them. The resolution further invited the Central Banks of 
the other Latin American countries to send observers 
to the meeting, and, lastly, requested ECLA to organize 
the meeting and, together with the IMF, to provide 
technical assistance while it was in progress. 
I. MEETING OF GOVERNMENTAL 
REPRESENTATIVES OF CENTRAL BANKS 
A . ATTENDANCE AND ORGANIZATION OF WORK 
Opening meeting 
3. The session was inaugurated on 12 January 1960 
in the Board Room of the Banco de la República Oriental 
del Uruguay, which generously provided all the facilities 
needed for the success of the proceedings. At the opening 
meeting an address was delivered by Mr. Mateo Maga-
riños de Mello, Chairman of the Inter-Governmental 
Conference for the Establishment of a Free-Trade Area 
among Latin American Countries. Speeches were also 
made by Mr. Homero Martínez Montero, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, and Mr. Felipe Gil, head 
of the Uruguayan delegation. Mr. Luis Mackenna, head 
of the Chilean delegation, spoke on behalf of the delega-
tions present. After the officers had been elected, a state-
ment on technical aspects was made by Mr. Raúl Prebisch, 
Executive Secretary of ECLA. He was followed by Mr. 
Herbert K. Zassenhaus, representing the International 
Monetary Fund. 
Membership and attendance 
4. The meeting was attended by representatives of 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and 
Uruguay, and observers from the Central Banks of 
Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico, as well as from the Board 
of Governors of the United States Federal Reserve 
System, the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America, the International Monetary Fund, the 
Organization of American States and the Inter-American 
Council of Commerce and Production. The list of par-
ticipants is as follows: 
Governmental representatives 
Argentina: Alberto H. Mage, Exchange Manager, 
Central Bank; Rodolfo Korenjak; Teodoro A. Fer-
nández; Adviser: Anibal Silva Garretón. 
Bolivia: Mario Ojara Agreda, General Adviser to the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs; Hugo Ortiz Justiniano; 
Claudio Calderón; Luis Viscarra. 
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Brazil: Herculano Borges da Fonseca, Chief of the 
Division of Economics, Department of Currency and 
Credit ; Paulo Cabrai de Mello ; Emane Galveas ; 
Alcides P. Costa; Lázaro Bauman das Neves; Irlio 
Octavio de Figueiredo Pessoa; J. O. Knaack de 
Souza (Observer). 
Chile : Luis Mackenna, General Manager of the Central 
Bank; Eduardo Morgan. 
Paraguay: Juan Félix Morales, Director of the Central 
Bank; Julio Sanabria. 
Peru: Emilio Foley, General Manager, Banco Agrope-
cuario; José Morales Urresti; Rodolfo León Carrera. 
Uruguay : Felipe Gil, Director, Banco de la República; 
Antonio Odicini Lezama; Crisólogo Brotos; Mario 
H. Maldini; Romeo Maeso Sueiro; Luis I. Carlevaro; 
Julio C. Solsona Flores; Washington E. Demaría; 
Alberto Casal; Alberto Morillo Otero; Juan C. 
Arrosa; Juan A. Eguiluz; Juan C. Mussio; Advisers: 
D. Flaubiano Simoens Arce; Luis C. Panizza; Gilberto 
Boasso; Raúl H. Torre; Fernando Oliú; Washington 
E. Souto; Mario Buchelli; Justo B. Otegui. 
Governmental observers 
Colombia: Rodrigo Botero, Economic Adviser, Banco 
de la República. 
Ecuador: José María Avilés Mosquera, Director, Ex-
change Department, Central Bank. 
Mexico : Octaviano Campos Salas, Manager, Banco 
de México. 
Panama : Fernandio Díaz, Deputy Manager, Banco 
Nacional 
Representatives of various national and international 
organizations 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
Raúl Prebisch, Executive Secretary; Esteban Ivovich, 
Director, Trade Policy Division; Alberto Solá, Eco-
nomist, Trade Policy Division; Julio Valdés, Deputy 
Secretary of the Commission. 
Organization of American States 
Phillip Glaessner, Deputy Director, Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs ; Advisers : Michael 
Zuntz; Fernando Fugazot. 
International Monetary Fund 
Herbert K. Zassenhaus. 
Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production 
Carlos Sanguinetti, Vice-President for the American 
continent; José Ma. Roca Sienra, Adviser, Uruguayan 
Section. 
Board of Governors oj the United States Federal Reserve 
System 
Ives Maroni, Economist, Division of International 
Finance. 
Officers 
5. The meeting elected the following officers: 
Chairman: Felipe Gil (Uruguay) 
Vice-Chairmen: Alberto H. Mage (Argentina) 
Herculano Borges da Fonseca (Brazil) 
Secretariat 
6. The duties of the secretariat of the meeting were dis-
charged by the ECLA secretariat under Mr. Esteban 
Ivovich. 
B . AGENDA 
7. The following agenda was adopted: 
1. Opening speeches 
2. Election of officers 
3. Adoption of the agenda 
4. Possible credit and payments systems 
5. General discussion 
6. Adoption of the report and conclusions to be 
submitted to the second session of the Inter-
Governmental Conference for the Establish-
ment of a Free-Trade Area among Latin Ameri-
can Countries 
Documents 
8. Payments and credits in the free-trade area projected 
by Latin American countries: possible systems 
Memorandum on a system of swing credits in the 
free-trade area projected by Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay 
Further considerations on the system of swing 
credits in the free-trade area 
Payments problems among the countries proposing 
to form a Latin American Free-Trade Area and 
possible solutions (International Monetary Fund 
report) 
II. CONCLUSIONS 
9. As a result of the discussions, the representatives 
of the Central Banks of the participating countries 
established the following conclusions: 
Conclusions of the Meeting of Governmental Repre-
sentatives of Central Banks, to be brought to the attention 
of the Inter-Governmental Conference for the Establish-
ment of a Free-Trade Area among Latin American 
Countries 
Governmental representatives of the Central Banks 
of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru 
and Uruguay met at Montevideo on 12-19 January 1960, 
in conformity with resolution 3, adopted at the first 
session of the Inter-Governmental Conference for the 
Establishment of a Free-Trade Area among Latin 
American Countries. 
The meeting examined the information relating to the 
different payments systems — through bilateral accounts 
and in convertible currencies — in use in the region and 
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discussed the way in which credits might be used to 
facilitate the achievement of the economic ends pursued 
by the establishment of a free-trade area. 
During the discussions important elucidatory state-
ments were made on fundamental aspects of the ques-
tions under consideration and useful guide-lines were 
laid down, thanks to which it will be possible to press 
on gradually with the endeavour to find solutions that 
will meet the dynamic requirements of the free-trade 
area. The conclusions reached by the meeting in that 
respect were as follows: 
(a) In the field of payments the target to be aimed at 
is free currency convertibility; 
(b) The fact that differing systems of payments and 
credits are in force in the region is no obstacle to the 
entry into operation of the free-trade area, in accordance 
with the firm intention of the countries represented at the 
meeting; 
(c) In the free-trade area, every endeavour must be 
made to obviate the discriminatory treatment to which 
the existence of differing payments and credit systems 
might otherwise give rise; 
(id) In order that the free-trade area may fully attain 
its objectives, access to appropriate credits for the 
financing of intra-area transactions should be facilitated. 
To this end, the study of possible systems of payments 
and credits should be continued, due regard being paid 
to the observations and views expressed in the course 
of the meeting. 
4. The reciprocal credits system for 
the Free-Trade Area * 
OBSERVATIONS BY THE ECLA SECRETARIAT ARISING OUT 
OF THE MEETING OF GOVERNMENTAL REPRESENTATIVES 
OF CENTRAL BANKS 
The Montevideo discussions cleared the way for the 
establishment of a credit system which would meet the 
requirements of the free-trade area. They showed that 
in such a system there was nothing which conflicted with 
the principle of convertibility or with any other sound 
monetary principle. Yet certain misgivings were ex-
pressed in connexion with the institution of an agency 
to handle credit operations among the countries of the 
area. These apprehensions were no longer grounded on 
reasons of principle, but on considerations relating to 
the ill-effects that might result from possible mismanage-
ment. In this context, too, the Montevideo talks were 
very enlightening. 
I. THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY 
Equivalence of trade benefits 
The Governments interested in the establishment of 
the free-trade area requested the secretariat to study a 
0 This section has hitherto only been circulated for internal 
use at the second session of the Inter-Governmental Conference 
for the Establishment of a Free-Trade Area among Latin American 
Countries. 
credit system suited to its purposes. Such a system could 
not be projected in the abstract, but only in close relation 
to the objectives of the area in question. The basic end 
pursued is the creation of additional inter-Latin American 
trade flows, which by promoting industrial specializa-
tion, and brisker competition within the area, as well as 
more efficient productive utilization of the land, may 
help to speed up the rate of economic development. 
There is no reason why the creation of these additional 
trade flows should affect trade with the rest of the world. 
The volume of this latter is dependent upon external 
demand, especially from the great industrial centres, and 
on the capacity of the Latin American countries to 
satisfy such demand and to avoid certain errors of 
economic policy which have jeopardized export possibi-
lities in the recent past. 
With a view to attaining the objective referred to, the 
proposed draft treaty sets up a preferential system under 
which negotiations will have to be conducted for the 
reduction and abolition of duties and restrictions among 
the contracting parties. Obviously, in the course of 
such negotiations each country will endeavour to ensure 
that the benefits it receives from the other members 
are equivalent to those it grants them. But, however 
great the care and wisdom displayed, there will be no 
possible way of assessing the results of these reciprocal 
benefits in advance. It was therefore deemed expedient 
to include in the draft provision for a corrective pro-
cedure, consisting in successive adjustments, whereby 
effective reciprocity could be achieved. 
Before this procedure is explained, a point should be 
cleared up in connexion with the kinds of goods traded. 
On the one hand, a first category includes those export 
commodities which find a relatively easy sale on the 
world market, and which the contracting parties will 
have no particular interest in diverting towards the free-
trade area through the system of preferences. And on 
the other hand, there are most of the goods in which 
inter-Latin American trade is at present conducted, 
together with those industrial products which might give 
rise to steadily expanding reciprocal trade flows. It is 
this second category of goods that will be the subject 
of negotiations under the preferential system. 
The first category comprises a few traditional export 
commodities. The rate of growth of world demand for 
these is, of course, relatively weak, and the development 
of Latin American demand will open up new prospects 
for the expansion of production. Only a preferential 
system will enable these possibilities to be exploited to 
the full. 
Method of achieving equivalence in practice 
The only yardstick whereby the effects of the reciprocal 
benefits granted can be measured in practice is the 
increase in each member country's exports and imports 
of all the goods covered by the preferential system. The 
aim of the procedure established in the draft treaty is 
to ensure that countries with a persistent export surplus 
of the commodities in question vis-à-vis the other members 
of the area expedite the reduction or abolition of duties 
and restrictions in order to facilitate the development of 
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countries in the opposite situation, i.e., having a persistent 
import surplus. Naturally, if the objectives of the treaty 
are to be fulfilled, each country will have to map out 
its programme for the reduction or elimination of duties 
and restrictions so that it will be able to negotiate for 
reciprocal benefits in the governmental committee to be 
set up under the terms of the draft agreement. In cases 
where a persistent export surplus occurs, the imple-
mentation of this programme will have to be speeded 
up. It might be advisable for the following supplementary 
provision to be included in the treaty: if the foregoing 
measure proved inadequate, the country with a persistent 
import surplus would be entitled to reduce and abolish 
duties and restrictions at a slower rate. 
Reciprocal encouragement of economic development 
The fact that reciprocity is established in relation to 
commodities' in respect of which benefits would be 
accorded, other commodities being excluded, is clear 
proof that the principle in question is dictated not by 
balance-of-payments considerations but by motives of 
trade policy. 
What are these motives ? It has already been pointed 
out that the underlying purpose of the Free-Trade Areas 
is to contribute to the acceleration of economic develop-
ment. The expansion of exports achieved by any given 
country with the help of the concessions it has been 
granted encourages its economic development, and in 
return it must afford the other members a corresponding 
stimulus through the increase of their own exports. 
Otherwise, what would be the advantage of the Free-Trade 
Area for a country that increased its imports from the 
rest as a result of the preferential system, without secur-
ing a corresponding expansion of its exports ? What is 
more, not only would it obtain no benefits, but the 
consequences of this lack of equivalence might actually 
be prejudicial to it, since it would have to pay for the 
difference between exports and imports in dollars that 
it could have used more advantageously for imports 
from the rest of the world. 
Reciprocity with the rest of the world 
Following this explanation of the raison d'être of the 
reciprocity principle, the question may arise why it 
should be extended only to the Free-Trade Areas coun-
tries, and not to the rest of the world. There is an 
essential difference with respect to export possibilities. 
In inter-Latin American trade such possibilities are vast, 
both for traditional export commodities and, more 
particularly, for those industrial goods in which very 
little trade has hitherto been conducted. The same is 
not usually true of the Latin American countries' trade 
with the great industrial centres. Here the prospects are, 
for the time being, limited, and an intensive expansion 
of exports of traditional commodities can hardly be 
expected, since it is common knowledge that, in their 
case, the income-elasticity of demand is relatively slight. 
Undeniably, the feebleness of world demand for such 
goods is also partly attributable to the protectionist 
policy pursued by the importer countries; were this 
relaxed, considerable impetus might well be given to 
Latin America's exports. From another point of view, 
no intensive development of the region's capacity to 
export manufactured goods to the great industrial centres 
could reasonably be expected. Yet such a possibility 
does indeed exist, and in a high degree, within the sphere 
of inter-Latin American trade, and as it is exploited in 
practice and the volume of industrial output increases, 
alongside increased specialization in manufacturing 
activities, costs will gradually fall also, and the region 
will find it feasible to begin exporting industrial products 
to the great centres on a relatively large scale. There 
will then be an opportunity — at present precariously 
limited to traditional commodities — of negotiating with 
these centres on bases of reciprocity, although not 
necessarily on the lines laid down in the treaty. 
II. THE RECIPROCAL CREDITS SYSTEM 
Function of credits 
It was stated above that, if reciprocity is to be achieved 
in practice, individual countries will have to expedite or 
retard the implementation of their programmes for the 
reduction or elimination of duties and restrictions. How-
ever, it will take some time for these readjustments to 
yield results, and, in the meanwhile, there Will still be 
instances in which the increases in exports and imports 
generated by the treaty fail to keep abreast of each other. 
This constitutes a strong argument in favour of the 
establishment of a reciprocal credits system. 
The monetary reserves of the Latin American coun-
tries are generally far from sufficient, and the trend of 
their import requirements from the rest of the world is 
apt to climb more rapidly than that of their export 
possibilities. In these circumstances, prudence would 
seem to counsel great caution as regards liberalization 
commitments (in the broadest sense of the term, i.e., 
reduction and abolition of duties and restrictions), 
unless additional credits are available to cover any 
balance-of-payments deterioration to which this liberaliza-
tion policy may give rise. In other words, the function 
of credit will be to allow time for the possible adverse 
effects of liberalization measures on a country's balance 
of payments to be succeeded by the favourable con-
sequences of those liberalization measures which coun-
tries with a persistent export surplus will have to adopt. 
Thus, the secretariat, in compliance with the request 
submitted to it, has studied a credit system calculated to 
help in ensuring that the principle of reciprocity, which 
is the cornerstone of the whole agreement, is respected. 
The Montevideo discussions, it must be repeated, 
strengthened the conviction that a system of this kind 
can be established without prejudice to any basic 
monetary principle. 
Credits and convertibility 
In this connexion, concern was expressed as to whether 
a reciprocal credits system might not present an obstacle 
on the road to convertibility on which some of the Latin 
American countries have successfully started out, or, 
what would be even worse, actually compel them to 
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retrace their steps. The discussion showed that there 
would be no objection whatever to the establishment of 
a reciprocal credits system entirely in dollars, not in 
units of account, which would in no way jeopardize 
convertibility. For the sake of elucidating so important 
a point, a reminder must first be given of how such a 
system might operate. 
A reciprocal credits agency would be set up for the 
countries of the area, through which the reciprocal 
credits that each country was prepared to grant to the 
others as a whole, and vice versa, would be negotiated 
periodically and in advance. 
An agency contrived on these lines would have no 
reason to intervene in international payments. These 
would be effected in dollars, as in the case of ordinary 
operations under a convertibility system; but periods 
(possibly quarterly) for computing the results of such 
payments would be set. If, at the end of any given 
quarter, the reckoning were to show that a country had 
paid out more dollars than it had received by virtue of 
area preferences, and that the outcome had been a 
deterioration in its balance-of-payments position, the 
country concerned would be empowered to make use 
of the credit previously assigned to it. In other words, 
the country would recover its excess dollar disburse-
ment, wholly or in part, according to the relation between 
this excess and the credit granted. 
The dollars thus recovered by countries with an import 
surplus could be used unrestrictedly both within the 
Free-Trade Area and in the rest of the world, without 
any effect on convertibility. On this point it would seem 
that the doubts existing prior to the Montevideo talks 
were completely dispelled. 
Source of funds for the system 
This was not equally true, however, of certain mis-
givings relating to the resources that would be con-
tributed under the system to enable it to grant the credits 
just referred to. In this context, an important distinction 
was drawn during the discussions with respect to the 
source of such funds. Dollar contributions might be 
determined in advance, in the shape of quotas to be 
subscribed by each country in accordance with certain 
indices of financial capacity; or they might be based in 
each instance on the surplus dollar payments received 
by any country (as previously described) in consequence 
of the preferential concessions. This distinction does not 
mean that the two sources are mutually incompatible, 
for even if the second were drawn upon for contributions, 
it would be necessary, as shown in the ECLA reports, for 
the system to have a capital fund at its disposal, which 
might be set up with contributions from the first of the 
sources indicated.1 
1 Yet another combination of funds from the two sources is 
conceivable. For example, contributions might be established in 
advance and a quota fixed for each country, but instead of their 
being payable immediately, these contributions would be claimed 
only when it became necessary to grant credits to countries with 
an import surplus. In such an event, countries with a correlative 
excess of exports would be called upon to contribute their pre-
established quotas. 
Operation of the agency 
Before passing to the objections raised to the second 
source of funds, it may be useful to give a brief explana-
tion of how the system would operate on the basis of 
contributions of this type. 
Countries which had received surplus dollar payments 
would be under the obligation to deposit them with the 
agency at the end of the period of reckoning, up to the 
amount of the credit they had pledged themselves to 
grant. The credit thus extended by any one country to 
the agency would not be frozen; on the contrary, it 
would be available to cover an import surplus should 
the said country's position be reversed as a result of 
the acceleration of its programme for the reduction of 
duties and restrictions, to which reference was made 
earlier. Thus, if a country which had previously shown 
an export surplus came to have an import surplus, and 
had consequently effected excess payments, it could 
recover the dollars concerned, as in the preceding case, 
by means of a credit granted by the agency, and this 
credit would be compensated at once with as much as 
was necessary of the credit extended by the country 
to the agency. 
The root of the arguments against contributions of 
this order lies in the incentive that, would thus be pro-
vided for an expansion of imports from the area; for 
it would obviously be to the interest of a country which 
had granted credit to the agency to mobilize it as quickly 
as possible, by making more purchases from other 
member countries. This is exactly what is aimed at in 
the treaty, and the criticisms levelled at this objective 
will be discussed below. 
III. OBJECTIONS TO A CREDIT SYSTEM BASED 
ON RESOURCES DERIVING FROM EXPORT 
SURPLUSES 
Limited application of creditors' resources 
The most important objection related to the mobiliza-
tion of credit resources granted to the agency by coun-
tries with export surpluses. Such resources, it was 
asserted, should be available to cover imports not only 
from within the area, but also from the rest of the 
world. Were this the case, implementation of the principle 
of reciprocity, far from being promoted, would be 
impeded; in order to retain at its disposal for the longest 
possible time resources which it could use to effect 
purchases anywhere else in the world, on better terms, 
generally speaking, than within the area, a country with 
an export surplus resulting from benefits obtained under 
the treaty would be inclined to wait until the last moment 
before honouring the liberalization commitments im-
posed by the principle of reciprocity. 
Another view expressed was that restricting to the 
Free-Trade Area the use of the resources deposited with 
the agency would imply non-convertibility. This would 
mean that any credit which could not be used in all 
parts of the world would run counter to the principle 
of convertibility. This point too was discussed at length. 
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The loans issued by the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development are by their very nature 
unrestrictedly available for use anywhere in the world. 
The credits granted by the United States Export-Import 
Bank, on the contrary, like those of the Development 
Fund and some of those extended by European coun-
tries, can be applied only in ways that will promote the 
export trade of the countries according them, and not 
to finance exports from other parts of the world. If 
these limitations were not considered incompatible with 
the principle of convertibility, there is no reason why 
such a drawback should be imputed to credits granted 
with a view to furthering reciprocal export trade within 
the area, that is, to attaining the primary objective of 
the treaty. 
Diversion of exports from the world market 
A further argument adduced was that, in order to 
liquidate such credits against the agency, the creditor 
country would find itself compelled to divert normal 
trade flows, to the detriment of exports that could easily 
be sold to the rest of the world by other countries, which 
would thus be induced to import from the area goods 
that they had formerly purchased freely in any part of 
the world. 
The reply to this contention was that reciprocity and 
the credits system related to the goods classified in the 
second of the categories mentioned above, in respect 
of which the expansion of exports was desirable. There 
is no reason why a country that finds it easy to sell 
certain commodities on the world market should accept 
or negotiate preferences and reciprocity in respect of these 
trade items unless it is attracted by the prospect of opening 
up a new market within the Latin American region. 
But such a situation is obviously not typical, since most 
countries will plainly be interested in availing themselves 
of the advantages offered by the Latin American market 
in order to boost production. 
Non-essential imports 
It was also contended that the available resources 
held by a country in the agency (or the credit it could 
obtain therefrom) might encourage non-essential or 
luxury imports. This is, of course, an argument which 
bears on the use of a country's monetary reserves in 
general, not only the agency funds, and raises a problem 
of a different nature which must not be confused with 
the question under consideration. If it is felt to be 
desirable on economic grounds to curtail consumption 
of luxury items, the mere levying of import duties does 
not solve the problem, since it may prove an incentive 
to capital investment in the production of such goods 
and this has actually happened in some cases; the taxa-
tion concerned would then have to be extended to these 
lines of production too, if the aim was to restrict con-
sumption. But were this not so, there would be no 
reason why liberalization measures should not be applied 
to imports of such goods whenever the time seemed ripe 
for such a step, as here too the advantages of specializa-
tion and division of labour within the Free-Trade Area 
still hold good. 
Discrimination against debtors 
It was also affirmed that the accumulation of credits 
would lead to trade discrimination; the creditor country 
might find itself obliged, at a given moment, to rechannel 
the exports it had been shipping to debtor countries 
in order not to increase the amount of credits deposited. 
To this objection two definite replies were vouchsafed. 
In the first place, there would be no room for discrimina-
tion under the agreement. Secondly, there would be no 
question of establishing unlimited credits; their amount 
would be determined by negotiation among the parties 
and in relation to the volume of trade. What is more, 
such credits would be negotiable at regular intervals, 
and if they proved disproportionate to the end pursued, 
there would be nothing to prevent reduction of the 
amount involved in the course of the next negotiation. 
Credits granted by countries with an aggregate payments 
deficit 
It was likewise pointed out that the system under 
discussion would mean that a country to which a dollar 
surplus had accrued from its intra-area operations 
would have to grant credit to the agency and return all 
or some of the dollars in question, even if it registered 
a payments deficit on the rest of its transactions, both 
within the area (in goods belonging to the first category 
and not covered by the treaty) and with the rest of the 
world. If such a situation should arise, it would not 
be through trade with the area that the deficit would 
have to be remedied, but by the application of appro-
priate balance-of-payments measures, whether these 
were of a monetary nature or of a more far-reaching 
kind designed to bring about structural changes and 
restore equilibrium. Moreover, a country in such a 
situation could not expect to right itself at the expense 
of the monetary reserves of another country whose 
balance-of-payments position had deteriorated as a 
result of a liberalization policy. 
Automaticity of credits 
The automaticity of credits also gave rise to certain 
objections. Nevertheless, there was a consensus of 
opinion to the effect that credits should not be negotiated 
in every individual case, but that a credit line should 
be established for a given period, after which recourse 
should be had to renegotiation for the introduction of 
such adjustments as were seen to be advisable in the 
light of experience. A credit line thus operated would 
have the advantages of automaticity inasmuch as it 
would give debtor countries the assurance that in specific 
circumstances, previously agreed upon, they would have 
free access to credit; and at the same time it would 
be flexible enough for any undesirable situation that 
might arise to be remedied by means of the adjustments 
referred to. 
Consolidation of convertibility 
If the whole problem is viewed in broader perspective, 
it is clear that a reciprocal credits system which encour-
aged the development of trade among the countries of 
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the area, far from impeding convertibility, would help 
to establish it on sounder bases than the very shaky 
foundations existing in several of the South American 
countries to-day. 
To make some currencies convertible, exchange control 
measures have had to be replaced by exchange restric-
tions in the shape of surcharges and prior deposits. 
This is undoubtedly a step in the right direction; but, 
on the other hand, the fact that the movement towards 
convertibility has had to be accompanied by these 
restrictions can hardly afford much cause for satisfaction. 
The balance-of-payments situation must therefore be 
improved by degrees, so that the exchange restrictions 
in question can be abolished (not only among the Latin 
American countries, as has already been done in some 
cases, but vis-à-vis the rest of the world), and the only 
customs duties applied to imports are those necessitated 
by protectionist or fiscal considerations. The sole way 
of achieving such an improvement in the balance of 
payments will be through the expansion of exports and 
import substitution; and in the whole of this field, the 
institution of the Free-Trade Area and the establish-
ment of a reciprocal credits system would be of vital 
importance. Thus, far from making convertibility harder 
to achieve, these measures would contribute to its 
consolidation. 
Objections to the creation of an agency 
To sum up, as a result of the Montevideo talks, which 
constituted the preparatory work, it should be possible, 
in the opinion of the ECLA secretariat, to consider 
specific ways and means of establishing a reciprocal 
credits system, which, without affecting the essential 
principle of convertibility, will contribute to the attain-
ment of the fundamental objectives of the Free-Trade 
Area. 
Undoubtedly, an indispensable prerequisite for a 
credits system would be the establishment of an agency 
with juridical powers. This idea too was in itself a target 
for criticism. Doubts were expressed regarding how 
such an agency could be run by the countries concerned. 
Attention has just been drawn to the apprehension felt 
with regard to excessive accumulations of credit and the 
discriminations to which they might lead, and, in addi-
tion, to the non-essential imports which a country 
might use such credits to effect. 
All these motives of concern form part of a much 
broader problem. The policy of the Free-Trade Area 
will not be easy to carry out. Never before have the 
Latin American Governments embarked upon joint 
action of such far-reaching scope, and to put this idea 
into practice they will have to initiate an experiment 
which, particularly in the early days, will present great 
difficulties. It will depend upon how these problems are 
solved whether the Free-Trade Area is to be really 
effective in promoting trade and economic development, 
or is to become a static mechanism, and even one which 
may, unless handled with a high sense of responsibility 
produce disturbing effects. 
The suggestion that the Governments will be unable 
to shoulder this responsibility with success cannot be 
considered an adequate motive for not creating the 
Free-Trade Area or for depriving it of a proper credit 
mechanism. The Governments will of necessity have to 
try the experiment and learn by their own mistakes, 
and this effort must at all costs be made if they are to 
solve their fundamental growth problems. To suppose 
that the basic principles for the satisfactory operation 
of the area and supervision of their implementation must 
be provided from outside, instead of emerging as a 
genuine outcome of the experiment itself, would be to 
shirk observance of the very principle of international 
co-operation. 
n. CUSTOMS POLICY, NOMENCLATURE, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES 
1. Customs duties and other import charges and restric-
tions in Latin American countries: average levels of 
incidence * 
INTRODUCTION 
1. This study, which has been carried out in pursuance 
of resolution 6 (II) of the Trade Committee of the 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA),1 
has two main aims: 
* Issued earlier in mimeographed form as document E/CN.12/ 
554 (13 February 1961). 
1 Operative paragraph 3 (c) of the resolution requests the secre-
tariat of ECLA " to give priority to and complete studies on the 
tariff, exchange and foreign trade systems . . . as regards the aspects 
which it considers to have a fundamental bearing on the formation 
of a common market 
(a) To present a systematic outline of the import 
régime in force in each of the ten South American 
countries and in Mexico, indicating at the same time, 
for each of the products and headings included in a 
sample representing the bulk (at least 85 per cent) of 
imports for each country in one or more recent years, 
the import duties, other charges of similar effect and 
other restrictions (quantitative and exchange restric-
tions, etc.) to which their entry into the country was 
liable on a given date; 
(b) To calculate for groups and categories of products, 
as well as for the sample as a whole, the average levels 
of incidence (weighted averages and simple arithmetic 
means) of such duties and charges of similar effect. 
2. With respect to three of these countries (Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile), a special study has been made of all 
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their customs headings, reclassified and grouped accord-
ing to the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN) and 
according to the groups and categories referred to in 
sub-paragraph (b) above. The purpose of this study is 
to determine the corresponding arithmetic means, and 
to identify, on the one hand, products whose imports 
are subject to charges regarded as excessive and, on 
the other, products free of duties and charges. 
3. For the purposes outlined in paragraph 1, a sample 
was selected for each country composed of products, 
average imports of which in 1957-58 — except for 
Argentina and Venezuela (1959 only), Uruguay (1957), 
Brazil (average for 1957-59) and Colombia (average 
for 1956-58) — exceeded a given value, thus making 
the sample representative of at least 85 per cent of total 
imports. 
4. The selected products were classified on the basis 
of the United Nations Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) 2 and allocated to three categories 
and ten groups,3 as follows: 
Category I. Primary goods 
Group 1 Unprocessed foodstuffs 
Group 2 Raw materials 
Group 3 Unprocessed fuels 
Category IL Capital goods, intermediate goods and 
durable consumer goods 
Group 1 Intermediate products 
Group 2 Processed fuels 
Group 3 Capital goods 
Group 4 Durable consumer goods 
Category III. Manufactured goods for current consump-
tion 
Group 1 Processed foodstuffs (including drinks and 
tobacco) 
Group 2 Finished products of the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries 
Group 3 Other goods for current consumption 
These three categories correspond to those envisaged 
in the recommendations on the structure and basic 
principles for a Latin American common market made 
by the Working Group on the Latin American Regional 
Market at its second session in Mexico in February 
1959.4 The purpose of the subdivision into various 
groups is to determine the corresponding individual 
levels of incidence, in order to provide more background 
information for this and other studies, as well as for 
possible negotiations concerning the common market. 
5. Special attention was paid, in placing the SITC 
items in these categories and groups, to the considera-
2 According to what was the official version from 1950 until 
1960, when it was replaced by the SITC-BTN HI, or revised SITC. 
3 The annex (issued in Spanish only) gives a list of the SITC 
items for all these categories and groups. 
4 See The Latin American common market (United Nations 
publication, Sales No.: 59.H.G.4), pp. 38 et seq. 
tions that led the Working Group on the Regional 
Market to adopt the three categories referred to, and 
also to the content that the Group gave to those 
categories. Accordingly, the groups in category II 
include products for which, because of their nature and 
the degree of development of the industries concerned 
in the various Latin American countries, demand may 
be expected to grow relatively rapidly, or which offer 
a wide margin for import substitution. The groups in 
category III include manufactured goods for current 
consumption for which demand is likely to increase 
relatively slowly and the margin for import substitution 
has either disappeared or shrunk considerably. Hence 
yarns, threads and fabrics, although essentially interme-
diate products, have been classified in group 3 of 
category III with other goods for current consumption, 
instead of in group 1 of category II. 
6. When the products included in the import sample 
had been classified under these groups and categories, 
the following information was provided for each of 
them: 
(a) the code number of the corresponding SITC 
item, and its code number in the national customs and 
statistical classifications; (b) the volume, value and 
unit price of imports for the year or period in question; 
(c) the specific and/or ad valorem duties chargeable on 
its entry into the country on a given date (general duty 
according to the customs tariff and, when applicable, 
the agreed or negotiated duty payable under the most-
favoured-nation clause, and preferential duty),5 the ad 
valorem equivalent of the specific duty,6 total customs 
charges expressed in ad valorem terms, and the amount 
collected by the customs under the most-favoured-
nation clause; (d) other charges with an effect equivalent 
to import duty and the corresponding amount collected 
by the customs or cost; and (e) other restrictions that 
are not the equivalent of customs duties — prior permits, 
bans, tie-in purchase requirements, quotas, etc. — and 
all other features concerning the import régime of the 
product in question (exchange category, exemption from 
duty under certain conditions, etc.). 
7. For each of the groups and categories referred to 
(see paragraph 4 above), and for the sample as a whole, 
5 The effective duty is deemed to be that to which each product 
is liable on a given date, under the customs tariff or, in the case 
of negotiated duties, under the trade treaties in force. Consequently, 
no account has been taken of exemptions or total or partial sus-
pensions of duty granted on a temporary or sporadic basis, or 
under special exemption systems, in order either to facilitate 
imports of a product considered essential, in order to cover a 
temporary deficit, or to encourage domestic industry, or because 
the imports are made by Government or semi-Government bodies, 
etc. (see paragraphs 26 to 32 below). Such exemptions do not 
constitute changes in the customs tariff itself, as they are generally 
of an administrative nature, or are granted in each case by 
administrative decision, or depend on the nature of the importer 
or the fulfilment of certain conditions, etc., or are of a temporary 
nature. 
6 The ad valorem equivalent of the specific duty is obtained by 
dividing the latter by the unit value of the product, obtained in 
turn from import statistics. Thus, the equivalent value so obtained 
is only approximate, since for various reasons this unit or statistical 
value may not correspond to the real price of the product, or 
that price may have been subject to subsequent changes« 
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separate calculations were made of the weighted averages 
(weighted by the value of the imports of each product) 
and arithmetic means, in respect of customs duties 
proper applicable under the most-favoured-nation clause, 
on the one hand, and in respect of other charges of 
similar effect, including the cost of financing prior 
deposits, on the other. The average levels of incidence 
for each country are shown in the tables concerned. 
8. A separate annex was drawn up for each country;* 
in addition to detailed information for each product 
and the table showing levels of incidence referred to in 
paragraphs 7 and 8, this annex includes an introductory 
note specifying the factors taken into consideration for 
the country concerned (minimum import value of the 
products, reference date selected for duties and other 
charges in force, etc.). These annexes also outline the 
general import régime (customs duties, charges of similar 
effect and other restrictions on imports), special régimes 
of liberalization or exemption, statistical and other 
problems met with, and how they are solved, and any 
other information considered relevant. 
9. The present general study summarizes the main 
features of the import régimes of the countries in question, 
and elucidates, compares and analyses the average 
levels of incidence of import duties and charges calculated 
for the various countries. It also indicates the conclu-
sions that can be drawn from the various background 
data used in preparing the present study, and from their 
processing and analysis. 
10. This study was possible thanks to the valuable 
co-operation of the customs authorities in some countries 
and of the central banks or bodies responsible for 
tariff policy in others. In most cases it was in fact they 
who did the preliminary work in selecting the products, 
identifying the duties and other charges and restrictions 
applying to their imports, and solving statistical and 
other problems. Nevertheless, the information, interpreta-
tions and conclusions contained in the present document 
with respect to, for example, what is to be regarded as 
the import duty or régime applying to the individual 
products in each country, are not official, and the ECLA 
secretariat assumes full responsibility for them. 
I. STRUCTURE OF IMPORT RÉGIMES 
11. The most striking features of the import régime 
in most of the countries studied were their complexity 
and their extremely restrictive character, resulting either 
from the very high level of the import duties or from the 
application of direct controls. Both features, particularly 
the second, are covered and analysed in greater detail 
below. This section will deal only with the main elements 
of the import régimes and their role in the import policy 
of the countries concerned. 
1. CUSTOMS DUTIES 
12. The first of the component elements of these 
import régimes to be dealt with will be the customs 
duties and other charges of similar effect. The duties 
* Available in Spanish only (E/CN.12/554/Adds.l to 11). 
set forth in the customs tariffs of the countries studied 
are predominantly of the mixed type, that is, a specific 
duty plus an ad valorem duty. The exceptions include 
Brazil, which has only ad valorem duties, and Venezuela, 
where the duties are mainly specific, with only an occa-
sional mixed duty. The customs tariff in Chile is also 
almostly entirely specific, unless the ad valorem tax on 
the nationalized value of the goods is regarded as a 
customs duty; this tax is in fact referred to in the customs 
tariff. The Argentine and Uruguayan tariffs do not 
include any mixed duties on any single item, but the 
duties are specific for some items and ad valorem for 
others. For the purposes of this study, ad valorem duties 
levied in those two countries on the basis of an official 
price, known as the " official base value" (aforo or 
valor de aforo), are regarded as specific duties, since 
the effect is similar. In Mexico also, the ad valorem duty 
is normally levied on the basis of an official price, although 
only when that price is higher than the value declared by 
the importer; furthermore, this official price is revised 
and brought up to date fairly frequently. 
13. As in other parts of the world, and especially 
in Western Europe, the customs tariffs of Latin America 
show a fairly marked trend towards ad valorem duties. 
In some cases such duties have been introduced into 
tariffs that formerly consisted entirely of specific duties; 
in others, the frequency and level of ad valorem duties 
in mixed tariffs has been increased, and in a few cases 
tariffs that are wholly or predominantly ad valorem 
have been adopted. 
14. From the early thirties on the customs tariff in 
most of Latin America, as in many other countries, 
became gradually less important as an instrument of 
trade policy. For reasons that are too well known to 
need repeating here, its function in this respect was 
largely usurped by exchange controls and other direct 
restrictions, or restrictions of other kinds. This movement 
was reversed during the fifties, when a number of Latin 
American countries abandoned direct controls or relaxed 
them considerably, obviously with the intention of once 
again forging the customs tariff into the basic instrument 
of import policy. However, this aim has been only 
partly achieved, because the factors that make the 
customs tariff a relatively rigid and inflexible instrument 
still persist. The most important of these factors is the 
consolidation of duties through the trade treaties in 
force, and the need for parliamentary approval to amend 
the tariff. In addition, customs tariffs, mainly because 
of the subsidiary role they continued to play as instru-
ments for controlling imports, were, and in many cases 
still are, very out of date and ineffective. Before customs 
tariffs can once again function as basic instruments of 
trade policy, they will have to be redrafted, a task that 
will require several years if the new tariffs are to fulfil 
such functions properly. 
2 . CHARGES OF EQUIVALENT EFFECT 
15. For the above reasons, the course usually followed 
in the Latin American countries that abandoned or 
considerably relaxed their exchange restrictions and 
other direct controls on imports has been to replace 
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those measures by non-tariff import charges of similar 
or equivalent effect to customs duties. In some cases 
they have been replaced by prior deposits, that is, by 
restrictions whose principle purpose, like that of a 
customs duty proper, is not the direct limitation of 
imports, but their indirect limitation through increasing 
their cost. It is even commonly stated that such addi-
tional charges are merely interim measures until a new 
customs tariff can be drawn up and put into effect. 
16. In other cases, such non-customs import charges 
are introduced as a special measure for revenue purposes 
or to limit imports on balance-of-payments grounds and 
in order to avoid recourse to direct controls. In these 
cases, in contrast to the first group, such charges do not 
appear to be used for protectionist purposes. 
17. Whatever the reason for levying these various 
charges equivalent in effect to customs duties, they 
exist in varying number and diversity in all the countries 
considered here. In this study such charges include 
any duty or charge levied on the imported product 
either exclusively, or at a higher rate than on the similar 
domestic product, which does not represent payment 
for services rendered. The charges in force in Latin 
American countries include the so-called exchange 
surcharges, taxes over and above customs duties, taxes 
on the remittance of funds abroad to pay for imports, 
consular fees charged in the form of a percentage of 
the value of the goods, import taxes on certain products 
of which the proceeds go to the development of domestic 
production of similar goods, domestic taxes (for example 
sales taxes) levied on imported goods either exclusively 
or at a higher rate than on similar domestic products, 
loading and unloading charges, general supplementary 
taxes or surcharges on customs duties for certain specific 
purposes (harbour construction, development of merchant 
shipping, etc.), forwarding charges, and other charges 
that do not represent payment for services rendered or 
that considerably exceed the cost of such services, etc. 
18. Charges equivalent in effect to customs duties 
are also considered here to include the cost of financing 
prior deposits, calculated on the basis of the amount 
of the deposit, the period for which it is kept and the 
current rate of commercial interest. In practice, although 
such a measure is predominantly a monetary measure 
aimed at sterilizing means of payment and limiting the 
financial capacity to import, the prior deposit has a 
direct effect on the cost of the imports, and from this 
standpoint its impact is similar to that of an import 
charge. 
19. On the basis of the available information, the 
import charges equivalent in effect to a customs duty, 
in accordance with the criterion described (see para-
graph 17 above), and for which the average levels of 
incidence have been calculated, are indicated for each 
of the countries concerned. In some of these countries 
(Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela), such 
charges are few and relatively low, the weighted average 
not exceeding 3.5 per cent of the value of the imports. 
(For Brazil no account has been taken of the cost of 
financing the advance payment of the agio or the higher 
cost of the foreign currency of products placed in the 
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special category.) In other countries, such charges are 
both more numerous and higher. Thus, in Bolivia the 
average incidence is over 7 per cent and in Ecuador over 
17 per cent, which in both cases represents almost half 
of the weighted average of the incidence of customs 
duties proper. In Paraguay, the average incidence of 
such charges exceeds that of the customs duties. The same 
applies, to an even greater extent, to Argentina, where 
the theoretical incidence of the so-called exchange 
surcharges is, on the average, eight times higher than 
that of the customs duties. For Chile it was not possible 
to arrive at a figure for the average incidence of the cost 
of the prior deposit and of the supplementary taxes 
that are replacing it, but there is no doubt that it is 
fairly high, and it may have a greater restrictive effect 
than the customs duties. Furthermore, if the Chilean 
import tax of from 3 to 30 per cent of the value of the 
goods after they have left the customs is not regarded 
as a customs duty, then non-customs charges on imports 
obviously far exceed the customs duties. Lastly, in 
Uruguay the average incidence of the surcharges and 
of the cost of financing the prior deposit established 
following the changes introduced by the decree promul-
gated at the end of September 1960 (that is, after the 
reference date selected for the import charges in force in 
Uruguay for the purposes of this study) undoubtedly 
exceed, perhaps by a considerable margin, the average 
incidence of the duties. 
20. It may therefore be concluded that in four of the 
eleven countries concerned — Argentina, Chile, Paraguay 
and Uruguay — the incidence or restrictive effect of 
customs duties is less than that of other import duties 
and charges of equivalent effect. In at least one of these 
countries — Argentina — and to a lesser extent in 
Uruguay, customs tariffs are a very secondary means 
of controlling imports, non-customs duties and charges 
being the main channel through which import control is 
exercised. At the opposite end of the scale, duties and 
charges other than customs duties carry little weight in 
five of the countries concerned and are applied exclu-
sively for revenue purposes. However, as will be shown 
later, this does not mean that customs tariffs are the 
only or even the chief means of import control in the 
countries concerned for in all of them except Peru imports 
are subject to exchange restrictions or direct controls. 
3. EXCHANGE AND QUANTITATIVE OR DIRECT CONTROLS 
21. The countries covered by this report have shown 
a tendency in recent years to abolish, reduce or simplify 
exchange and quantitative controls and to replace 
them by protectionist customs duties or — as a first 
stage — by similar charges of equivalent effect. Not-
withstanding this trend, exchange and quantitative 
controls are still applied in varying degrees in several 
of these countries or, more specifically, in four of the 
five countries in which, as indicated in the previous 
paragraph, non-customs charges have little effect, namely 
in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, as well 
as in Ecuador. Controls of this type are not applied in 
the six other countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Para-
guay, Peru and Uruguay), except to a very small extent 
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and in respect of a specific product, e.g., the ban 
in Argentina on imports of motor vehicles above a 
certain price level. All these countries except Peru, 
on the other hand, levy fairly heavy charges other than 
customs duties on imports. 
22. Hence, Bolivia and Peru are the only countries 
covered in this report in which customs duties are the 
chief or virtually exclusive method of restricting imports. 
In the other countries customs duties play a less important 
role than in those two countries, even a fairly secondary 
role in some of them, and imports are restricted less by 
customs duties than by other charges of equivalent 
effect or, alternatively, by exchange and quantitative 
controls. One of these countries — Ecuador — applies 
both types of restrictions simultaneously. 
23. Only one of the countries under review — Brazil — 
uses a system of exchange control the application of which 
has, in practice, resulted in multiple exchange rates. 
The effect of this system is: (a) to limit the total value 
of imports requiring foreign exchange cover to perio-
dically estimated amounts; (b) to subsidize some imports 
by means of a special or favourable rate of exchange 
and to discourage others by an exchange rate which 
raises their cost substantially. In Ecuador, Colombia 
and, more recently, in Venezuela, exchange control is 
applied which does not in fact limit imports, since the 
importer is at liberty to resort to the open exchange 
market; its purpose is rather to subsidize imports 
or to ensure that they are not affected, or their 
cost increased, by sudden fluctuations or devaluations 
on the open exchange market. To this end, the three 
countries concerned allow imports to be paid for in 
whole or in part on the official exchange market at a 
rate which is more favourable — by about 10 per cent 
in Ecuador and Colombia and 20 per cent in Venezuela — 
than the open market rate. 
24. Direct import restrictions in the form of bans 
and prior licences are applied more frequently and 
thoroughly. There are import bans on a number of items 
in Colombia and Ecuador and on a few in Venezuela. 
A prior import permit or licence — with or without perio-
dical quotas — is required for a long list of items in 
Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, and, at least in the 
last two countries, one of its main purposes is to prevent 
or restrict imports of goods likely to compete with 
locally-manufactured items. Prior import permits or 
licences are also required in Brazil — for items included 
in the special category — and in Ecuador, but are 
usually granted as a matter of course in both countries. 
They must therefore be considered a potential rather 
than an actual restrictive measure. 
25. Lastly, several countries apply other restrictions 
to a few items. These include the tie-in purchase require-
ments of Colombia and Venezuela —in Colombia the 
granting of an import permit is contingent upon an 
undertaking by the importer to purchase a certain quan-
tity of a similar domestically-produced item — State 
import monopolies, either de jure or de facto, the latter 
occurring when franchises are granted only to the State-
owned enterprise, etc. 
4 . EXEMPTION FROM IMPORT DUTIES AND CHARGES 
26. The policy of granting total or partial exemption 
from customs duties and other charges in respect of 
a number of imported items, depending upon their 
nature, their destination, the importer, etc., is one aspect 
of the import regulations in the countries under review, 
the significance and effect of which is so unusual as to 
constitute one of the chief means of protecting and 
stimulating domestic production. 
27. The special exemption régimes now in force are 
listed for each country in the annexes to the present 
document. These régimes are numerous and varied, 
particularly in some countries. They usually provide 
for exemptions in respect of the following types of 
imports: 
(a) Goods imported by governmental and semi-
governmental organs (including State-owned petroleum, 
railway, shipping, electric power enterprises, etc.); 
(b) Imports of machinery, equipment, other capital 
goods and, in some cases, raw materials for new industries, 
for the expansion of existing industries, or representing 
investment of foreign capital. This type of exemption is 
common in every country and in some — Ecuador, 
Mexico, Paraguay and Peru — is embodied in legisla-
tion for promoting industrial development. Certain 
conditions must normally be fulfilled, such as registration 
of the investment or enterprise, or prior authorization 
for its establishment and perhaps the signing of a special 
contract with the Government, the use of a minimum 
percentage of domestic raw materials, the classification 
of the industry as essential or basic, etc. In some coun-
tries, such as Brazil and Uruguay, the exemption is 
extended to imports of machinery, equipment, etc., 
in general, while Venezuela accords particularly 
favourable treatment to imports of raw materials and 
semi-finished goods — as well as equipment and machi-
nery— for industrial or agricultural enterprises; 
(c) Imports of machinery, equipment, tools, etc., for 
agriculture — in Argentina, Chile, Peru and Uruguay — 
or for certain industries (e.g., fisheries, mining, petroleum, 
steel, motor vehicles, fertilizers, electric power, etc.); 
(d) Imports of some items, if imported by governmental 
organs, which leads to the de facto monopolies referred 
to in paragraph 25 — e.g., imports of wheat in Brazil — 
if the items are considered essential and domestic supply 
problems exist or if the importer fulfils the requirement 
of purchasing a certain quantity of similar domestically-
produced items (as in Brazil and Venezuela), etc.; 
(e) Imports into the " free-zones " of Argentina and 
Chile and the " free sectors " of Mexico. 
Lastly, some countries — Argentina, Chile, Peru and 
Uruguay — have a drawback system, under which import 
duties paid are refunded when the goods are re-exported 
in a finished state, and two countries — Argentina and 
Paraguay — exempt from surcharges all or some imports 
from adjacent countries. 
28. The chief purpose of the exemption régimes 
referred to — which usually do not apply to goods 
which are also manufactured locally — is, as was 
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indicated earlier, to promote domestic industry, supple-
menting the protection which this industry enjoys from 
import duties and other charges and restrictions by 
granting exemptions in favour of imports of items needed 
to establish the domestic industry, for its expansion and 
sometimes for its operation. In other cases, exemptions 
are designed to facilitate imports of some essential 
items or raw materials for industry in adequate amounts 
to make up for temporary or chronic shortages in 
domestic production, but without affecting outlets for 
domestically-manufactured goods. Exemptions in favour 
of goods imported by governmental or semi-govern-
mental bodies seem to be based primarily on the very 
debatable contention that payment of duties and charges 
in such cases would merely be a book-keeping transaction. 
29. An attempt has been made in the present docu-
ment to measure the effect of these special exemption 
régimes by comparing the theoretical incidence of customs 
duties applied in the countries considered with their 
actual incidence, in other words with the relationship 
between the duties actually paid and the total value of 
the imports. While this comparison, shown in table 3, 
presents a number of serious difficulties and shortcom-
ings,68' it nevertheless gives some idea of the order of 
magnitude of duties which have not been collected 
because of exemptions. 
30. This order of magnitude is indeed considerable 
in most of the countries under review, the most extreme 
case being Argentina where the actual incidence of 
exchange surcharges — virtually the only burden on 
imports — was in 1959 only one third of the theoretical 
incidence calculated for that country in this report. The 
actual incidence of customs duties — including the ad 
valorem tax on nationalized value — is about 40 per 
cent of the theoretical figure for Chile, 50 per cent for 
Brazil, Colombia and Peru, 55 to 60 per cent for 
Venezuela, 56 to 72 per cent for Paraguay, 72 per cent 
for Mexico and about 90 per cent for Ecuador. The 
figures for Bolivia and Uruguay could not be calculated 
for lack of data (see table 3 below). It may be assumed, 
however, that in these countries the relationship between 
the actual and theoretical incidence of non-customs 
import charges is about the same as that indicated in 
respect of customs duties. 
31. It therefore seems obvious that, as a factor deter-
mining the composition of imports and as an instrument 
for the protection and promotion of domestic industry, 
the policy of import tax exemptions in most of the 
countries considered carries as much, if not more, 
weight than customs duties, non-customs charges and 
6a In practice, the actual revenue from customs duties proper 
cannot be easily identified with any degree of accuracy from the 
tax statistics of most countries, nor is it possible in most cases 
to determine the revenue from other charges of equivalent effect. 
Available data on customs revenue relate to imports effected in 
earlier years, while the average levels of theoretical incidence have 
been calculated in this report on the basis of the duties in force 
in each country fairly recently — after having increased sub-
stantially in some countries — and of imports effected in earlier 
years, the composition of which may have been very different 
from what it is at present, etc. It has not been possible to calculate 
the actual incidence of non-customs charges — except in the case 
of the exchange surcharges levied in Argentina — for lack of 
information on the revenue from such sources. 
direct restrictions. Moreover, it appears to be largely 
responsible for further minimizing the use and effect 
of customs duties and/or charges of equivalent effect 
in the import policy of these countries, except in so far 
as such duties and charges are fixed for many products 
at levels which are in fact so prohibitive as to make 
it possible to import these products unless they are 
totally or partly exempt from such duties and charges. 
In other words, the import duty or charge is tantamount 
in such cases to a ban on imports and the exemption 
régime to a system of prior licences or permits. In fact 
this exemption — not normally automatic — is subject 
to the fulfilment of certain conditions by the importer 
and, in any event, to an administrative decision, since 
the decision whether or not to grant the exemption 
usually lies with some office or branch of the executive 
authority. 
32. It may therefore be asserted that the system of 
direct import controls by means of prior permits operates 
de facto not only in the countries already mentioned 
(see paragraph 24 above) but also — in respect of goods 
subject to exemption régimes — in others, such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay. 
33. There are two main reasons for this policy 
of establishing high and even prohibitive duties and 
other charges on a number of products — including 
capital goods — and then to facilitate or permit imports 
by means of total or partial exemptions. So far as raw 
materials, foodstuffs and semi-finished goods are con-
cerned, the purpose of this system is to enable imports 
to be cut to the minimum required to make up the gap 
in domestic production and to protect domestic pro-
duction and, at the same time, prevent or try to prevent 
a rise in the cost of the imported article. To achieve 
this purpose, exemptions are granted only to close the 
gap, or subject to the importer purchasing a specific 
quantity of the domestically-manufactured product, or 
in the case of goods imported by governmental or semi-
governmental organs. With regard to capital goods, the 
exemption régime is a means of controlling or guiding 
the establishment and development of specific industries, 
which in many cases can be set up or expanded only if 
exemption is granted. 
5. THE RATE OF EXCHANGE 
34. It is quite clear that the rate or multiple rates of 
exchange, as the case may be, at which goods are imported 
have a considerable influence on imports since they 
strengthen or weaken the restrictive effect of customs 
duties and other equivalent charges, unless there is a 
" neutral " exchange rate which does not affect imports 
in either direction. An exchange rate higher than the 
neutral rate, i.e., for an undervalued currency, means 
an additional standard charge on all imports in direct 
ratio to the undervaluation. On the other hand, a lower 
exchange rate, i.e., for an overvalued currency, con-
stitutes a standard subsidy for imports, also in direct 
ratio to the overvaluation. 
35. The problem is to define and determine the 
neutral rate of exchange. In this connexion, and again 
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from the point of view of its effect on imports, the most 
practical and closest concept would seem to be to define 
as neutral the rate of exchange which is equal to the 
general internal and external purchasing power of the 
currency, in other words one which equals the purchasing 
power of the different monetary units. According to 
this concept, a currency is overvalued if more goods 
can be bought outside with a given amount of foreign 
exchange of a certain country than inside the country. 
If the opposite is true, it is undervalued. 
36. Whatever the criterion applied in order to define 
and determine the neutral rate of exchange and, therefore, 
to decide whether the exchange rate at which imports are 
effected in a given country is undervalued or overvalued, 
the neutral rate of exchange must clearly be taken into 
consideration in judging the level — whether average or 
specific for a given product — of duties and other charges 
levied by the country on its imports and in comparing 
that level with those prevailing in other countries. Thus, 
for instance, a high duty or a high average level of charges 
in a country with an overvalued exchange rate may be 
less restrictive or protectionist than a substantially lower 
charge or average level of charges in another country 
with an undervalued exchange rate. 
37. The ECLA secretariat has recently completed a 
study on price levels and the purchasing power of 
currencies in ten Latin American countries — those 
covered in the present report (except Bolivia and Vene-
zuela) plus Panama,7 which provides a fairly accurate 
picture as regards whether their currencies are relatively 
undervalued or overvalued according to the criterion 
stated above (see paragraph 35), or at least an idea of 
the relationship maintained between the purchasing 
power of these currencies with respect to each other 
at the open market exchange rates. These exchange 
rates are the same as those at which imports are effected 
in the countries considered, except in Brazil, and, allow-
ing for slight differences, in Colombia and Ecuador. 
38. In accordance with the preliminary findings of 
the study and based on the open market exchange rates, 
with Mexico serving as the percentage basis, the price 
level indexes for the various countries covered by the 
report would be the following, taking into account 










As can be seen, there are considerable differences in 
the purchasing power of the currencies of the various 
countries. Taking Mexico as the base, these differences 
mean that the exchange rates for imports in Uruguay, 
Argentina, Paraguay and Peru strengthen, in decreasing 
order of magnitude, the duties and charges which these 
countries levy on imports. On the contrary, the official 
exchange rates in Colombia and Ecuador — more 
7 Comparative prices and the purchasing power of currencies in 
selected Latin American countries: (E/CN. 12/589). 
favourable to imports than the open market rates — and 
even more so in Chile, constitute an import subsidy 
which partly counteracts the effect of import duties and 
charges. The latter situation clearly prevails to an even 
greater extent in Venezuela. As for Brazil, the exchange 
rate for imports classified in the general category is not 
as favourable as the open market rate and therefore 
constitutes an additional import duty, and the same 
applies, though to a much greater extent, to the exchange 
rate for imports classified in the special category. On the 
other hand, the special or favourable rate for imports 
effected outside the exchange auction constitutes a heavy 
import subsidy. 
39. The following section refers specifically to the 
average levels of incidence of duties and other charges 
on imports in the eleven countries covered in the present 
study. In interpreting and comparing these levels, the 
considerations set out with respect to the effect of 
exchange rates should be taken into account, although 
this has not been quantified in this report, nor has any 
attempt been made to adjust these levels of incidence 
to the effect of exchange rates. 
II. AVERAGE LEVELS OF INCIDENCE OF CUS-
TOMS DUTIES AND OTHER IMPORT DUTIES 
AND CHARGES 
1. NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AVERAGE 
LEVELS CALCULATED 
40. One of the main purposes of the present study 
was to calculate the average levels of incidence — both 
weighted and arithmetic — of the customs duties and 
other import duties and charges applied in the eleven 
countries dealt with, both in general and in respect of 
each of the categories and groups of goods to which 
allusion has already been made (see paragraph 4 above). 
These averages were calculated in accordance with the 
methodology outlined in the introduction. Before the 
analysis and comparison of the results obtained is 
embarked upon, in order to ensure that they are not 
credited with greater accuracy than should really be 
attributed to them, nor their significance misinterpreted, 
some indication must be given of the meaning and scope 
of the average levels in question. 
41. The first point to note is that these averages neither 
represent the degree of protection afforded or the re-
strictive effect produced by import duties and charges, 
nor constitute an accurate index of their relative level. 
Thus, in the calculation of the weighted averages the 
weighting factor utilized was the value of imports of 
each of the goods included in the sample, which is 
directly influenced by the duties and other charges 
payable on entry, and, in addition, in many countries, 
by restrictions of other kinds, as well as by the franchises 
or exemptions granted. Effectively protectionist duties 
and charges, which severely limit importation or preclude 
it altogether, carry little or no weight in the computation 
of the average. It may therefore happen that for a country 
with a highly protectionist tariff— Brazil, for example — 
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a lower average is obtained than for another with a 
tariff of a predominantly fiscal type, like Ecuador or 
Paraguay. Again, the fact that a country's imports of a 
given product may be scanty or non-existent does not 
necessarily mean that the importance of that product 
for its economy is slight. 
The arithmetic mean has the serious defect that in 
its case the duty and/or charge on a good of secondary 
importance carries the same weight as that applied to 
one much more significant. While it is true that the 
arithmetic means obtained in the present paper — except 
in the special case of Argentina, Brazil and Chile — 
were calculated on the basis of a sample excluding pro-
ducts whose value within each country's imports is 
slight or nil, the defect persists in relation to the goods 
included. As regards those excluded from the sample, 
the same objection as has already been raised in con-
nexion with the weighted average is applicable here. 
42. Even if a satisfactory and practical solution for 
the problem of weighting were to be found — for example, 
by utilizing a weighting factor (such as the value of 
domestic production or consumption) which would 
reflect the relative importance of each product for the 
country's economy more faithfully than the value of 
imports — and even if imports were not subject to re-
strictions other than customs duties, the averages obtained 
for different countries would not necessarily indicate the 
protectionist effect of the national tariffs concerned. 
High duties in one country may not signify more effective 
protection or a greater barrier to imports than lower 
duties in another. Even with reference to specific goods, 
a relatively high duty may not afford sufficient protec-
tion if the industry producing the article in question 
operates in very unfavourable conditions, while a low 
duty may be protection enough for another activity 
which is in a better position to compete. 
43. In this context, it should be recalled that the pro-
tectionist effect of the duty on a manufactured good 
is a function not only of the rate or level of the said 
duty, but also other variables, which include the per-
centage of value added to the product by domestic 
processing — ceteris paribus, the higher this percentage 
the less will be the protectionist effect of the duty — and 
the duty payable on the raw material, intermediate pro-
ducts, etc., used in its manufacture. Thus, the duty on 
a good may turn out to be high because it incorporates 
a " compensatory rate " whose purpose is to offset the 
effect of the duties payable on the raw material or inter-
mediate products used. 
44. Nevertheless, it seems an admissible assumption 
that as a general rule a high duty — the term being 
taken to include other charges having an equivalent 
effect — exerts a stronger protectionist or restrictive 
influence than a lower one. It likewise appears undeniable 
that the establishment of high duties with a view to 
protection for certain industries tends to force up the 
level of other duties also, so as to bring them into line 
with the changes in the relative prices of the factors of 
production of the activities concerned. This effect may 
be produced directly in some instances, through an 
increase in the cost of the raw materials or intermediate 
products utilized — compensatory duties are a case in 
point — or indirectly, through the diversion of factors 
of production towards the new industries enjoying pro-
tection, and the rise in overall price levels brought 
about by the development of less efficient industries. In 
other words, the establishment of high duties for the 
protection of certain industries renders it necessary for 
protectionist duties to be imposed, or for those already 
existing to be increased, in respect of other lines of 
manufacture. Consequently, a high average level of 
duties in a given country indicates, in principle, that 
protection is given to many sectors of the economy, 
or at least to some which are both important and relatively 
inefficient. 
45. To the foregoing limitations with respect to the 
significance of average levels of duties and other charges 
must be added, in the case of several of the Latin Ameri-
can countries covered by the present study, the reserva-
tion that such duties and charges constitute only a part 
— sometimes the least important — of the restrictions 
applied to imports. Thus it comes about that in Mexico, 
where the average level of customs duties is relatively 
low, import restrictions for protectionist — or balance-
of-payments — purposes operate mainly through the 
system of prior permits. This fact must never be lost 
sight of when any judgement on this average level of 
duties is formed, or when it is compared with that of 
other countries which do not apply direct import 
restrictions. 
46. Another factor that must be borne in mind is 
the exchange rate in force for the imports concerned, 
since this, as has already been pointed out (see para-
graphs 31 to 33 above), may represent an import subsidy 
or an additional import duty which offsets or strengthens 
the restrictive effect of duties and charges proper. 
47. This does not hold good for the system consisting 
in exemption from duties and other charges. In accor-
dance with the considerations set forth elsewhere (see 
paragraphs 31 to 33 above), when such a system is 
adopted duties and other charges are in fact generally 
replaced by prior permits, whose restrictive effect would 
seem to be determined by the theoretical level of the 
said duties or charges, that is, by the amount that would 
be payable on imports if exemption were not granted. 
In other words, the difference between the theoretical 
and the effective level of duties and other charges 
gives the measure of the restrictive effect of the prior 
permits required in order to obtain the relevant exemp-
tion or franchise. 
48. To the above-mentioned limitations affecting the 
significance of the average levels of incidence of import 
duties and charges must be added others deriving from 
the nature of the data utilized and the methodology 
followed in the calculation of the average levels. The 
following should be taken into consideration: (a) the 
weighting factor used in the calculation of the weighted 
averages was the value of imports in a single year for 
some countries, a two-year average for the majority and 
a three-year average for others; (b) the period selected 
may not always be sufficiently representative of the 
composition of imports; (c) subsequently to and some-
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times within the period to which the imports correspond, 
several countries increased or considerably modified 
their duties, charges and other restrictions, and one of 
them — Uruguay — radically altered its import régime, 
by all which reforms the composition of imports may 
have been appreciably influenced; (d) the ad valorem 
equivalence of specific duties was computed on the 
basis of the unit price of the good resulting from import 
statistics, which often differs — in some cases sub-
stantially— from the real price; (e) in several countries 
(Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, for example), the 
classification or nomenclature used in import statistics 
is entirely different from that adopted for tariff purposes, 
so that for many products it was impossible to establish 
a satisfactory equivalence between the two — although 
in almost all countries this difficulty was less acute in 
the case of certain goods, owing to changes in the import 
tariff— while in Chile the discrepancy between tariff 
nomenclature and that adopted for the purposes of 
application of prior deposits and additional surcharges 
prevented these from being taken into account in the 
computation of average levels of incidence of import 
duties and charges; and so forth. 
49. If, in view of all these limitations and considera-
tions and with due regard to the possibility of a certain 
margin of error, recourse is had to supplementary 
background data, the analysis and comparison of the 
average levels of incidence of import duties and other 
charges calculated in the present study proves very 
useful. It does in fact enable an approximate idea to be 
formed of the order of magnitude of tariff levels (in-
cluding charges of equivalent effect) in the various coun-
tries, both for imports as a whole and for categories 
and groups of products, as well as of the role played 
by duties and other charges in import policy. Further-
more, in the course of the process of compiling, 
systematizing and processing the data used in the calcula-
tion of the averages in question it is also possible to form 
a fairly adequate and complete impression of the structure 
of tariff duties — and other charges — in relation to 
each country, of the level of duties on individual goods, 
of the approximate degree of protection granted to 
specific industries, of the criteria by which import policy 
is guided, etc. An attempt has been made to incorporate 
all this in the present paper, in the section dealing with 
the conclusions reached.8 
50. Once again it should be noted that the significance 
of the average levels calculated in the present study 
should not be over-estimated or misconstrued. They 
may be considered representative of the level of tariffs 
(including other non-tariff import duties and charges) 
in the countries covered by this study, always provided 
that what is understood by tariff level is the average — 
arithmetic mean or weighted average, as the case may 
be — of the percentages of the value of the goods con-
stituting the bulk of each country's imports which are 
8 The more detailed special study of customs duties and other 
import duties and charges in Argentina, Brazil and Chile was 
carried out precisely in order to furnish some of these supplementary 
background data. With the same end in view, in the calculation 
of the arithmetic means of incidence for the countries referred 
to, the tariffs concerned were taken into account in their entirety. 
represented by duties and other charges of equivalent 
effect. 
51. The procedure followed in the present study for 
the computation of the weighted averages of import 
duties and other charges is similar to that adopted by 
the United States Tariff Commission to determine the 
effects of the tariff concessions accorded by that country 
up to 1952 inclusive (comparison of the weighted averages 
of the duties in force before and after the granting of 
the said concessions). It is also analogous to that applied 
by the Commission of the European Economic Com-
munity, inasmuch as the average incidence of the com-
mon external tariff approved for the Community in 
question in March 1960 was calculated on the basis 
of the imports effected by the States members in 1958.9 
The Latin American Free Trade Association has adopted 
the same procedure in the calculation of the weighted 
averages of the duties and other charges applied by 
member countries in their reciprocal trade, which must 
serve as the basis for computation of the annual reduc-
tions to be effected under the provisions of the Montevideo 
Treaty. It would also have to be followed in computing 
the average levels of tariff incidence which the signatories 
of a possible future agreement on the gradual establish-
ment of the Latin American common market would 
pledge themselves to attain in an initial phase, if this 
undertaking were to be carried out in line with the 
recommendations of the Working Group on the Latin 
American Regional Market.10 
52. It may be noted in this connexion that although 
the results given by the method in question do not lend 
themselves to satisfactory inter-country comparisons, it 
is the best and perhaps the only practical way of measur-
ing variations in a given country's tariff level. This is 
particularly true in respect of tariff variations resulting 
from concessions granted — for example, those deriving 
from trade treaties or from the agreement designed to 
establish a free-trade area — if and when the same 
weighting factor is utilized, that is, provided that duties 
and other charges before and after their modification 
or reduction are weighted by the imports effected in a 
single year or period. This requisite is fulfilled, for 
instance, by the formula adopted in the Montevideo 
Treaty, which applies the same weighting factor to 
duties and other charges on imports from within the 
area, on the one hand, and to those in force for third 
countries, on the other. 
9 United States Tariff Commission, Effect of trade agreement 
concessions on United States tariff levels based on imports in 1952 
(Washington, 1953) and Commission of the European Economic 
Community, Third general report on the activities of the Com-
munity (Brussels, 1960), p. 238. Although neither of these two 
publications gives a detailed account of the procedure followed 
in calculating tariff levels, both indicate that duties were weighted 
by the imports effected in a selected base year. 
10 See above " Treaty establishing a free-trade area and institut-
ing the Latin American Free-Trade Association", Protocol No. 1, 
and The Latin American common market (E/LN. 12/531), op. cit. 
For a more detailed study of the problem represented by the 
measurement of tariff levels and information on other procedures 
differing from that adopted in the present study, see League of 
Nations, Tariff level indices (Geneva, 127-11.34) and Swedish Tariff 
Commission, Revision of the Swedish Customs Tariff (Stockholm, 
1957). 
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2 . COMPARISON BETWEEN THE WEIGHTED AVERAGES 
OF INCIDENCE OBTAINED 
53. Tables 1 and 2 show, respectively, the weighted 
averages and arithmetic means calculated for the inci-
dence of import duties and charges, broken down by 
groups and categories of products, in the case of each 
of the eleven Latin American countries included in the 
present study. 
54. As was to be expected, in most instances the arith-
metic mean is higher than the corresponding weighted 
average, but what is really significant is that a very 
close correlation between the two types of average can 
be observed. In fact, with few exceptions, they are in the 
same order of magnitude in each of the various coun-
tries, both for total imports and for groups and categories 
of products. This implies that the conclusions which 
can be deduced from examination and comparison of the 
weighted averages are corroborated, on the whole, by 
the arithmetic means. 
55. The first noteworthy aspect of the results of the 
calculation is that most of the average levels of incidence 
of import duties and charges obtained are distinctly 
high. In two countries — Argentina and Paraguay — the 
weighted average exceeds 50 per cent and the arithmetic 
mean is over 60 per cent, and only in two others — 
Mexico and Uruguay — does the weighted average fall 
below 20 per cent. It must be noted that the average 
in question would have been a good deal higher in 
Uruguay's case, if the calculation had taken into account 
the surcharges and financing costs for the prior deposit 
imposed as from the end of September 1960, to replace 
the exchange controls, prior permits and import prohibi-
tions which had previously been applied, particularly 
before the reform introduced in December 1959. 
56. When classified in accordance with the magnitude 
of average levels of incidence of import duties and 
charges, the countries under consideration fall into the 
following groups: 
A. By weighted averages: 
Over 50 per cent  
From 40 to 50 per cent  
From 30 to 40 per cent  
From 20 to 30 per cent 
Under 20 per cent  
B. By arithmetic means : 
Over 60 per cent  
From 50 to 60 per cent  
From 40 to 50 per cent  
From 30 to 40 per cent  
Under 30 per cent  
Paraguay and Argentina 
Ecuador 
Chile and Colombia 
Brazil, Venezuela, Peru 
and Bolivia 
Uruguay and Mexico 
Argentina and Paraguay 
Venezuela and Ecuador 
Chile, Colombia and 
Brazil 
Bolivia 
Peru, Uruguay and 
Mexico 
57. Another striking feature is the considerable 
scattering of the averages, as well as the substantial 
difference between those registered in the countries at 
the upper and lower extremes of the scale. 
58. However, such differences are understandable and 
will be seen to counterbalance each other to an appre-
ciable extent, for the majority of countries, if account 
is taken of other restrictions which some of them apply 
to imports. For example, Mexico, which has the lowest 
general level of incidence and applies the lowest or next 
to lowest rates to almost all groups and categories, 
prefers to use the system of prior permits as a means of 
controlling imports, to the extent that approximately 
60 per cent of the total average value of imports for the 
period 1957-58 was constituted by goods thus controlled. 
It may also be supposed that this type of control pre-
vented or severely restricted the entry of many other 
imports. Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela also use 
this type of restriction to a greater or lesser extent and/or 
an import ban, while in Brazil the exchange control 
system acts as a brake, particularly on goods classified 
in the special category. If such restrictions were not in 
force, it is to be supposed that the aforementioned 
countries would make a much wider use of tariff protec-
tion, in which case the average level of their duties and 
charges on imports would be higher, and in some cases 
perhaps substantially higher, than those calculated in 
this report. 
59. In judging and comparing the average levels of 
incidence in some countries, other factors must also be 
taken into account. In the case of Uruguay, it has 
already been explained that the averages had to be cal-
culated before additional duties and charges and pre-
liminary deposits had completely replaced direct restric-
tions and that these averages would be considerably 
higher if new calculations were to be made on the basis 
of the duties and charges now in force. In the case of 
Chile it was not possible, as has already been stated 
elsewhere, to include in the calculation of the averages 
either the cost of financing prior deposits or the amount 
of the additional tax. Both are fairly substantial and it 
may be assumed that, if they had been taken into account, 
the average rates of incidence for Chile would have 
been higher than for any of the other countries. (The 
cost of financing a prior deposit of 1,500 per cent for 
90 days is the approximate equivalent of a 90 per cent 
charge on the c.i.f. value of the goods, and the additional 
tax in the case of many items is as much as 200 per cent.) 
60. The average levels for Paraguay include the sales 
tax on imported goods; it has not, however, been possible 
to determine whether or not an equivalent tax is also 
levied on domestically-produced goods. If such a tax 
exists, then the sales tax on imports should not be taken 
into account and the average levels of incidence would 
be appreciably reduced (from 56.1 to 48.1 per cent for 
the overall weighted average and from 61.5 to 49.3 per 
cent for the arithmetic mean). 
61. In Argentina and Paraguay, exchange or additional 
surcharges — which in Paraguay amount to as much 
as 20 per cent of the f.o.b. value or the equivalent of 
24 per cent of the c.i.f. value for almost all items — 
have been weighted by the total for all imports, in accor-
dance with the method adopted throughout this paper; 
thus neither Argentina nor Paraguay applies such 
charges to imports from neighbouring countries. Further-
Os 
Table 1 
Weighted averages of theoretical incidence of customs duties and other duties or charges of equivalent effect on the c.i.f. 
value of imports in selected Latin American countries a 
( Percentages) 
Country and import year or period 
Argentina Bolivia Brazil0 Chilec Colombia Ecuador Mexicod Paraguaye Peru Uruguay Venezuela 
(1959) (1957-58) (1957-59) (1957-58) (1956-58) (1957-58) (1957-58) (1957-58) (1957-58) (1957) (1959) 
Duties and charges in force as at 30.IV.60 31.XII.59 31.VIII.60 15.IIL60 30.IX.59 1.IX.59 31.XII.59 30.IX.60 15.IX.59 15.VII.60 23.11.60 
Category I. Primary goods 18.5 9.9 2.9 20.2 28.3 24.7 4.7 26.8 14.5 9.4 35.6 
Group 1. Unprocessed foodstuffs 40.6 8.7 1.1 14.2 45.6 23.9 4.1 24.4 12.9 11.0 20.3 
Group 2. Raw materials 42.7 16.6 22.0 16.1 19.3 36.2 6.5 50.0 22.7 12.4 68.1 
Group 3. Unprocessed fuels 1.0 12.1 0.8 34.1 t f 1.4 51.5 f 0.1 f 
Category 11. Capital, intermediate and durable 
consumer goods 64.7 13.4 36.9 39.6 28.3 40.7 14.1 61.9 18.6 19.3 12.6 
Group 1. Intermediate products 49.6 7.6 26.1 40.6 32.9 38.0 19.2 54.6 18.6 15.8 23.2 
Group 2. Processed fuels 1.2 14.1 22.8 40.1 12.1 70.2 6.9 76.2 15.4 15.9 32.0 
Group 3. Capital goods 78.2 13.3 45.6 37.3 22.2 29.2 11.7 53.1 15.1 22.3 5.2 
Group 4. Durable consumer goods 699.7 29.4 79.1 83.7 113.7 75.2 56.2 72.6 33.3 20.3 14.3 
Category III. Manufactured goods for current 
consumption 66.5 34.2 40.4 56.8 48.2 62.3 30.8 59.9 35.9 19.2 66.3 
Group 1. Processed foodstuffs and tobacco . . 142.4 19.1 50.5 62.8 160.5 114.0 132.8 55.4 26.2 23.3 87.3 
Group 2. Chemical and pharmaceutical products 62.9 20.8 35.4 14.7 24.6 42.0 9.8 49.2 20.4 9.5 37.5 
Group 3. Other goods for current consumption 63.6 62.6 37.3 55.1 41.1 59.1 24.0 64.6 44.3 18.4 61.3 
TOTAL 52.8 20.4 28.8 38.2 32.1 46.7 13.8 56.1 21.8 15.9 28.0 
Source: E/CN.12/554/Adds.l to 11 (Spanish only). 
s Except in the case of Chile, the cost of financing prior deposits in countries applying this type of 
restriction (Colombia, Paraguay and Uruguay) is included among duties and charges of equivalent effect 
to an import duty. In respect of Paraguay and Venezuela, the incidence on the f.o.b. value is converted into 
terms of the equivalent incidence on the c.i.f. value. 
b Excluding the higher cost of foreign exchange for products imported under the special category and 
the cost of financing advance payment of the agio or premium on foreign exchange purchased under the 
auction system. 
c Excluding the incidence of the cost of financing prior deposits and of the supplementary duty or 
surcharge, since it could not be computed owing to difficulties with respect to tariff classification equivalences; 
but including the 3 per cent or 30 per cent ad valorem duty on the value of the nationalized goods. 
d Average incidence on the statistical value, not on the value as recalculated at official prices. 
e Including the sales tax, whose incidence on the c.i.f. value of total imports is approximately 8 per cent 
as a weighted average and 12 per cent as a simple arithmetical average. Incidences are expressed in terms 
of the equivalent incidences on the c.i.f. value. 
t There were no imports of sufficient magnitude to warrant their inclusion in the sample. 
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Arithmetic means averages of incidence of customs duties and other duties or charges of equivalent effect onjthe^c.i.f. 
value of imports in selected Latin American countries a 
( Percentages) 























Duties and charges in force as at 30.IV.60 31.XII.59 31.VIU.60 15.ni.60 30.IX.59 1JX.59 31.XII.59 30.1X.60 Ì5.ÌX.59 15.VII.60 13.11.60 
Category I. Primary goods 54.2 21.1 13.4 40.8 43.3 34.0 7.8 48.2 18.1 12.3 52.2 
Group 1. Unprocessed foodstuffs 40.4 17.8 9.5 33.5 68.0 32.9 12.8 47.1 15.1 13.8 38.0 
Group 2. Raw materials 65.0 27.0 19.7 45.1 30.9 35.8 7.0 50.0 22.5 12.4 75.7 
Group 3. Unprocessed fuels 6.9 12.0 10.2 53.5 f t 2.0 52.5 £ 0.1 F 
Category II. Capital, intermediate and durable 
consumer goods 96.9 17.6 40.8 45.9 33.9 44.3 16.8 58.8 22.0 24.0 22.3 
Group 1. Intermediate products 62.1 12.1 31.0 45.3 35.9 43.7 17.2 59.1 23.6 22.7 40.4 
Group 2. Processed fuels 4.0 14.8 29.3 45.5 11.4 61.0 7.1 59.1 15.9 21.2 40.3 
Group 3. Capital goods 84.7 17.4 46.1 40.5 26.5 32.7 14.9 52.6 17.6 26.5 10.9 
Group 4. Durable consumer goods 612.2 37.1 60.0 83.4 100.9 106.5 46.7 72.7 35.2 24.1 14.7 
Category IIL Manufactured goods for current 
consumption 110.0 52.5 50.4 66.2 58.9 73.1 33.9 66.1 40.9 22.7 111.6 
Group 1. Processed foodstuffs and tobacco . . 136.4 35.9 56.3 126.4 137.6 124.8 121.6 70.2 29.1 18.4 287.0 
Group 2. Chemical and pharmaceutical products 102.7 37.8 25.0 16.5 30.8 59.3 10.9 58.9 20.6 10.1 121.1 
Group 3. Other goods for current consumption 108.6 58.7 52.0 64.5 57.1 67.6 28.3 65.5 47.9 26.0 74.0 
TOTAL 91.5 30.3 40.1 49.2 41.3 54.9 18.1 61.5 28.3 21.1 56.0 
Source: E/CN.12/554/Adds.l to 11 (Spanish only). 
a Except in the case of Chile, the cost of financing prior deposits in countries applying this type of 
restriction (Colombia, Paraguay and Uruguay) is included among duties and charges of equivalent effect 
to an import duty. In respect of Paraguay and Venezuela, the incidence on the f.o.b. value is converted into 
terms of the equivalent incidence on the c.i.f. value. 
b Excluding the higher cost of foreign exchange for products imported under the special category and 
the cost of financing advance payment of the agio or premium on foreign exchange purchased under the 
auction system. 
c Excluding the incidence of the cost of financing prior deposits and of the supplementary duty o r 
surcharge, since it could not be computed owing to difficulties with respect to tariff classification equivalences; 
but including the 3 per cent or 30 per cent ad valorem duty on the value of the nationalized goods. 
^ Average incidence on the statistical value, not on the value as recalculated at official prices. 
e Including the sales tax, whose incidence on the c.i.f. value of total imports is approximately 8 per cent 
as a weighted average and 12 per cent as a simple arithmetical average. Incidences are expressed in terms 
of the equivalent incidences on the c.i.f. value. 
f There were no imports of sufficient magnitude to warrant their inclusion in the sample. 
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more, Argentina does not apply them to imports from 
Peru, nor Paraguay to imports from Uruguay. If these 
charges had been weighted only by imports subject to 
such charges, the average levels obtained would have 
been lower, particularly in respect of foodstuffs and 
raw materials. Similarly, these averages would have 
been smaller, although to a much lesser extent, not 
only for Argentina and Paraguay but also for Chile 
and Peru if, in calculating them, account had been taken 
of the preferential duties levied by Argentina on certain 
imports from Paraguay, by Paraguay to some items 
from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay; by Chile to certain 
items from Argentina and Peru; and by Peru to a few 
imports from Chile. 
62. Much larger adjustments would have to be made 
in the average levels of some countries to offset the 
impact of the exchange rate on imports (see above, 
paragraphs 34 to 39). Such an adjustment would involve 
a substantial reduction in the average levels calculated 
for Venezuela and, to a lesser extent, for Chile, but 
would imply an increase in those for Argentina, Para-
guay, Peru and Uruguay. 
63. The adjustments which might have resulted from 
taking account of the foregoing observations might have 
led to some — and in certain countries a considerable — 
change in the average levels shown in tables 1 and 2 
and would have reduced the differences between the 
extremes. For obvious reasons, the most important of 
these considerations could not be included, namely the 
effect of applying direct controls to exports. It seems, 
however, most probable that their inclusion would not 
have led to any substantial change in the order of 
magnitude of the average levels of incidence. The coun-
tries concerned would probably have continued to be 
grouped in much the same way as indicated in para-
graph 56. 
64. The most important feature of the averages shown 
would have continued and might even have been accen-
tuated, namely, the high level of most of them. The 
weighted averages range from a minimum of 13.8 per 
cent to a maximum of 56.1 per cent, the mean being of 
the order of 30 per cent. By way of contrast, the weighted 
average incidence of the common external tariff approved 
in March 1960 for the European Economic Community 
— resulting from its application to all the Community's 
imports in 1958 — is no more than 7.4 per cent,11 and 
the average of duties in force in the United States as on 
1 January 1953, weighted by imports for 1952, is only 
5.1 per cent.12 
65. These pronounced differences and the consequent 
conclusion that the level of duties and charges on im-
ports is extremely high in the majority of the Latin 
11 Commission of the European Economic Community, op. cit 
p. 238. According to the Third General Report on the Activities 
of the Community, the weighted average incidence varies from 
one group of products to another. It is negligible in the case of 
raw materials, 5.9 per cent for manufactures and from 13.6 to 
17.2 per cent for equipment and other industrial goods. 
12 United States Tariff Commission, op. cit. This average covers 
all imports including those free of duty, in accordance with the 
practice followed in this paper. Excluding free imports, the average 
incidence for imports paying duties and other charges is 
12.2 per cent. 
American countries under consideration are borne out 
by the results obtained from the arithmetic means if 
these are calculated on the basis of all the tariff items. 
The arithmetic means for the three Latin American 
countries to which that appendix refers — Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile — are 151, 60 and 93 per cent respec-
tively. Accordingly, they turn out, as was to be expected, 
to be higher than the weighted averages and the arith-
metic means calculated solely on the basis of principal 
imports (see tables 1 and 2), but they remain in the same 
order for the three countries and maintain much the 
same proportional relationship to each other. For 
France, however — which country was included in the 
special study for comparative purposes as a European 
country applying relatively high duties — the arithmetic 
mean, calculated in the same way is not more than 
18 per cent. 
66. Differences of a similar order may be obtained 
by comparing the average levels of incidence by groups 
of products. For instance, the weighted average inci-
dence of duties on raw materials in the common external 
tariff of the European Economic Community is negligible, 
while for the Latin American countries covered in this 
paper it ranges from 6.5 per cent for Mexico to 43 per 
cent for Argentina, 50 per cent for Paraguay and 68.1 per 
cent for Venezuela if unprocessed foodstuffs are ex-
cluded. (See table 1.) The weighted incidence of import 
duties on capital goods in only four of the countries under 
consideration — Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela — 
is less than 20 per cent. It reaches 45 per cent in Brazil, 
53 per cent in Paraguay and 78 per cent in Argentina. 
The average rate for equipment and other industrial 
products in the common external tariff of the European 
Economic Community — where a greater degree of 
protection than in the Latin American countries is 
justifiable for imports of capital goods — is from 14 to 
17 per cent. The arithmetic means calculated for Argen-
tina, Brazil and Chile, taking all tariff items into con-
sideration, are — for each and every one of the ten 
groups and three categories considered in this paper, 
as also for all the sections and practically all the chapters 
of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature — higher and 
frequently considerably so than in France. So far as these 
three Latin American countries are concerned the order 
of magnitude is usually higher for Argentina than for 
Chile and higher for Chile than for Brazil.13 
67. The same conclusions regarding the high level of 
import duties and charges in the majority of the Latin 
American countries dealt with in this paper may be 
reached by comparing such duties and charges for each 
one of the tariff items. By whatever standard they may 
be judged, duties and charges on imports are too fre-
quently excessively high. Confirmation of this is to be 
found, for example, in the relevant analysis for Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile. Although in those three countries such 
excessive duties and charges would seem to be commoner 
with levels in all cases higher than in the other Latin 
American countries, it cannot be denied that they are 
fairly representative of the general situation. 
13 It was not possible to take into account for Chile the additional 
tax or the cost of financing prior deposits. 
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68. One important reservation must be made. Many 
of the excessively high duties and charges to be found 
in the Latin American countries and particularly in 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile are or appear to be in many 
cases considerably higher than the rates that would be 
required to protect domestic industry and make imports 
prohibitive. In other words, the average rates of incidence 
obtained for a number of the Latin American countries 
are artificially high as a result of duties and charges 
greater than would be required to fulfil the purpose for 
which they were introduced. If such duties and charges 
were reduced to a level closer to that really required to 
ensure effective protection, the average rates of incidence 
would also fall to an appreciable extent without the 
restrictive effect of such duties and charges being nullified. 
69. It is to be expected that with respect to Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile this fall would be greater in the case 
of the arithmetic means calculated for all tariff items. 
The same would also occur in the case of the weighted 
averages, as these include many products liable to 
prohibitive duties and charges but which are none the 
less imported — sometimes in large quantities — under 
one or other of the exemption régimes already referred 
to (see above paragraphs 26 to 33). In computing the 
average incidence, calculations are made as if such 
imports paid the duty or charge concerned because it 
exists and is in force. The exaggeratedly high level of 
the duty raises the average, particularly in respect of 
intermediate goods, capital goods and durable con-
sumer goods for Argentina, in respect of processed and 
unprocessed foodstuffs, raw materials and intermediate 
goods for Venezuela, and in general in respect of capital 
goods and, to a lesser extent, intermediate goods for the 
remaining countries. The conclusion therefore seems 
obvious that, if exemptions were not granted — which 
apply most frequently, particularly in Argentina and 
Venezuela, to goods liable to very high or prohibitive 
duties and charges — the products enjoying such exemp-
tions would not be imported or would be imported on 
a much smaller scale. The weighted averages would 
consequently probably be much lower than those shown 
in table 1. 
70. The wide use of exemptions from import duties 
and charges in the majority of the Latin American coun-
tries included in this paper undoubtedly has an appre-
ciable and varied effect on the magnitude of such duties 
and charges and on their theoretical levels. Some of 
these practices have already been described. Much more 
important than such exemptions is the fact that, in the 
majority of cases, the efficient use of special exemption 
régimes as an instrument of protection and guidance in 
industrial development requires the levying of high and 
even prohibitive import duties and charges ; only if they 
exist and by authorizing total or partial exemptions from 
them can imports of given quantities for certain pur-
poses be possible, the only alternative being to subject 
importation to a number of other conditions. Con-
sequently, the level of duties and charges has to be 
higher than that which would prevail if such control 
did not operate through the granting of exemptions but 
rather through a direct system of prior import permits, 
as occurs, for example, in Mexico. As a result, the 
exemptions system is in itself a factor determining the 
high level of import duties and charges.14 
71. In such circumstances, the level of the duty would, 
as has already been pointed out (see above, paragraph 
47), give an approximate measure of the restrictive 
effect of the prior permit which is normally necessary 
in order to benefit from the exemption. However, in 
some of the countries studied, the existence of exemption 
régimes for goods imported by public bodies, State or 
semi-state enterprises, or for certain types of activity 
or industry — for example, railways, power, petroleum 
exploration and extraction, etc. — seems to give rise to 
theoretically high duties and charges on such products 
which are more noticeable for their absence than for 
their incidence. Accordingly, it is reasonable to suppose 
that at least part of the surcharges of 150 per cent 
theoretically applicable to the importation of many 
items into Argentina are attributable to the fact that, 
as such items are normally only imported under the 
exemption régime, it was not considered necessary to 
include them specifically in the lists of items free of 
surcharge or liable to rate of surcharges less than 
150 per cent. 
72. In any case, although it may be thought 
reasonable not to adjust, totally or partially, the 
theoretical levels of incidence of the import duties 
and charges so as to take into consideration the effects 
of the exemption régimes, it is obviously very interest-
ing to compare the theoretical levels with the revenue 
from the duties and charges levied in practice. In gene-
ral, this comparison has had to be confined — except 
in the case of Argentina — to the theoretical and real 
levels of customs duties proper, since there is no 
information available on the revenue from duties and 
charges of equivalent effects (see table 3). Moreover, 
even in the case of the revenue from customs duties, 
official statistics are not as precise as they might be 
in defining the items included under the head of 
" customs revenue nor does this revenue necessarily 
correspond to the customs duties considered in the 
present study. Even so, a comparison of this type gives 
a fairly close idea of the scale of the exemptions and 
of the relation between the theoretical and real levels 
of incidence of import duties and charges in the case 
of the countries under review. 
73. The difference between the averages for theoretical 
incidence as given in table 3 and those in the last Une 
of table 1 is due to the fact that the latter include duties 
and charges that have an effect equivalent to customs 
duties. The difference therefore indicates the average 
incidence of the said duties and charges. It may be 
assumed that the special exemption régimes act in the 
same way on these duties and charges as on customs 
14 ït may happen that, when a new customs tariff is drawn up or 
the existing tariff substantially modified, protective duties are levied 
in favour of industries not yet established but whose development 
it is proposed or thought desirable to stimulate. Later, pending 
the establishment of the new industry concerned, exemptions are 
granted to import the product which it is proposed to manufacture 
in the country. Or else, exemptions may also be granted if after 
the establishment of the new industry, it is not yet in a position 
to satisfy demand completely, and the exemption will then cover 
the difference between domestic output and demand. 
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Table 3 
Theoretical and actual incidence of customs duties 




of theoretical Approximate Proportion 
incidence average of between actual 
Country 
of duties 





f Customs duties . 4.6 2.8 61 
Argentina« Exchange sur-
I [ charges 47.3 16.6 35 
Bolivia . . 13.0 ... .,, 
Brazil . . . 25.9 12-12.5 46-48 
Chile . . . . 38.2 d 15.0 d 39 
Colombia 28.7 c 13.7 48 
Ecuador . 29.7 26.8 90 
Mexico .. 13.8 10.0 72 
Paraguay 27.8 16-20 56-72 
Peru 21.2 10-11 47-52 
Uruguay . 10.0 e . . . 
Venezuela 20.0 f 11-12 55-60 
a E/CN.I2/554/Adds.l to 11 (Spanish only). 
b Actual customs revenue in the most recent year or years for which data are 
available, expressed as a percentage of the total value of imports for those years. 
0 Duties in force in September 1959, after an appreciable increase in such 
duties in May 1959. 
d Including the ad valorem tax on the nationalized value. 
e Including the exchange surcharges in force as on 15 July 1960. 
1 Incidence estimated approximately on the basis of the duties in force prior 
to 1 September 1959; the incidence calculated on the basis of duties in force in 
February 1960 amounts to 28 per cent of the c.i.f. value. 
duties, and that their real incidence must therefore 
differ from their theoretical incidence in approximately 
the same proportion as in the case of customs duties. 
74. All the consideration, limitations and reserva-
tions mentioned with respect to the general averages 
of incidence of import duties and other charges are 
applicable, albeit to a varying extent, to the individual 
averages computed for each of the categories and groups 
in tables 1 and 2. This should also be borne in mind 
when making any analysis or comparison of these 
averages. 
75. The analysis and comparison of individual 
averages leads to one observation — referring primarily 
to the weighted averages in table 1, although these 
averages bear out the arithmetic means in table 2 — 
and that is that, in most cases, the averages for the 
different categories and groups are inter-related, within 
each country, in such a way as to correspond, g rosso 
modo, to what may be considered as the rational struc-
ture of the customs tariff and of other import duties 
and charges; in other words, the average incidence of 
such duties and charges is less for primary goods than 
for manufactures, etc. This conclusion is, however, 
subject to important limitations and reservations in 
view of the exceptions that are made and of the high 
level — unduly so in a large number of countries — 
of the averages for certain groups of products — 
unprocessed foodstuffs, raw materials and capital goods 
— for which a much more favourable treatment might 
be expected. 
76. It is true that this situation is very largely attribut-
able to the fact that the use of exchange and quantitative 
controls, as well as of special exemption régimes, has 
a far-reaching effect, as already noted, on the struc-
ture of import duties and charges in the countries under 
consideration. It is also evident that, in most of these 
countries, the structure in question suffers from serious 
shortcomings and in some ways has had and continues 
to have an adverse influence on their economic develop-
ment. 
77. Thus, although the average for the duties and 
charges on primary goods (Category I) is considerably 
less than that for manufactured goods for current 
consumption (Category III) in every country, this is 
primarily due not to the fact that duties and charges 
on goods in Category I are low — which indeed they 
are not — but to the exceedingly high level of duties 
on those in Category III, particularly processed food-
stuffs (including beverages and tobacco). 
78. Within Category I, the averages for the duties 
and charges levied in the majority of the countries on 
unprocessed foodstuffs and raw materials are surpris-
ingly high. Although, in several countries, many of these 
charges are not applied or are applied partially through 
the exemptions régime, their high level is in any case 
indicative of heavy protection for the domestic produc-
tion of such articles which does not seem very compatible 
with the countries' status as primary producers. 
Moreover, this protection for primary goods tends, as 
is only natural, to raise the level of duties and charges 
required to give adequate protection to intermediate and 
manufactured goods. 
79. Another striking fact is the exceedingly high 
average level of duties and charges for capital goods 
in general, contrary to what might be expected in the 
case of countries that are developing economically but 
are not yet ready to produce such goods themselves. 
In fact, in four countries only are the charges less than 
20 per cent and, in one alone, less than 10 per cent.15 
At this juncture it might be useful to recall once again 
that, since the duties and charges are, however, theoreti-
cal in many cases, imports are frequently protected by 
the exemption régime. Nevertheless, as pointed out 
before, exemptions are seldom granted automatically, 
as special authorization has to be obtained and certain 
requirements fulfilled. 
80. Although in eight of the eleven countries studied, 
the average for the duties and charges on raw materials 
is less than for intermediate goods, in some instances 
the difference has been reduced. In the three remaining 
countries — Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela — the relation 
is the antithesis of what would be expected of a rational 
structure. Conversely, there is a more consistent and 
logical relation between the average for duties and 
charges on raw materials and intermediate goods, on 
the one hand, and on durable and non-durable consumer 
15 In this paper, the capital goods group includes components, 
spares and parts for such goods. These components, spares and 
parts are usually subject to fairly heavy duties and charges in the 
countries that manufacture items of this kind, which tends to 
raise the average incidence of duties and charges for the group 
as a whole. 
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goods, on the other — excluding chemical and pharma-
ceutical products which are often given preferential 
treatment as a group. There is one exception to this 
rule: in Venezuela the average for raw materials is 
higher than for other current consumer goods. Never-
theless, the exemption régime plays a major part as 
regards raw materials in that country.16 
3. DISTRIBUTION OF IMPORTS BY CATEGORIES AND 
GROUPS OF PRODUCTS 
81. It is clearly very difficult to form an opinion on 
and make a satisfactory interpretation of the average 
levels of incidence of import duties and charges for 
different groups and categories of products. This is 
because any comparison of averages has to be constantly 
adjusted in the light of fresh information and because 
the picture that emerges tends to be rather confused. 
The ideal solution would be to quantify or measure, 
for each group and category of products, the average 
level of the aggregate effect on imports of the different 
restrictions applied — customs duties, other charges, 
exchange and quantitative controls, etc.—and of the 
exemption régimes. 
82. Although this solution is impracticable, a fairly 
close idea of the combined effect of the different ele-
ments that go to make up a country's import policy 
may be obtained from the composition or structure of 
its imports, as indicated in table 4 for the countries 
considered in this study. Admittedly, the composition of 
imports is only the outcome of the different measures 
that compose an import policy, but policy has a pre-
ponderant influence on composition and, in some cases, 
directly determines it. Moreover, the composition of 
imports is also largely dependent on a country's produc-
tion structure and degree of economic development, 
both of them factors that, in turn, are closely linked to 
import policy, through the reciprocal operation of cause 
and effect. 
83. The period covered by the data in table 4 is, of 
course, short — one year for Argentina, Uruguay and 
Venezuela; the annual average of a three-year period 
for Brazil and Colombia and that of a two-year period 
for the other countries — and therefore perhaps 
insufficiently representative. Nevertheless, it does show 
that the different countries have an import composition 
that is very much what might have been expected in 
view of their production structure, the respective stage 
reached by their economic activities and the criteria and 
considerations underlying their import policies. 
84. A salient consideration has been and still is, in 
the majority of the countries, their balance-of-payments 
difficulties. Many of the restrictions on imports are 
imposed with these difficulties in mind. For this reason, 
the restrictions are applied selectively so as to limit 
10 The existence of serious defects in the structure of import 
duties and charges has been confirmed, in the case of Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile, by the analysis of these duties and charges, as 
well as by the calculations of average incidence for the categories 
and groups to which this study refers and for the chapters and 
sections of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature, due account being 
taken of all items on the relevant tariffs. 
imports of non-essential goods as far as possible while 
leaving the way open to goods that are essential for pro-
duction or consumption (foodstuffs, raw materials, 
intermediate goods, fuels, capital goods). This explains, 
for instance, the high proportion of unprocessed food-
stuffs in Uruguay's imports during 1957. 
85. Of the percentages in table 4, those which best 
illustrate the general structure of production and the 
degree of economic development reached by each of the 
countries, as well as the effect of the import restrictions 
imposed for protectionist purposes or to stabilize the 
balance of payments, are undoubtedly the percentages 
for durable consumer goods (Group II-4), other current 
consumer goods (Group III-3), and, to a lesser extent, 
processed foodstuffs (Group III-l). The share of these 
groups in total imports is decidedly low in the more 
industrialized countries and high in the relatively less 
advanced countries. 
86. The percentages for imports of capital goods 
(Group II-3) is also very high. In every country — 
except Argentina and Paraguay — this group of products 
is pre-eminent in the imports effected during the period 
to which the national data in table 4 refer. In the case 
of Argentina, the exception coincides with its economic 
situation in 1959. In every country, as pointed out before, 
these imports are given preferential treatment, either 
through the application of low duties and charges, or 
more commonly, through complete exemption from such 
charges, which would otherwise have a very limiting 
effect. 
87. Lastly, it should be pointed out that, in the case 
of unprocessed foodstuffs (Group 1-1) and fuels (Groups 
1-3 and II-2) — despite the fact that the relative 
magnitude of imports is primarily determined by struc-
tural or institutional factors — their importation on a 
large scale coincides with relatively low levels of duties 
and charges for such items, as may be seen from table 1. 
Only one of the countries under discussion — Colom-
bia — levies on its imports of unprocessed foodstuffs 
duties and charges that are high in comparison with 
those levied on nearly all the other groups of products, 
as part of a protectionist policy and as an incentive to 
domestic production. Consequently, Colombia's imports 
of unprocessed foodstuffs are relatively smaller than 
those of the other countries, with the exception of 
Argentina. 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
88. On various occasions in the course of this study, 
conclusions have had to be drawn and comments made 
with respect to the general structural characteristics of 
the measures by means of which the import policies of 
the different countries are implemented, as regards the 
levels of duties and charges, etc. These conclusions and 
comments will be presented in a more systematic way 
in the following paragraphs, on the basis not only of 
the considerations outlined above but also of the many 
other background data collected during the preparation 
of this doccument. 
89. The first point worth noting is the great complexity 
of the import systems in force in nearly all the countries 
Table 4 
Latin America: Import distribution by groups and categories of products in selected comi tries 
(Percentages) 
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chilea Colombia Ecuador Mexico a Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela 
(1959) (1957-58) (1957-59) (1957-58) (1956-58) (1957-58) (1957-58) (1957-58) (1957-58) (1957) (1959) 
Category I. Primary goods 26.1 8.7 24.4 20.1 10.9 5.6 13.6 14.6 11.6 34.3 6.5 
Group 1. Unprocessed foodstuffs 3.5 7.3 11.3 8.9 3.7 5.2 7.6 13.2 9.7 19.0 4.4 
Group 2. Raw materials 7.6 1.2 2.2 5.7 7.2 0.4 4.8 1.3 1.9 9.3 2.1 
Group 3. Unprocessed fuels 14.9 0.3 10.9 5.5 — — 1.2 0.1 — 6.0 — 
Category 11. Capital, intermediate and durable 
consumer goods 70.2 56.4 70.1 65.4 70.5 62.7 80.6 49.8 66.5 54.3 67.6 
Group 1. Intermediate goods 34.2 14.9 21.2 16.3 31.2 21.4 22.3 11.6 18.2 22.4 21.4 
Group 2. Processed fuels 7.7 3.2 10.8 5.5 4.5 6.8 5.2 11.1 4.5 2.1 0.9 
Group 3. Capital goods 27.2 33.1 36.8 41.8 33.3 28.9 51.9 18.8 34.6 26.2 34.9 
Group 4. Durable consumer goods 1.0 5.3 1.4 1.8 1.6 5.6 1.2 8.4 9.2 3.6 10.5 
Category IIL Manufactured goods for current 
consumption 3.7 34.8 5.4 14.5 18.6 31.7 5.8 35.6 21.9 11.4 25.9 
Group 1. Processed foodstuifs and tobacco .. 0.1 39.2 1.4 8.6 1.6 4.2 0.7 9.8 6.5 3.0 7.7 
Group 2. Chemical and pharmaceutical products 0.5 3.6 0.8 1.0 3.7 7.5 2.5 5.3 2.9 0 . 6 3.1 
Group 3. Other goods for current consumption 3.1 12.0 3.3 4.9 13.3 20.0 2.6 20.5 12.5 7.8 15.1 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sample as a percentage of total imports 93.9 91.9 92.9 93.2 94.3 87.5 83.8 86.2 85.1 87.3 86.6 
Sources: E/CN.12/554/Adds. 1 to 11 (Spanish only), 
a Excluding imports into free zones and sectors. 
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considered. In most of them, there is a great multiplicity 
of import duties and charges and/or controls of other 
kinds, supplemented by the wide application of various 
administrative measures, particularly that of exemption 
from payment of duty. 
90. As a result in only two of the eleven countries 
studied — Bolivia and Peru — is the customs tariff the 
prime instrument of trade policy and the principal 
determinant of the composition of imports. In all the 
others, these functions have been largely and even 
almost entirely usurped by non-customs duties and by 
restrictions and measures of other kinds. In some 
countries, the role of the customs tariff and its influence 
on the composition of imports are unquestionably of 
minor importance, and as an instrument it is often 
thought of, in such cases, as out of date or ineffectual. 
91. Nevertheless, there is a marked tendency to 
eliminate exchange and other direct controls, as well 
as to restore to the customs tariff its onetime importance 
as the principal element in an import policy. This is not 
being done immediately ; controls are first replaced during 
an interim period by non-tariff duties and charges and 
prior deposits. This transitional procedure is considered 
necessary primarily because the formulation of a new 
customs tariff requires much time and effort, and also 
because of the seeming persistence of a preference for 
restrictions — such as non-tariff duties and charges 
and prior deposits — that can be established, amended 
and applied by administrative decision, and are outside 
bounds set by the obligations contracted in trade agree-
ments with respect to customs duties. 
92. Another characteristic of the import régimes 
studied is their marked instability not only as regards 
their overall structure but also, and more particularly, 
with respect to the treatment accorded to individual 
products. In fact, in most of the countries, frequent 
changes are made in the lists of surcharges, additional 
taxes, prior deposits and permits, etc. and, in some, 
even in customs duties. This is apparently largely due 
to the fact that, precisely because of the ease with which 
these restrictions can be modified by administrative 
decision, the sectors concerned are continually pressing 
for more favourable treatment. Another factor is the 
desire to adjust the treatment accorded to the different 
products so as to bring it into line with the changes 
in the economy. Whatever the case, the untoward use 
of the flexibility inherent in a system that is subject to 
arbitrary administrative decisions foments uncertainty 
with all its consequent ill-effects on the national eco-
nomies. 
93. The foregoing considerations, and above all the 
way in which the majority of the countries have been 
devising and applying the different instruments of trade 
policy, explain why there has been no rational and well-
planned import policy in these countries, in other words, 
a policy that derives from an integrated and well-balanced 
concept of economic development requirements. 
94. It may be noted, indeed, that nearly all the coun-
tries in question lack a soundly conceived, planned and 
formulated policy of protectionism. On the contrary, 
protection is frequently provided in a haphazard and 
extremist way without sufficient regard for the more 
rational and efficient utilization of resources or the pro-
gramming of economic development. 
95. It is therefore customary in the countries under 
consideration for imports of goods that compete with 
those of domestic industry to be banned or subjected 
to a system of prior permits which is in practice tanta-
mount to banning. In fact, one of the habitual pre-
requisites for authorizing imports is the assurance that 
the product has no domestic counterpart. Wherever 
direct controls have been abandoned, they have been 
replaced by a system of duties, charges, prior deposits, 
etc. which is prohibitive in its effects. In other words, 
the policy adopted is usually that of preventing or fore-
stalling any real or potential competition from foreign 
goods. 
Annex 
CLASSIFICATION BY S I T C ITEMS OF GOODS IN THE CATEGORIES AND 
GROUPS CONSIDERED IN THE PRESENT STUDY 
Note: The annex is available in Spanish only. Part II of the 
Spanish version contains a list of the code numbers of the corre-
sponding SITC items, which can be looked up in the Standard 
International Trade Classification (United Nations publication, 
Sales No.: 51.XVIII.1). 
2. Report of the first session of the Working Group 
on Customs Questions * 
(Montevideo, 1 to 12 August 1960) 
INTRODUCTION 
1. This document presents an account of the pro-
ceedings at the first session of the Working Group on 
Customs Questions, held at Montevideo (Uruguay) 
from 1 to 12 August 1960. 
2. The Working Group was established by virtue 
of resolution 7 (II) of the Trade Committee of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, 
adopted at Panama on 19 May 1959. In that resolution, 
the Trade Committee, considering " that, in order to 
attain the objectives for the establishment of the Latin 
American common market, it is necessary to standardize 
the tariff nomenclature of the Latin American countries 
decided to recommend to the ECLA secretariat, " that 
it should prepare, for consideration by the Trade Com-
mittee, suitable bases and procedures for the adoption 
of a standard tariff nomenclature in the Latin American 
countries When calling the session of the Working 
Group, the ECLA secretariat also took into account the 
request put before it in resolution No. 2 of the Provisional 
Committee of the Latin American Free-Trade Associa-
tion that the session should be held at Montevideo. The 
purpose of the request was to facilitate the attendance 
of the representatives constituting the Provisional Com-
mittee and of their advisers and thereby to ensure that 
the maximum benefit would be derived from the Group's 
4 Issued earlier in mimeographed form as documents E/CN.12/ 
C.l/WG.3/4/Rev.l (24 August 1960) and E/CN.12/568 (1 March 
1961). 
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work. The Committee therefore requested that, as regards 
the agenda of the session, priority should be given to 
certain items of particular interest to the Provisional 
Committee. 
3. The secretariat, in complying with this request, 
gave weight to the close link between the customs ques-
tions which would be considered by the Working Group 
and matters connected with the operation of the Latin 
American Free-Trade Association. Accordingly, the 
agenda covered matters that interest all the Latin Ame-
rican countries to an equal degree and also other closely 
related items bearing on the Montevideo Treaty under 
which the Latin American Free-Trade Association was 
established. 
4. With a view to the preparation of background 
documents for the first session of the Working Group 
on Customs Questions, the secretariat duly distributed 
a questionnaire on basic customs questions to all Latin 
American countries. As the secretariat did not, however, 
receive all the replies from Governments to the afore-
mentioned questionnaire sufficiently in advance, the 
documentation for many of the items on the agenda 
had to be prepared mainly from information which the 
secretariat itself had at its disposal. Furthermore, special 
attention should be drawn to the valuable co-operation 
given in this matter by the Brussels Customs Co-opera-
tion Council, which seconded one of its technicians to 
collaborate as an adviser in the preparation of the 
aforementioned basic documents. 
5. This report is divided into two parts. The first part 
indicates the membership of delegations and describes 
the organization of work. It gives a summary account 
of the proceedings during the session and provides an 
objective interpretation of the conclusions reached. 
The second part contains the resolutions approved by 
the Working Group. 
6. This report was adopted by the Working Group 
at its closing meeting. 
I. WORKING GROUP ON CUSTOMS QUESTIONS 
A . DELEGATIONS PRESENT AND ORGANIZATION 
OF WORK 
1. Opening and closing meetings 
7. The opening meeting of the Working Group on 
Customs Questions took place in the assembly hall of 
the Automóvil Club del Uruguay on 1 August 1960. The 
following persons attended: the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Commander 
Homero Martínez Montero; the Under-Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, Mr. Mateo J. Magariños 
de Mello; other members of the Uruguayan Govern-
ment, the heads and members of diplomatic missions 
of the Latin American countries and representatives of 
various Uruguayan public and private bodies. Mr. Este-
ban Ivovich, Director of the Trade Policy Division of 
the Economic Commission for Latin America, repre-
senting Mr. Raúl Prebisch, Executive Secretary of the 
Commission, took the chair. 
8. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay wel-
comed the delegations present on behalf of his Govern-
ment. The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs and 
Chairman of the Provisional Committee of the Latin 
American Free-Trade Association then spoke on behalf 
of the Provisional Committee and of delegations present. 
The representative of the ECLA secretariat thanked 
those present for their attendance and the Uruguayan 
Government for its hospitality and for making it pos-
sible to hold the first session of the Working Group on 
Customs Questions at Montevideo. He also thanked 
the authorities of the Automóvil Club del Uruguay for 
having made their facilities available for holding the 
session.1 
9. The closing meeting was also held in the assembly 
hall of the Automóvil Club del Uruguay on 12 August 
1960. The following persons made statements: Mr. 
René Ortuño, permanent representative of the Argentine 
Republic on the Provisional Committee of the Latin 
American Free-Trade Association, on behalf of the 
delegations and the Provisional Committee; Mr. Romeo 
Maeso Sueiro, Chairman of the first session of the 
Working Group on Customs Questions; and Mr. Esteban 
Ivovich as representative of the Executive Secretary 
of ECLA. 
2. Attendance 
10. The meetings of the Working Group were attended 
by representatives, delegates and observers from the 
following Latin American States members of the Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America, and from inter-
governmental and non-governmental organizations: 
(i) Representatives and members of delegations from 
Latin American States members of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America 
Argentina: Representative: Arnaldo Domingo Martino; 
Members: Carlos Bochert, Ricardo La Rosa, Juan 
Antonio Vito Burlando, Héctor R. Mastracchio, Fer-
nando Pedro Bocci, Juan Carlos Diaz, Manuel Miguel 
Quintana, Juan José Flores, Victorio Jesús Silva 
Brazil : Representative : Gerson Augusto da Silva ; 
Members: Armindo Branco Mendes Cadaxa, Armindo 
Correa da Costa, Oto Ferreira Neves, Lucia Merinho 
Pirajá, Vinicius Ferraz Machado, Luis Emygdio 
Camara 
Chile: Representative: Abelardo Silva Davidson (Am-
bassador) ; Members : Gustavo Valdivieso, Victor 
Leiva Araya, Juan Broughton 
Colombia: Representative: Alberto Navas de Brigard 
Cuba : Representative : Mario García Incháustegui 
(Ambassador) ; Member : Leonardo Bravo (Consul 
General) 
Mexico: Representative: Mario Espinosa de los Reyes; 
Members: Guillermo López Vargas, Antonio Calderón 
Martínez, Rodrigo Vidal Ortiz 
1 All the speeches made during the opening meeting were 
distributed as information documents. 
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Paraguay: Representative: Hermes Troche; Members: 
Pablo E. Bergemann, Jesús G. Cañete, Juan Isasio 
Cabrai 
Peru: Representative: Vice-Admiral Pedro Mazuré A.; 
Members: Alejandro Bussalleu, Joaquín Monar Nuñez 
Uruguay: Representative: Romeo Maeso Sueiro; Mem-
bers: Enrique Bianchi, Ricardo Cat Vaeza, Hugo de 
Marco, Guillermo Doulas, Héctor Garicoits, Roberto 
González Casal, Alfredo Noè, Fernándo Papa Preve, 
Alfredo Ponce de León, Lauro Rodríguez, Alberto 
Rovira, Miguel Angel Vásquez Rolfi, Hugo Roselló 
(ii) Observers from inter-governmental organizations 
Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the 
Organization of the American States: Juan B. Schroder, 
Rodolfo León 
(iii) Observers from non-governmental organizations2 
Inter-American Council of Commerce and Produc-
tion: Pedro Celia, Luis E. González Cuñarro, Mario 
Pena, Jorge Seré 
3. Secretariat 
11. The secretariat was as follows: 
Esteban Ivovich, Representative of the Executive Secre-
tary and Director of the Trade Policy Division of 
ECLA 
Santiago Macario, economist, member of the Trade 
Policy Division of ECLA, Secretary of the Working 
Group 
Alberto Sola, Alfredo Escobar, Alejandro Power, Mario 
Movarec, staff members of ECLA, advisers 
Ruben Chelle, Deputy Administrative Secretary of the 
Provisional Committee of the Latin American Free-
Trade Association 
Emilio Gómez Pallete, official of the Customs Co-opera-
tion Council, acted as adviser to the secretariat 
4. Organization of work 
(a) Election of officers 
12. At the opening meeting the following officers 
were elected: 
Chairman: Romeo Maeso Sueiro (Uruguay) 
Vice-Chairmen: Hermes Troche (Paraguay) 
Alejandro Bussalleu (Peru) 
Rapporteur: Mario Espinosa de los Reyes (Mexico) 
(b) Committees 
13. With a view to facilitating consideration of the 
items on the agenda, it was decided at the opening 
meeting to establish three committees with the following 
officers : 
2 The representatives of the Inter-American Council of Com-
merce and Production were invited by the secretariat to attend 
the meetings of the Working Group. 
9 
Committee 1. Standard tariff nomenclature and customs 
value 
Chairman: Juan Carlos Diaz (Argentina) 
Secretary : Santiago Macario (secretariat) 
Committee 2. Adoption of standard definitions of basic 
customs terms, customs procedures and 
definition of origin of goods for customs 
purposes 
Chairman : Armindo Correa da Costa 
(Brazil) 
Secretary: Alfredo Escobar (secretariat) 
Committee 3. Consideration of certain customs matters 
connected with the Montevideo Treaty 
Chairman : Abelardo Silva Davidson 
(Chile) 
Secretary : Alberto Sola (secretariat) 
B. AGENDA 
14. At the opening meeting, the Working Group 
adopted the following agenda: 
I. Election of officers 
II. Adoption of the agenda 
III. General statements 
IV. The standardization and co-ordination of certain 
aspects of the customs systems of Latin American 
countries 
1. Standard tariff nomenclature : 
(a) Bases and procedures for its adoption 
(b) Its use as a common reference among the 
countries participating in the Latin American 
Free-Trade Association (Montevideo Treaty) 
with the object, inter alia, of facilitating 
tariff negotiations 
2. Customs value 
(a) Standard definition for the purpose of levy-
ing ad valorem duties on imports 
(b) Practical application of the standard defini-
tion 




(c) In-transit trade 
(d) Re-exportation 
(e) Temporary importation 
( / ) Temporary exportation 
(g) Foreign goods 
(h) Nationalized goods 
(i) Border trade 
(j) Miscellaneous 
4. Customs procedures: ways and means of stan-
dardizing or co-ordinating and simplifying 
customs procedures and documentation 
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5. Definition of origin of goods for customs pur-
poses: 
(a) Preliminary consideration from the customs 
standpoint 
(b) Standard and procedures for verifying the 
origin of goods 
Background documents: La uniformación o co-
ordinación de ciertos aspectos de los sistemas 
aduaneros en los países latinoamericanos (E/CN. 
12/C.1/WG.3/2 and Add.l to 3) 
V. Consideration of certain customs matters related 
to the Montevideo Treaty: 
(a) Meaning of the term " duties and charges " for 
the purposes of article 3 of the Treaty and its 
expression or equivalence in terms of ad valorem 
customs duties 
(b) Definition of the term " duties and charges " for 
the purposes of article 5 of the Treaty 
Background documents: Antecedentes para la defi-
nición de " gravámenes de efectos equivalentes a 
derechos aduaneros " y de " gravámenes vigentes " 
a los fines de la aplicación del Tratado de Monte-
video (E/CN. 12/C.l/WG.3/3/Rev. 1 and Add.l/ 
Rev.l) 
VI. Other business 
C . ACCOUNT OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. Standard customs nomenclature 
15. When the Group reached this item on its agenda, 
for which the basic document was E/CN.12/C.1/WG.3/2, 
prepared by the ECLA secretariat, it decided to consider 
the questions involved in the following order: 
(1) Bases and characteristics of existing customs 
nomenclatures in various Latin American countries 
(2) What nomenclature might be adopted as a com-
mon basis for the customs tariffs of Latin American 
countries 
(3) Form in which the said nomenclature should be 
adopted and degree of detail in the breakdown 
of its hearings 
(4) Rules and procedures to be followed for keeping 
the nomenclature up to date and ensuring its 
uniform application 
(5) Use of the standard nomenclature for customs 
purposes: 
(a) As a common point of reference in negotia-
tions 
(b) Gradual adoption by all Latin American coun-
tries as their national nomenclature 
(6) Use of the standard nomenclature for statistical 
purposes: 
(a) Rules and procedures 
(b) Establishment of a regional centre for the 
processing of statistics 
16. In accordance with this outline, the discussion 
opened with accounts of the bases and characteristics 
of each of the existing customs nomenclatures of the 
Latin American countries represented at the meeting. 
Those of Argentina, Chile and Paraguay did not corre-
spond to the international type of classification, although 
those of Chile and Paraguay follow a logical and con-
sistent order. Both Argentina and Chile are in the process 
of adopting the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN). 
The customs nomenclature in force in Uruguay corre-
sponds to the Draft Customs Nomenclature of the League 
of Nations (as do those of Colombia and Ecuador), and 
the Peruvian nomenclature is based on the Minimum 
List drawn up for statistical purposes on the basis of 
the Drajt Customs Nomenclature. The Mexican nomen-
clature, in its general lines and in the content of its sec-
tions although not in its headings, follows the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC), drawn up by 
the United Nations for statistical purposes. Lastly, 
the nomenclatures used by Brazil and Cuba correspond 
to the BTN, although with some changes in the headings, 
particularly in the case of Brazil. 
17. Speaking of the nomenclature in force since 1956 
in Mexico, the Mexican representative said that the 
SITC had been adopted as the basis, although with a 
number of changes in the items and sub-items, because 
at the time it was drafted more detailed knowledge was 
available on the SITC particularly through its use for 
the Standard Central American Tariff Nomenclature 
(NAUCA), whereas the BTN was still in the course of 
preparation. Thus far experience with the nomenclature 
adopted had been satisfactory; it had served well the 
purposes of the industrialization policy pursued by 
Mexico during recent years and, generally speaking, had 
met the requirements of tariff protection and economic 
and statistical analysis. He added that in his opinion the 
explanatory notes on the items and sub-items had 
serious drawbacks, because the rigidity they imparted 
to the contents of the items in question was liable to 
lead to tax evasion. 
18. The Brazilian delegate said that his country's 
experience with the BTN had also been satisfactory; it 
had proved perfectly suited to the protectionist policy 
called for by the dynamic process of Brazil's industria-
lization, and there had been no difficulties or problems 
in its application. 
19. The representatives of Argentina and Chile said 
that in their respective countries it had been decided, 
after study of the various alternatives, to adopt the 
BTN for the new customs tariffs that were being drawn 
up, since it was considered that that nomenclature fully 
met the requirements, particularly those relating to the 
industrialization process. Although experience was lack-
ing as regards the practical application of the nomen-
clature, thus far no difficulties had arisen in drawing up 
the two national nomenclatures on the basis of the 
BTN. One of the main reasons for adopting the BTN 
had in fact been the existence of rules and interpretative 
notes for its sections and chapters and explanatory notes 
on its headings, all of which contributed to the exactitude 
necessary for its application. 
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20. By way of clarifying the doubts and queries raised 
by some representatives with respect to the adoption 
of the BTN, it was explained that the intention was not 
to impose a rigid nomenclature on the various countries 
but rather to give an indication of general lines and basic 
headings that they should respect, while remaining free 
to subdivide the headings in the way and to the extent 
they considered suitable for their own particular require-
ments. The same applied to the general rules and inter-
pretative notes on the sections and chapters; their order 
and numbering should be respected and maintained, but 
that did not mean that any country was not free to add 
whatever further notes it wished in order to clarify 
further the content of the sections or chapters concerned, 
and especially the meaning of any subdivisions it might 
introduce. 
With respect to the international obligations of coun-
tries that adopted the BTN, it was explained that only 
countries that were members of the Nomenclature Com-
mittee of the Customs Co-operation Council are obliged 
to adopt the nomenclature and to adhere strictly to its 
headings, general rules and interpretative notes. There is 
no such obligation or undertaking for other countries, 
although it is advisable that the nomenclature should 
be adopted without changes in order to preserve the 
desired uniformity, without prejudice to the right to 
establish additional subdivisions as required. This is, in 
fact, the principle adhered to by most of the 45 countries 
that have adopted the BTN without being members 
of the Nomenclature Committee. 
21. In view of these and other considerations advanced 
during the debate, and without entering into the merits 
of drawing up a basic standard customs nomenclature 
specially for Latin America, it was agreed to recommend 
that the BTN should be adopted and that, in order to 
ensure the desired uniformity, while each country is 
left free to establish under every heading listed such 
subdivisions as it may deem expedient, the adoption of 
the nomenclature be effected (a) without omission of any 
of its headings, addition of any new headings or altera-
tion of the numbering of the headings, and (b) without 
the introduction of any change in the general rules of 
its interpretation or in the notes to chapters or sections 
which might modify their content or the content of the 
headings. 
With the same object of ensuring the desired unifor-
mity, it was also decided to recommend that national 
customs tariffs in Latin America based on the BTN be 
drawn up and applied in conformity with the Explana-
tory Notes approved by the Customs Co-operation Coun-
cil, while countries are left free to supplement the said 
notes with any they may deem necessary to define such 
subdivisions as they may establish. Both recommenda-
tions are included in resolution 1 (I). In this resolution 
the Working Group also suggests to the ECLA secre-
tariat that it provide technical advice to the Latin Ame-
rican Governments on the occasion of their adoption 
of the Brussels Nomenclature in their national customs 
tariffs, and that in this connexion it seek the co-operation 
of the United Nations Bureau of Technical Assistance 
Operations and of the Customs Co-operation Council, 
and that in addition the ECLA secretariat should take 
the necessary steps to ensure that the nomenclature is 
kept up to date by the countries that adopt it in accordance 
with any recommendations that the Nomenclature Com-
mittee of the Customs Co-operation Council may make. 
22. As regards the amount of detail in the breakdown 
that might be given to the BTN headings by the various 
Latin American countries in adopting it for their national 
customs nomenclature, it was concluded that, since 
the establishment of sub-items or sub-headings was 
closely linked with the particular circumstances and 
interests of each country, it would be neither practicable 
nor desirable to lay down any general rules or restrict the 
freedom of action of each country in any other way, 
so long as sufficient knowledge of those circumstances 
and interests was not available and so long as it was not 
necessary to standardize national nomenclatures at the 
subdivision level. Thus the signatories to the Montevideo 
Treaty would remain free to agree on whatever rules 
or standards they deemed appropriate for the purposes 
of applying the said Treaty. 
23. The Working Group agreed that, in order to iden-
tify, in the national nomenclatures based on the common 
nomenclature, the subdivisions introduced by each 
country, it would be advisable to retain the decimal classi-
fication and add one or two digits, as required, to those 
used in the BTN. With respect to the gradual adoption 
of the BTN by all the Latin American countries as their 
national customs nomenclature, there was general agree-
ment that it would not be appropriate for the time 
being to set any time limit for this adoption, which would 
have to depend on the particular circumstances of each 
country. 
24. With respect to the use of the standard nomencla-
ture as a common point of reference for the negotiations 
provided for in the Montevideo Treaty, the Group con-
sidered that the use of the BTN would be helpful for 
this purpose. As it was not feasible for the Group to 
enter into any detailed consideration of what rules and 
procedures should be followed for that purpose, it 
confined itself to commending this view to the attention 
of the Provisional Committee of the Latin American 
Free Trade Association. 
25. With respect to the use of the standard nomencla-
ture for statistical purposes, the Group considered it 
advisable that this and similar matters should be studied 
further at a conference of statistical experts with the 
advisory assistance of customs experts. 
26. When the foregoing questions were being discussed, 
the Brazilian representative proposed that they should 
be given more extensive consideration, so that there 
could be a detailed discussion of how the BTN was to 
be used in relation to matters specifically connected 
with the Montevideo Treaty. With this aim in mind he 
submitted the following supplementary agenda to the 
Working Group: 
1. Requirements to be met by the standard nomen-
clature in order to comply with the provisions of 
article 49 (c) of the Montevideo Treaty: 
1.1 Minimum degree of detail in breakdown for use 
as a common basis for the negotiations; 
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1.2 Minimum degree of detail in breakdown for 
standard presentation of foreign trade statistics; 
2. Procedure for the drafting of a standard nomen-
clature: 
2.1 Drafting of a Spanish-Portuguese version of the 
BTN; 
2.2 Drafting on the basis of existing nomenclatures 
of a first breakdown of the BTN headings for 
the purpose of using it, as far as possible, in 
the first series of negotiations. 
3. Establishing correlations between the standard no-
menclature and each of the nomenclatures in use 
in the countries of the Area. 
4. Appointment of a group of experts for the purposes 
of paragraphs 2 and 3 above. 
5. Application of the standard nomenclature: 
5.1 Procedures to be adopted to ensure that it is 
applied and kept continuously up to date; 
5.2 Establishment of a specialized body, attached to 
the Standing Executive Committee of the Latin 
American Free-Trade Association, to: 
5.2.1 Follow closely the application of the 
standard nomenclature; 
5.2.2 Keep it up to date; 
5.2.3 Study cases of doubt or disagreement as 
to its interpretation and make recommenda-
tions thereon; 
5.2.4 To provide technical assistance in this field 
to the countries of the Area; 
6. Adoption of the standard nomenclature by the 
countries of the Area as their national nomenclature: 
6.1 Possibility of its immediate adoption by some or 
all of the countries of the Area, in view of the 
provisions of article 15 of the Montevideo Treaty; 
6.2 Advisability of recommending that those coun-
tries that cannot adopt the nomenclature im-
mediately should begin to make the necessary 
changes in their respective national nomenclatures 
so as to facilitate the change-over to the standard 
nomenclature. 
27. The Working Group, although it shared the 
Brazilian representative's concern and recognized that, 
for the purposes of the Montevideo Treaty, it would 
be necessary to achieve a standard breakdown of the 
BTN to facilitate the negotiations provided for in that 
Treaty, considered that, in view of the short time avail-
able and of the fact that some representatives had stated 
that they needed more time to collect the necessary 
background information, it would not be possible at 
the current session to embark on a detailed analysis 
of the questions raised in the proposed supplementary 
agenda. It consequently decided to take note of that 
agenda and to transmit it to the Provisional Committee 
of the Latin American Free-Trade Association. 
2. Definition and verification of customs value 
28. For the consideration of this item of the agenda, 
referred to in document E/CN.12/C.l/WG.3/2/Add.l 
prepared by the ECLA secretariat, the following order 
of business was proposed and adopted: 
I 
(1) The notion of " customs valuation " in the various 
Latin American countries 
(2) The need to adopt a standard definition 
(3) Component elements of a definition: 
(a) Place of delivery of the goods 
(b) Time when the price of the goods is taken into 
account 
(c) Price of the goods 
(d) Quantity of goods and level of the transaction 
(4) Advisability of drafting a new definition or adopting 
an existing definition 
II 
(1) Administrative valuation agencies: existing offices 
and analysis of the various suitable methods of 
operation 
(2) Analysis of some of the opinions of the Valuation 
Committee of the Customs Co-operation Council on 
particular cases (deferred payments, interest, pro-
duction surpluses, goods no longer of use in the 
country of origin, dumping, etc.) 
(3) Exports from the countries with a centrally planned 
economy and the extent to which they conform to 
the definition adopted. 
29. With respect to item (1), each representative gave 
an account of the definition or concept of customs 
value and its actual application in his own country. 
These accounts, which were subsequently submitted in 
writing on the basis of a standard questionnaire or 
model and reproduced as annex I 3 of the present report 
show that there is a variety of criteria and procedures 
for determining the value of goods subject to ad valorem 
duties. 
30. The Working Group recognized the need to 
arrive at a standard definition of customs value and also, 
as far as possible, to adopt standard procedures for its 
application in order to ensure that the actual incidence 
of ad valorem duties is not affected by differences in 
methods of valuation. This consideration is of special 
importance with respect to countries that are parties to 
agreements aimed at establishing customs unions, free-
trade areas or any other kind of economic association. 
31. In view of this recognized need, and desirous of 
arriving at a standard definition on the basis not of any 
preconceived idea but rather of an examination of the 
essential component elements of such a definition, the 
Group proceeded to consider those elements, namely, 
8 Available in Spanish only. 
C . OTHER ASPECTS OF MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 129 
place of delivery of the goods, time when the price used 
as the basis of valuation is to be established, the price 
to be used as the basis of valuation, and effect on that 
price of the quantity of goods and level of the transaction. 
32. The first element, the place where the goods are 
assumed to be for valuation purposes, is essential, since 
it governs the choice of the type of price used as the 
basis of valuation. There are a number of alternatives, 
the ex-factory price, the price at the port of shipment 
(f.a.s. or f.o.b. value), price at the port of destination 
(c.i.f. value) etc. Most countries, including the Latin 
American countries, use the c.i.f. price (value of the 
goods delivered at the port of destination) as the basis 
for levying duties (although others usually prefer the 
f.o.b. price, which is the value of the goods on board 
ship at the port of shipment). The Working Group 
expressed itself as generally in favour of the c.i.f. price, 
among other reasons because it was considered as 
representing the actual cost of the goods for the im-
porter at the time of valuation. Because it is the price 
of the goods at the time of valuation, it is easier to 
determine or check, since at that time the goods, the 
importer and the customs official responsible for the 
valuation are all together in one place. The adoption of 
the f.o.b. price, on the other hand, might create difficul-
ties, since if any inquiry were necessary it would have 
to be referred to the exporter market. However, in view 
of the fact that the question was not in fact one of vital 
importance, it was conceded that there might be economic 
or practical reasons why, in certain countries or instances, 
it might be better to use the f.o.b. rather than the c.i.f. 
price. 
In view of the need to adopt a standard criterion, it 
was considered generally more suitable to use the c.i.f. 
price as the basis of valuation, that is, the price of the 
goods at the place where the goods are imported, and 
not at the place from which they are exported. 
33. With respect to the time when the price to be 
used as the basis for valuation is established, it was 
likewise recognized that, generally speaking, it seemed 
more satisfactory and appropriate to choose the time 
when the duty becomes payable, that is, the base price 
would be the price of the goods at the time they are 
undergoing customs formalities in the importing country, 
which is also the time when the goods are valued. Each 
country could establish this time more specifically 
between the date on which the customs declaration is 
submitted or recorded and the date on which the goods 
are withdrawn from customs. 
Without prejudice to its acceptance of the general 
criterion referred to, the Working Group took the view 
that that criterion should have a certain flexibility, and 
agreed that it would be advisable to leave a certain 
leeway with respect to the time element, so that countries 
that might prefer to do so could base valuation on the 
price of goods at the time of export instead of the time 
at which the duty becomes payable. 
34. With respect to the price to be used as the basis 
of valuation of the goods, it was affirmed during the 
debate that the positive concept of price — that is, the 
actual sale price of the imported goods — would be 
unacceptable for the purposes of customs valuation, 
since that price might be different from the actual price 
established in a transaction effected on the open market. 
Moreover, in some cases there may not even be any 
such sale for various reasons: for example, there may be 
a special relationship or link between the buyer and 
seller (as in sales to subsidiary firms, to sole agents, etc.) 
which results in the price paid, or to be paid, not being 
the same as it would be if there were no such link; 
again, the commercial or consular invoice is usually 
accepted as proof of the price paid and this can be 
falsified or forged; or the purchase may have been made 
on exceptional or abnormal terms (for instance, for 
sales of surpluses, stock clearances, sales of liquidation 
stocks, etc.) not available to most importers; or there 
may not have been any actual sale (goods imported on 
consignment, for instance). Lastly, there may be a 
number of other reasons why the price actually paid 
by the purchaser, or at least the price appearing in the 
commercial invoice, may not be the price at which 
such goods are normally purchased by other buyers. 
35. The Working Group decided that these problems 
would be solved by adopting, instead of the positive 
concept of price — the sale price, that is the price at 
which the goods " are " sold — a notional concept, in 
which the indicative " are" is replaced by the con-
ditional " would b e " : the price at which the goods 
to be valued " would be " sold under assumed conditions 
(for example, of independence between buyer and 
seller). 
Accordingly, the essential condition for a price to be 
acceptable as a basis of valuation under this concept 
is that it must have been established under open market 
conditions, since it is only under such conditions that 
it can be stated that that would be the price at which 
any importer could obtain the goods in question from 
the same supplier. 
During the discussion on this aspect of customs value, 
it became clear that the adoption of a definition of that 
value based on the above-described notional concept 
would not imply rejecting the validity of the price 
declared by the importer in the commercial or consular 
invoice. On the contrary, that price should in fact be 
given much weight as a point of departure, but it should 
be checked to determine whether or not it corresponds 
to what may be regarded as the normal market price of 
such goods. In determining this normal price, there 
must again be standards or rules derived from a given 
definition. It was pointed out that, in practice, no 
customs administration accepts the price declared by 
the importer without question; it is in fact subject to 
analysis on the lines described. But this does not change 
the fact in most cases that price coincides with that at 
which the goods " would b e " sold according to the 
notional concept referred to, and which is consequently 
acceptable. 
36. With regard to the elements represented by 
quantity and by the level at which the transaction is 
negotiated, and their influence on the sales price of the 
goods, the Working Group reached the conclusion that 
these should be taken into account in the determination 
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of customs value. It is, in fact, a current and accepted 
trade practice for the price at which merchandise can 
be obtained (that is, the discounts normally made on 
the basis price) to be related to the quantity sold and 
still more closely to the level at which the sale is effected, 
— between manufacturer and wholesaler, between one 
wholesaler and another, between wholesaler and re-
tailer, etc. 
37. On concluding its study of the elements which 
must be taken into account in the determination of 
customs value, the Working Group considered that they 
were satisfactorily embodied in the definition of customs 
value drawn up by the Customs Co-operation Council 
and commonly known as the " Brussels Definition 
In article I of this definition, it is established that for the 
purposes of the application of ad valorem customs duties, 
the value of goods to be imported for consumption is 
their " normal price ", that is, the price that would be 
fixed for the said goods, at the time when the customs 
duty became payable, under a contract of sale con-
cluded in the open market between buyer and seller 
independent of each other. In its other articles the 
Definition specifies the place of delivery of the goods 
as an element in the concept of their " normal price " 
(port or place of introduction of the merchandise into 
the country of importation, which implies adoption of 
the c.i.f. value of the goods), the prerequisites for the 
existence of open market conditions, and the manner 
of determining the price of the goods to be valued when 
they are manufactured in accordance with any patented 
invention or are imported under a foreign trade mark. 
38. After detailed study of each article of the Defini-
tion and its Explanatory Notes, the Working Group, 
by virtue of its resolution 2 (I) decided to recommend 
that the aforesaid " Brussels Definition " be adopted, 
since it fulfilled the theoretical and practical requisites 
considered desirable, with the reservation that the time 
element should be susceptible of interpretation with 
tolerance or latitude, in the sense that it might be taken 
to refer to the time of exportation of the goods. 
39. The Brussels Definition of customs value having 
been adopted, the Working Group went on to consider 
the practical aspects of its application and the mechanism 
or procedure which might be recommended for the 
determination of the normal import values or prices of 
the various goods by each individual country, as well as 
the question of the agency or agencies to be responsible 
for this work and the means of verifying values that 
could be placed at the disposal of customs officials. In 
this connexion, it was felt to be desirable that each 
country should establish, either within or in close associa-
tion with the national customs administration con-
cerned, a central valuation office responsible for the 
compilation and analysis of data and information which 
would be of use to customs officials for the correct 
valuation of imported goods, whether by providing 
them with price lists and other background data, or 
through any other procedure which might be deemed 
satisfactory. Hence a recommendation to this effect 
was incorporated in resolution 2 (I), with the additional 
suggestion that such offices should make arrangements to 
interchange information and data likely to be reciprocally 
helpful to them in the efficacious discharge of their 
functions, and that they should adopt, so far as possible, 
standard methods or procedures for the collection and 
analysis of such material. 
40. It was likewise decided in the same resolution to 
suggest to the ECLA secretariat that it should assist 
those Latin American Governments which so requested 
with technical advice on measures conducive to the 
implementation of the recommendations formulated, 
with the collaboration, when it deemed this necessary, 
of the Customs Co-operation Council, independently 
of any additional contacts which each individual country 
might establish directly with the Council. 
41. The delegations of countries already possessing 
agencies of the kind recommended in paragraph 39 
described their organization and mode of operation. 
The Working Group also took cognizance of information 
on certain particular problems relating to valuation 
practices, such as the determination of customs value for 
imports of goods whose production has been discontinued 
or of production surpluses, or in the case of countries 
where State trading prevails. In this same connexion, 
note was taken of the suggestions contained in the last 
part of the ECLA secretariat document E/CN.12/C.1/ 
WG.3/2/Add.l. 
3. Definition of basic customs terms 
42. In the course of the general discussion of basic 
customs terms for which the background document was 
another paper prepared by the ECLA secretariat (E/CN. 
12/C. l/WG.3/2/Add.2), the Working Group agreed that 
in working out the various definitions a co-ordinating 
principle ought to be followed, so as to ensure that they 
were complementary and properly correlated. It was 
also deemed necessary to define the concepts " foreign 
goods ", " domestically-produced goods " and " nationa-
lized goods ", since they were constituent elements in 
all definitions relating to customs operations. 
The term " goods " was defined as in Explanatory 
Note (ii) on the concept of " importation the aim 
being to establish the exact scope of the term for customs 
purposes, by interpreting it to include all goods passing 
through customs instead of only those actually traded. 
43. After examining each of the definitions proposed 
in the document referred to, the Working Group pro-
ceeded to adopt them in the form in which they are set 
forth in resolution 3 (I), deeming it necessary to sup-
plement some of them with explanatory notes that would 
ensure a more precise elucidation of the concepts con-
cerned. 
44. In the course of the discussion, the following obser-
vations were formulated in connexion with certain 
customs operations: 
(a) Temporary admission. Some delegations stated that 
under the head of operations of this type the entry of 
foreign goods for processing or manufacture was per-
mitted under bond or on payment of duties reimbursable 
when the goods left the country. 
C. OTHER ASPECTS OF MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 131 
It was determined that such operations should not 
be classified under the concept of " temporary admis-
sion as some of them would fit more appropriately 
into the drawback system, which might be studied at 
a later stage. The existence of a clear differentiation 
between the two systems was established, since the very 
term " temporary admission " implies a time limit, 
whereas under the drawback system the period during 
which the goods remain in the country may be in-
definitely prolonged. In the former case the underlying 
reason for the suspension of import duties is the fact 
that the goods are not to be nationalized, while in the 
latter duties are payable because the goods are 
nationalized, even though they may leave the country 
at a later date. 
In view of these considerations it was decided to add 
note (ii) to the definition of " temporary admission 
(b) Re-exportation. The Working Group reached the 
conclusion that the scope attributed to this operation 
in article 50 of the Montevideo Treaty was not consistent 
with the correlation existing between the customs concepts 
of " importation " and " exportation since the first 
of these designates the legal entry, upon payment of duty, 
of goods intended for final use or consumption within 
a country, which thus become " nationalized Con-
sequently, the redispatch abroad of nationalized goods 
would be defined as " exportation 
Attention was also called to the fact that the concept 
of " re-exportation " adopted in article 50 of the Monte-
video Treaty is not of a technical character, and makes 
determination of the nature of the operation conditional 
upon the industrial processing of the goods. 
(c) Domestically-produced goods. The Working Group 
pointed out that the definition of this term formulated 
in resolution 3 (I), paragraph (g) related to customs 
operations, and could not be applied to a given product 
for purposes of determining its origin. 
(d) Border trade. It was not considered expedient to 
define this aspect of trade, since, given its manifold 
facets, no definition would satisfy the individual interests 
of the different countries. In this connexion, too, it 
would be necessary, in order to facilitate negotiations 
between Latin American countries and especially among 
the members of the Latin American Free-Trade Associa-
tion, to ascertain the provisions and principles govern-
ing such trade in each of the countries of the region. 
To this end, the ECLA secretariat might compile the 
said provisions and principles for the information of 
interested countries. 
4. Customs procedures 
45. After considering the ECLA secretariat document 
E/CN. 12/C. 1 /WG.3/2/Add.3 and hearing what the various 
delegations had to say on the formalities and documents 
in use in their respective countries, the Working Group 
recognized that these customs documents and formalities 
varied' to some extent, as did also the number of docu-
ments that had to be submitted to customs, both for 
imports and for exports. It was also noted that the 
customs formalities and documents relating to importa-
tion in the different countries had a common basis which 
would facilitate standardization and simplification. 
46. The delegations agreed that the possibility of 
simplifying shipping formalities and documents, many 
aspects of which bore a close relation to customs pro-
cedures, should be considered in conjunction with the 
simplification of these latter. 
47. Since multilateral treaties conducive to the liberali-
zation of trade had already been concerted by Latin 
American countries, the Working Group felt that the 
studies which would be carried out for the purposes of 
simplifying customs formalities might afford a useful 
opportunity of devoting special attention to ways and 
means of establishing a simple and speedy procedure 
for the entry of goods to which liberalization measures 
were applied under such treaties. 
48. In the same context, it was pointed out that in 
the view of the Customs Co-operation Council, which 
is carrying out comparative studies on the customs pro-
cedures observed in its member countries,4 the improve-
ment of any set of customs regulations could not be 
seriously contemplated without knowledge of its ob-
jectives, the texts by virtue of which it was applied and 
its practical implications. This suggested that a great 
deal of time-consuming work would have to be under-
taken before acceptable conclusions could be reached 
in respect of the standardization and simplification of 
formalities. 
49. The Group therefore considered that the work 
in question should be begun at the earliest possible date, 
to which end it decided, in resolution 4 (I), to recom-
mend to the ECLA secretariat that in its current studies 
on customs questions it should give priority to the 
aspect of co-ordinating and simplifying customs and 
shipping procedures and documents, and should seek 
in that connexion, if necessary, the assistance of the 
Customs Co-operation Council and other international 
bodies. 
5. Origin of goods: preliminary consideration from 
the customs standpoint 
50. The Working Group was in agreement with the 
statement in the ECLA secretariat document E/CN. 12/ 
C.l/WG.3/2/Add.3, to the effect that the problem of 
the origin of goods within a free-trade area could be 
considered at the current session only from the admini-
strative point of view. It therefore confined itself to 
placing on record that, in the opinion of the delegations 
present, the action of customs authorities with respect 
to the origin of goods should relate mainly to admini-
strative aspects. Resolution 5 (I) embodies a declaration 
to that effect, and also suggests to the ECLA secretariat 
that, in consultation with the Latin American Free-
Trade Association, it should prepare draft regulations 
and procedures relating to the certification of origin 
with a view to facilitating the administrative customs 
work referred to above. 
4 See Information document No. 1, El Consejo de Cooperación 
Aduanera: su origen, estructura y actividades, distributed at the 
present session, for a full account of the constitution of the said 
Council and the studies it has completed or is carrying out. 
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6. Training of customs officials 
51. The Working Group also discussed the question 
of the training of customs officials, calling attention to 
the increasingly responsible nature of their work as a 
result of the important bearing that customs tariffs now 
have on economic policy and industrialization in the 
Latin American countries. Since, with few exceptions, 
these countries have at present no special training schools 
of the type indicated, the Working Group decided, in 
resolution 6(1), to recommend the establishment of 
such schools and to suggest to the ECLA secretariat 
that, in co-operation with the United Nations Technical 
Assistance Board and other international bodies, it 
should provide countries, on request, with any advisory 
services that might be required for the fulfilment of the 
recommendation aforesaid. 
7. Meaning of the term " duties and charges " for the 
purposes of article 3 of the Montevideo Treaty, and 
its expression or equivalence in terms of ad valorem 
customs duties 
52. The Working Group broke down this item on 
the Agenda into the following three sections: 
(a) Bases for the identification of " import duties and 
charges" „ 
(b) Expression of import duties and charges in terms 
of ad valorem customs duties 
(c) Import duties, charges and other restrictions exist-
ing in the various countries 
Discussion was based on the background document 
entitled Identificación de los conceptos que deben ser 
considerados como " gravámenes" a los efectos del 
artículo 3 del Tratado de Montevideo, y su expresión 
equivalente en términos de derechos aduaneros ad valorem 
(E/CN.12/C.l/WG.3/3/Rev.l), prepared by the ECLA 
secretariat. 
(a) Bases for the identification of " import duties and 
charges " 
53. The phrase " customs duties and any other charges 
of equivalent effect" (Montevideo Treaty, article 3) was 
considered to comprise all duties, charges or taxes 
payable on or in relation to imports, provided that they 
do not represent payment of the approximate cost of 
services rendered. Monetary or exchange restrictions 
which directly affect the cost of imports will also be 
regarded as charges of equivalent effect. 
54. Accordingly, in addition to customs duties proper, 
the following will be considered to constitute import 
duties and charges: 
(i) Supplementary import duties; 
(ii) Taxes on transfers of funds abroad in payment for 
imports; 
(iii) Consular dues or fees, when they do not correspond 
to the cost of the service rendered; 
(iv) Other import duties or taxes collected in return 
for services rendered, but appreciably in excess of 
their approximate cost; 
(v) Taxes classified as internal, but applicable only 
to imported, not to domestically-produced goods 
(with the exception of the régime contemplated in 
chapter V of the Treaty), or heavier for the former 
than for similar domestically-produced articles (in 
this case it is the amount of the difference that 
will be regarded as an import duty); 
(vi) Exchange surcharges; 
(vii) Exchange allocation systems, when their effect is 
to raise the cost of foreign exchange for the financ-
ing of certain imports; 
(viii) Cost of financing prior deposits or payments in 
advance; 
(ix) Other duties, charges or restrictions representing 
direct or indirect protection for domestically-
produced goods or import taxation imposed for 
fiscal or exchange reasons, if their effect is to raise 
the cost of imported merchandise. 
55. In connexion with consular dues or fees, divergent 
opinions were expressed. Thus, while one delegation 
was in favour of abolishing them in their entirety, includ-
ing consular formalities proper (consular invoices, visas 
for commercial invoices, etc.), in the view of another 
only that proportion of the total which was in excess 
of the cost of the service rendered should be eliminated, 
although the possibility of agreeing on their complete 
abolition for intra-Area trade should not be dismissed. 
A third delegation stressed that consular action benefited 
the importer, since it accredited the authenticity of the 
documents presented and strengthened the likelihood 
that the declaration of value was correct. 
56. The Working Group analysed, among other 
import restrictions, those mentioned in the secretariat 
document, which would have to include certificates of 
essentiality and, where appropriate, health certificates. 
It was pointed out that prior deposits, as well as the 
application of a quota system to the foreign exchange 
supply, also acted as indirect quantitative restrictions. 
(b) Expression of import duties and charges in terms of 
ad valorem customs duties 
57. Broadly speaking, the Working Group was in 
agreement with the views propounded in the relevant 
section of document E/CN.12/C.l/WG.3/3/Rev.l. Never-
theless, it made the reservation that the bases and ele-
ments used for calculation purposes in each country 
ought to give a clear idea of the real incidence of duties 
and charges, estimated on the basis of a standard concept 
of value. At all events, it would be necessary to ascertain 
the exact extent to which the method of calculation 
applied, in each individual country, involved a difference 
or divergence from the calculation based on the standard 
concept of value adopted by the Latin American Free-
Trade Association. 
58. In this connexion it would be worth while to 
devote special attention to the divergences resulting 
from the adoption of the f.o.b. or c.i.f. value; the question 
of whether supplementary charges were or were not 
included in that value, the exchange rate used for con-
version of the value expressed in terms of foreign ex-
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change to national currency, and the situations arising 
from the adoption of official customs or base values 
(aforos) differing widely from the real value of the 
merchandise. Only thus could the real incidence of the 
import duties and charges in force in each country be 
accurately defined. 
(c) Duties, charges and other restrictions existing in the 
various countries 
59. In the course of reviewing the duties and charges 
of every type existing in each of the member countries, 
the individual delegations gave detailed accounts of the 
duties and charges and the mechanisms for their applica-
tion in force in their respective countries. To supplement 
these oral explanations, the delegations furnished the 
information in writing reproduced in annex I I 5 to the 
present report. In the opinion of the Working Group, 
such information might be of special interest in so far 
as it permitted countries to acquaint themselves with 
the principal characteristics of one another's import 
régimes. 
8. Concept of " duties and charges in force " 
60. The Working Group considered that the observa-
tions in the ECLA secretariat document E/CN.12/C.1/ 
WG.3/3/Add.l/Rev.l referring to the definition of the 
concept of " duties and charges in force " for the purposes 
of article 5 of the Montevideo Treaty would afford 
very useful guidance in future negotiations, since they 
formulated the criteria that might be adopted in estab-
lishing the bases for a definition of the said concept, 
both in respect of third countries (as a basis for the 
calculation of weighted averages) and in the initial rela-
tions between the signatories of the Treaty. 
9. Other business 
61. The delegations described each country's situation 
with regard to international treaties including a most-
favoured-nation clause, treaties comprising tariff con-
cessions or consolidations, special circumstances in 
respect of exemption or reduction of duties, etc. This 
information is included in annex II to the present report. 
62. Since both this and the preceding item on the 
Agenda related to matters more closely allied to economic, 
trade and tariff policy than to specific problems of customs 
technique or theory, it was not considered incumbent 
upon the Working Group to formulate definite resolutions 
or recommendations on the topics concerned. The re-
sponsibility of the Group was limited to providing the 
opportunity for a comprehensive exchange of views and 
information, which would be of positive use in placing 
at each delegation's disposal the background data it 
would need during the negotiations contemplated in the 
Montevideo Treaty. 
II. RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED 
63. During the first session of the Working Group 
on Customs Questions, the following resolutions were 
adopted: 
5 Available in Spanish only. 
1 (I). Standard customs nomenclature 
2 (I). Definition and verification of customs value 
3 (I). Definitions of basic customs terms 
4(1). Customs procedures 
5 (I). Administrative control of the origin of goods 
6 (I). Training of customs officials 
64. The text of the resolutions is given below. 
Resolution 1 (I) 
STANDARD CUSTOMS NOMENCLATURE 
The Working Group on Customs Questions, 
Bearing in mind resolution 7 (II) of the ECLA Trade 
Committee, as well as the document prepared by the 
ECLA secretariat in compliance with the said resolution 
(E/CN. 12/C. 1 /WG/3/2), of which it takes note with 
satisfaction, 
Considering that it would be desirable for the Latin 
American countries to adopt an up-to-date standard 
tariff nomenclature which would facilitate customs 
operations and tariff negotiations, 
Believing that the adoption of such a standard tariff 
nomenclature is at the same time a factor of importance 
for the smooth working of multilateral treaties aiming 
at the liberalization of trade, such as those already con-
cluded in Latin America, 
Whereas the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature offers un-
deniable technical and practical advantages, having 
already been adopted by more than sixty countries, 
Decides : 
1. To recommend the adoption of the Brussels Tariff 
Nomenclature by the Latin American countries in then-
national customs tariffs; 
2. To recommend likewise that, in order to ensure 
the desired uniformity, while each country is left free to 
establish under every heading listed in the aforementioned 
Nomenclature such subdivisions as it may deem expedient, 
the adoption of the Nomenclature be affected (a) without 
omission of any of its headings, addition of any new 
headings or alteration of the numbering of the headings, 
and (b) without the introduction of any change in the 
general rules for its interpretation or in the notes to 
chapters or sections which might modify their content 
or the content of the headings ; 
3. To recommend further, with the same end in view, 
that national customs tariffs based on the Brussels 
Tariff Nomenclature be drawn up and applied in con-
formity with the Explanatory Notes approved by the 
Customs Co-operation Council, while countries are left 
free to supplement the said notes with any they may 
deem necessary to define such subdivisions as they may 
establish; 
4. To suggest to the ECLA secretariat that it provide 
technical advice to the Latin American Governments 
on the occasion of their adoption of the Brussels Nomen-
clature in their national customs tariffs, and that in this 
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connexion it seek the co-operation of the United Nations 
Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations and of the 
Customs Co-operation Council; 
5. To suggest to the ECLA secretariat, in addition, 
that it report in due course to those Latin American 
countries which have adopted the Brussels Nomenclature, 
so that they may keep it up to date, any changes intro-
duced into the said Nomenclature as a result of recom-
mendations made by the Customs Co-operation Council, 
and all such rules and regulations as may be adopted by 
the said Council to facilitate its uniform interpretation, 
independently of any direct information which countries 
acceding to the Council may receive; 
6. To call the attention of the Provisional Committee 
of the Latin American Free-Trade Association to the 
desirability of considering the use of the Brussels 
Nomenclature as a point of reference for the purposes 
mentioned in article 49 (c) of the Montevideo Treaty. 
12 August 1960 
Resolution 2 (I) 
DEFINITION AND VERIFICATION OF CUSTOMS VALUE 
The Working Group on Customs Questions, 
Bearing in mind the document entitled " Valor Adua-
nero" (E/CN.12/C.l/WG/3/2/Add.l) prepared by the 
secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America with the collaboration of the Brussels Customs 
Co-operation Council, of which it takes note with 
satisfaction, 
Considering that the application of ad valorem customs 
duties requires an equitable system for the valuation of 
imported goods, based on a definition of customs value 
which is consistent with internationally-recognized 
theoretical principles and which at the same time affords 
practical bases for the solution of the various problems 
arising in connexion with the valuation in question, 
Considering that it is necessary, especially among 
countries which are parties to agreements aiming at the 
establishment of customs unions, free-trade areas, or 
economic associations of any other type, for such a 
definition of customs value to be uniformly adopted, in 
order to prevent differences in systems of valuation 
from affecting the real incidence of ad valorem duties 
and charges, 
Whereas the definition of customs value, with the 
relevant interpretative notes, contained in the Annex to 
the Agreement signed at Brussels on 15 December 1950, 
fulfils the above-mentioned requisites — as is clear from 
the analysis to which it was subjected in the course of 
discussion and from the experience of the countries 
which have applied it — and is also in line with the 
principles set forth in article VII of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
Decides: 
1. To recommend that the Latin American countries 
adopt, for the valuation of imported goods, the Customs 
Co-operation Council's definition of customs value, 
together with the interpretative notes accompanying the 
said definition; 
2. To point out that the tolerance recommended by 
the Valuation Committee of the Customs Co-operation 
Council in its Explanatory Notes, and implicitly accepted 
in Interpretative Note No. 5 to article I of the definition 
allows countries desirous of so doing to adopt as the 
time element the date of exportation of the goods; 
3. To recommend likewise that those Latin American 
countries which have not yet done so establish, either 
within or in close association with the national customs 
administration concerned, a central valuation office, 
responsible for the compilation and analysis of data and 
information which will be of use to customs officials 
for the correct valuation of imported goods, whether by 
providing them with price lists and other background 
data, or through any other procedure which may be 
deemed satisfactory; 
4. To recommend also that such offices make arrange-
ments to interchange information and data likely to be 
reciprocally helpful to them in the efficacious discharge 
of their functions, and that they adopt, so far as possible, 
standard methods or procedures for the collection and 
analysis of such material; 
5. To suggest to the secretariat of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America that it assist those Latin 
American Governments which so request with technical 
advice on measures conducive to the implementation of 
these recommendations and to the maintenance of the 
desired uniformity, and that in this connexion it solicit, 
when it deems this necessary, the collaboration of the 
Customs Co-operation Council independently of any 
additional explanations, suggestions and advice for which 
countries may apply to the Council. 
12 August 1960 
Resolution 3 (I) 
DEFINITIONS OF BASIC CUSTOMS TERMS 
The Working Group on Customs Questions, 
Bearing in mind resolution 7 (II) of the Trade Com-
mittee of the Economic Commission for Latin America 
as well as the document prepared by the secretariat of 
the Commission and entitled " Definición de términos 
aduaneros básicos" (E/CN.12/C.l/WG.3/2/Add.2), of 
which it takes note with satisfaction, 
Considering that it is highly desirable for the Latin 
American countries to adopt standard definitions for 
certain basic customs operations and terms, especially 
in order to facilitate the interpretation and application 
of multilateral treaties aiming at the liberalization of 
trade, 
Decides: 
1. To recommend that the Latin American countries 
should adopt the following customs definitions: 
(a) Importation: the entry, after due compliance with the 
legal formalities, of foreign goods intended for final 
use or consumption within the country; 
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Notes: 
(i) The phrase " after due compliance with the legal 
formalities " implies that all provisions of a legisla-
tive, regulatory or any other nature in force in the 
importer country with respect to the entry of 
foreign goods have been duly complied with; 
(ii) The term " goods " covers all products, articles, 
manufactures, livestock and other movable tangible 
goods without any exception whatsoever; 
(iii) The term " final " implies that the goods are ad-
mitted into the importer country without any 
stipulation to the effect that they are for re-export, 
in transit or to remain only temporarily in the 
country; 
(b) Temporary admission: the duty-free entry, after due 
compliance with the legal formalities, or specific foreign 
goods which are to remain in the country for a limited 
time, on the condition that they are redispatched abroad: 
Notes : 
(i) The phrase " after due compliance with the legal 
formalities " covers the fulfilment of requirements 
relating to permits, bonds and other formalities in 
force in the importer country; 
(ii) Goods entering a country for processing or manu-
facture are not included in the foregoing definition 
and shall be governed by the individual provisions 
laid down in each country's legislation; 
(c) Foreign goods : goods brought into the country, from 
abroad and not nationalized, even if they were domesti-
cally produced or manufactured; 
Optional supplementary clauses: 
(i) Unless they are shown on reliable evidence to be 
of domestic origin; 
(ii) Or if they were imported on a condition which is 
no longer being fulfilled; 
(d) Nationalized goods: goods brought in from abroad 
which have been imported for final use or consumption 
after due compliance with all the legal formalities ; 
(e) Exportation: the dispatch abroad, after due com-
pliance with the legal formalities, of domestically-pro-
duced or nationalized goods intended for final use or 
consumption abroad; 
Note: 
This definition does not cover the régimes for the 
provisioning of aircraft and vessels, which shall be 
governed by the special regulations in force in each 
country; 
(f) Temporary exportation: the dispatch abroad duty-
free, after due compliance with the legal formalities, of 
specific domestically-produced or nationalized goods 
which are to remain out of the country for a limited time, 
on the condition that they are returned to the country; 
Note: 
The phrase " after due compliance with the legal 
formalities " covers the fulfilment of requirements relat-
ing to permits, bonds, and other formalities in force 
in the exporter country; 
(g) Domestically-produced goods: goods produced or 
manufactured in the country with domestic or natio-
nalized materials; 
(h) Re-exportation : the redispatch, after due compliance 
with the legal formalities, of foreign goods brought to 
the country but not nationalized; 
Note: 
The foregoing definition is based on a technical customs 
criterion and does not relate to the sense in which the 
term is used in the Montevideo Treaty (article 50); 
(i) International transit: the passage through a country, 
after due compliance with the legal formalities, of 
foreign goods intended for a third country; 
Note: 
The foregoing definition does not affect the provisions 
in force in each country with respect to transit of 
domestically-produced or nationalized goods which, in 
order to be transferred from one part of the national 
territory to another, have to pass through foreign 
territory; 
2. To recommend the continuance of the work pro-
grammes on customs questions and the preparation of 
projects and studies relating to other customs definitions, 
operations and régimes not included in paragraph 1 of 
the operative part of the present resolution, such as 
drawback, special temporary admission régimes, free 
ports, private warehouses, régimes relating to containers, 
samples and so forth, with due regard to the studies of 
a similar nature carried out in other countries or by 
other international organizations; 
3. To suggest that consideration be given to the 
advantages which the Latin American countries would 
derive from participation in the international conven-
tions dealing with such matters. 
12 August 1960 
Resolution 4 (I) 
CUSTOMS PROCEDURES 
The Working Group on Customs Questions, 
Bearing in mind resolution 7 (II) of the Trade Com-
mittee of the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the ECLA secretariat report on customs procedures 
(E/CN. 12/C.l /WG. 3/2/Add. 3), first part, of which it 
takes note with satisfaction, 
Considering that the existing multiplicity of customs 
procedures and documents in the different countries of 
Latin America gives rise to manifest difficulties which 
hamper the development and reduce the tempo of 
trade in general, 
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Considering that standardization and simplification of 
the customs formalities analysed and of the relevant 
documents would contribute to the smooth working of 
the multilateral treaties already concluded among Latin 
American countries, 
Considering that an overall study of the problem might 
appropriately include examination of the question of 
related shipping formalities and documents, 
Decides: 
1. To recommend to the secretariat of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America that, in the current 
studies on customs questions, priority should be given 
to the aspect of co-ordinating and simplifying customs 
procedures and documents as well as shipping formalities 
and documents; 
2. To suggest that, with a view to achieving this aim, 
the Latin American countries accede to existing agree-
ments; 
3. To suggest that, if necessary, the assistance of the 
Customs Co-operation Council and other international 
bodies should be sought; 
4. To indicate the desirability of convening a second 
meeting of the Working Group on Customs Questions 
when sufficient progress has been made with the above-
mentioned studies to justify such action. 
12 August I960 
Resolution 5 (I) 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF THE ORIGIN OF GOODS 
The Working Group on Customs Questions, 
Bearing in mind resolution 7 (II) of the Trade Com-
mittee of the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the ECLA secretariat report on the origin of goods 
a preliminary study from the customs standpoint 
(E/CN. 12/C. 1 /WG.3/2/Add.3, second part), of which it 
takes note with satisfaction, 
Considering that the activities of the Working Group, 
with the information at present available to it, are con-
fined to a study of existing customs practices in the 
countries it represents, 
Considering that the determination of the origin of 
goods is outside the purview of the Working Group, 
Considering that, within the aforementioned field of 
action, it was not possible to do more than consider the 
documents relating to origin and pertinent regulations, 
Decides: 
1. To place on record its view that the action of 
customs authorities with respect to the origin of goods 
should relate mainly to the administrative aspects; 
2. To suggest to the secretariat of the Economic Com-
mission for Latin America that, in consultation with 
the Latin American Free-Trade Association, it should 
prepare and submit to a second meeting of customs 
experts draft regulations and procedures relating to the 
certification of origin with a view to facilitating the 
administrative customs work referred to in sub-para-
graph 1; 
3. To suggest to the secretariat of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and to the Latin American 
Free-Trade Association that, in undertaking studies on 
the origin of goods, they should take into account 
existing studies on this subject by other countries and 
international bodies. 
12 August I960 
Resolution 6 (I) 
TRAINING OF CUSTOMS OFFICIALS 
The Working Group on Customs Questions, 
Bearing in mind the increasingly responsible nature of 
the work of customs officials as a result of the important 
bearing that customs tariffs now have on economic 
policy and industrialization in the Latin American 
countries, 
Considering that fully trained staff are necessary for 
the proper application of customs tariff regulations, 
Decides: 
1. To recommend the establishment of training schools 
for customs officials in Latin America; 
2. To suggest to the Montevideo Provisional Com-
mittee that it should include this subject in its considera-
tion of customs questions; 
3. To suggest to the secretariat of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America that, in co-operation 
with the United Nations Technical Assistance Board and 
other international bodies, it should provide countries 
on request with any advisory services that may be 
required for the fulfilment of the foregoing recom-
mendation. 
12 August 1960 
Annex I 
DEFINITIONS AND PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING CUSTOMS VALUE IN 
VARIOUS LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
A. Questionnaire submitted to delegations attending the first session 
of the Working Group on Customs Questions 
Annex II41 
RMPORT RÉGIMES IN FORCE IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES THAT ARE 
SIGNATORIES TO THE MONTEVIDEO TREATY 
(Argentina, Brazilt Chile9 Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay) 
Note: These two annexes are available in Spanish only (see 
Spanish edition of this publication). 
® Information provided by the delegations attending the first 
session of the Working Group on Customs Questions in addition 
to the information contained in document E/CN.12/C.1/WG.3/3/ 
Rev.l. It refers especially to customs duties, charges of similar 
effect and other import restrictions in force in the countries 
concerned. 
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m. THE TRADE POLICY OF THE GREATER-COLOMBIA COUNTRIES 
1. Consultations on trade policy: report of the third series 
of meetings between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela * 
(Quito, 7 to 10 December 1960) 
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT 
The work on the expansion of inter-Latin American 
trade and the establishment of the regional market that 
the secretariat, in various resolutions adopted by the 
Governments members of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America at the sessions of the Commission and its 
Trade Committee, has been requested to undertake, 
includes the study of possible solutions to sub-regional 
problems which constitute obstacles to the attainment 
of the objectives in view. 
To this end, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela agreed 
to hold two series of meetings of experts on trade policy, 
one at Bogotá (November 1958) and the other at Caracas 
(May 1959).1 
In furtherance of the programme of which these two 
series of consultations formed a part, and at the request 
of the above-mentioned Governments, a third was 
convened by the secretariat at Quito, Ecuador, in 
December 1960. This time the meetings were of an official 
character, since the competent authorities of the three 
countries considered that, in view of the work already 
carried out as well as of the new circumstances arising 
from the current movement towards multilateral economic 
co-operation in Latin America, the time had come to 
approach the topics concerned at the governmental level. 
A . PURPOSE OF THE MEETINGS, MEMBERSHIP 
AND ORGANIZATION OF WORK 
Purpose of the meetings 
1. In furtherance of the work programme under which 
the two previous series of similar consultative meetings 
had been held (at Bogotá in 1958 and at Caracas in 
1959), the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela requested the secretariat of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA) to convene a 
third series, with the primary object of considering 
along what lines these countries' trade policy might best 
be channelled in respect of their reciprocal economic 
and trade relations, with due regard to the new situations 
created by the active movement towards multilateral 
co-operation in which most of the Latin American 
countries were taking part. 
* Issued earlier in mimeographed form as documents E/CN.12/ 
C.l/17 (27 December 1960) and E/CN.12/555 (20 February 1961). 
1 See the summary records of these meetings in documents 
E/CN.12/C.1/11, pp. 15 to 41, and E/CN.12/C.l/ll/Add.2. 
Opening and closing meetings 
2. The third series of consultations was held in the 
Law Courts (Palacio Legislativo) at Quito, Ecuador, 
from 7 to 10 December 1960. At the opening meeting, 
which took place in the assembly hall of the Casa de 
Cultura, an address was delivered by Mr. José Ceballos 
Carrión, Minister of Economic Affairs of Ecuador. 
Mr. Misael Pastrana Borrero, Minister of Public Works 
of Colombia, spoke on behalf of the delegations present. 
A statement was made to the meeting by Mr. Esteban 
Ivovich, Chief of the ECLA Trade Policy Division. 
3. The closing meeting was held on 10 December 1960. 
The speakers on this occasion were Mr. Enrique Tejera 
Paris, representative of Venezuela, who voiced the 
delegations' gratitude for the hospitality extended to the 
third series of consultations by Ecuador, and Mr. Esteban 
Ivovich, Chief of the ECLA Trade Policy Division. 
4. At the closing meeting, the present report of the 
third series of consultations was adopted. 
Membership and attendance 
5. The meetings were attended by delegations repre-
senting the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela. The complete list of representatives appears 
in an annex to the present report. 
6. In virtue of the relevant applications submitted by 
their Governments, Mr. Ramón Meira Serantes and 
Mr. Adolfo Crespo Ramírez were present at the con-
sultations as observers for Argentina and Mexico, 
respectively. 
7. Mr. Pascual Montanero, representing the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (of the United Nations (FAO)), 
attended the meetings as an observer. 
Organization of work 
Election of officers 
8. At the third series of consultative meetings, the 
following officers were elected: 
Chairman: Mr. José Ceballos Carrión (Ecuador) ; 
Vice-Chairmen : Mr. Misael Pastrana Borrero (Colombia); 
Mr. José Luis Sálcedo Bastardo (Venezuela). 
9. The secretariat for these meetings was formed by 
Mr. Esteban Ivovich, Chief of the ECLA Trade Policy 
Division; Mr. Alejandro Power, member of the ECLA 
Trade Policy Division, who acted as Secretary-General; 
and Mr. Julio Prado Vallejo, an official of the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs of Ecuador, as Assistant Secretary-
General. 
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B . AGENDA 
10. At the first meeting, held on 7 December, the 
following agenda was adopted: 
I. General statements 
II. Recent trends in bilateral agreements between 
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela 
Documentation 
Recent trends in bilateral agreements between Colom-
bia, Ecuador and Venezuela (working paper) 
III. Characteristics and mechanism of a possible multi-
lateral treaty 
IV. Effects of possible participation in a multilateral 
instrument on the bilateral treaties in force between 
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela 
V. Guiding principles for future trade policy in relation 
to the Latin American movement towards multi-
lateral economic co-operation 
Documentation 
Suggested guiding principles for the participation of 
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela in the Latin 
American movement towards multilateral economic 
co-operation (working paper) 
Background documents: 
(a) Consultations on trade policy (Bogotá, 13-
18 November 1958) (E/CN.12/C.1/11), pp. 15 
et seq. 
(b) Consultations on trade policy (Caracas, 2-7 May 
1959) (E/CN.12/C.l/ll/Add.2) 
VI. Findings of the first session of the Working Group 
on Customs Questions with regard to the participa-
tion of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela in inter-
Latin American multilateral treaties 
Documentation : 
Informe de la primera reunión del grupo de trabajo 
para asuntos aduaneros (Montevideo 1-12 de agosto 
de 1960) que se eleva al Comité de Comercio de la 
CEPAL (E/CN.12/C.l/WG.3/4/Rev.l) 
C . ACCOUNT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Opening addresses and general statements 
11. At the opening meeting of this series of consulta-
tions, Mr. José Ceballos Carrión, Minister of Economic 
Affairs of Ecuador, welcomed the delegations, and was 
thanked on behalf of the delegations of Colombia and 
Venezuela by Mr. Misael Pastrana Borrero, Minister of 
Public Works of Colombia. In both addresses, emphasis 
was laid on the importance of the third series of meetings 
in view of the need to study potentially suitable methods 
of channelling the trade policy of the Greater-Colombia 
countries, both in their reciprocal relations and vis-a-vis 
the other Latin American republics, along co-operative 
lines conducive to the economic development of all, 
to the co-ordination of that development on equitable 
terms and to the expansion of Latin America's intra-
regional and extra-regional trade alike. In both addresses, 
too, appreciative reference was made to ECLA's col-
laboration in the technical elucidation of problems 
bearing on trade policy and on the acceleration of 
economic development in the Greater-Colombia coun-
tries, as well as to the preparation of the requisite studies 
for the third series of consultative meetings. 
12. Mr. Esteban Ivovich, Chief of the ECLA Trade 
Policy Division, after thanking the previous speakers for 
their praise of the secretariat's work, made a brief 
statement on the implementation of the resolutions 
adopted by the Governments members of the Commission 
in connexion with the formation of the common market, 
and on the relevant activities under way in respect of 
Central America and of the Free-Trade Association 
established by six South American countries, plus 
Mexico, under the Montevideo Treaty. 
13. The discussion opened with a general statement 
by each delegation. That of Ecuador stressed the need 
for an objective evaluation of the factors which might 
be of real use in the task of offsetting and overcoming 
the repercussions on levels of living in the Latin American 
countries produced by such circumstances as the now 
traditional deterioration of the terms of trade, and the 
difficulty of installing certain industries on account of 
the limited size of individual domestic markets. Another 
serious problem was that of agriculture's incapacity to 
provide employment for the increasing manpower supply 
deriving from the rapid growth of the population. 
14. From the foregoing standpoints, the intention 
underlying the Montevideo Treaty was laudable, especially 
if it resulted in the provision of efficacious incentives for 
the establishment of industries that would eventually be 
able to produce on competitive terms. It was only natural, 
however, that in view of the particular structure of its 
economy, and of such considerations as the close relation-
ship between its foreign trade and fiscal revenue, Ecuador, 
before adopting any definite attitude to the new circum-
stances affecting Latin American trade policy, should 
make a searching examination of the problems that 
would be created if it were to accede to a multilateral 
instrument of the Montevideo type. 
15. Given Ecuador's geographical proximity to the 
other two Greater-Colombia countries, its traditional 
links with them and certain problems and interests which 
they all shared, it should first be considered whether 
the best plan for the moment might not be to pursue 
a policy aiming at the formation of a common market 
among the three countries in question, with the idea 
of subsequently studying the possibility of their acces-
sion, en bloc, to the Montevideo Treaty. At all events, 
Ecuador would attach great importance to any light 
that might be shed on that point. 
16. The delegation of Colombia called attention to 
the differences between the atmosphere and circum-
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stances of the third series of consultations and of the 
two that had preceded it. A new and highly significant 
factor had now made its appearance, in the shape of the 
Montevideo Treaty — signed by seven countries, four 
of which had already ratified it — whose advent was 
bound to influence the trade policy of the whole of 
Latin America. At the two previous series of consultative 
meetings, the problems of trade and the prospects for 
its expansion as between Colombia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela had been discussed mainly from the angle 
of bilateral relations, but the desirability of perhaps 
reaching a tripartite agreement had also been borne 
in mind, at least with regard to certain aspects of the 
desired economic co-operation. The circumstances aris-
ing out of the Montevideo Treaty made it necessary 
to revise the criteria which had prevailed at the two 
series of meetings mentioned. If that revision — which 
would have to be undertaken during the Quito consulta-
tions — were to lead to the conclusion that it was advis-
able or essential to sign the Montevideo Treaty, a joint 
or co-ordinated approach on the part of Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela would unquestionably facilitate 
the solution of the problems presented by their acces-
sion to that instrument, whether the step were taken 
by all three countries simultaneously or by only one 
or two of them for the time being. 
17. To assuage the popular unrest deriving from its 
low per capita income levels, Colombia, like the other 
Latin American countries, was making every endeavour 
to improve its rate of development. Among the internal 
and external factors that constituted requisites for the 
attainment of such an end, it was impossible to overlook 
the expansion of the market on bases broad enough 
for import substitution to be extended to the manu-
facture of durable consumer and capital goods. This 
would be the sole way to achieve economic and 
specialized production, which was a goal impossible to 
attain when only small consumer markets were avail-
able. A free-trade area such as that instituted by the 
Montevideo Treaty afforded, in relation both to that 
and to other vital problems, glimpses of brighter 
prospects than could be opened up by bilateral agree-
ments or a possible tripartite pact among the Greater-
Colombia countries. 
18. The delegation of Venezuela, in its turn, expressed 
sincere interest in Latin American integration. Venezuela 
had traditionally been an advocate of Latin American 
unity in the political and economic spheres. In face 
of the tendency observable in the economies of the 
region and of the world to seek integration as a means 
towards the acceleration of development, it seemed 
difficult for a country to stand aloof from the movement 
and try to pursue in isolation, or on bilateral bases, a 
policy beneficial to its national interests. But despite 
Venezuela's conviction to that effect, its situation at 
the moment was such — owing to special circumstances 
of which everyone was aware — that it could not adopt 
decisions or take action with a view to acceding to associa-
tions like that constituted by the Montevideo Treaty, 
whose usefulness it considered obvious. Should one or 
more of the Greater-Colombia countries be in a posi-
tion to decide to sign that instrument forthwith, 
Venezuela would view such a step with satisfaction, since 
the possible future accession of the others would thereby 
be facilitated. 
Recent trends in bilateral agreements between Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela 
19. In the course of the discussion on recent trends 
in the concerting of bilateral agreements among the 
three countries, it was pointed out that practical results 
had so far been obtained only in the Colombo-
Ecuadorian sector, notwithstanding the full and compre-
hensive elucidation of the problems and possibilities 
existing in the case of Colombia and Venezuela and in 
that of Venezuela and Ecuador, for which the Bogotá 
and Caracas consultations on trade policy had afforded 
opportunities. Hence it had become necessary to deter-
mine whether the programme of work which was being 
developed at the consultative meetings should hold 
firmly by bilateralism or should veer in the direction 
of a broader multilateral formula, either tripartite or 
of more ambitious regional scope. 
20. In this context, the delegation of Colombia said 
that its country's efforts in the field of bilateral agree-
ments were well known, their aim having been to convert 
into a reality the solutions advocated at the two previous 
series of consultations. But the policy with which they 
had been in line would have to be adjusted to the new 
contingencies arising out of the Montevideo Treaty. Since 
the altered circumstances called for a change of attitude, 
in the future the necessary formulae would have to be 
sought within the multilateral framework, with due regard 
to the situations created by the existing bilateral instru-
ments and to the need to maintain or reach special 
agreements in connexion with particular problems origi-
nating in geographical proximity or other causes. 
21. In the opinion of the delegation of Venezuela, 
the bilateral system, while it had been useful when 
different conditions prevailed in the Latin American 
and world economies, had ceased to be so, in view of 
current trends in trade relations. Venezuela had not 
responded of late, nor did it intend to respond, to the 
overtures it had received from various European and 
Latin American countries with a view to the concert-
ing of bilateral pacts; for it considered that the multi-
lateral course was of greater benefit to all concerned. 
Its position in that respect was unequivocal, although 
it recognized that certain specific problems might in a 
few instances necessitate the conclusion of an occasional 
bilateral agreement. The signing of new bilateral trade 
treaties would make it more difficult for Venezuela to 
accede to multilateral agreements, which were in its 
opinion the best suited to the times. 
22. The conclusion emerging from the discussion of 
item II of the agenda was that, generally speaking, the 
three countries regarded multilateralism as the more 
advantageous course to follow in their economic co-
operation and trade relations, without repudiating such 
bilateral arrangements as might be essential for the 
solution of problems affecting only two of the countries, 
not all three. 
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Possible participation of Colombia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela in multilateral instruments 
23. In view of their interdependence, the topics 
covered by items III, IV and V of the agenda were taken 
together. 
24. One of the moot points raised was whether the 
desired multilateralism would prove more beneficial if 
it were confined to the three countries or if it were 
extended to a wider orbit like that resulting from the 
Montevideo Treaty. In the relevant statements it was 
recognized that the framework afforded by the territories 
of the seven signatories of the Montevideo Treaty would 
of course permit of complementarity and specialized pro-
duction in respect of a longer list of articles than could 
form the basis of trade within the narrower bounds of 
a tripartite agreement. The complexity of contemporary 
technological development and the increasing diver-
sification of the supplies needed by a rapidly growing 
population made it advisable for efforts to be directed, 
in so far as was feasible, towards the establishment of 
a multilateral market proper. 
25. It was felt that the meetings offered a favourable 
opportunity for consultations among the Governments 
of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, in order to de-
termine the policy that should be pursued if any or all 
of those countries were to decide to participate in Latin 
American economic integration agreements. Next, there-
fore, the delegations reviewed some of the principal 
characteristics of the Montevideo Treaty and of its 
mechanisms, as well as the nature of its provisions for 
special treatment to be accorded to contracting parties 
at a relatively less advanced stage of economic develop-
ment. They then analysed the repercussions on the bi-
lateral agreements in force between the Greater-Colombia 
countries that might result from a decision on the part 
of any or all of them to accede to the Montivedeo Treaty. 
26. In that connexion, and at the request of several 
members of the delegations, the representatives of the 
ECLA secretariat supplied various technical data bear-
ing on points 2 and 3 of the document entitled 
" Suggested guiding principles for the participation of 
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela in the Latin American 
movement towards multilateral economic co-operation 
Findings of the first session of the Working Group 
on Customs Questions 
27. The delegations took note with satisfaction of 
the ECLA document containing a summary record of 
the conclusions reached at the meetings of customs 
experts held at Montevideo, from 1 to 12 August 1960, 
with respect to the standardization or co-ordination of 
certain aspects of customs systems, in particular 
nomenclature, determination and checking of customs 
value and definition of basic customs terms. An account 
was also given of the existing programmes for carrying 
out the work in question. 
28. The delegations recognized the importance of 
such matters, and especially of the readjustments that 
would have to be made in the national systems concerned 
to enable each country to participate, if it so desired, 
in multilateral treaties. They therefore declared their 
intention of taking the necessary action to promote the 
study of the questions referred to, for which the 
competent government departments in their countries 
were responsible. 
Co-operation of ECLA 
29. In the course of discussion, the delegations 
expressed the wish that ECLA should extend its co-
operation with the Greater-Colombia countries to the 
following fields: 
(a) Preparation of projects to ensure complementarity 
among the three countries — taking into account both 
technical and trade policy considerations — in respect 
of the petrochemical and the steel and aluminium making 
industries; 
(b) Consultations and preliminary studies to pave the 
way for implementation of the agreement reached at 
the second series of consultations on trade policy (Caracas 
1959), with regard to co-ordination of the activities of 
the official economic programming organs of Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela. 
Alternative possibilities for multilateral action 
30. When all the items on the agenda had been dealt 
with, the delegation of Ecuador proposed that in order 
to define the points on which agreement had been 
reached, a precise reply should be given to the follow-
ing questions: 
(а) If the three Greater-Colombia countries were to 
decide in favour of multilateralism, would they aim at 
forming a tripartite association ? 
(б) Would such a step constitute the first phase in 
a programme of action designed to culminate in the 
accession of the Greater-Colombia countries, en bloc9 
to the Montevideo Treaty ? 
(c) Would the current third series of consultations 
leave Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela in a position 
to decide individually as to their possible immediate 
accession to the Montevideo Treaty ? 
(d) Would any member or members of the Greater-
Colombia group that acceded to the Montevideo Treaty 
be able to maintain the existing bilateral treaties with 
other members ? If so, on what bases ? 
31. The delegation of Colombia suggested the desir-
ability of studying in addition one or two alternative 
possibilities for the action to be taken, in connexion 
with the fact that public opinion in that country was 
in favour of its early accession to the Montevideo Treaty, 
if possible prior to the conducting of the first tariff 
negotiations and to the definition of certain basic cri-
teria which would have to be established by the organs 
of the Treaty in question. The alternative formulae 
suggested for the ingress of Colombia and Ecuador to 
the Latin American Free-Trade Association could be 
summed up as follows*. 
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A. In the event of simultaneous accession : 
(a) The concessions granted in the bilateral treaty 
in the form in which it was in force at the date of deposit 
of the instruments of accession would be extended to the 
other members of the Association; or 
(b) The tariff treatments instituted by the bilateral 
treaty would be renegotiated within the Association, 
with the exception of those which exclusively benefited 
Ecuador in respect of its exports to Colombia, and which 
could therefore be recognized by the Association under 
the terms of chapter VIII of the Montevideo Treaty. 
Border trade régimes would also be excluded; or 
(ic) Before Colombia and Ecuador joined the Associa-
tion, those aspects of their bilateral treaty which related 
to tariff treatment would be denounced. 
B. In the event of a separate decision: 
(a) The first country to join the Association would 
extend to the other members the tariff concessions granted 
in the Colombo-Ecuadorian bilateral treaty, in so far 
as they affected the imports of the country concerned; 
or 
(b) Prior to accession by unilateral or joint decision, 
those clauses of the Colombo-Ecuadorian bilateral 
treaty which dealt with tariff concessions would be 
denounced. 
32. Before discussion of the foregoing alternatives 
began, the delegation of Venezuela reaffirmed its Govern-
ment's interest in the Montevideo Treaty, which it 
regarded as an initial step towards the desired formation 
of the Latin American common market. Venezuela , did 
not consider its participation unlikely if, when the time 
came, the organs of the Latin American Free Trade 
Association duly took into account certain special fea-
tures of the country's economic structure. The same 
delegation also stated that the Government of Venezuela 
set a high value on ECLA's co-operation in the necessary 
technical elucidation both of potential solutions for the 
problems relating to Venezuela's possible accession to 
the Montevideo Treaty, and of the advantages that 
might accrue therefrom; and in that connexion it re-
quested the secretariat's collaboration. 
FINAL DECLARATION 
33. As the outcome of the relevant discussions, at 
the closing meeting the three delegations formulated the 
following declaration on behalf of their respective 
Governments: 
The delegations attending the third series of consultations 
on trade policy between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, 
Having considered the circumstances that have arisen 
since the series of consultative meetings held at Bogotá 
and Caracas, and in particular the fact that several 
countries have signed and ratified the Treaty concluded 
at Montevideo on 18 February 1960, whereby a Free 
10 
Trade Area is established and the Latin American Free-
Trade Association is instituted, 
Bearing in mind that because of their geographical 
contiguity and because they form part of a single eco-
nomic area, it is incumbent upon them to aim at the 
closest possible reciprocal co-operation, without being 
deterred thereby from collaborating in arrangements 
of wider regional scope, 
Considering that the expansion and liberalization of 
trade, in so far as it will provide broader markets for 
their increasing agricultural and industrial production, 
may constitute an important factor in the acceleration 
of the development of their respective economies, and, 
consequently, in the improvement of their peoples' levels 
of living, 
Declare: 
1. That the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela recognize the Montevideo Treaty as a suitable 
instrument for expediting the fuller and more balanced 
development of the Latin American economy; 
2. That the Governments of Colombia and Ecuador 
will take the necessary steps towards formally joining 
at the earliest possible date the Latin American Free-
Trade Association instituted by the Montevideo Treaty, 
The Government of Venezuela, while fully endorsing 
the opinions embodied in the foregoing consideranda, 
reserves for a future occasion any statement on its possible 
accession to the Latin American Free-Trade Association; 
3. That the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela will take immediate joint action to secure for 
Ecuador, within the above-mentioned Association, the 
special treatment for which the Montevideo Treaty 
makes provision in favour of contracting parties at a less 
advanced stage of economic development, since Ecuador 
considers this an essential condition of its accession to 
the Montevideo Treaty; 
4. That the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela, bearing in mind the special conditions pre-
vailing in the economy of the last-named country, will 
likewise take joint action with the object of securing 
special treatment for Venezuela, to offset the disadvan-
tages it would suffer if its accession to the Montevideo 
Treaty were affected without due regard to the peculiar 
features of its present economic structure; 
5. That the Governments of Colombia and Ecuador 
will study ways and means of adapting their bilateral 
agreements to the characteristics and mechanism of 
the Montevideo Treaty, in order to forestall any possible 
unfavourable repercussions on the economies of their 
respective countries which their accession to the said 
Treaty might produce; 
6. That the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela request the ECLA secretariat to study, in 
consultation with them, the problems relating to the 
participation of each of the three countries in the Monte-
video Treaty, and to put forward possible solutions for 
the same. 
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2. Recent trends in bilateral agreements between 
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela * 
1. The paper entitled " Suggested guiding principles 
for the participation of Colombia, Ecuador and Vene-
zuela in the Latin American movement towards multi-
lateral economic co-operation " includes brief references 
to the trade treaties in existence among the Greater-
Colombia countries. The present report enlarges upon 
these references in an endeavour to present a picture 
of the most important aspects and trends of contractual 
relations among the countries in question. 
I. BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND ECUADOR 
2. Since 1942, trade relations between Colombia and 
Ecuador have been governed by the treaty signed in 
that year and by supplementary instruments such as 
the 1949 payments agreement. The 1942 treaty establishes 
reciprocal freedom of trade and navigation and identical 
treatment for Colombian and Ecuadorian capital, as 
well as the application of the most-favoured-nation 
clause in respect of customs, navigation, exchange 
controls and import régimes. It also exempts a number 
of commodities from customs duties. However, certain 
import restrictions of a general nature adopted by 
Colombia from balance-of-payments motives, and others, 
relating to tariffs, instituted by Ecuador, have virtually 
annulled the effect of the customs exemptions. 
1. THE 1 9 5 9 TRADE AGREEMENT 
3. These circumstances, and others deriving from the 
need to regulate their intensive border trade, induced 
the two countries to conduct negotiations based on the 
principles laid down in the so-called Bogotá Declara-
tion of 1958 which culminated in August 1959 with the 
signing of three treaties — one relating to trade, one 
to payments and a third to economic co-operation — 
that have already been ratified by Ecuador, although not 
yet by Colombia. 
* Working paper prepared by the ECLA secretariat (for limited 
distribution only) for the third series of meetings on trade policy 
held between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. It was issued 
in mimeographed form as part of document E/CÑ.12/555. 
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4. The 1959 treaty establishes the unconditional and 
unlimited application of the most-favoured-nation clause, 
with a reservation in favour of the preferences accorded 
by Colombia or Ecuador to adjacent countries in order 
to facilitate border trade. 
The products of each party, on entering the other's 
territory, enjoy the same treatment as domestically-
produced goods. If import quotas are imposed, the coun-
try applying them shall accept from the other a volume 
of imports at least equal to its contribution to the 
supplies concerned in previous years. 
(a) Customs treatment for Ecuadorian products 
5. Under the terms of the 1959 treaty, substantial 
tariff concessions are granted in favour of goods pro-
duced by Ecuador. The products affected are mainly 
primary commodities, in particular those grown in the 
Sierra — such as wheat, rice, maize, dry pulses, barley, 
malt and fresh fruit — and sugar. The implementation 
of these provisions would be a way of regularizing a 
traffic which at the present time is in great measure 
clandestine. Ecuador's production of the above-men-
tioned articles for the Colombian market is apparently 
expected to expand appreciably, perhaps with the co-
operation of Colombian capital, when the new tariff 
régime is applied in their favour. 
The Treaty also refers to cacao from Ecuador. Colom-
bia has been absorbing a considerable volume of Ecua-
dor's exports of this commodity, which is an important 
one for the latter's balance of payments. Despite the 
fact that programmes for the development of cacao-
growing are under way in Colombia, the treaty establishes 
the right of free entry for the Ecuadorian product. 
6. It is of interest to note that the treaty institutes 
customs exemptions for Colombia's imports of certain 
chemical and laboratory products manufactured in 
Ecuador. 
7. Those Ecuadorian products which are the object 
of tariff concessions on Colombia's part can be freely 
imported into the latter country. Imports of wheat and 
barley are effected by the Colombian National Institute 
of Supplies (Instituto Nacional de Abastecimiento — 
INA), whose purchases are intended to bridge the gap 
between domestic production and demand. 
(b) Customs treatment for Colombian products 
8. Ecuador abolishes the duties on various Colom-
bian chemical and pharmaceutical products and grants 
reductions ranging from 10 to 70 per cent in respect 
of many manufactures. The tariff régime for Colombian 
textiles comprises a specific duty varying between 7 and 
17.60 sucres per kilogramme, plus a 10 per cent ad 
valorem duty. These rates seem to have been calculated 
with a view to the equalization of Ecuadorian and 
Colombian textile prices and the consequent discourage-
ment of contraband. It is common knowledge that in 
recent years the improvement of productivity in Colom-
bia's textile industry and the devaluation of the national 
currency have weighted the scales in favour of Colombia 
as regards the price difference between the two coun-
tries' textile products. Consequently, the Ecuadorian 
mills, although not working at full capacity, would seem 
to be accumulating an exceptionally large volume of 
stocks. It is hoped that the tariff régime applicable to 
textiles under the terms of the treaty will help to restore 
the situation to normal. Ecuador also accords Colombia 
customs reductions — and in some cases exemptions — 
in favour of such industrial products as plate glass and 
glass manufactures; aluminium and enamelware; elec-
trical materials; agricultural machinery, machinery for 
the building industry and machine-tools; and household 
electrical appliances (wireless receiving sets, electric 
razors, etc.). Similarly, a number of important con-
cessions — reductions and exemptions — are granted 
to the Colombian chemical and pharmaceutical industry. 
(c) Charges other than tariff duties 
9. The two countries reciprocally consolidated charges 
equivalent in effect to customs duties, for goods on which 
the latter were negotiated. Among the charges thus 
consolidated are the Ecuadorian consular fee of 9.5 per 
cent and the special 10 per cent rate applied by Colombia 
to cacao imports. 
(d) Exclusive character of customs treatment 
10. The treaty contains several clauses relating to 
the nature of the special customs treatment which the 
two countries accord each other. Article VII states that 
the benefits reciprocally granted, especially those con-
nected with the tariff régime, are conceded in virtue of 
their being adjacent States.1 It should be noted that in 
respect of the products covered by the special treatment 
neither of the two parties has specific commitments 
with third countries, except those of a generic character 
deriving from the most-favoured-nation clause. 
(e) Border trade 
11. The treaty defines "border trade" as that which 
supplies essential commodities for use and consumption 
in towns and villages on the frontier. The joint standing 
commission instituted by the treaty is to lay before the 
Governments draft proposals for a bilateral agreement 
which would serve as a basis for each country's internal 
regulations with respect to border trade. 
2. THE PAYMENTS AGREEMENT 
12. On the same date as the trade treaty, Colombia and 
Ecuador signed a payments agreement establishing the 
dollar of account for purposes of their transactions, 
quoted at the same rate as the free United States dollar 
for similar operations, and on the basis of a swing 
credit of up to half a million dollars. When the balance 
exceeds this limit, the creditor country may request the 
total or partial transfer of the excess to another clearing 
account in operation with a third Latin American 
country, or may reach an agreement with the debtor 
1 The economic co-operation agreement which Colombia and 
Ecuador signed in 1959 at the same time as the trade treaty defines 
the exclusive character of the treatment in question. 
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country for the payment of the excess in other exchange. 
If, within a period of six months, the excess is not cleared 
by one or other of the methods referred to, the creditor 
country may request total or partial payment in free 
United States dollars, by cable transfer. 
This payments agreement, which is in line with the 
more flexible principles of the Montevideo standard 
agreement,2 supersedes that of 1949, which in its turn 
was modified in 1951 with the aim of converting the 
system of import and export licences reimbursable in 
national currencies into one whereby the value of the 
operations concerned would be reimbursed in dollars. 
The 1949-51 agreement stipulated that balances on the 
account were to be liquidated every six months at the 
creditor's request and that their equivalent in dollars 
would be paid in that currency not later than 30 days 
from the date of liquidation. 
3. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
13. Together with the trade treaty and the payments 
agreement, an instrument relating to economic co-opera-
tion was signed, with the object of fostering the smooth 
co-ordination of the two countries' national economic 
development and trade policies. Among other measures 
to this end, the Governments of Colombia and Ecuador 
agreed to promote understandings between individual 
sectors, adopt provisions for the rapprochement of their 
respective markets within the general framework of 
Latin American integration, encourage the formation 
of private enterprises on a basis of public or private 
capital and sponsor the establishment of a system of 
consultations on the policy to be pursued at economic 
congresses or with regard to accession to multilateral 
pacts affecting both parties.3 
II. BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA 
1. THE FORMER MODUS VIVENDI 
14. At the present time no trade agreement exists 
between Colombia and Venezuela. From 1934 to 1948 
a frontier agreement, renewable annually, was in force. 
It did not include the most-favoured-nation clause, and 
established that Venezuelan salt imported through the 
customs houses of Cucuta and Arauca should enter 
Colombia duty-free. It also accorded tariff exemption to 
cattle — up to 25,000 head a year — exported from 
Venezuela to the Colombian department of Norte de 
Santander. This measure facilitated the fattening of 
Venezuelan cattle in Colombia. The instrument also 
2 Adopted at the first session of the Central Banks Working 
Group, held at Montevideo from 29 April to 10 May 1957, as 
can be seen in the relevant report (E/CN.12/C.1/WG.1/5) incor-
porated in document E/CN.12/484. 
3 This provision of the treaty is in harmony with the resolution 
adopted by the Joint Colombo-Venezuelan Commission to the 
effect that they should hold consultations, together with Ecuador, 
on matters relating to the determination of attitudes vis-à-vis 
intra-regional multilateral agreements. In both cases implicit 
reference is made to the Montevideo Treaty. 
stipulated that the customs duty on tinned fish from 
Venezuela should not exceed 15 Colombian centavos 
per kilogramme of gross weight. 
Venezuela in turn refrained from taxing Colombian 
exports or imports in transit. The same exemption was 
enjoyed by goods from Cucuta which had to cross 
Venezuelan territory on their way to the Colombian 
Petroleum Company's camps in Catatumbo, and those 
passing through Venezuela in transit to Arauca. 
15. As from August 1948 the modus vivendi was 
allowed to lapse, partly on account of the circumstances 
to be described below. However, pursuant to an admi-
nistrative resolution adopted in that same year, the 
Venzeualan Government continues to maintain the 
exemption from transit dues in Colombia's favour. 
The reasons for the failure to renew the modus vivendi 
include the fact that Colombia began to produce enough 
salt to satisfy the demand generated in areas adjacent 
to the Venezuelan frontier — in particular, that of stock-
breeders in the Llanos — as a result of improvements 
in the transport system and because the salt trade had 
been centralized in the Banco de la República. Further-
more, the non-tariff restrictions on imports of consumer 
goods imposed in Colombia from balance-of-payments 
motives affected Venezuela's exports of tinned fish. 
This, and the progressive shortage of exportable cattle 
in Venezuela, virtually put a stop to traffic in the com-
modities which for years had been among the most 
important items in border trade. Thenceforward, the 
trade in question expanded and became more diversified, 
but the balances registered were in favour of Colombia, 
thus reversing the previous situation. 
2. CHANGES IN BORDER TRADE 
16. Since 1948, when the Colombo-Venezuelan modus 
vivendi ceased to be applied, the need to solve the prob-
lems of trade between the two countries, especially 
those originating in border trade characteristics and 
disequilibria, has become manifest.4 At the same time, 
it is clear that the conclusion of a trade agreement 
between them is no easy matter, owing to the peculiar 
structure of their respective economies and to the 
influence exerted on the scope and balance of trade 
movements by the differing evolution of their currency 
situations. 
Thus, when the Colombian peso stood at par with 
or higher than the bolivar and, concurrently, customs 
duties and other import charges and restrictions were 
heavier in Colombia than in Venezuela, the flow of 
border traffic was primarily in the direction of Colombia 
or, at least, was relatively well-balanced. As the devalua-
tion of the Colombian peso was intensified, without a 
corresponding rise in domestic production costs, the 
Venezuelan importer found that he could buy many 
Colombian goods at a price lower than he would have 
to pay for similar articles from home sources or from 
a third country. With the increase in the bolivar's 
4 See Study of inter-Latin American trade, United Nations 
publication, Sales No.: 56.II.G.3, pp. 100-101. 
C. OTHER ASPECTS OF MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 145 
purchasing power in terms of Colombian merchandise, 
demand expanded, while sufficient counterparts in the 
shape of Venezuelan products were not forthcoming. 
This situation is giving rise to a great deal of concern 
in Venezuela's industrial circles, and creates obstacles 
to the concerting of trade agreements between the two 
countries, especially if such agreements would involve 
prospects of the substantial liberalization of commerce 
in manufactured goods. 
3. ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT COMMISSION 
17. With a view to the solution of border trade 
problems and the study of adequate formulae for the 
aggregate trade between Colombia and Venezuela, a 
joint commission was set up in 1959. Besides drawing 
up a schedule of possible trade items, this commission 
has recommended, inter alia, that the two countries' 
development programmes be closely co-ordinated, and 
has suggested that the potential effects of Latin American 
multilateral agreements on their trade with each other 
and with the rest of the region be carefully analysed. 
18. As in the case of the 1959 agreements between 
Colombia and Ecuador, the studies that are being 
undertaken in the context of bilateral relations between 
Colombia and Venezuela reveal that interest is felt in 
economic co-operation and in integration at a level 
higher than their mere reciprocal trade. It seems, however, 
that final decisions could hardly be made without due 
reference to the degree of conviction entertained by 
public opinion — especially in entrepreneurial circles — 
as to the possibility of participating in integration 
formulae which would facilitate the implementation of 
industrial expansion programmes. 
III. BETWEEN ECUADOR AND VENEZUELA 
19. A variety of circumstances — transport difficulties, 
in no small measure — have combined to keep trade 
between Ecuador and Venezuela at very low levels, 
although at the consultations on trade policy held in 
1958 and 1959 5 the existence of interesting possibilities 
for a fairly substantial volume of trade was clearly 
evidenced. Moreover, it seems that Ecuador would 
offer considerable inducements for the investment of 
Venezuelan capital. 
There is at present no treaty relating to trade between 
the two countries, nor is the most-favoured-nation clause 
applied. 
20. In consequence of the possibilities noted at the 
trade policy consultations referred to above, Ecuador 
and Venezuela established a joint commission which 
met at Quito in February 1960, and sketched out the 
bases for possible trade and economic co-operation 
treaties, including incentives to investment in the creation 
of industries producing for both markets. 
5 See documents E/CN.12/C.1/11 and E/CN.12/C.l/ll/Add.2 
for the relevant summary records. 
3. Suggested guiding principles for the participation of 
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela in the Latin American 
movement towards economic co-operation * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. In Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela the idea of 
establishing close reciprocal co-operation in economic 
affairs is frequently mooted. The grounds on which it 
is based include, in addition to historical links and 
geographical proximity, the possibility of expediting the 
development of the three countries through efficient 
utilization of their complementarity potential — both 
the natural possibilities relating to primary commodities 
produced in specific frontier areas, and those that would 
derive from the co-ordinated installation of certain 
industries. 
2. The concept of economic co-operation seemed on 
the way to materialization in August 1948, when the 
above-mentioned countries, together with Panama, signed 
the Quito Charter, by virtue of which the Greater-
Colombia Council (Consejo Grancolombiano), was 
constituted and operated in Caracas up to 1953. As the 
Charter was ratified only by Colombia and Ecuador, 
its provisions could not be put into force. 
This setback, which various factors helped to deter-
mine, up to a point reflected the apprehensions aroused 
by the Charter in certain circles connected with private 
enterprise. These motives of concern included the 
possible repercussions of the application of the instru-
ment on Venezuelan industry. The latter's factory costs 
were higher as a rule than those registered in Colombia 
and Ecuador, because of the greater proportional 
influence of wages. It was feared that, if the customs 
union contemplated in the Quito Charter became a 
reality, the resultant free circulation of goods among the 
three countries would redound to the detriment of 
Venezuela's industrialization process. 
3. The Charter having been, in practice, repudiated, 
during the past decade trade among the three countries 
continued to be carried on through bilateral channels, 
and the only instruments successfully concerted with 
a view to its encouragement were the new treaties con-
cluded between Colombia and Ecuador in relation to 
their reciprocal trade. Their long-standing agreement to 
grant each other most-favoured-nation treatment and 
exemption from customs duties on specific products was 
amplified in 1959 by means of instruments whose entry 
into force is now pending their ratification by Colombia. 
Between Ecuador and Venezuela, whose reciprocal 
trade is insignificant, no treaty exists, and not even the 
most-favoured-nation clause is applied. Nor is there 
any trade treaty between Colombia and Venezuela, 
but the movement of goods between these two countries 
is considerable, although its levels fluctuate sharply; 
moreover, partly owing to the absence of a trade agree-
* Working paper prepared by the ECLA secretariat (for limited 
distribution only) for the third series of meetings on trade policy 
held between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. A few comments 
were inserted after the Quito meeting. The paper was issued in 
mimeographed form as part of document E/CN. 12/555. 
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ment, a good deal of this traffic takes the form of 
smuggling. In this connexion it must be acknowledged 
that the complexity of the circumstances attending such 
" unregistered " trade makes the conclusion of instru-
ments for its regularization a very difficult matter. It 
has thus long been surrounded by an atmosphere of 
uncertainty which is unquestionably prejudicial to the 
economic sectors connected with Colombian-Venezuelan 
trade. 
4. At the sessions of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA), the Greater-Colombia countries 
have given their support to recommendations that 
studies be carried out on the expansion of inter-Latin 
American trade and the possibilities of establishing the 
regional market. 
In connexion with such studies, various meetings of 
groups of experts have been convened for the purpose 
of consultations on trade policy, in order to elucidate 
problems which, on account of geographical proximity 
or other causes, are common to several countries. These 
series of meetings were organized by the ECLA secreta-
riat in 1958 and 1959 for the southern countries of South 
America on the one hand, and for the Greater-Colombia 
republics on the other. In February 1960, the first of 
these two groups, which was joined by Mexico in the final 
stage of its proceedings, signed the Montevideo Treaty, 
whereby the Latin American Free Trade Association is 
created.1 The Greater-Colombia group, although useful 
light was shed on its problems during the Bogotá and 
Caracas meetings,2 has not yet reached the point of 
launching specific multilateral measures, and has deemed 
it necessary to sponsor a third series of consultations, 
accepting the invitation of the Government of Ecuador 
to hold them in Quito. 
5. It is of interest to recall that at its first series of 
meetings (Bogotá, 13-18 November 1958), the group of 
Greater-Colombia experts advocated a solution of the 
multilateral type for their countries' reciprocal trade and 
industrial complementarity problems. It supported, in 
principle, the free-trade area formula as a transitional 
step towards the desired long-term goal of a customs 
union.3 
In the same context, various suggestions were formu-
lated at this series of consultations with respect to the 
gradual paving of the way for multilateral economic 
1 The Montevideo Treaty was signed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay on 18 February 1960. For 
its text, see " The Free-Trade Area Economic Bulletin for Latin 
America, vol. V, No. 1 (Santiago, Chile, March 1960), pp. 6-20. 
2 See annex I below. For the summary records of the consulta-
tions held at Bogotá and Caracas, see documents E/CN.12/C.1/11 
(pp. 15-41) and E/CN.12/C.l/ll/Add.2. 
3 According to the text of the summary record of the Bogotá 
meetings, it was pointed out that, at first, the free trade area would 
cover trade relations and economic complementarity between 
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, in view of those countries* 
geographical proximity and certain characteristics and problems 
common to all of them, while provision would be made for the 
following two aspects as well: (a) the admission of any other 
country in the region which wished to take part on terms of full 
reciprocity; and (b) the correlation or ultimate merger of the area 
on the same reciprocal basis with others already existing or to 
be established in Latin America (op. cit., p. 37). 
co-operation. Although some of these suggestions were 
favourably received by the Governments concerned and 
certain aspects of them were subsequently taken into 
consideration by the Colombian-Venezuelan and Ecuado-
rian-Venezuelan joint commissions, it has become evident 
that misgivings similar to those that carried weight in 
the repudiation of the Quito Charter are still militating 
against the feasibility of a specific multilateral agree-
ment among the three countries. 
6. The establishment of the Latin American Free-
Trade Association — which covers a major part of inter-
Latin American trade relations — introduces a new 
element into the consideration of each country's indi-
vidual policy vis-à-vis a possible multilateral treaty on 
intra-regional trade and economic co-operation. 
Inevitably, the repercussions of the Montevideo Treaty 
will exert an ever-increasing influence on the overall 
trade relations of the Latin American countries. More-
over, it would not be surprising if public opinion on 
common market projects were to some extent swayed 
thereby, and not only the corresponding decisions but 
also the choice of methods for their implementation 
were facilitated. 
It should also be noted that, reconciling the rules 
inherent in a Free-Trade Area with the characteristics 
of economies in process of industrialization, as theirs 
are, the signatories of the Montevideo Treaty — 
prompted by motives of concern similar to those existing 
among the Greater-Colombia countries — adopted in 
the instrument in question a system under which each 
party can exclude from the trade liberalization pro-
gramme, in accordance with specific norms, particular 
fines of production that it wishes to continue protecting. 
Apart from this, as the Treaty is based on reciprocity 
of concessions and contemplates the conclusion of 
industrial complementarity agreements aimed at facilitat-
ing the production of capital goods, durable consumer 
manufactures and certain raw materials which call for 
high capital density and extensive areas of distribution, 
it opens up the possibility that the prices of the manu-
factured goods concerned may gradually become com-
petitive in world market terms. 
7. In the course of the informal consultations held by 
the ECLA secretariat in connexion with the forthcoming 
Quito meetings, it was observed that governmental 
circles were greatly interested in making a thorough 
inquiry into whether such a formula as that of the Latin 
American Free-Trade Association was a satisfactory 
means of channelling economic co-operation and trade 
between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, either 
through the signature of an agreement similar to the 
Montevideo Treaty but confined, during a preliminary 
phase, to those three countries, or else by means of their 
individual accession to the Montevideo Treaty itself. 
In recent instruments, the Governments of the three 
countries have agreed to consult one another before 
taking up any definite position vis-à-vis multilateral 
agreements signed in the Latin American region. 
8. During the above-mentioned informal consulta-
tions, the following were seen to be, for the moment, the 
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predominant trends in the unofficial opinion of trade 
policy experts, given in their personal capacity: 
(a) Some consider that the Montevideo Treaty repre-
sents a satisfactory solution for the Greater-Colombia 
countries, since its inherent flexibility would afford 
them ways and means of settling questions of great 
concern to them, such as those relating to border trade, 
to the régime for countries at a relatively less advanced 
stage of economic development and to complementarity 
agreements; 
(b) Others think that the course of acceding to the 
Montevideo Treaty or to any other multilateral agree-
ment — even one confined to the three Greater-Colombia 
countries — while desirable in principle, would as yet 
be premature. According to this view, a better expedient 
for the time being would be to seek solutions for the 
problems connected with the expansion of trade among 
the Greater-Colombia countries, and with the broadening 
of their markets for certain lines of production, in 
bilateral agreements similar to that not long ago con-
cluded between Colombia and Ecuador. It is recalled 
in this connexion that the latter country is studying the 
possibility of concerting a bilateral treaty with Venezuela; 
(c) Lastly, a third current of opinion, while not 
denying recognition, in principle, to the possible value 
of multilateral treaties, given certain conditions, in rela-
tion to the acceleration and diversification of economic 
development, would nevertheless deem it preferable 
that attention should first be concentrated on the im-
portant practical problems of the three countries' 
border trade, and that complementarity or integration 
prospects for specific branches of industrial production, 
especially the petro-chemical industry, should be care-
fully explored. 
9. In official circles, questions such as the following 
were asked: 
(a) If Colombia and Ecuador were to accede to the 
Montevideo Treaty, together or separately, would they 
be able to maintain the exclusive treatment agreed upon 
between them, particularly that relating to the agricul-
tural commodities produced by Ecuador whose right of 
free entry into Colombia is established by the bilateral 
treaty in question ? What would be the position of the 
tariff concessions instituted by the treaty between Chile 
and Ecuador ? 
(b) With regard to the provisions of the Montevideo 
Treaty, could Ecuador, in order to attain the ends just 
referred to in connexion with the Colombian-Ecuadorian 
agreement, invoke chapter VIII of the aforesaid instru-
ment, as a country at a relatively less advanced stage 
of economic development ? 
(c) In the event of Venezuela's acceding to the Monte-
video Treaty, would the tariff concessions in force 
between that country and the United States be extended 
ipso facto to the signatories of the Treaty, with the 
majority of which Venezuela has at present no link in 
the shape of the most-favoured-nation clause ? 
10. The subjects to which the foregoing questions 
allude, and others to which reference will be made later, 
are allied to the régime of the most-favoured-nation 
clause. The Montevideo Treaty established this clause 
in its most comprehensive form, as a basic principle 
of the relations among the signatories, with two reserva-
tions — those concerning border trade on the one hand, 
and, on the other, the special concessions temporarily 
granted by the Contracting Parties to countries at a 
relatively less advanced stage of economic development. 
At a later stage in the present report some considera-
tions are formulated with respect to the practical signifi-
cance of the most-favoured-nation clause in a free-trade 
area, should the Greater-Colombia countries decide to 
create one. The conclusion to which these considerations 
lead is that Venezuela's exports would have access to 
those special customs régimes in force between Colombia 
and Ecuador which are not peculiar to border trade, and 
the exports of Colombia and Venezuela to the conces-
sions deriving from the treaty between Chile and Ecuador. 
In turn, the customs treatment established for United 
States goods under the terms of the agreement in force 
between the latter country and Venezuela would be 
extended to the exports of Colombia and Ecuador. If, 
on the other hand, instead of creating a special free-trade 
area, the three countries were to decide upon accession 
to the Montevideo Treaty, the same extension of pri-
vileges would automatically come into effect for all the 
signatories of that instrument, in conformity with article 
18 of the said Treaty. 
Also at a later stage, a few points are raised in con-
nexion with the scope of the provisions contained in 
chapter VIII of the Treaty, in so far as they authorize 
certain tariff concessions in favour of countries classified 
as being at a relatively less advanced stage of economic 
development. 
11. During the consultations, some sources in the 
Greater-Colombia countries expressed the view that if 
the States in question showed an inclination to accede 
to the Montevideo Treaty, it might well happen that 
they could not do so simultaneously, since the trade 
policy problems with which such a step would confront 
them are of differing scope. On the other hand, it would 
be desirable for the country or countries that could 
decide to sign the Treaty to do so forthwith. By so 
proceeding, in their capacity as members of the Latin 
American Free Trade Association, they could avail 
themselves of its organs to help in seeking and applying 
the formulae that would have to be devised within the 
Association in order to facilitate the accession of the 
other Greater-Colombia countries. 
12. The forthcoming Quito consultations will un-
doubtedly provide a good opportunity for the objective 
study, in the light of comprehensive discussion, of 
topics as important as those referred to in the preceding 
paragraphs. With this end in view, to facilitate the 
elucidation of problems and in response to suggestions 
made during the recent informal consultations, the 
ECLA secretariat has compiled the background data 
summarized in the present document and the annexes 
thereto. 
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II. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS 
OR MULTILATERAL RÉGIME? 
13. The first question raised in this context may be 
summed up as follows: Is it more to the interest of the 
Greater-Colombia countries to continue to conduct their 
reciprocal relations at the level of bilateral trade agree-
ments, or to channel them within a multilateral instru-
ment ? 
It is common knowledge that the growing world 
tendency to eliminate bilateral treaties is taking concrete 
shape through the system of multilateral customs agree-
ments instituted by the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and other instruments. Such pacts 
include that of the Benelux countries, the Organisation 
for European Economic Co-operation, the European 
Economic Community, the European Free-Trade Asso-
ciation, and, in Latin America, the free-trade area formed 
by five Central American countries,4 the common 
market to which three belong5 and which a fourth 
is on the way to joining,6 and the free-trade area estab-
lished by the Montevideo Treaty. 
1. ADVANTAGES OF MULTILATERALISM 
14. Apart from the economic and political motives 
which may in each individual case prompt the concert-
ing of multilateral treaties, these undoubtedly offer 
noteworthy practical advantages over the bilateral 
system from the angle of trade policy. The mere fact 
that the signatories are more than two in number improves 
the prospects for the diversification and sound expansion 
of trade. What is more, and most important of all, 
a multilateral treaty permits the establishment of in-
centives to more efficient utilization of the factors of 
production, thus helping the economies of the contract-
ing parties gradually to reach a position in which they 
can provide employment for the factors in question at 
satisfactory levels and on competitive terms. 
Again, even if the directive and administrative organs 
of the multilateral instruments are not of a supra-
national character, it would be a mistake to under-
estimate the value of their intrinsic continuity and the 
consequent specialized knowledge of the permanent 
representatives and secretariat officials as elements 
making for the successful conduct of the systematic 
work entailed in attaining the treaty's objectives. 
Among other arguments in favour of the multilateral 
system, it is worth while to point out that this method 
affords opportunities — such as bilateral treaties are 
unlikely to provide — for participating in agreements 
on complementarity by sectors of industry, and thus 
establishing in their national territory plants which could 
not operate in satisfactory economic conditions if they 
were dependent entirely upon domestic demand for 
support. Moreover, multilateralism makes it a feasible 
or a less arduous task to solve such problems as those 
4 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. 
5 El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. 
6 Nicaragua. 
of credit for the financing of exports and those deriving 
from international transport. Yet again, it enables com-
mon bases of negotiation to be prepared for the con-
clusion of trade or other agreements — such as can 
seldom result from isolated action — with third countries 
or groups of countries. 
Nor is it even extravagant to suppose that utilization 
of the resources of international financial institutions 
(the Inter-American Development Bank, for example) will 
be facilitated for parties to multilateral treaties through 
which complementarity agreements can be put into 
effect, since in the financing of the latter such resources 
could be turned to highly advantageous account. 
2 . RELATION BETWEEN THE SUCCESS OF THE INSTRUMENT 
AND THE NUMBER OF MEMBER COUNTRIES 
15. Under a multilateral instrument, as has already 
been pointed out, the wider diversity of production 
affords a broader margin for trade, facilitating tariff 
negotiations and the fulfilment of the obligations inherent 
in the treaty concerned. 
In the case of the Greater-Colombia countries, this 
view is confirmed by a glance at the composition of the 
reciprocal trade between Colombia, Ecuador and Vene-
zuela and that of the trade they maintain with the signa-
tories of the Montevideo Treaty.7 
III. CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO THE 
EFFECTS OF A POSSIBLE MULTILATERAL 
TREATY ON EXISTING SITUATIONS 
1. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF AGREEMENTS IN FORCE 
(a) Colombia 
16. The only bilateral agreement on tariff concessions 
that Colombia has in force is the one it signed with 
Ecuador in 1942, supplemented by the additional con-
vention of 1943. 
17. The 1942 agreement establishes the most-favoured-
nation clause in respect of customs, lifts taxation on 
goods in transit and exempts specific products of each 
party from import duties in Colombia and Ecuador. 
Excluded from the most-favoured-nation treatment are 
the advantages accorded to adjacent countries in connexion 
with border trade, or those resulting from customs 
unions. 
(a) The following are the Colombian products which 
enter Ecuador duty-free: woollen and printed cotton 
fabrics, pharmaceutical specifics, chemical products, 
glass and chinaware, iron and steel manufactures, leather 
goods, perfumery and other toilet articles, tin containers 
and crown caps, agricultural machinery, farm utensils, 
cigarettes, cigars and leaf tobacco. 
(b) The following are the Ecuadorian products 
exempted from duties: rice, barley, wheat, sugar, cacao, 
beans, lentils, animal wool and woollen and cotton 
7 See annex II below. 
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yarns, cotton textiles, woollen suitings, cement, petrol, 
coal gas, dry ice, plaster, butter, fresh fruit, meat (in 
brine, salted or in the form of jerked beef) and tagua 
wood manufactures. 
18. The tariff treatment instituted by the 1942 
Colombo-Ecuadorian pact is exclusive in character, as 
agreed between the parties in view of their position as 
adjacent countries and regarded as justifiable under the 
meaning of international resolutions such as that of the 
Seventh Inter-American Conference (No. 80) dated 
24 December 1933, and that adopted by the Inter-
American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee 
on 18 September 1941. In practice, this exclusive régime 
has exerted little influence on trade between the two 
countries, since the treaty contains provisions under 
which quantitative restrictions in respect of the nego-
tiated products can be and actually have been applied 
to remedy balance-of-payments disequilibria and for 
other reasons. Again, from another point of view, the 
exclusive nature of the régime has had no major reper-
cussions on the trade of Colombia and Ecuador with 
third countries. It must be remembered in this connexion 
that a substantial proportion of Colombian-Ecuadorian 
trade is carried on across the land frontier and for the 
principal purpose of supplying areas remote from the 
coast, so that competition from other sources of supply 
is difficult or impossible in the case of certain articles. 
Attention must here be called to the fact that in 1945 
the Government of the United States agreed not to claim 
the benefits of the special tariff treatment conceded by 
Colombia to Ecuador.8 
19. The 1959 treaty between Colombia and Ecuador 
was drawn up in order to replace that of 1942 by another 
on broader lines. Under the new treaty, a number of 
Ecuador's agricultural products would enter Colombia 
duty-free, a circumstance which would facilitate the 
development of temperate-zone farming in the Andean 
regions of Ecuador, thanks to the prospects of capital 
investment on the part of both countries. The counter-
part items are mainly Colombian manufactures, on 
which the import duties imposed by Ecuador are reduced 
or eliminated altogether. 
20. Besides the agreement with Ecuador, within Latin 
America the most-favoured-nation clause is in force 
between Colombia and Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and 
Chile. It should be noted that three of these countries 
are signatories of the Montevideo Treaty, while the 
fourth — Bolivia — which took part in the negotiating 
of that instrument, is studying the possibility of acceding 
to it.9 Colombia has also signed an agreement with 
Uruguay, not yet ratified, whereby most-favoured-
nation treatment is established as between the two 
countries. In all these agreements, the clause in question 
is unconditional, except that in the case of Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile the benefits accorded to adjacent 
8 See Study of inter-Latin American trade, op. cit., p. 98 and 
footnote 102. 
9 A Protocol extended by the signatories of the Montevideo 
Treaty grants Bolivia a moratorium expiring on 31 December 1960, 
during which it is free to accede to the instrument in question 
on an equal footing as a signatory State. 
countries to facilitate border trade are excluded from 
its effects. Also excluded under the agreements with 
Argentina and Brazil are the concessions deriving from 
participation in customs unions or free-trade areas. 
In the rest of the world, the countries to which Colom-
bia extends the benefits of the most-favoured-nation 
clause are Belgium, Canada,10 Denmark, France, Hun-
gary, Italy, Luxembourg,11 the Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United 
States. Of these agreements, only three — those signed 
with Hungary, Italy and Norway — exclude from the 
treatment stipulated by the clause the special concessions 
relating to border trade and those obtained through 
membership of customs unions or free-trade areas. 
21. Colombia also maintains a customs co-operation 
agreement with Peru, which is in force for trade in 
certain frontier areas. It establishes a common customs 
tariff applicable to a large number of articles, as well 
as regulations — also in common — for the collection 
of the duties affecting the many goods specifically indi-
cated in the agreement. The most-favoured-nation 
clause is not in force between Colombia and Peru. 
22. The Colombian National Federation of Coffee-
Growers (Federación Nacional de Cafeteros) with the 
authorization of the Banco de la República, has concluded 
private agreements with governmental foreign trade 
institutions in Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, Hun-
gary, Romania, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 
These pacts — virtually barter agreements — aim at 
promoting exports of Colombian coffee in exchange 
for goods from the other parties. A similar agreement 
has been signed with Israel. 
(b) Ecuador 
23. Chile and Ecuador, already linked by a tariff 
treaty signed in 1949, concluded another in 1957. This 
institutes the most-favoured-nation clause, with the 
following exceptions: special treatment accorded to 
adjacent countries; advantages extended by Ecuador 
under the terms of the Quito Charter; concessions deriv-
ing from the participation of Chile or Ecuador in 
multilateral agreements to which the other State is not 
a party; and benefits granted within a customs union 
or free-trade area. 
24. The 1957 treaty lifts tariff duties on Chile's imports 
of bananas, pineapples, peanuts, alkaloids and their 
components, certain oilseeds, printed books, balsa wood, 
corozo in the piece, and " Panama " hats. 
Ecuador in turn exempts the following Chilean pro-
ducts from duties: hulled or unhulled oats, fresh fruit 
(grapes, sweet and Morello cherries and apples), printed 
books and periodicals, sodium and potassium nitrate 
and copper sulphate. Chile, in compensation, reduces 
the duties on cacao and coffee beans, castor oil and 
raw rubber. Ecuador grants concessions in respect of 
10 Trade relations between Colombia and Canada are governed 
by the treaty concluded with the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland. 
11 The most-favoured-nation clause in the agreement with the 
Netherlands is applied by extension to Luxembourg. 
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copper wire or bars, pipes and tubes, plums and raisins, 
plywood, dynamite and mine fuses, chick-peas and 
vermouth. 
So far only Ecuador has ratified the 1957 treaty. 
25. The bilateral agreements with Chile and Colombia 
are the only two tariff instruments in force between 
Ecuador and other Latin American countries. As regards 
the rest of the world, the most-favoured-nation clause 
is established in Ecuador's trade treaties with Canada, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Nor-
way, Spain, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. With two 
exceptions — the agreements with the Federal Republic 
of Germany and with Italy — these treaties exclude from 
the effects of the clause concessions deriving from member-
ship of customs unions or free-trade areas, as well as 
those granted to adjacent States and those originating 
in the Quito Charter. The agreement with France also 
stipulates that the clause shall not cover the privileges 
conceded by Ecuador to Colombian shipping considered 
as national under Ecuadorian law (Flota Mercante 
Grancolombiana) and to goods transported in such 
vessels. 
(c) Venezuela 
26. Venezuela has granted tariff concessions only 
in the agreement concluded with the United States in 
1939 and modified in 1952. It also maintains the most-
favoured-nation clause with Bolivia, Brazil and El 
Salvador among the Latin American countries, and 
Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands,12 Spain and 
the United Kingdom in the rest of the world. Only the 
agreements signed with Canada and the United States 
make any mention of the saving clause relating to 
participation in customs unions or free-trade areas. 
The modus vivendi with Canada excludes in addition the 
preferences granted by Venezuela to Colombia, Ecuador 
and Panama. 
27. The concessions extended by Venezuela under the 
bilateral agreement with the United States have lost 
some of their practical significance since mid-1959, 
when quantitative restrictions were established. 
2. THE NEGOTIATIONS MECHANISM OF THE MONTEVIDEO 
TREATY 
28. Discussion of what might be the effect on their 
extant agreements of the Greater-Colombia countries' 
possible accession to the Montevideo Treaty may use-
fully be preceded by a brief indication of the most 
important aspects of the negotiations mechanism of the 
said Treaty. 
29. The basic commitment assumed by the signatories 
of the Montevideo Treaty consists in the elimination of 
existing duties, charges and restrictions on trade items 
which represent: 
(a) Substantially all1 3 their imports from the other 
12 The application of the most-favoured-nation clause to the 
Netherlands is conditional. 
13 In principle, " substantially all " is understood to mean a 
proportion of about 80 per cent of total trade (or total imports, 
as the case may be). 
members of the Area, at an average annual rate of 
elimination of 8 per cent. The concessions resulting 
from the fulfilment of this obligation are to be specified 
in the National Schedule of the country concerned; and 
(b) Substantially all the aggregate trade of all the 
member countries. In respect of this obligation no annual 
commitment is established, but each country is to 
proceed as suits its own convenience, provided that 
duties on the products in question have been totally 
eliminated by the time a period of 12 years has expired. 
30. Presumably the member countries, by means of 
the pertinent negotiations, will promote the inclusion 
on the National Schedules of commodities which have 
not yet played a part in their trade. While this is a highly 
desirable course, and failure to follow it would be out 
of line with the aims of the Treaty, it must be pointed 
out that there is no specific engagement to expand 
trade by the addition of new items, at least in so far 
as this is not indispensable for the fulfilment of the 
collective obligations set forth in articles 4 (b) and 7 of 
the instrument. 
31. When a country wishes to obtain preferences which 
will enable it to promote the exportation of products 
not previously included in its trade, it will submit to one 
or more of the other States members an application 
for the extension of the concessions it needs. Through 
the negotiations conducted to that end, the counterpart 
concessions to be granted by the country taking the 
initiative will be established. The benefits thus agreed 
upon are applicable to all the members of the Free-
Trade Area without compensation during an initial 
phase. 
32. Only at first are the concessions to be extended 
gratuitously, for when, thanks to the advantages thereby 
obtained, a third country begins to develop a steady 
flow of exports, the countries by whose concessions it is 
benefiting will be entitled to request application of the 
clauses of the Treaty bearing on the principle of recipro-
city. These clauses provide for subsequent negotiations, 
on the basis of which the countries developing their 
exports will in turn grant concessions designed to facilitate 
the establishment of new export lines on the part of the 
other members of the Free-Trade Area. 
33. It has already been stated that the firm and im-
mediate commitment assumed by every member country 
consists in the reduction of duties and the relaxation 
of restrictions on the products comprising substantially 
all its imports from the Area. In practice, the scope of 
this commitment is limited. It should be recalled in this 
connexion that, in general terms, existing trade is carried 
on under the auspices of exemptions or preferences 
established in bilateral agreements or granted unilaterally. 
That is, in many instances compliance with the com-
mitment will be facilitated by the consolidation of 
special treatments which have long been applied. More-
over, such existing trade does not usually compete with 
the domestic activity of the States concerned, since it 
involves as a rule commodities that are not produced 
in the importer countries. A case in point is that of the 
exchange of certain temperate-climate products for 
others from the tropics. 
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34. The other commitment assumed by the signatories 
of the Montevideo Treaty is, as has already been said, 
that of eliminating duties, charges and restrictions in 
respect of the products that represent substantially all 
the aggregate trade of the Area. These will not 
necessarily be the same as the commodities constituting 
substantially all the imports of each individual country. 
In the first place, each member State's own exports of 
course form part of the aggregate trade of the Area. 
Thus, each country will also be under the obligation to 
eliminate duties and restrictions affecting imports of 
goods of which it is a traditional exporter. This would 
apply, for example, to copper and nitrate in the case of 
Chile, or coffee and bananas in that of Brazil. Secondly, it 
seems unlikely that the composition of each country's 
imports will coincide with that of the aggregate trade of 
all the States members. 
Inevitably, therefore, it will happen that trade in 
certain products has to be liberalized despite the fact 
that they do not habitually appear among a given 
country's imports. Such commodities will be included 
in the Common Schedule for which the Treaty provides. 
In their case no commitment to effect a specific annual 
reduction exists. Each country has twelve years in which 
to adopt the necessary measures. It is thus free to 
distribute the reductions over this period in such a way 
as not to jeopardize existing situations and to promote 
the wise reorientation of certain production processes 
that might find themselves in some danger from external 
competition by the end of the said 12-year period. 
35. The Treaty contemplates an additional mechanism 
designed to encourage and facilitate the elimination of 
duties and restrictions and, therefore, the expansion of 
trade: namely, that deriving from complementarity 
agreements by industrial sectors. Through these, and 
basically by virtue of understanding between repre-
sentatives of the interested economic circles in each 
country, the liberalization of trade in the products of the 
industrial sector concerned can be planned along such 
lines that the consequent broadening of markets will 
stimulate the installation or consolidation of given 
industrial activities, allow the requisite investment pro-
grammes to be drawn up and enable enterprises to attain 
the dimensions most recommendable from the economic 
point of view. 
36. To sum up, the objectives of the Montevideo 
Treaty comprise not only the elimination of duties, 
charges and restrictions which hamper existing trade 
but also the expansion of that trade by the incorporation 
of products which it does not at present include; all of 
which is to be achieved through negotiations based on 
the principle of reciprocity. 
3. EFFECTS ON SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS 
(a) Agreement between Colombia and Ecuador 
37. As previously stated, various precise questions have 
been formulated as to how the exclusive tariff treatment 
compacted between Colombia and Ecuador would be 
influenced by the possible accession of one or both of 
these countries to the Montevideo Treaty. 
The questions relate to aspects which merit careful 
consideration, for the treatment referred to covers im-
portant lines of agricultural production on the side of 
Colombia's purchases from Ecuador and a number of 
manufactures on that of Ecuador's imports from Co-
lombia. 
Several motives of concern present themselves in this 
connexion. Apparently, if at the time of joining the 
Free-Trade Association Colombia were to extend the 
treatment in question to the other members, its sub-
sequent capacity for negotiation with them might be 
weakened, inasmuch as it would have authorized before-
hand the duty-free entry of agricultural commodities 
whose admission to its territory might otherwise have 
provided a basis for the negotiating of counterpart 
concessions in favour of Colombian products. In the 
case of Ecuador, apart from other repercussions, some-
thing similar might happen in respect of certain manu-
factured goods included on the exclusive-treatment 
schedule negotiated with Colombia, if this treatment were 
automatically incorporated into the Area's multilateral 
régime. 
To facilitate the study of these problems at the forth-
coming Quito meetings, various questions have been 
formulated, as was mentioned earlier, in the introduction 
to the present report. These questions are reproduced 
below, followed by a few preliminary explanations 
which may prove helpful in the discussions that will 
take place. 
(i) Automatic transmission of concessions 
First question : Would the tariff concessions established 
in the most recent treaty between Colombia and Ecuador 
have to be automatically transmitted to the other signatories 
of the Montevideo Treaty, or could this proceeding be 
modified on the grounds that the régime concerned is 
peculiar border trade ? 
38. Under article 18 of the Treaty, the transmission 
of concessions is automatic. Consequently, when a 
country accedes to the Treaty it extends to the other 
signatories all the most-favoured-nation or exclusive 
treatments which it has accorded up to that date in 
respect of imported goods and services entering its 
territory, and in return its own goods and services 
benefit by the preferential treatments in force for imports 
into the territories of the other members of the Area. 
The bilateral agreements from which such preferences 
emanate remain operative, although in practice, of course, 
the real effects of the treatments in question vary in 
scope ipso facto, and they may or may not be adjusted 
by means of renegotiation. 
39. Although, as stated above, most-favoured-nation 
and exclusive treatments in force between pairs of 
signatories are automatically extended to the other 
members of the Area, it seems hardly likely that, in 
accordance with the mechanism of the Treaty, the 
concessions thus introduced will be taken into account 
at first in calculating the fulfilment by each member 
of the obligation to reduce customs duties on imports 
from the Area at an average annual rate of 8 per cent. 
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It would be incumbent on the organs of the Treaty to 
determine, in due course, whether the computation 
indicated in paragraph 41 would be justifiable at a later 
date. 
40. There are some pairs of signatories of the Treaty 
which at present grant each other certain exclusive 
treatments of a bilateral character. One possibility 
would be to denounce simultaneously all the agree-
ments from which these preferences derive. This done, 
the exclusive treatments would be renegotiated with a 
view to their renewal or adjustment on a multilateral 
basis within the Area, and could then be taken into 
account in the calculations relating to the tariff reduc-
tion commitment established by the Treaty. 
41. Whether or not this possibility materializes, the 
subsequent computation of reductions on behalf of the 
country extending them will in any event depend upon 
the decision reached by the States of the Area, prior 
to the tariff negotiations, as to the interpretation of the 
term " duties in force " to be adopted for the purposes 
of the negotiations in question.14 It would not be sur-
prising if the extension of an exclusive treatment to the 
other members of the Area were to be included in the 
calculations when it implied an effective preference 
vis-à-vis other suppliers, and this was made clear during 
the negotiations conducted in conformity with articles 11 
and 14 (a) of the Treaty (the latter in so far as it relates 
to the principle of reciprocity). 
42. It would seem that the trade between Colombia 
and Ecuador to which the exclusive treatment stipulated 
in their treaty relates, although carried on by overland 
routes, cannot easily be covered by the definition of 
" border trade " to secure its exclusion from the régime 
of the Montevideo Treaty, especially if it is taken into 
consideration that article XVII of the Colombian-
Ecuadorian agreement already contains a highly restrictive 
definition. 
The signatories of the Montevideo Treaty have not 
yet made any exact pronouncement on the concept of 
" border trade Possibly a definition may be reached 
by negotiation. If the concept were to prove broad 
enough to permit the exclusion of significant trade 
flows, the country thereby enabled to maintain a specific 
trade movement outside the Montevideo Treaty might 
in return find itself injured to an extent equalling or 
exceeding the benefits it enjoyed, if owing to the latitude 
of the definition it were cut off from exclusive treatments 
in other sectors of the Area. 
(ii) Automatic counterparts 
Second question: What would be the most important 
concessions that might be automatically extended to 
Colombia and Ecuador ? 
43. Argentina buys its coffee supplies — about 37,000 
tons yearly, with an approximate value of 35 million 
dollars — entirely from Brazil. Brazilian coffee is 
exempted from the 20-per-cent exchange surcharge on 
14 See Antecedentes para una definición de lo que debe entenderse 
por gravámenes vigentes a los efectos del artículo 5 del Tratado de 
Montevideo (E/CN.12/C.l/WG.3/3/Add.l/Rev.l). 
the c.i.f. price which is in force in Argentina for coffee 
from other sources. It would appear that this benefit 
will be extended to coffee imported by Argentina from 
any other country in the Area. 
44. The case of the same product in Chile may now 
be considered. This country applies a substantial reduc-
tion— larger than those it has compacted under the 
GATT and with Ecuador — to duties and charges on 
coffee from any country with which it maintains the 
most-favoured-nation clause. The reduction derives 
partly from an agreement with Brazil, under the terms 
of which Chile lowers the ad valorem duty to 8.5 per 
cent instead of the 30 per cent generally levied; and 
partly from a unilateral decision by the Government of 
Chile, by virtue of which, in order to prevent modifica-
tions of the exchange rate from raising the internal price 
of coffee, this commodity is exempted from the specific 
duty of 0.35 sixpenny gold pesos per kilogramme of 
gross weight.15 
45. With the entry into operation of the Montevideo 
Treaty, the same treatment as at present would be 
extended by Chile to coffee from any country in the 
Free-Trade Area, and in respect of non-member coun-
tries would presumably be withdrawn. This would mean 
that apart from leaving the necessary margin between 
intra-area tariffs and those applied to the rest of the 
world, the importer country would reckon the difference 
in tariff levels as part of the reduction commitment 
inherent in the Treaty. At the same time, its capacity 
for negotiation with Brazil would be strengthened, since 
the margin might imply a substantial concession in that 
country's favour, which it would compensate with a 
15 Under the 1937 treaty between Cuba and Chile, the latter 
country agreed not to apply to imports of Cuban coffee customs 
duties or other internal taxes, charges or dues exceeding the lowest 
in force at the date of signature of the said treaty. These minimum 
charges consisted of a specific duty or 0.35 sixpenny gold pesos 
per gross kilogramme and an ad valorem duty which affected a 
considerable number of articles and amounted to 3.5 per cent of 
the c.i.f. value, plus 5 per cent of the value of the goods after 
they had entered the country. The same treatment accorded to 
Cuban coffee was extended by Chile to other countries through 
the operation of the most-favoured-nation clause. Subsequently, 
the ad valorem duty rose, in general, to 30 per cent, without in 
practice affecting the treatment negotiated for coffee. 
When the Chilean-Cuban treaty of 1937 was superseded by 
that of 1952, the concession in favour of Cuban coffee — and 
consequently of coffee from other countries enjoying the same 
benefit by virtue of the most-favoured-nation clause — was sup-
pressed. To obviate the difficulties that would be created in respect 
of imports of Brazilian coffee by the withdrawal of the concession 
and the automatic increase in the ad valorem duty, Chile, through 
an exchange of notes in May 1952, maintained the treatment 
originally granted to Cuban coffee under the 1937 agreement in 
favour of Brazilian coffee, and therefore, of coffee imports from 
the other countries with which it had compacted the most-favoured-
nation clause. 
Furthermore, Chile negotiated the specific duty on coffee within 
the GATT — reducing it to 0.25 gold pesos — although not the 
30-per-cent ad valorem duty. In the 1957 treaty between Chile 
and Ecuador the former grants the latter country treatment equi-
valent to that negotiated within the GATT. But by virtue of the 
most-favoured-nation clause, Chile applies both to Ecuadorian 
and to Colombian coffee the lower duties agreed upon with Brazil. 
By its own unilateral decision, Chile freed coffee imports from 
the specific duty in 1959, while continuing to apply the 8.5 per 
cent ad valorem duty payable by Brazil. 
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similar benefit. Thus, again on the basis of general 
principles, in the future Chile might well grant coffee 
from countries outside the Area the treatment negotiated 
within the GATT, which is identical with that con-
templated in the 1957 treaty between Chile and Ecuador. 
46. It is worth while noting that the automatic ex-
tension of exclusive concessions — whether in the case of 
coffee or in that of any other trade item — does not mean 
that the enjoyment of such advantages will ultimately 
be gratuitous. The root principle of the Montevideo 
Treaty is that of reciprocity. Consequently, any marked 
disequilibrium in the magnitude of the benefits under 
discussion leads to negotiations designed to compensate 
them, on the basis of the steady improvement of trade 
levels. This implies that compensation will not be sought 
through the withdrawal of concessions, but rather by 
the intensification of those already granted or the incor-
poration of new trade items into the liberalization 
régime. 
(iii) Discriminatory exchange measures 
Third question : Do discriminatory exchange practices 
exist which might nullify or reduce the value of the con-
cessions granted through the mechanism of the free-trade 
area ? 
47. Most-favoured-nation treatment within the Free-
Trade Area and relating to the elimination of duties, 
charges and restrictions is also explicitly extended to the 
exchange régime. The risk suggested in the question is 
therefore non-existent. 
(iv) Classification of Ecuador as a country at a relatively 
less advanced stage of economic development 
Fourth question: In the event of Ecuador9s accession 
to the Montevideo Treaty, it would seem reasonable to 
classify that country, in accordance with the opinion of 
certain experts consulted, as one at a relatively less 
advanced stage of development, for the purposes of 
chapter VIII of the Treaty. In that case, what prospects 
would be opened up for the discovery of a formula that 
would exempt from the régime of the Treaty the exclusive 
treatment granted each other by Colombia and Ecuador ? 
48. If the signatories of the Treaty agreed that Ecua-
dor was entitled to invoke the provisions of chapter VIII, 
there would be several directions in which the formula 
referred to in the question might be sought. In any 
case it would be necessary for Ecuador and Colombia — 
if such a decision were reached — to make a prior study 
of the possible formula or alternative formulae which 
to that end they would submit to the Contracting Parties 
of the Montevideo Treaty for their consideration-
Such alternatives might be: 
(a) To leave in force the treatment at present estab-
lished in the bilateral treaty between Colombia and 
Ecuador, but to exclude from the effects of the Area's 
most-favoured-nation clause the provisions relating to 
Ecuador's exports to Colombia; or 
{b) To leave in force only the latter treatment, on a 
unilateral and exclusive basis; or 
i l 
(c) To bring the treatment into line with such other 
benefits as Ecuador's exports to the rest of the Area 
might enjoy as a result of the application of chapter VIII 
of the Montevideo Treaty. 
49. As regards the first of these alternatives, it should be 
recalled that a considerable proportion of the Colombo-
Ecuadorian exclusive treatment covers supplies for 
specific districts in the interior of the two countries. 
Given transport costs and other factors, it seems unlikely 
that competition on the part of similar goods from other 
countries — even if they were granted the same customs 
treatment — would have any significant restrictive reper-
cussions on trade between Colombia and Ecuador. On 
each country's domestic production of the goods covered 
by the Colombo-Ecuadorian exclusive treatment, how-
ever, competition from similar merchandise of foreign 
origin would exert a much stronger influence if the 
concessions in point were extended multilaterally within 
the Free-Trade Area. 
If the second alternative were chosen, Colombia 
would receive no compensation for the favourable treat-
ment it accorded to Ecuador, but its capacity for negotia-
tion with the other countries of the area would remain 
intact. 
In the third case, the bases for the readjustment would 
be established as a result of the ad hoc negotiations 
conducted by the competent organs of the Latin American 
Free-Trade Association. 
50. The selection of one of the foregoing procedures, 
or of any other, would unquestionably be contingent 
upon the findings that emerged from each country's 
study of the repercussions of the possible formulae on 
the movement of the products in which it trades. 
(b) Treaty between Chile and Ecuador 
51. Of the three Greater-Colombia countries, only 
Ecuador is a party to an agreement on customs treatment 
for specific goods with a signatory of the Montevideo 
Treaty. This agreement is the one it signed with Chile 
in 1957. The accession of Chile to the Montevideo 
Treaty — and, if the case should arise, the participation 
of Ecuador in a free-trade area to which Chile does not 
belong — will undoubtedly reduce the relative value of 
the treatments bilaterally agreed upon between the two 
countries, since presumably the products concerned will 
not be covered by the liberalization effected in the other 
area. It must be remembered that under the Chilean-
Ecuadorian agreement, treatments deriving from customs 
unions or free-trade areas of which the contracting 
parties are members are excluded from the effects of the 
most-favoured-nation clause. 
(c) Treaty between the United States and Venezuela 
52. This treaty contains the saving clause relating to 
customs unions and free-trade areas. At the present time, 
for reasons which include the protection of domestic 
industry, Venezuela has quantitative restrictions in force 
that limit the entry of various goods for which the agree-
ment established a specific customs treatment. It is under-
stood that this instrument is shortly to be renegotiated 
with a view to its improvement. 
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53. If Venezuela were to accede to the Montevideo 
Treaty, in regard to the provisions of the latter the 
situation would seem to be as follows: 
(i) The most-favoured-nation clause would become a 
basic principle of Venezuela's relations with the other 
signatories of the Treaty; 
(ii) The tariff concessions accorded by Venezuela to 
the United States would be automatically extended to 
the Contracting Parties of the Montevideo Treaty, but 
with respect to the goods currently subject to quantitative 
restrictions, the practical significance of this extension 
would depend upon the characteristics of the import 
licence system. The contribution it represented could be 
counted in Venezuela's favour in the calculation of that 
country's annual reduction of import duties, charges 
and restrictions on goods from within the Free-Trade 
Area. 
(iii) The automatic extension of concessions would 
not be gratuitous, since, in observance of the principle 
of reciprocity, the establishment of equitable compensa-
tions would be negotiated if perceptible disequilibria 
were noted in the magnitude of the resulting benefits. 
4 . WAGE LEVELS IN VENEZUELAN INDUSTRY 
54. When in 1958 the bases for a possible broad Latin 
American common market were projected for the first 
time, it was thought that the reduction and elimination 
of duties — to be effected gradually and on a basis of 
averages — might be made extensive to all the goods 
scheduled in the customs tariff, whether they were or 
were not currently traded among the member countries. 
One of the reactions to which the draft bases gave rise 
in Venezuela from the outset related to the difficulty 
it would find in competing in the market, owing to its 
high industrial wage levels, relatively superior to those 
of other countries in monetary terms. It was then sug-
gested that, as a measure making for equity, Venezuela 
might be accorded some form of special treatment (for 
example, a rate of reduction of duties lower than the 
general percentage fixed for the other members). 
55. The Montevideo Treaty entirely alters the situa-
tion. It stipulates the reduction and elimination of duties, 
not in respect of all the goods on the customs tariff, 
but only for those included in the signatories' reciprocal 
trade or incorporated into it by means of negotiations, 
and up to the point at which the magnitude of such 
reductions and eliminations is equivalent to substantially 
all the value of that trade (" substantially all " being 
estimated for these purposes at approximately eighty 
per cent of the total). This system would leave each 
country room to reserve for its own industry the op-
portunity of meeting domestic requirements in lines of 
production where it felt that customs protection should 
be maintained or established — especially since the 
interests of practically all the Contracting Parties of the 
Treaty would probably coincide as regards excluding 
from the liberalization procedure the goods produced 
by primary activities for whose output the domestic 
market is commonly reserved. 
Nevertheless, as some of Venezuela's representative 
figures have clearly perceived, the Treaty may open up 
what are perhaps unparalleled opportunities for the 
expansion of Venezuelan industry. The prospect of being 
able to rely on the support of so great a demand as the 
Free-Trade Area will afford in sectors whose develop-
ment entails heavy investment and a high level of 
mechanization — with the corresponding reduction of 
the proportion of factory costs represented by wages — 
would undoubtedly facilitate the implementation of 
national programmes for the installation of such manu-
facturing activities as aluminium making, iron and steel 
and specific branches of the petrochemical industries. 
It is easy to imagine the impetus that accession to the 
Montevideo Treaty would give to some of these indus-
tries — for example, those producing artificial textile 
fibres, synthetic rubber and certain plastic raw materials, 
in all of which fines it seems very unlikely that wage 
levels would affect the intra-Area competitive capacity 
of the exports concerned.16 
Moreover, each individual Contracting Party will 
presumably abstain from negotiating exports or imports 
of a particular manufacture if it lacks competitive 
capacity or if the result would be ruinous competition 
for similar domestic products, unless the sacrifice were 
offset by advantages obtained in favour of other goods. 
56. There is another aspect to which attention must 
be drawn. Apparently the Montevideo Treaty does not 
exclude the possibility of negotiating, within the frame-
work of the complementarity agreements by industrial 
sectors for which it provides, the establishment of special 
terms for the reduction or elimination of duties, when 
the entry into operation of such agreements needs to 
be realistically adapted to the situation of the signatories. 
Such terms might consist, inter alia, in temporarily 
granting a particular country special treatment — for 
instance, a more rapid rate of reduction of duties — for 
exports of the goods covered by the complementarity 
agreement to which the country concerned is a party. 
5. TRADE IN PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 
57. The possibility of Venezuela's joining the Latin 
American Free-Trade Association calls for a somewhat 
detailed study of the situations that might arise within 
the Association in connexion with trade in petroleum 
and petroleum products, which account for one fifth 
of total inter-Latin-American trade. 
16 The report on water resources in Venezuela prepared by the 
ECLA secretariat (at present in preliminary draft form) shows 
that the productivity of that country's manufacturing industry 
notably improved between 1950 and 1959, rising from a level 
lower than the average for the Venezuelan economy as a whole 
(excluding the extractive industries) to 37 per centhigher by theendof 
the period cited. It is worth noting that during the same years 
the agricultural sector also registered a significant increase in 
productivity in absolute terms. To judge from these developments, 
provided that such trends in manufacturing and agriculture are 
maintained, the problem of the incidence of high wages on com-
parative costs would seem to be taking a turn for the better under 
the influence of the improvement in productivity. 
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As is well-known, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay 
are major purchasers of petroleum, of which they buy 
substantial quantities from Venezuela. If the latter 
acceded to the Montevideo Treaty, its importance as a 
supplier of petroleum would have certain implications 
for the fulfilment of the liberalization programme at 
which the Treaty aims. The inclusion of hydrocarbons 
in the programme would be inevitable. While at the 
moment petroleum products might be excluded from the 
Common Schedule contemplated in the Treaty, on the 
grounds that they represent barely 2 per cent of the 
aggregate trade of the seven signatories, the accession 
of Venezuela without the inclusion of petroleum would 
mean that it was impossible to draw up a schedule of 
goods whose value amounted to that of substantially all 
trade. 
58. The inclusion of petroleum on the Common 
Schedule, as well as on the National Schedules of 
habitual importers, would ipso facto facilitate, as far as 
the latter were concerned, the implementation of the 
liberalization programme. Given the volume of trade 
in petroleum, its computation would reduce the relative 
importance of the other products eligible for inclusion 
on the Common Schedule, and many of them might be 
relegated to a marginal status. Thus, in their case the 
application of the programme would not be compulsory. 
59. Crude petroleum is already exempt from duties 
in Brazil and to all intents and purposes in Argentina, 
so that the two leading importer countries would be 
able to meet a considerable proportion of their liberaliza-
tion commitment simply by consolidating existing treat-
Table 1 
Treatment accorded to imports of petroleum products in selected 
Latin American countries a 
Crude Ordinary Lubricants 
Country petroleum Fuel oil Gas oil Diesel oil Kerosene petrol in bulk 
— 35.0 
Argentina 
Specific duty unit Ton 
Specific duty 0.2 
Brazilb 
Effective import duty on c.i.f. cost 
(percentage) 
Chile 
« >C J Tons gross 
Specific duty unit weight 
Specific duty 5.47 c 
GATT 5.47c 
Ad valorem duty (percentage) 
GATT (percentage) 
Supplementary duty (percentage) . 20.0 
Prior deposit (percentage) 
Uruguay 6 
Specific duty unit 
Specific duty 
Ad valorem duty (percentage) 
Official base value {aforo) 


























tons tons tons litres litres Tons 
2.47C 2.47 c 1.35 c — 1.33 c 51.5 
30.9 
30/33 d 30/33 d 30/32 * 30 — 30/39 
30/35 
5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
(30 dis) (30 dis) (30 dis) (30 dis) (30 dis) (30 dis: 
Gross Gross Gross 100 100 
tons tons tons litres litres Tons 
0.34 4.0 1.8 0.36 1.38 0.89 
21.2 84.8 84.8 25.3 20.2 45.5 
8.8 14.0 10.5 1.29 3.51 4.21 
a The present table shows specific duties and the official 
base value (aforo) calculated in terms of dollars. 
b For purposes of the application of the single duty, 
the c.i.f. value in dollars is converted into cruzeiros at the 
exchange rate in force for imports of these products (100 
cruzeiros to the dollar at present), not at the official exchange 
rate, which is the one used for conversion purposes in the 
case of other imports, and at the moment is 180 cruzeiros 
to the dollar. Consequently, the effective import duty on 
the c.i.f. cost in dollars, expressed in terms which permit 
comparison with the duty applied to other imports, works 
out at only 55.6 per cent of the latter. Imports of all these 
products are effected outside the auction system, at a favour-
able or subsidized exchange rate (100 cruzeiros to the dollar 
at present), as established in the Customs Tariff Act (Ley 
de Tarifa Aduanera), article 50, paragraphs 1 and 2, and 
to the amounts determined annually in the foreign exchange 
budget. Any imports in excess of such amounts would have 
to be effected within the pertinent special category. Imports 
of these products are exempt from the 5-per-cent customs 
clearance tax. 
c The disembarkation charge of 20 gold pesos per ton 
is included in the specific duty. 
d The first of the two figures given indicates the ad 
valorem duty on the value of the goods when formalities 
have been completed. The second represents the equivalent 
duty estimated on the basis of the c.i.f. value. 
e The National Department of Fuels, Alcohol and Cement 
(Administración Nacional de Combustibles, Alcohol y Port-
land — ANCAP) holds the monopoly of imports of petro-
leum and derivatives, which it brings in duty-free. When 
ANCAP authorize private firms to effect such imports, 
the usual duties and charges are payable. 
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ments. The situation would be different in Chile and 
Uruguay. The former levies a specific duty of 5.7 dollars 
per ton, plus an additional 20-per-cent ad valorem duty 
which does not seem to be applied. Uruguay imposes 
a specific tax and a supplementary ad valorem duty 
calculated on a certain official base value {valor de aforo) 
which together total about 3.18 dollars per ton of crude. 
In both instances, the elimination of duties might 
result in a special treatment favouring Venezuela. 
60. Again, the situation with respect to crude differs 
from that of petroleum derivatives. In the four countries 
mentioned, imports of petrol and kerosene, as well as 
those of fuel oil, diesel oil and lubricants, are subject 
to various duties and charges (see table 1). Consequently, 
the benefits which liberalization would entail for Vene-
zuela might be of some practical significance.17 
61. The value of liberalization for Venezuela is modi-
fied, however, by a circumstance deriving from the 
characteristics of trade in petroleum. In many countries 
imports are in practice effected solely by State trading 
agencies — such as the National Department of Fuels, 
Alcohol and Cement (Administración Nacional de 
Combustibles, Alcohol y Portland — ANCAP) in Uru-
guay — or by these agencies and a few big international 
enterprises. The purchasing policy of such firms and 
agencies may not be so strongly influenced by customs 
preferences as by other considerations in its decisions 
on sources of supply. Nevertheless, it must be recalled 
in this connexion that the enterprises referred to gene-
rally have subsidiaries in Venezuela, so that the com-
mercial effects of the special treatment accorded to 
petroleum within the Free-Trade Area might benefit 
that country considerably. 
As regards the petroleum bought by State agencies, 
it would remain to be seen whether the hope of obtaining 
certain concessions for the sale of goods in Venezuela 
might channel such purchases in that country's direction. 
Apart from this, although the Montevideo Treaty makes 
no express stipulations with respect to official trade 
transactions, the Contracting Parties will presumably 
seek to conduct them in such a way as not to restrict 
trade in products covered by the liberalization pro-
gramme. Should import restrictions result from State 
trading, they would have to be gradually eliminated in 
conformity with the provisions of the Treaty. 
62. Lastly, it must be borne in mind that the current 
structure of inter-Latin American trade may undergo 
sweeping changes in consequence of the development 
of petroleum production in various countries, such as 
Argentina and Bolivia, for instance. In a few years' 
time, some of the latter may well become exporters of 
substantial volumes, for the sale of which they may 
seek guarantees through the mechanisms of the Free-
Trade Area. 
17 The commitment to eliminate duties affects only those which 
have no equivalent in the shape of a tax applicable to the similar 
domestic product. In the case of petroleum derivatives such a 
situation often arises, although as a rule the tax on the domestic 
commodity is lower than the duty on the imported article, as is 
the case in Brazil. Thus, only that part of the import duty which 
was in excess of the internal tax would have to be eliminated. 
IV. OTHER ASPECTS 
63. Brief mention will now be made of other subjects 
that aroused interest during the informal consultations 
preparatory to the Quito meetings. 
1. EXCEPTIONS IN THE MOST-FAVOURED-NATION CLAUSES 
COMPACTED WITH THIRD COUNTRIES 
64. Membership of a free-trade area implies the need 
for the implicit or express introduction of the correspond-
ing exception into any most-favoured-nation régime 
that may have been established in agreements with third 
countries. If the latter were to withhold their consent 
to the exception, the other possible procedure would be 
to revise the agreement concerned after verifying whether 
specific commodities habitually imported from countries 
outside the area really were adversely affected. This 
might apply to the pacts concluded with third countries 
by Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Since these States 
are not members of the GATT, they are not covered by 
the automatic exception accorded to its Contracting 
Parties when they form a free-trade area under its 
regulations. 
However, it is reasonably likely that if the Greater-
Colombia countries create or join a free-trade area they 
will be able to secure explicit or express recognition of 
the exception, especially if the area in question observes 
the rules laid down by the GATT. Moreover, the problem 
is solved beforehand in the case of some treaties by 
virtue of the saving clauses they contain. 
2. CUSTOMS NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ORGANS 
OF TWO MULTILATERAL TREATIES 
65. If a special free-trade area were established by 
the three Greater-Colombia countries, could this area, 
through its organs, conduct tariff negotiations with 
the Contracting Parties of the Montevideo Treaty ? 
As both associations would be based on the formula 
of the free-trade area, neither would unify or standardize 
the external tariff of its members, who would therefore 
have to negotiate individually with the States members 
of the other area, since group negotiations would not 
be practicable. 
3. ACCESSION OF ONE AND THE SAME COUNTRY 
TO TWO MULTILATERAL TREATIES 
66. Could a country be a member of two free-trade 
areas at the same time ? It is hard to see how, unless 
in each area it was granted the corresponding exception 
to most-favoured-nation treatment in respect of the 
concessions concerted in the other area. This is a case 
not contemplated in the Montevideo Treaty, and should 
obviously be the object of negotiation when occasion 
arises. 
4. DEPOSIT OF THE INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION 
67. The requisite for the entry into force of the Monte-
video Treaty is that the pertinent instrument of ratifica-
tion be deposited by not fewer than three of the 
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signatories. The Treaty comes into force 30 days after 
the third such instrument has been deposited. Meanwhile, 
Latin American countries that have not signed the 
Treaty can become contracting parties by depositing 
an instrument of accession. This becomes fully effective 
30 days from the date of deposit, since accession consti-
tutes a final act in itself. Therefore, if the formal acces-
sion of the country concerned has to be approved by 
Parliament, the necessary sanction must be obtained 
before the instrument is deposited. 
Annex I 
SOME POSSIBILITIES FOR TRADE AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
BETWEEN COLOMBIA, ECUADOR AND VENEZUELA 
During the consultations on trade policy held at Bogota and 
Caracas in November 1958 and May 1959, one of the points that 
emerged was the desirability of a thorough investigation of the 
possibilities for trade and economic co-operation apparently 
existing or expedient in respect of the following items: 
1. Agricultural sector 
Long-staple cotton. Exports from Ecuador to Colombia and 
Venezuela. Investment of joint capital in the first of these countries 
to promote the development of cotton-growing; 
Malted barley. Supplies from Ecuador for Colombian breweries 
situated near the Ecuadorian frontier. Exports from both Ecuador 
and Colombia to Venezuela; 
Cattle and meat. Furtherance of Venezuela's cattle development 
programme on the basis of improved breeds from Colombia and 
Ecuador. Exports of meat and of cattle on the hoof for slaughter 
from Colombia to Venezuela; 
Sheep, vicuñas, alpacas, etc. Exports of Ecuadorian wool to 
Colombia. Development of sheep farming in Ecuador on the basis 
of joint Colombian-Ecuadorian investment; 
Dairy products. Imports of Ecuadorian produce into Colombia 
and Venezuela; 
Wheat. Supplies of Ecuadorian wheat for Colombia and 
Venezuela; 
Maize seed. Exports to Ecuador and Venezuela of Colombia's 
hybrid types for tropical and temperate climates, and of the soft 
and hard Ecuadorian types to Colombia; 
Potato seed. Exports of certain special Colombian varieties to 
Venezuela; 
Light tobacco. Supplies from Venezuela for the tobacco industry 
in Colombia and Ecuador; 
Calf-hide. Exports from Ecuador to Venezuela; 
Fish meal. Exports to Colombia from Ecuador; 
Banana flour. A possible collective agreement to develop the 
industrial processing of non-exportable bananas and their by-
products, with a view to the production of flour and balanced 
animal feeds for aU three countries; 
Tinned fish. Understanding between Colombia and Venezuela 
on the use of Colombian oil and containers in the processing of 
tinned fish in Venezuela for consumption in Colombia; 
Wood. Manufacture of Colombian plywood for Ecuador and 
exports of balsa wood from the latter country to Colombia and 
Venezuela; 
Coal. Exports from Colombia to Ecuador; 
Rice. Exports from Ecuador to Venezuela, as long as the latter's 
rice production deficit lasts. 
2. Textile industry 
Possibilities in this field would be limited by the circumstance 
that the textile industry, while relatively advanced, is at different 
stages in Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. However, it became 
apparent that as all lines of production are not yet covered, a 
desirable step would be to formulate a joint programme for the 
three countries aimed at selective production to supply the Greater-
Colombia area. This complementarity programme would be based 
on a special customs régime. 
In the textile branch, Venezuela would import from within the 
area fine yarn, rayon fibres, absorbent cotton and hygienic woven 
goods, and would export to it synthetic resins for the manufacture 
of artificial textiles and yams. 
3. Chemical industry 
In this sector, and especially in the petrochemical industry, it 
would be expedient to conclude certain agreements for the purpose 
of combining lines of production and markets and exchanging 
technological data and experience. The possibility of concerting 
such agreements is strengthened by the fact that, broadly speaking, 
the national projects concerned are at the programming stage or 
only just being put into execution. Specialization seems particularly 
necessary in such lines as plastic raw materials and synthetic 
rubber. 
Venezuela would export urea and ammonium nitrate to Ecuador, 
as weU as powdered resin for the manufacture of polyethylene 
sheets. 
4. Iron and steel industry 
In its initial phase, complementarity might relate to the following 
items: coke for steel making, tubes for the petroleum industry, 
flat products, metal structures, tinplate, drop-forging on thick 
plate, tractors and farm implements. 
5. Guidelines for sectoral complementarity 
At the informal consultative meetings it was recommended that 
in the study of the bases for possible complementarity in the above-
mentioned sectors, attention should be devoted to such aspects 
as the following: 
(a) Problems deriving from the differences in the proportion 
of industrial costs represented by wages in the three countries; 
(b) Effects of the joint demand of the Greater-Colombia area 
on the unit costs of production; 
(c) A common policy with respect to private investment; 
(d) Trade — especially customs — policy required to encourage 
the conclusion of complementarity agreements; 
(e) Accession of other Latin American countries to such agree-
ments; 
(f ) Co-operation on the part of representatives off private 
industry; and 
(g) Expansion of trade with the rest of Latin America. 
6. Economic complementarity 
One of the recommendations formulated at the Caracas meetings 
was that an agreement on technical co-operation should be con-
cluded between the programming agencies of Colombia, Ecuador 
and Venezuela, with a view to the joint drafting of development 
policy as well as to collaboration with the trade policy committees 
that would be set up by each of the three countries and whose 
main objective would be the promotion of their reciprocal trade 
relations. 
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To attain these ends, the three programming agencies would 
co-operate in the following activities: 
(a) The study of economic development projects for border 
zones; 
(b) The formulation of production programmes whose imple-
mentation at satisfactory levels of productivity would require a 
common market; 
(c) The exchange of information on technical assistance require-
ments, with a view to supplementing the assistance received and 
giving preference to the utilization of national experts; and 
(id) Reciprocal transmission of regular progress reports on their 
technical research and on any projects which may be of common 
interest. 
To facilitate the fulfilment of the agreement, the three agencies 
would set up a common subsidiary body — the Technical Secretariat 
for Co-operation between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. 
The secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America 
was requested to collaborate in the organization and operation 
of the technical secretariat contemplated in the agreement, and in 
the studies to be carried out. 
Annex n 
GREATER-COLOMBIA COUNTRIES' TRADE WITH ONE ANOTHER AND 
WITH THE SIGNATORIES OF THE MONTEVIDEO TREATY 
1. Trade among the Greater-Colombia countries is concerned 
almost in its entirety with foodstuffs, which account for about 
65 per cent of their aggregate trade. With the exception of chemical 
and pharmaceutical products, the goods traded do not represent 
identical lines of production. On the contrary, a considerable 
degree of complementarity characterizes the reciprocal trade in 
question. Fuels and other petroleum products are exported from 
Venezuela to Colombia and Ecuador; from Ecuador, rice to 
Venezuela and cacao, sugar, cereals and dry pulses to Colombia; 
cotton textiles, agricultural machinery and chemical products 
from Colombia to Ecuador; and from Colombia to Venezuela, 
sesame, milling machines for grinding maize or mincing meat, 
and livestock. 
2. A comparative study of the composition of the imports effected 
by Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela shows that whereas the goods 
they import from one another are mainly foodstuffs, a large pro-
portion of their imports from the Free-Trade Area consists of 
raw materials, intermediate products and capital goods (see table 2). 
Venezuela, however, is still an importer of foodstuffs even in 
relation to the signatories of the Montevideo Treaty. 
3. As regards the tariff régime applied to the products traded 
among the Greater-Colombia countries, Colombia's basic imports 
— cacao, sugar, cereals and pulses — are subject to the special 
treatment granted under the terms of the trade agreements signed 
by Colombia and Ecuador in 1942 and 1959. Chemical products, 
cotton textiles, agricultural machinery and certain kinds of 
machinery and tools that Ecuador purchases from Colombia are 
also covered by the same preferential customs régime. As regards 
Venezuela, only one item of any importance in its trade with 
Colombia — milling-machines for grinding corn or mincing meat 
— was negotiated in the agreement with the United States. Rice, 
on the other hand, which in 1957-58 accounted for over 60 per cent 
of the total value of Venezuela's purchases from the Greater-
Colombia area, cannot be imported unless a permit is obtained 
in advance. 
4. Of Colombia's imports from the Free-Trade Area, ap-
proximately 50 per cent is represented by goods — greasy wool, 
raw cotton, chemical products — which are duty-free under the 
terms of the trade agreement with Ecuador. If Colombia extended 
this régime to the members of the Free-Trade Area through the 
most-favoured-nation clause, apart from the consequent reduction 
in the relative importance of the preferential treatment granted 
to Ecuador, the Ecuadorian products covered by the concessions 
might find themselves having to compete with similar articles 
from other countries in the Area. 
What is more, the automatic extension of the aforementioned 
treatment to the Area might affect Colombia's capacity to negotiate 
within the Latin American Free-Trade Association, since the list 
of goods to which the concessions relate is a very long one. 
Over 40 per cent of Venezuela's purchases from the Area cor-
responds to products negotiated in the agreement with the United 
States, outstanding among these being foodstuffs, certain chemical 
products and copper wire and cables. It must be noted, however, 
that an appreciable number of the articles in question — especially 
those of agricultural origin and some raw materials — are subject 
to the prior permit requirement in Venezuela. It seems, then, that 
the effects of extension to the Area of the treatment applied to the 
United States would be limited in so far as the tariff concessions 
inherent in that treatment would be modified by the permit system. 
Table 2 
Trade of the Greater-Colombia countries with one another and with the contracting parties 
off the Montevideo Treaty: annual average, 1957-58 
(C.i.f. import values, in thousands oj dollars) 
Imports from one another Imports from the Free-Trade Area 
Grand 
Commodity Colombia Ecuador Venezuela Total Colombia Ecuador Venezuela Total total 
Live animals (excluding fish, crustacea and 
molluscs) 





Coconuts of copra 
Cereals, pulses and vegetables 714 
Birdssed, rape, millet, pure or blended 
50 50 94 45 331 470 520 
1 1 45 45 46 
4 4 1 547 548 552 
1 626 1 626 1 626 
113 113 113 
S 8 8 
37 37 37 
9 729 798 798 1 521 
39 39 39 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Imports from one another Imports from the Free-Trade Area 
1 Grand 
Commodity Colombia Ecuador Venezuela Total Colombia Ecuador Venezuela Total total 
Tinned and prepared foods 
Unhulled oats 
Hulled oats 
Sugar and confectionery 1 386 
Fresh fruit (grapes, apples, pears, quinces, etc.) 
Raisins 
Walnuts, unshelled 
Brazil nuts and similar products 
Pepper 
Cacao and cocoa preparations 4614 




Crude vegetable wax 
Coffee extracts, essences and preparations 8 
Tanned skins and hides 
Untanned skins 
Wool, horsehair and bristles 7 
Pure woollen textiles 4 
Straw 
Quebracho extracts 




Cotton textiles 43 
Wool (greasy, washed, bleached or dyed) 
Wool waste 
Combed yarns, mercerized or not 
Artificial silk thread 
White pine and pitch pine simply sawn 
Wood, simply saVn 
Wood, planed or tongued and grooved 
Unspecified soft wood manufactures 
Pharmaceutical specifics 
Chemical and pharmaceutical products 70 95 
Biological products other than organic serum 
Cement 
Rawhide and leather manufactures 
Tallow and tallow manufactures 
Unspecified artificial plastic manufactures . . . 
Navigable craft 
Silver manufactures 
Minted gold or gold bars or ingots weighing 
not less than 12 kilogrammes 
Industrial preparations : 
(а) for sizing fabrics 
(б) for cleaning boilers 
Fertilizers 
(а) natural and vegetable 
(б) chemical 
Raw materials for plaiting and carving and 
other raw materials and unprocessed products 
of vegetable origin 
Non-edible essential oils 
Natural asphalts 46 
Edible oils 74 
Mineral fuels 530 
Tar oils and their components 










3 507 507 510 
9 9 9 
495 495 495 
1 386 1 386 
93 2 273 2 366 2 366 
7 7 7 
9 9 9 
9 9 9 
16 16 16 
4 614 4 614 
3 3 3 
10 10 10 
75 75 75 
123 123 123 
23 23 23 
8 11 11 19 
9 3 759 762 771 
48 48 48 
7 701 21 722 729 
4 39 39 43 
36 7 7 43 
540 540 540 
105 51 156 156 
137 137 137 
59 15 74 74 
772 49 111 932 932 
43 43 
49 49 49 
7 7 7 
97 97 97 
5 5 5 
9 9 9 
7 7 7 
39 39 39 
31 31 31 
42 226 226 268 
165 174 59 293 526 691 
14 138 138 152 
26 26 
6 43 43 49 
15 23 38 38 
21 13 13 34 
47 47 
1 145 145 146 
251 10 10 261 
7 7 7 
5 5 5 
105 109 214 214 
112 112 112 
35 35 35 
6 6 6 
3 3 3 
46 35 35 81 
74 658 4 662 736 
530 530 
10 10 10 
162 162 162 
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Table 2 (concluded) 
Imports from one another Imports from the Free-Trade Area 
Grand 
Commodity Colombia Ecuador Venezuela Total Colombia Ecuador Venezuela Total total 
Aluminium collapsible tubes with screw caps . . 
Crown caps  
Paper and board  
Printed books and graphic art products  
Iron, castings and steel 50 
Unspecified iron or steel tubings, coupling, 
stopcocks, joints  
Iron and steel bars  
Iron and steel bars, grooved, structural, ribbed 
or with attachments; also hollow bars  
Unspecified iron and steel manufactures  
Copper  
Copper bars and wire, coated or uncoated, 
wrought, etc  
Cinematographic reels  
Unspecified instruments for arts and crafts . . . 
Cork manufactures  
Passenger cars, motor-cycles, bicycles and other 
vehicles 119 
Objets d'art and collectors' items  
Sanitary apparatus and appliances  
Unspecified devices for the protection of workers 
Milling-machines and appliances for grinding 
corn or mincing meat  
Packing-machines  
Threshers and shellers 
Cooking-stoves, water-heaters, ovens  
Boilers, machinery, mechanical apparatus and 
instruments and spare parts 97 
Machine-tools weighing from 100 to over 
5,000 kilogrammes  
Machine-tools weighing from 10 to over 5,000 
kilogrammes  
Electrical machinery and apparatus and articles 
for use in electrical engineering, and spare 
parts  
Raw asbestos  
Non-metallic ores  
Salt, sulphur, earths and stones, lime 106 
Optical, measuring and precision instruments 
and apparatus, and other unspecified instru-
ments and apparatus  
Chemical preparations and other products for 
cinematography and photography  
Natural and artificial barium sulphate  
Hemp, jute and manilla cables, rope and cord 
Fishing-nets  
Ceramic products  
Glass for construction  
Glass and glass manufactures  
Railway sleepers  
Crude lead  
Iron or steel springs  
Springs for vehicles  
Medical and surgical instruments  







TOTAL COMMODITIES 7 727 4 8 0 2 519 10 726 
GRAND TOTAL 7 732 720 2 690 11 142 
162 162 162 
39 39 39 
54 111 165 165 
1 5 1 6 7 
50 693 693 743 
1 1 390 1 390 1 391 
285 285 285 
630 630 ' 630 
48 48 48 
69 13 82 82 
609 609 609 
185 185 185 
25 25 25 
122 122 122 
119 119 
3 3 3 
2 111 111 113 
187 187 187 
198 1 1 199 
49 49 
41 41 
197 197 197 
97 69 69 166 
15 15 
102 1 1 103 
21 21 21 
2 2 
22 19 94 113 135 
106 106 
3 3 3 
109 109 109 
13 13 13 
11 11 11 
40 40 40 
25 25 25 
15 15 15 
27 27 27 
23 23 23 
21 7 51 79 79 
57 57 57 
62 62 62 
5 5 5 
34 34 




11497 17 235 27 961 
 14 847 21 175 32 317 
Source: Official foreign trade statistics of importer countries. 
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Annex i n 
THE TRADE POLICY OF VENEZUELA » 
1. In order to facilitate studies on the adaptation or readjust-
ment of its trade policy which would be entailed by Venezuela's 
immediate or subsequent accession to multilateral agreements such 
as the Montevideo Treaties or others designed to promote inter-
Latin American trade expansion and economic co-operation, the 
characteristics and orientation of Venezuela's contractual régime 
in respect of trade are briefly reviewed below. 
A . TRADE AGREEMENTS 
1. The overall picture 
2. In comparison with other Latin American countries, Venezuela 
is a party to relatively few trade agreements (see table 3). The 
treaties signed by this country can be classified in two groups 
which correspond to different stages of its economic development. 
The first comprises the traditional friendship, trade and naviga-
tion agreements whose clauses, without establishing customs 
reductions or exemptions for specific goods, relate to the import 
and export régime and stipulate the treatment to be accorded 
to natural and juridical persons, diplomatic and consular agents, 
and shipping. This group includes — to mention only the treaties 
in force today — those signed with Belgium (1884), Bolivia (1883), 
El Salvador (1883), Italy (1861), Spain (1882) and the United 
Kingdom (1834), as well as the 1920 agreement re-establishing 
diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.5 
Some of these long-standing treaties currently in force, like 
others which have ceased to be applied in recent years,® have, 
by virtue of their most-favoured-nation clause, effectively influenced 
the placing of goods in Venezuela. The reason is that in this country 
the substantial inflow of foreign exchange accruing from petroleum 
exports has enabled imports to be maintained at a high level for 
many years, much less drastic restrictive or selective measures 
having been imposed than in countries beset by chronic balance-
of-payments difficulties. 
Thus, while under agreements to which other Latin American 
countries are parties, the most-favoured-nation clause has often 
lost a good deal of its customs significance through the operation 
of the permits system, quotas, bans, differential exchange rates 
a See Study of inter-Latin American trade, op. cit., pp. 96-102, 
for a report on Colombia's trade policy. The ECLA secretariat 
has another study in preparation on the trade policy of Ecuador. 
b The most-favoured-nation treatment extended to the Nether-
lands is conditional. 
c The modus vivendi with France and Switzerland have not been 
renewed since 1956. 
Table 3 
Venezuela: trade agreements in force which grant most-favoured-nation treatment 
Clause 
Uncon- Con-
ditional ditionai Article Country 
Agreed exceptions to the clause 
Customs 
union or Greater-
Border free-trade Colombia 
trade area countriesa 




1 and 3 






Friendship, trade and navigation 
treaty 1.3.1884 
Peace, friendship, trade and navi-
gation treaty 14.10.1883 
Trade modus vivendi c 11.6.1940 
Trade modus vivendic 11.10.1950 
Friendship, trade and navigation 
treaty 27.8.1883 
8 Italy Friendship, trade and navigation 
treaty 19.6.1861 
3 Netherlands 
4, 6 and 11 Spain 
4 United Kingdom 
IX and X United States 
Convention to re-establish diplo-
matic relations 11.5.1920 
Trade and navigation treaty 20.5.1882 
Friendship, trade and navigation 
treaty 29.10.1834 
Modified trade reciprocity treaty 28.8.1952 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Convenios comerciales suscritos por la b The relevant provision is inserted in the text of the note outlining the modus 
República de Venezuela que otorgan el tratamiento de nación más favorecida y vivendi. 
permanecen en vigencia, Caracas, 1954. c Formalized by an exchange of notes between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Venezuela and the diplomatic representative concerned, and renewed annually 
a Including Panama. upon expiry. 
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and other foreign trade controls, in Venezuela it has retained in 
greater measure its character as a factor positively facilitating the 
sale of the products it covers. This is evidenced by the fact that 
European countries, under the aegis of the clause, have succeeded 
in appreciably increasing their relative contribution to Venezuela's 
supplies of certain goods which benefit by specific reduction under 
the agreement between that country and the United States. Con-
versely, there are some Latin American countries which, because 
the agreement to apply the clause is no longer in force, have witnessed 
a proportional decrease in their exports to Venezuela in so far 
as these consist of items covered by the agreement between 
Venezuela and the United States. Nevertheless, the significance 
of the clause for Venezuela's imports have declined to some extent, 
since a short time ago the process of economic diversification, 
among other factors, induced the country to increase import 
restrictions and extend them to various products, in particular 
manufactured goods. When these restrictions affect commodities 
included in the agreement with the United States, they are likewise 
applicable in respect of countries supplying similar goods to the 
Venezuelan market. 
3. Venezuela's second group of agreements is very small, and 
belongs to the period in which the Venezuelan economy was 
switching over from agriculture to mining. The rapid changes 
introduced into the structure of exports by this metamorphosis 
and the position of absolute predominance attained by hydro-
carbons turned Venezuela's traditional trade policy into new 
channels. 
The agreements belonging to this group are aimed mainly at 
guaranteeing markets for hydrocarbons. Of those at present in 
force, only one establishes reductions and consolidations of customs 
duties on specific imported goods, i.e., the treaty between Venezuela 
and the United States, which in practice constitutes the axis of 
Venezuela's trade policy. The other extant instruments in this 
group are two modus vivendi with countries that are important to 
Venezuela for the sale of its petroleum — Brazil and Canada. 
4. In its trade policy, Venezuela holds aloof from the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), apparently because 
of the peculiar structure of its trade. About 95 per cent of 
Venezuela's exports consists of petroleum products; and about 
three quarters of the total volume of these are purchased by coun-
tries with which Venezuela maintains bilateral agreements that 
embody a most-favoured-nation clause and thus ensure it non-
discriminatory treatment in the markets concerned. It would seem 
that the authorities responsible for Venezuela's trade policy doubted 
whether the new or greater concessions — transmissible to all the 
Contracting Parties of the GATT — which Venezuela would 
secure for its petroleum would more or less counterbalance the 
extension of the reductions and consolidations compacted with 
the United States to all the GATT countries and the new benefits 
it would have to grant them. The size of Venezuela's importer 
market, and the freedom hitherto characterizing the exchange 
régime on the basis of which it operates, clearly have something 
to do with these misgivings. Such considerations seem to have 
carried weight when in 1952 the agreement signed by Venezuela 
and the United States in 1939 was revised outside the GATT. 
However, circumstances which seriously affected the balance of 
payments and the liquidity of the banking system, and which 
mainly resulted from an abnormal drain on the means of external 
payment, compelled the Government to institute foreign exchange 
controls in November 1960. 
An analysis of the causes which determined the application of 
these measures would be out of place here. But were they to persist, 
the outcome might well be a complete recasting of Venezuela's 
traditional trade policy. 
2. The agreement with the United States 
5. In the United States the Venezuelan petroleum industry has 
a large market close at hand, which absorbs more than half of 
Venezuela's total exports. For its heavy fuel oil, in particular, there 
is a strong demand in power stations, mines, foundries and many 
other industries in the States along the North Atlantic seaboard, 
where domestic producers of coal and petroleum often advocate 
restriction of the flow of supplies from abroad. 
Under the 1939 bilateral agreement, the United States granted 
Venezuela a substantial reduction of petroleum import duties, but 
only on a quantity not exceeding 5 per cent of the crude refined 
in the United States during the fiscal year preceding that in which 
the imports were effected. Under the terms of the 1943 treaty 
between Mexico and the United States, this tariff quota was 
abolished for imports from the former country. By virtue of the 
most-favoured-nation clause, the same concession was then ex-
tended to Venezuela. The treatment thus established lasted until 
thé agreement between Mexico and the United States was denounced 
in 1950. Its expiration brought the tariff quota back into force, 
making it almost inevitable that Venezuela's exports to the United 
States would be subject to restriction, since in that year they already 
exceeded the stipulated 5 per cent of the crude handled by the 
United States refineries. Thus it was that in 1951 more than half 
the exports in question were unable to benefit by the reduction 
contemplated in the 1939 agreement because they were in excess 
of the quota, and on the surplus the whole of the tariff duty had 
to be paid. 
6. When the agreement with the United States was revised in 
1952, the quota system was eliminated. Under the régime agreed 
upon for United States imports, duties were payable according 
to the gravity of the petroleum (A.P.I, grades). The lowest duty 
corresponded to heavy products, which constitute about 45 per 
cent of Venezuela's output of crude.d 
7. For certain derivatives — petrol and other engine fuels, 
lubricants and some paraffin products — the 1952 revision estab-
lished a treatment similar to that already negotiated by the United 
States for the same items within the GATT. The importance of 
its inclusion in the 1952 instrument seems to derive from the fact 
that both Contracting Parties are empowered (article XVII) to 
terminate any part of the agreement at 30 days' notice. If — to 
take a purely hypothetical case — such a decision were adopted 
in respect of the most-favoured-nation clause, the insertion referred 
to would safeguard the continuance of the above-mentioned tariff 
treatment for the Venezuelan products concerned. 
8. As regards coffee, cacao and iron ore, the instrument con-
solidates exemption from customs duties in the United States, 
where these commodities, whatever their source, are not subject 
to tariff duties. In this connexion, consolidation forestalls the 
effects of a possible change in the régime as a whole. 
9. Despite the elimination of the tariff quota (see paragraph 6 
above), the 1952 agreement accords the United States — and, 
reciprocally, Venezuela, as far as its imports from the United 
States are concerned — the right to suspend and sometimes with-
draw a customs concession, when its application is substantially 
detrimental to similar goods of domestic origin. The motive underly-
ing this provision is much the same as in the case of the saving 
clauses incorporated in the GATT Charter. 
10. The counterpart granted by Venezuela in return for the 
United States customs concessions may now be considered. The 
United States supplies about two thirds of Venezuela's total im-
ports, which in 1959 amounted to an aggregate value of approxi-
mately 1,400 million dollars. Roughly half of these imports from 
the United States consists of goods benefiting by the concessions. 
The customs concessions granted by Venezuela as a result of the 
1952 readjustment, in the shape of reductions and, above all, con-
solidations, at present cover goods classified under 176 items, 
d The duty is 1/8 of a cent per gallon (5.5 cents per barrel) on 
petroleum of less than 25 A.P.I. grades. On that of 25 A.P.I, grades 
or over, the duty is 1/4 of a cent per gallon (10.5 cents per 
barrel). 
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including machinery and equipment, raw materials and a con-
siderable number of manufactured goods and foodstuffs. 
11. The 1952 instrument introduced into the schedules, reduc-
tions and consolidations comprised in that of 1939 a series of 
modifications designed to encourage the diversification of the 
Venezuelan economy. But the latter's development in recent years 
is once again giving rise to a need for readjustments. In this con-
nexion, the aforesaid selective and restrictive measures recently 
adopted by Venezuela are symptomatic. Under the guise of an 
extension of the permit system, these measures affect a variety 
of foodstuffs, as well as other goods such as cigarettes, some 
alcoholic beverages, cables and wire (coated and uncoated), specific 
electrical appliances for household use and certain types of motor 
vehicles for which assembly plants exist in Venezuela. 
12. Again, it is worth recalling that as early as 1957 the United 
States had begun to apply a programme of voluntary restrictions 
on imports of crude petroleum and derivatives. These restrictions 
became compulsory in the course of 1959. They would seem to 
originate mainly in the steadily increasing disparity between pro-
duction costs in the United States and in other countries, in the 
consequent expansion of the former country's imports and in the 
effect of this on the domestic petroleum industry. The restrictions 
are a motive of serious concern in Venezuela, since its petroleum 
exports are extremely dependent upon the United States market.® 
13. Lastly, it should be pointed out that the appropriate 
authorities in the two countries are known to be in touch for the 
purpose of furthering studies conducive to the revision of the 
1952 agreement. 
3. Inter-Latin American policy 
14. Broadly speaking, in comparison with that of other countries 
Venezuela's contractual activity with respect to Latin America has 
been slight. Hitherto it has taken virtually no steps to concert 
trade agreements. 
The background data which probably account for Venezuela's 
attitude are complex. Firstly, various Latin American countries 
offer an attractive and growing market for the sale of petroleum 
products. But in no case do they extend a discriminatory customs 
régime to the imports concerned, the evolution of which is con-
ditioned largely by such factors as the quotation of competitive 
sellers' prices and also, in the case of crude, the field of speciali-
zation of the refineries where it will be distilled. Consequently, 
any reduction or elimination in the customs treatment obtained 
by Venezuela within Latin America would be automatically 
transmitted to other supplier countries, unless it were incorpo-
rated in the framework of a free-trade area or customs union. 
15. In Venezuela, moreover, neither the Government nor pri-
vate enterprise seems convinced of the usefulness of systematically 
concluding agreements to supply Latin American countries with 
petroleum, the implementation of which might, and in the case of 
many of the applications submitted to Venezuela in this connexion 
actually would, mean that the latter was obliged to accept as a 
counterpart Latin American goods whose prices might be higher 
than world market quotations and had to put up with the temporary 
freezing of resources which clearing operations entailed. 
16. Nevertheless, in the course of the last 15 years Venezuela 
has made a limited number of arrangements to barter petroleum 
— usually a part of the Government royalty consisting of 16.75 
per cent of total production of crude — against other commodities 
from certain South American countries. 
17. At the present time there are no data available on the real 
prospects which the negotiation of Venezuelan petroleum royalties 
in Latin America would offer, even if the corresponding operations 
e See " Economic developments in Venezuela in the 1950's 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. V, No. 1 (Santiago, 
Chile, March 1960), pp. 21-61. 
were liquidated in actual dollars, as Venezuela would prefer, in 
view of the basic importance of petroleum for its balance of pay-
ments. To shed some light on the prospects in question, it would 
be useful to relate the volume represented by such royalties — 
classified by types of crude, according to A.P.I. grades — to the 
requirements of each importer country, the products in which its 
refineries specialize and the composition of the demand concerned. 
4. The most-favoured-nation clause 
18. The extant agreements which establish most-favoured-nation 
treatment as between Venezuela and other Latin American coun-
tries are very few — only three — in number. Apart from the 
long-standing treaties still in force with Bolivia and El Salvador 
(countries whose trade with Venezuela, for geographical and other 
reasons, is on a very small scale), Venezuela maintains the most-
favoured-nation clause only with Brazil. 
This fact, and the abolition of the most-favoured-eation régime 
between Chile and Venezuela, are of interest inasmuch as they 
help to form some idea of the real significance of the extension of 
the régime in relation to the development of trade between Venezuela 
and other Latin American countries. 
(a) The modus vivendi with Brazil 
19. The modus vivendi with Brazil has been long in existence, 
for it dates from 1940, notwithstanding the precarious juridical 
character of an instrument which has to be renewed every year 
by means of an exchange of notes. Intrinsically, this modus vivendi 
simply represents the establishment of a most-favoured-nation 
clause. 
In the world scale, Brazil holds fourth place among the purchasers 
of Venezuelan petroleum, while it comes first among Latin American 
buyers.E The corresponding exports to Brazil are subject to the 
general non-discriminatory treatment which this country, like those 
of Latin America as a whole, accords to hydrocarbons. Under 
this general régime crude petroleum is a duty-free product. 
20. The fact that the modus vivendi extends to Brazilian goods 
the same customs treatment that Venezuela grants to the United 
States has hitherto had few positive repercussions. There are 
several reasons for this. The treatment in question benefits various 
foodstuffs produced in the temperate zone, of which Brazil is not 
an exporter. Again, there is the problem of transport. Despite 
the relative geographical proximity of Brazil and Venezuela, their 
seaports are linked by few direct maritime freight services. The 
only way to obviate long waiting periods is to resort to transship-
ments, which considerably raise freight costs. Another reason why 
so little advantage is taken of the opportunities which the modus 
vivendi seems to offer for the sale of various Brazilian manufactures 
is to be found in the lack of commercial organizations, such as 
exist in the case of the traditional markets, for the purpose of pro-
moting and facilitating the operations concerned. However, both 
the public sector and private enterprise are making some effort 
to exploit these possibilities in gradually increasing measure. 
(b) The modus vivendi with Chile 
21. This modus vivendi, which had been in force since 1941, 
lapsed in 1948, and the consequent discontinuance of the most-
favoured-nation treatment it established began to produce restrictive 
effects on some of Chile's exports from 1952 onwards. In this 
latter year the tariff reductions granted by Venezuela to the United 
States in relation to preserved temperate-zone fruit and certain 
copper manufactures were first applied. The most-favoured-nation 
f In 1958 Venezuela's exports of petroleum to Brazil accounted 
for almost 6 per cent of its total world sales of this commodity. 
In the same year, Brazil's purchases amounted to one third of the 
total quantity of petroleum bought from Venezuela by Latin 
American countries. 
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clause having disappeared with the expiration of the modus vivendi, 
these benefits could not be extended to similar exports from Chile. 
As from the year mentioned the proportional decrease in Chile's 
contribution to Venezuela's supplies of the goods concerned can 
clearly be seen from the available statistics.® 
(c) Other agreements 
22. Between 1934 and 1948, Venezuela was a party to a bilateral 
agreement with Colombia for the regulation of border trade, 
especially in relation to Venezuela's exports of salt, cattle and 
tinned fish. It exempted goods in transit through Venezuela from 
payment of duties, but did not establish the most-favoured-nation 
clause with respect to trade between the two countries. 
23. From 1943 to 1949 a modus vivendi was in force between 
Venezuela and Haiti, the sole object of which was to institute 
most-favoured-nation treatment. 
5. Special arrangements 
24. Apart from international agreements proper, a common 
practice has been for the Banco Agrícola y Pecuario de Venezuela 
to make administrative arrangements with State departments in 
other Latin American countries — such as, for example, the 
Colombian National Institute of Supply (Instituto Nacional de 
Abastecimiento — INA) — with a view to the barter of rice, sugar 
and maize from the countries in question against the surplus pro-
duction of the Venezuelan canning industry, part of the value of 
these surpluses being paid in dollars. 
B . FOREIGN TRADE RÉGIME 
1. The customs tariff 
25. Venezuela's customs tariff was reformed on 1 January 1959, 
on the basis of the Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC), especially as adapted for the Standard Central American 
Tariff Nomenclature (Nomenclatura Arancelaria Uniforme Centro-
americana — NAUCA). This reform did not alter the previous 
structure of that part of the tariff which relates to duties, and was 
confined to the reclassification of the existing duties under the new 
nomenclature. 
26. Predominant in the tariff are specific duties, supplemented 
in some cases by an ad valorem tax which may amount to as much 
as 100 per cent. For such articles as wireless sets, passenger cars, 
refrigerators, etc., the tariff establishes a scale of specific duties 
varying according to the unit weight of the product concerned. 
27. For purposes of the liquidation of ad valorem duties the 
competent authorities are empowered to determine the values of 
goods on which these duties are payable. 
28. Various surcharges on the total amount represented by 
import duties also exist, and are applicable when the goods are 
brought into the country under special conditions or without 
fulfilment of some given requisite. Outstanding among these 
surcharges is that of 30 per cent payable on goods from the Guianas 
or from non-self-governing territories in the West Indies. 
29. In addition to the import duties shown in the customs tariff, a 
consular fee is charged, which ranges from 2 to 3.5 per cent of the 
f.o.b. value of the goods according to the amount of imports 
involved. 
s Imports of uncoated copper wire from Chile represented over 
31 per cent of Venezuela's total imports in 1952, and only 17 per 
cent in 1956. 
2. Imports 
30. Recently,11 Venezuela modified its traditional exchange 
system by establishing direct control of international exchange 
transfers. 
31. In conformity with these new measures, foreign exchange 
earnings on exports of iron ore and other non-combustible ores, 
instead of being liquidated on the free market as before, will be 
bought by the Central Bank at the purchase rate of 3.33 bolivares 
to the dollar. 
32. This foreign exchange, like that deriving from exports of 
hydrocarbons and purchased by the Central Bank at a rate of 
3.09 bolivares to the dollar, as well as the revenue accruing to the 
Bank from the conversion into national currency of capital brought 
into the country after the establishment of exchange controls, 
will be used to cover the following requirements: those of the 
State and its autonomous institutes; imports by the private sector, 
insurance and reinsurance; transport costs; students' allowances 
and subsistence remittances for relatives; and certain transfers 
connected with movements of capital and invisible trade. Foreign 
exchange earnings from coffee and cacao exports, if sold to the 
Central Bank, are earmarked for the same purposes, although it 
should be noted that in the case of these products the exporter 
may liquidate his foreign exchange on the free market if he chooses. 
33. The purchase of foreign exchange to defray import payments 
is authorized by the Central Bank on receipt of the following data: 
importer's name and type of activity; name of shipper or forward-
ing agent; full description of the goods concerned showing the 
relevant tariff item; f.o.b. and c.i.f. values of the merchandize; 
and country of origin. 
34. When this formality has been completed and the Central 
Bank's authorization obtained, the foreign exchange needed can 
be purchased as soon as the goods concerned have reached a 
Venezuelan port or been despatched thereto. In particular circum-
stances, however, advance payments may be made and guarantees 
given. In such cases, a deposit in national currency is required, 
equivalent to 40 per cent of the value of the foreign exchange in 
question. Similarly, another guarantee deposit of up to 20 per cent 
is stipulated in respect of specific foreign exchange drafts for 
external payments on account. 
35. These deposits will not yield interest. They will be in-
corporated into the national treasury as fines, if the operations for 
which they were made are not transacted within the predetermined 
time limits, i.e., 120 and 180 days respectively, for imports from 
the American continent and for those from other regions. In the 
case of import commodities which usually take a longer time to 
despatch — such as, for instance, capital goods — the time limit 
may be extended up to two years. 
36. The customs tariff is used as an instrument of trade policy 
in two ways — through its scale of duties, and through exemptions 
from these in the interests of domestic productive activities. 
37. Another instrument of trade policy is the system of prior 
import licences through which essentially quantitative restrictions, 
sometimes amounting to prohibition, are applied. 
38. Exemption from duties may be total or partial. The goods 
benefited may be raw materials and intermediate or semi-manu-
factured products, machinery, implements and other industrial 
or agricultural requirements. 
One of the conditions on which exemptions are granted in favour 
of raw materials is that neither they nor substitutes utilizable for 
the same purpose be produced in Venezuela, unless such domestic 
production is substantially inadequate in quantity or quality. 
When domestic production does exist, exemption for raw 
materials is accorded only to the extent necessary to cover the 
h 8 November 1960. 
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deficit. It is often granted on the condition that a certain amount 
of raw material be purchased from domestic sources. In other 
cases the quantity certified to be required by the enterprise sub-
mitting the application is exempted usually for a period of six 
months. 
39. There is a long list of raw materials and other goods for 
purely industrial use which can be imported wholly or partly duty-
free. Exemptions or reductions in respect of these totalled a little 
over 134 million bolivares (40 million dollars) in 1959, as against 
128 million in 1958 and 106 million in 1957. 
In addition to the exemptions granted in favour of the manu-
facturing industry and agriculture, the amount of which is also 
considerable, there are others extended to the petroleum industry, 
to official agencies and in favour of certain goods for mass con-
sumption. 
40. The licence requirement is basically a protectionist measure, 
the aim of which is to control imports of certain goods similar 
to lines of domestic production which it is desired to protect or 
encourage. It should be noted that in exceptional instances this 
requirement may have a different purpose. Such is the case, for 
example, with wheat, where the object of the licence is to facilitate 
the fulfilment of Venezuela's commitments in relation to the 
corresponding international agreement. 
Through the licence system an endeavour is made to limit 
imports of most of the products affected to the amount of deficit 
in domestic supplies, or, in other words, to the difference between 
local consumption and production. To this end, quotas are some-
times established, or importing is confined to given periods of the 
year. This applies, for instance, to imports of garlic, onions, potatoes 
and other agricultural commodities, which are licensed on the 
basis of quotas determined in conformity with the Ministry of 
Agriculture's recommendations. 
41. In the case of a few products, the licence is granted only 
if the importer buys a given quantity of the same article from 
domestic sources. 
42. In that of some commodities, imports are suspended, or an 
official monopoly exists. 
3. Exports 
43. Foreign exchange earnings from petroleum exports are 
purchased by the Central Bank at the rate of 3.09 bolivares to the 
dollar up to a certain sum, and 3.05 for the excess. The exchange 
rate for other exports is 3.33 bolivares to the dollar. Varying pro-
portions of coffee and cacao exports, in certain circumstances, are 
granted special rates which may rise to 4.80 and 4.25 bolivares, 
respectively, in varying proportions and under a system whereby 
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